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ABSTRACT 
 
Globally, the justice system has set up courts to respond to complaints of 
a criminal and civil nature.  Courts also respond to complaints which 
require swift relief by way of shortened procedures, in the form of motion 
proceedings.  In all these complaints, courts have to respond in a manner 
that leaves litigants with a feeling of satisfaction that justice has been 
done.   
 
To the end of ensuring that there is legal certainty, justice systems in all 
jurisdictions have established a hierarchy of courts, with lower courts 
being bound by the decisions of higher courts in their jurisdiction.  There 
has been no problem in the application of this principle called stare 
decisis, or judicial precedent, in disputes of law.  However, in disputes of  
constitutional interpretation, courts have demonstrated a marked shift 
from observing the rule of judicial precedent.  The disregard for this rule 
manifests itself particularly in the adjudication of cases surrounded by 
controversy.  It is argued herein that constitutional interpretation is no 
different from legal interpretation, in that the rule of judicial precedent 
which characterises court decisions in legal disputes, should characterise 
court decisions in constitutional interpretation disputes.  The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa itself, though it is the highest arbiter 
iv 
 
in constitutional matters, is bound by its own previous decisions, unless 
its previous decisions have become manifestly wrong. 
 
Three constitutional rights are analysed.  The right to life in its three 
manifestations, namely, the right to life of the unborn child, the right to 
life of the convicted criminal not to be hanged, and the right of the 
terminally ill to continue living by receiving medical care at state expense. 
The other two rights are the right to privacy, and the right to culture. 
 
The right to privacy is the right that has been claimed in political 
controversies.  In isolated instances, specifically mentioned herein, the 
Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution have also 
contributed to the resultant inconsistency in constitutional interpretation.  
This is especially so with regard to the right to practise one‘s culture. 
 
KEY TERMS:  desirability;  consistency;  Constitution;  interpretation; 
judicial precedent; stare decisis ; rights; judges 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
General introduction 
 
1.1  How the need for interpreting arises 
 
For decades, courts have had to interpret legislation.  The concept of 
interpreting is not used in connection with common law.  The popular 
modern concept with regard to common law is to develop it.  With the 
advent of the Constitution,1 the concept of interpreting has been 
extended to the Constitution itself. 
 
A question that seems not to have been answered satisfactorily is what 
gives rise to the need to interpret.  It would appear that if drafters of 
legislation were to devote their drafting skills to closing all possible 
loopholes for ambiguity, misunderstanding, and lack of clarity, in drafting 
a legislative text, the need for courts to interpret would not arise.   
 
The intriguing aspect of interpretation is that the help of those who 
authored the document called an Act of Parliament is never resorted to by 
courts to explain what they meant, or had in mind, when they drafted a 
piece of legislation which now baffles courts.  One reason for this could 
                                                 
1  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ―the  
   Constitution‖). 
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be that the authors consist of several segments of the legislative 
community.  More often than not, what becomes a piece of legislation in 
the end is not the product of Parliament alone.  Most statutes have their 
genesis in national government departments.  Their embryonic stage is 
what has been called the Green Paper.2  The Green Paper is brought to 
the attention of the public for comment.  Stakeholders also have their 
share of comment on the proposed policy. 
 
Having taken the views of the public into account, a government 
department converts the policy document into a draft Bill.  The draft Bill 
is drafted by either the department‘s internal drafters, or by external 
consultants, who do the work for a fee. At this stage, the policy document 
which has become a draft Bill is termed the White Paper. 
 
Government departments work in clusters.  Government departments 
whose functions are intertwined, form a cluster.3  A department that is 
the author of the Bill must discuss the Bill with the departments in its 
cluster.  If the departments in the cluster approve the draft Bill, the draft 
Bill must be presented to the entire Cabinet for approval.   Only after the 
draft Bill has been approved by the entire Cabinet does it become a Bill. 
                                                 
2  The Green Paper is the policy document produced by a government department for public      
   comment and discussion with stakeholders. 
3  For example, the Department of Police, the Department of Justice and Constitutional  
   Development, and the Department of Correctional Services may form a cluster, since their  
   responsibilities, or functions, are interdependent. 
3 
 
The Bill is then sent to the central State Law Advisers, whose function is 
to scrutinise the Bill for constitutionality and possible clash with the 
existing body of laws.  If the State Law Advisers are satisfied that the Bill 
is constitutional, they certify the Bill to this effect. 
 
The Bill is then tabled in Parliament.  Parliamentary committees critically 
analyse the Bill, and if Parliament finally adopts the Bill, it is assented to 
and signed by the President into law. 
 
The above process illustrates the numerous entities who are involved in 
the eventual product of a statute.  In view of the numerous stages and 
entities involved in the production of a statute, the inevitable 
consequence is that although a government department is the source of 
the statute, the ultimate product is far different from what the source 
department originally intended.  When litigants are before a court, and 
the relief they seek is based on a statute, and there is a dispute as to the 
meaning of a section, or sections, in the statute, it would be impractical 
and impossible for the court to call all these entities to appear before the 
court to explain what their intention was when they worded the statute in 
the way that they did.  Thus arises the need for courts to interpret 
statutes. 
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The Constitution is not different.  Although it did not originate from a 
government department like a statute, some of its provisions were 
drafted in a manner that is open to interpretation.  It is this imperfection 
in drafting that lawyers capitalise on in their attempt to secure the 
desired relief for their clients.  Consequently, a court has to decide which 
interpretation, of the interpretations submitted, is acceptable to it.  It may 
also be necessary for a court to come up with its own interpretation.   
 
1.2  How statutes and the Constitution have been interpreted 
 
Before the advent of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, 
courts have, over the decades, invented different approaches of 
interpreting statutory provisions.  Some of these approaches have been 
preferred over others when they proved to be in the interest of a litigant.  
When the Constitution emerged as the supreme law of the land which 
also needed to be interpreted, courts used the established methods of 
interpreting to interpret ambiguous provisions of the Constitution.  But in 
interpreting the Constitution, these methods have been augmented to a 
certain extent, as it is felt that a Constitutional provision needs a more 
liberal approach than a statutory provision.  These methods of statutory 
and constitutional interpretation, and the extent to which they have been 
augmented, are the subject matter of Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 3 deals with an essential element that should characterise court 
judgments.  This essential element is consistency.  Consistency is the 
positive result produced by the doctrine of stare decisis, or judicial 
precedent.  The interpretation methods applied in interpreting 
constitutional provisions have little value if they are used inconsistently.   
 
One of the factors which have resulted in inconsistency in constitutional 
interpretation is the influence of social controversies.  It will be shown 
from what some judges themselves have admitted that it is indeed 
possible for judges to allow some inclinations to have a bearing on their 
judgments.  The chapter will show that without consistency, methods of 
constitutional interpretation do not produce the desired legal certainty 
for future litigants. 
 
1.3  Constitutional rights which have been interpreted inconsistently 
 
The right to life4 stands out as one of the rights the interpretation of 
which has been inconsistent.  The right to life is an indispensable right 
entrenched in the Constitution, as all other rights cannot be enjoyed 
unless one is alive.  There have been three challenges surrounding the 
right to life.  The first challenge revolves around which stage can 
accurately be said to be the beginning of life, and whether one can 
                                                 
4  Section 11 of the Constitution. 
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rightfully claim the protection extended by the Constitution at that stage.  
The position in the South African jurisprudence is explored.  The position 
in foreign jurisdictions is compared to the position in South Africa.  
Finally, the influence that international instruments are supposed to have 
in the constitutional controversy surrounding the right to life is analysed.   
 
The second challenge that has been raised in connection with the right to 
life revolves around the preciousness of the life of convicted criminals.5  
Convicted violent criminals do not belong in society, but whether that 
justifies punishment which robs them of life is a bone of contention 
where society sees the matter differently from courts. 
 
Finally, the life of a law-abiding, but terminally ill, person is weighed in 
the scales with the life of a convicted, but healthy, criminal.  Besides 
protecting life itself, the Constitution protects the right of a patient to 
receive medical attention.6  In some cases, a patient may be terminally ill, 
yet his or her condition may not, in the eyes of the court, require 
―emergency ‖ medical treatment in terms of section 27(3) of the 
Constitution.7  The adjudication of the right to life has been characterised 
by inconsistency of interpretation.  These inconsistencies, and the various 
shades of the right to life, are dealt with in depth in Chapters 4 to 6. 
                                                 
5  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA  391 (CC). 
6  Section 27(1) of the Constitution. 
7  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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Another right that is entrenched in the Constitution is the right to 
privacy.8  This right, like the right to life, has been claimed in at least 
three areas of life.  It has been claimed in the kind of entertainment one 
can rightfully enjoy in the privacy of one‘s home.9  It has also been 
claimed in the types of sexual intimacies one is entitled to in the deep 
recesses of one‘s bedroom.10  The respected profession of lawyers has 
claimed it in what is known as privilege in the legal profession.11  There is 
also the question of whether the right to privacy can be extended to other 
aspects of privacy that are not listed in section 14, such as legal 
professional privilege.  This constitutional right, and the controversial 
issues surrounding it, and the inconsistencies in its interpretation, are 
delved into in Chapter 7. 
 
Finally, inconsistency in the interpretation of the right to practise one‘s 
culture, is considered.  Although it is a right on its own, the right to 
practise one‘s culture has been associated with the right to speak one‘s 
own language.12   
 
                                                 
8   Section 14 of the Constitution. 
9   Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others  1996 (3) SA 617 (CC). 
10  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and 
    Others  2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
11 Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
    (CC). 
12  Section 30 of the Constitution. 
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Customary law is unwritten law.  It exists in the minds and hearts of 
traditional communities who choose to go about their lives in the cultural 
way.  Because customary law, unlike statute law, is unwritten, it cannot be 
amended, or repealed.  Nor can it be developed by courts, since it evolves 
on its own from generation to generation.  It is, therefore, not so much 
the inconsistency of courts in interpreting customary law that has thrown 
the right to culture into confusion, but primarily the Constitutional 
Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution are to blame for the 
inconsistency.  It will be shown how the Constitutional Assembly and the 
drafters of the Constitution are responsible for the resulting 
inconsistency in interpretation by the courts.  Chapter 8 considers, 
therefore, some problems in the way the text of the Constitution was 
drafted, as one of the factors contributing to inconsistency. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Theories of interpretation and their relevance 
 to constitutional interpretation 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Over the years, courts have developed principles of interpreting statutes.   
Prior to the constitutional democracy in 1994, South Africa had various 
constitutions,13 but these were nothing more than an Act of Parliament, 
as they were not the supreme law of the land.  Thus, theories of 
interpreting ordinary statutes were used to interpret these constitutions 
as well.  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
containing an entrenched Bill of Rights, became the supreme law which 
has to be respected and interpreted in a manner more embracing than 
the methods used in interpreting ordinary statutes.   
 
Accordingly, the interpretation of the Constitution follows the same 
interpretation approaches which are often used in the interpretation of 
statutes.  However, since the Constitution is not a statute enacted by 
Parliament, its interpretation should not be limited to the interpretation 
approaches used for statutes.  These different approaches are principles 
                                                 
13  South Africa Act of 1909; Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961; Republic of 
    South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983. 
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which have guided courts over decades in the legal history of South 
Africa, and other jurisdictions.  Considering these principles is 
appropriate as a stepping stone to the interpretation of the Constitution 
itself, because, although the Constitution is not an Act of Parliament,14 
the principles employed in interpreting the Constitution are the same as 
those applied in interpreting legislation. 
 
2.2  The literal or ordinary-meaning approach 
 
The literal approach is usually the point of departure.  Also known as the 
ordinary meaning approach, this method is often abandoned as soon as it 
becomes clear that the ordinary meaning of a word leads to a senseless 
interpretation.15  In terms of this approach in its crude and unqualified 
form, the meaning of a statutory provision must be gleaned from the 
actual words in which the statute is couched.  According to this 
interpretation approach, the interpreter must unquestioningly defer to 
the authority of the legislature, and no one may dare tamper with the 
words that the legislature used to express its will.  It is assumed that 
statutory language as it stands, on condition that it is clear and 
unambiguous, is a reliable expression of the legislative intent.16 
 
                                                 
14  Section 1 of the Citation of Constitutional Laws Act, Act 5 of 2005. 
15  Du Plessis L  Re-Interpretation of Statutes  (2002) 93, 94. 
16  Du Plessis L Re-Interpretation of Statutes  (2002) 93. 
11 
 
It often happens, however, that the literal application of the words used 
by the legislature leads to difficulties.  This has been the experience of 
courts as far back as the early part of the twentieth century.  A case in 
point is the case of Venter v R 17 where the Court, per Innes CJ, had to 
interpret the word ―person‖ in terms of sections 3 and 5 of Ordinance No. 
20 of 1905.  The sections provided that any person entering into the 
Transvaal Colony after the passing of the Ordinance would be guilty of an 
offence if convicted elsewhere of certain offences.  The Court came to the 
conclusion that the legislature could not have intended to include 
persons who were resident in the Transvaal. 
 
When the approach of interpreting a statute ipsissima verba leads to 
absurd results, the golden rule as stated by Lord Wensleydale in Grey v 
Pearson 18  applies, that ―the grammatical and ordinary sense of the 
words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or 
some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in 
which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be 
modified, so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no 
farther‖.19 
 
                                                 
17  Venter v R  1907 TS 910  913.  
18  Grey v Pearson  [1857] 6 HL Cas 61 All ER. 
19   at 36. 
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In the context of the South African Constitution, the difficulty presented 
by the literal or ordinary-meaning approach was experienced in Christian 
Lawyers Association v Minister of Health, 20 where the provisions of the 
Termination of Pregnancy Act,21 were impugned.  Plaintiffs, in this case, 
contended that section 11 of the Constitution which provides that 
―everyone has the right to life‖ applied also to unborn children from the 
moment of conception. The High Court, finding that the ordinary-
meaning approach leads to difficulties, held that: 
 
      If s 11 were to be interpreted as affording constitutional protection to the life of a foetus         
       far-reaching and anomalous consequences would ensue.  The life of the foetus would enjoy  
       the same protection as that of the mother.  Abortion would be constitutionally prohibited  
       even though the pregnancy constitutes a serious threat to the life of the mother.  The  
       prohibition would apply even if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or if there were a  
       likelihood that the child to be born would suffer from severe physical or mental abnormality  
       . . . In my view, the drafters of the Constitution could not have contemplated such far- 
       reaching results without expressing themselves in no uncertain terms.22 
 
The need to interpret statutes would probably not exist, or would be 
minimised if statutes were drafted in a clear, forthright manner.  Most 
statutes were drafted in a convoluted style with long sentences, and with 
no full-stops.  The sentences were characterised by numerous commas, 
                                                 
20  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others  1998 (11)  
     BCLR 1434 (T). 
21  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
22  See footnote 20 above at 1442 - 1443. 
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with the  predicate far removed from the  subject because of numerous 
phrases and commas in-between.   
 
It is noteworthy that, thanks to plain language advocacy of modern times, 
the drafting of legislation in legalese has in recent years shifted to a more 
modern, short-sentence style, with the predicate following soon after  the 
subject.23  The same can be said of the Constitution, which has avoided 
the use of the legal term, ―jurisdiction‖ in section 167(4) of the 
Constitution.  In the unsimplified style of drafting, this section would 
have read as follows:  ―Only the Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction 
—  to (a) decide . . .‖  However, in the simplified drafting style, the 
meaning  is better conveyed with the words:  ―Only the Constitutional 
Court may . . .‖ 
 
Notwithstanding the improvement in the drafting style, seeking to find 
the correct interpretation by resorting to the ordinary-meaning approach 
is no lasting panacea to interpretation problems because what seems to 
be clear to one judge may not be to another.  It is only what individual 
judges think is the clear meaning.24 
 
 
 
                                                 
23  Thornton G C Legislative Drafting  (1996) 2nd ed at 16. 
24  Cockram G  The Interpretation of Statutes  (1983)  at 49. 
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2.3  Determining the meaning of the legislature 
 
Determining the intention of the legislature is another approach to 
legislative interpretation.  Frankly, intention is elusive.  This is because 
courts always endeavour to determine the intention of the legislature, yet 
the legislature is, more often, not the source of a piece of legislation.25  
Thus, intention is searched for from a wrong source.  As shown in the 
previous Chapter, a piece of legislation undergoes numerous processes 
by various groups, so that by the time it is promulgated into law, it bears 
little resemblance to what it originally looked like.  The result is that the 
intention is almost lost and untraceable by courts. 
 
In South Africa, the intention approach to statutory interpretation has had 
to yield to the Constitution and its interpretation.  In the years prior to 
the adoption of the Constitution, Parliament was sovereign, and courts 
had to defer to the will of Parliament, especially where the wording of 
legislation was clear and unambiguous.   
 
With the advent of the Constitution, however, courts must defer to the 
will of the legislature, but subject to the Constitution.  In other words, in 
interpreting statutes, courts must be satisfied that their interpretation 
harmonises with the spirit of the Constitution.  If an interpretation which 
                                                 
25  Du Plessis L  Re-Interpretation of Statutes  (2002) at 94-95. 
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harmonises with the Constitution is not achievable, the relevant piece of 
legislation must be struck down.26 
 
To illustrate, the traditional definition of ―marriage‖, for example, has 
always been that it is a legally recognised life-long voluntary union 
between one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all other 
persons.27  The recognition of the right to equality, however, has resulted 
in the enactment of the Civil Union Act,28 which provides for an 
alternative to the traditional concept of marriage.  The Civil Union Act 
defines ―civil union‖ as the voluntary union of two persons who are both 
eighteen years of age or older, which is solemnised and registered by way 
of either a marriage or a civil partnership, in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed in the Act, to the exclusion, while it lasts, of all 
others. 
 
It is worthy of note that the definition of ―civil union‖ differs from the 
traditional definition of marriage, which regarded marriage as a ―life-
long‖ union, whereas in reality marriages are often terminated by divorce.  
The Civil Union Act has taken into account the undeniable fact of divorce, 
and has omitted the element of ―life-long‖ duration.  Thus, the intention 
                                                 
26  Du Plessis L Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 96. 
27   Cronje DSP and Heaton J South African Family Law  2nd ed (2004) at 17; See also Seedat‘s  
     Executors v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302, 309. 
28   Civil Union Act 17 of 2006. 
16 
 
approach to interpretation has had to yield to the supreme influence of 
the Constitution.  
 
2.4 The purposive approach 
The purposive approach is yet another approach to legislative 
interpretation.  The line of distinction between intention and purpose is 
very faint.  Purpose, however, is not elusive, as it is invariably stated in 
the long title of a piece of legislation.  Also, some statutes29 of national 
importance, or statutes the enactment of which is directly authorised by 
the Constitution, invariably begin with a preamble.  The preamble of a 
statute throws light on the purpose of the statute. 
 
In the Constitution, however, there is no long title setting out the purpose 
of the Constitution, but the preamble to the Constitution may be of 
assistance in this regard, as it lays the background giving rise to the 
drafting of the Constitution.  The preamble may therefore serve as the 
historical approach to interpretation.  It was for this reason that Sachs J,30  
in reference to the interim Constitution,31 said that the preamble should 
not be dismissed as a mere aspirational and throat-clearing exercise of 
                                                 
29  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000; Promotion of Equality and Prevention of  
    Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
30  In S v Mhlungu  1995 (3) SA 867 (CC). 
31  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993). 
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little interpretive value.  He emphasised that the preamble connects up, 
reinforces, and underlies all of the text that follows.32 
 
The interim Constitution also had a postamble which was relied upon for 
interpretation purposes in Shabalala v Attorney-General of the 
Transvaal.33   Its relevance was emphasised.  It was said to be similar to a 
historic bridge which the Constitution provides between a past based on 
conflict, untold suffering, injustice, and a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights.34 
 
The spirit of the postamble to the interim Constitution manifested itself 
in the final Constitution as part of its preamble.  The phrases of the 
preamble to the final Constitution, such as, ‗the injustices of the past, 
and the honouring of those who suffered for justice and freedom in our 
land, and the need for healing the divisions of the past‘, are all an 
indication that the spirit and tenor of the postamble to the interim 
Constitution survived to the final Constitution.35 
 
                                                 
32  See footnote 30 at par. 112. 
33  Shabalala v Attorney General of the Transvaal and Another 1996 (1) 725 (CC). 
34   at par. 25. 
35  Du Plessis L  ―Interpretation‖ in Woolman S and Roux T (eds) et al Constitutional Law of South  
    Africa Vol 2 (2009) at 32-119. 
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Miers and Page36 mention the occasional possibility of a statute providing 
that certain concepts in it are to be understood as having the same 
meaning as in an earlier statute, but in the South African context, this 
seldom happens.  Interpreters of legislation have to fumble their way 
through, determining the purpose and intention of legislation at hand. 
 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the benefit of the purposive approach 
in action is to consider the line of reasoning of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa in construing the provisions of section 14 of the Local 
Government: Municipal Electoral Act.37  In casu,38 the applicant, a political 
party contesting municipal elections, paid a deposit in the form of  a 
bank guaranteed cheque as required by the Municipal Electoral Act.  
Section 14(1) of the Act requires that a party intending to contest 
municipal elections should pay a prescribed deposit, before a stipulated 
date, to the local of office of the Electoral Commission.39  In error, the 
applicant made its payment to the head office of the Commission.  The 
                                                 
36  Miers D R and Page A C Legislation  (1990) at 169. 
37  Act 27 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the Municipal Electoral Act). 
38  African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission and Others 2006 (3) 305 (CC). 
39  The full provisions of section 14(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of  
     2000 are as follows: 
    ―A party may contest an election in terms of s 13(1)(a) or (c)  only if the party by not later than a  
     Date stated in the timetable for the election has submitted to the office of the Commission‘s  
     local representative— 
(a) in the prescribed format— 
(i )   a notice of its intention to contest the election; and 
           (ii )  a party list; and 
(b)  a deposit equal to a prescribed amount, if any, payable by means of a bank guaranteed   
         cheque in favour of the Commission‖. 
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applicant intended to contest elections in several municipalities, including 
Cape Town.  However, by oversight, the applicant did not include Cape 
Town as one of the municipalities in which it intended to contest 
elections. This resulted in the Electoral Commission holding surplus 
funds paid by the applicant.  Upon becoming aware of its omissions, the 
applicant requested the Electoral Commission to use the surplus funds as 
a deposit to contest the Cape Town municipality elections.  The Electoral 
Commission declined the request, reasoning that the provisions of the 
section are peremptory and cannot be adhered to in some other way.  
Thereupon the applicant approached the Electoral Court.   
 
For purposes of illustrating the application of the purposive approach in 
construing a statutory provision in the spirit of the Constitution, it must 
be noted at this stage that the Electoral Court dismissed the applicant‘s 
application, whereupon the respondent contended that no further remedy 
could the applicant hope for.  The reason advanced by the respondent for 
this submission was that the Constitutional Court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the matter since, firstly, the decision of the Electoral 
Court was final and could not be appealed against40 and, secondly, the 
matter did not raise a constitutional issue. 
 
                                                 
40  Section 96(1) of the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 provides: 
     ―The Electoral Court has final jurisdiction in respect of all electoral disputes and complaints  
     about infringements of the Code, and no decision or order of the Electoral Court is subject to 
     appeal or review‖. 
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In considering whether the applicant could be granted relief, the 
Constitutional Court dwelt on the reasons of the Commission for not 
certifying the applicant and its candidates.  One reason was that the 
applicant, although it paid its deposit, had not done so in the manner 
required by the Act.  The Commission‘s view was that the Act required 
compliance to the letter.    
 
It is enlightening to note that the Constitutional Court, in being purposive 
in its approach, did not limit itself to the interpretation of section 96 of 
the Electoral Act, but widened its scope by invoking the provisions of a 
closely related provision in another Act, section 17 of the Municipal 
Electoral Act.  While the Electoral Act contains a provision ruling out an 
appeal or review by another court, the Municipal Electoral Act does not 
contain an equivalent express provision.  The Court held that this leads to 
the reasonable conclusion that section 96 of the Electoral Act is not 
applicable to disputes arising from municipal elections.  Also, there is no 
provision in the Municipal Electoral Act that the decision of the Electoral 
Court is final.  Based on this broadened view which takes into 
consideration a related provision in a related Act, the Constitutional Court 
could come to a balanced conclusion on the question whether the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court was ousted by the narrow 
construction of section 96. 
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Adopting a purposive approach on the question whether the matter 
raised a constitutional issue or not, the Court broadened its scope of 
application to a relevant section in the text of the Constitution, section 
19.41  The point of departure is that this section entrenches the right of 
citizens to vote.  It is clear, therefore, that any statutory provision which 
deals with, or regulates, voting, must be interpreted in the spirit of 
realising the entrenched nature of this right in the Constitution.  
Consequently, any dispute arising from the exercise of the right to vote 
will give rise to a constitutional issue, and the matter will fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, was the Court‘s approach.  The 
fact, therefore, that section 19 of the Electoral Act renders the decision of 
the Electoral Court unappealable or unreviewable, must be understood in 
the light of this principle.  Moreover, the Municipal Electoral Act was 
enacted by Parliament specifically to give effect to the constitutional 
political rights of section 19 of the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
41  Section 19 of the Constitution provides: 
―(1)  Every citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right— 
        (a)  to form a political party; 
        (b)  to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a political party; and 
        (c)   to campaign  for a political party or cause. 
  (2)  Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body  
        established in terms of the Constitution. 
  (3)  Every adult citizen has the right— 
        (a)  to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the Constitution,  
              and to do so in secret; and 
        (b)  to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office‖. 
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A further factor which makes it evident that the matter is a constitutional 
one is the fact that the Electoral Commission itself is an institution 
established by the Constitution,42 to perform a vitally important 
constitutional function.  Consequently, the question whether it performs 
its functions must raise a constitutional issue. 
 
An aspect on which the Electoral Commission had refused to grant the 
applicant‘s request was that the provisions of section 14 of the Municipal 
Electoral Act are peremptory, and accordingly, the Commission required 
compliance to the letter.  In this regard, the Constitutional Court quoted 
with approval the words of the then Appellate Division, per Van Winsen 
AJA, in Maharaj and Others v Rampersad,43: 
 
      The enquiry, I suggest, is not so much whether there has been ―exact‖, ―adequate‖ or  
      ―substantial‖ compliance with this injunction but rather whether there has been compliance 
      therewith‖.44 
 
The Court adopted a strong view that a narrow approach should be 
avoided.  Adopting the purposive approach, the Court stated that the 
purpose of section 14 was to ensure that a deposit was paid by a political 
party to establish beyond doubt that the party had a serious intention of 
contesting the election.  Looking at the requirement of the section that 
                                                 
42  Section 181(1)(f) of the Constitution. 
43  Maharaj and Others v Rampersad  1964 (4) SA 638 (A). 
44  at 646C. 
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the deposit be paid at the local office of the Commission, and not 
anywhere else, the Court found that the legislature had no specific 
purpose in thus requiring.  What is more, no other party would be harmed 
by this generous and purposive interpretation.  Thus, the purposive 
approach of the statutory provision was to the benefit of the litigant. 
 
2.5  Contextualism 
 
Sometimes judges resort to contextualism,45 as an alternative approach.  
A judge employing this approach looks at the context by having regard to 
similar words or phrases in other sections, or in the entire piece of 
legislation, or even at the surrounding circumstances. This approach 
presents problems in the interpretation of the Constitution because the 
Constitution, unlike a piece of legislation, does not deal with one subject, 
one intention, and one purpose, but covers various facets of life in 
society.  Nevertheless, the contextual approach has been found to be an 
indispensable tool in arriving at an appropriate construction of a piece of 
legislation.46  By the same token, it has been a useful guide in 
constitutional interpretation.47 
                                                 
45  Contextualism is an interpretive approach which seeks to interpret a statutory provision, or a  
     constitutional provision, by having regard to the Act, or the Constitution, as a whole, and not  
     focus attention on a single provision, to the exclusion of all others.  See Du Plessis L Re- 
    Interpretation of Statutes  (2002) at 112. 
46  Naylor N ―Removing the prescription blindfold in cases of childhood sexual abuse‖  2005  227   
     ACTA JURIDICA  233. 
47  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par 40. 
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2.6  The mischief rule 
 
The mischief rule requires a court to determine the mischief which the 
piece of legislation at hand seeks to remedy.  In Hleka v Johannesburg 
City Council ,48 the then Appellate Division, per Van Den Heever JA, 
considered how the intention of the words of the empowering legislation 
were to be understood.  Van Den Heever JA held that to arrive at the real 
meaning, the Court had to ―consider, (1) what was the law before the 
measure was passed; (2) what was the mischief or defect for which the 
law had not provided; (3) what remedy the Legislator had appointed; and 
(4) the reason for the remedy‖.49  
 
This makes the mischief rule akin to historical approach which is 
backward-looking and forward-looking, seeking to remedy the results 
brought about by the past, such as apartheid.50  In Qozeleni v Minister of 
Law and Order,51 the Court adopted the view that the interim Constitution 
must be interpreted in the light of the mischief it sought to cure.  In this 
case, the mischief was the previous apartheid dispensation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
48  Hleka v Johannesburg City Council  1949 (1) SA 842 (A). 
49  Ibid at 852, 853. 
50  Goldblatt B  ―Litigating Equality — the example of child care‖  2001 8 ACTA JURIDICA  25. 
51  Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order  1994 (1) BCLR 75 (E). 
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2.7  The generous approach 
 
The generous approach is a cornerstone in legal interpretation.52  This 
approach is in harmony with a vital principle in the interpretation of 
statutory provisions, namely, that if a provision is open to more than one 
interpretation, one being favourable to the accused, and the other being 
adverse, the interpretation favourable to the accused must be preferred.  
This approach was used extensively in the case of Makwanyane,53  to the 
benefit of the accused.   
 
Recently, in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma,54 the 
interpretation of section 179(5)(d) of the Constitution was open to more 
than one interpretation. The question was whether an accused facing 
prosecution is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to be invited for 
representations before he or she could be recharged.  Rather than 
interpret the section in a manner that would answer the constitutional 
question once and for all, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) avoided the 
crux issue, nor was its view one of a generous approach.  The question 
which the appellant wanted the Court to settle for future cases was 
whether all accused persons whose cases had been withdrawn or struck 
off the roll would have, as a matter of law and right, to be invited for 
                                                 
52  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 9. 
53  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
54  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA). 
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representations before they could be recharged.  As indicated, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal handled the matter in a manner that does not 
settle the crux for future cases as desired.   
 
With the advent of the Constitution, Constitutional Court judges have, 
according to Currie and de Waal,55 laid down guidelines as to how the 
Constitution in general, and the Bill of Rights in particular, should be 
interpreted.  These two authors make it appear as though the 
Constitutional Court judges are the inventors of these theories of 
constitutional interpretation, whereas these have been employed by 
courts decades before the judges of the South African Constitutional 
Court used them.56  These interpretation theories have served as a useful 
tool in unravelling the hidden intention of drafters. However, these 
theories contribute little to consistency and certainty in interpretation.  
 
No single interpretation theory is adequate on its own, but a combination 
of two or more has to be employed, basing the combination on the 
ordinary-meaning approach, as a point of departure. 
 
                                                 
55  Currie I and de Waal J Bill of Rights Handbook  (2005) 5th ed at 147. 
56  Hleka v Johannesburg City Council  1949 (1) SA 842 (A) 852, 853;  Harris v Minister of the  
     Interior  1952 (2) 428 SA  (A) 459 F-H. 
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In the Corporal Punishment case,57 the Namibia Supreme Court 
emphasised the wisdom of a value judgment which ―requires objectivity 
to be articulated and identified, regard being had to the contemporary 
norms, aspirations, expectations and sensitivities of the . . . people‖.58  
Against this background, it was felt in Makwanyane 59 that a court may 
not allow itself to be guided by public opinion in interpreting the 
Constitution.  With these two thoughts in mind, it is difficult to draw a 
line between a ―value judgment‖ which is based on values of society as 
endorsed by the Court in the Corporal Punishment case, and public 
opinion, because public opinion can be said to reflect values of society.   
 
Admittedly, a number of interpretation approaches should be explored, 
and those that would be favourable to the litigant should be favoured.   
This means that if the literal approach would be prejudicial to the litigant, 
a purposive approach would be preferable. However, that alone should 
not be the end.  There should be a common thread permeating all those 
cases in which a generous approach was chosen as an aid to 
interpretation.    
 
                                                 
57  Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia:  In Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 1991 (3)  
     SA 76 (NmSc). 
58  at 86 H-I. 
59  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) (SA) 391 (CC) at 9. 
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Illustrating this point is the Mhlungu  case.60  Item 17 of Schedule 6 of 
the Constitution61 needs no interpretation, as it expressly states that 
cases which were pending when the Constitution came into effect were 
not to be decided on the basis of the Constitution, unless it was in the 
interests of justice to do so.  Notwithstanding such a clear provision, a 
generous interpretation was adopted, thus allowing constitutionally 
disqualified persons to benefit from a Constitution which was not in force 
when their cases were finalised.  However, the same generous approach 
was not adopted to the benefit of the litigant in the Soobramoney  case.62   
Instead, a literal, ordinary-meaning interpretation was sufficient.  No 
doubt, the situation in Soobramoney  was more compelling to adopt the 
generous approach, as life was at risk.  By contrast, the situation of a 
litigant facing imprisonment in the Mhlungu case was less compelling, 
since life was not at risk. 
 
2.8  The historical approach 
 
The historical approach without the element of consistency has also 
proved not to be a panacea in constitutional interpretation.  While by and 
large the generous approach, combined with the purposive approach, was 
resorted to by the Court in Makwanyane, the Court also relied on the 
                                                 
60  S v Mhlungu  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
61  The interim Constitution was used at that time. 
62  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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historical approach.  ―It is against this historical background and ethos 
that the constitutionality of capital punishment must be determined,‖ was 
Chaskalson JP‘s view.63   
 
Reasoning along the same lines, the same Court in the Grootboom  case64 
expressed the view that: 
 
      the cause of the acute housing shortage lies in apartheid.  . . . The cycle of the apartheid era,  
        therefore, was one of untenable restrictions on the movement of African people into urban  
        areas, . . . The legacy of influx control in the Western Cape is the acute housing shortage that  
        exists there now.65 
 
However, this historical approach, though used in both these instances 
did not yield the same result.  In Makwanyane, this approach yielded a 
positive result in the form of a positive order, saving the lives of the two 
convicts, and of many others who would suffer the fate of the gallows 
ending their life.  The same approach in Grootboom yielded a result 
falling short of a positive result, a mere declaratory order.   
 
It cannot be said that Grootboom provides a useful framework for an 
analysis of women‘s housing rights.  This order proved to be ineffective. 
This can be seen in the fact that Mrs Irene Grootboom, the leading figure 
                                                 
63  See footnote 59 at 264. 
64  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others  2001 (1) SA  
      (CC). 
65   at 6. 
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in the case bearing her name, died in September 2008 at Kraaifontein, 
Western Cape, seven years after the landmark judgment, still without a 
state-provided roof over her head.  She was still living in a corrugated-
iron-makeshift shelter against which she had contindually fought so 
vehemently.   
 
This analysis of statutory interpretation theories demonstrates that courts 
are not striving towards consistency in their interpretation.   
 
2.9  Constitutional interpretation 
 
The Constitution contains no provision prescribing how it should be 
interpreted.  It is silent on the theories of interpretation.  However, in 
section 39 it throws some light on how its Bill of Rights should be 
interpreted.  It prescribes that in interpreting the Bill of Rights a court, 
tribunal or forum, must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.66  This 
signifies that in interpreting the Bill of Rights, the interpreter must 
interpret the right in question in a manner that takes into account the 
values which our modern society lives by.  It has been suggested67 that 
such values should include the African concept of ubuntu .68   Indeed, the 
                                                 
66  Subsection (1)(a). 
67  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 31. 
68  Ubuntu means humanity, or the spirit of being human. 
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concept of ubuntu makes the interpretation of the South African Bill of 
Rights unique, since the values to be taken into account in the process of 
interpretation are not merely those of international law and Western 
civilisation.  The concept of ubuntu gives these values a unique character 
of being rooted in the native soil of South Africa, and are not merely 
imposed by a previous colonial, imperialist, political and social order.69 
 
The spirit of ubuntu as an element of the values promoted by the 
Constitution of South Africa has already displayed itself in the 
interpretation of legislation dealing with the eviction of unlawful 
squatters.  The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act,70 has been invoked to evict unlawful occupiers of 
land in the case of Cape Killarney Property Investments v Mahamba.71  
The property company sought to evict unlawful residents on its property, 
doing so without notice to the unlawful residents, notwithstanding the 
peremptory provisions of section 4 of the Act.72  
 
                                                 
69  Devenish G E A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights  (1999) at 587. 
70  Act 19 of 1998. 
71  Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba  2001 (4) 1222 (SCA). 
72  Section 4 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of  
    1998 provides: 
        ―(1)  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or the common law, the  
     provisions of this section apply to proceedings by an owner or person in charge of land for the 
     eviction of an unlawful occupier. 
          (2)  At least 14 days before the hearing of the proceedings contemplated in subsection (1),  
     the court must serve written and effective notice of the proceedings on the unlawful occupier  
     and the municipality having jurisdiction‖. 
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 It is obvious from the peremptory nature of the provision that the relief 
of eviction sought cannot be sought ex parte.  There is a respondent who 
must, as a matter of legislative injunction, be served with notice.  Doing 
so in the context of eviction does not only satisfy the audi alteram partem 
rule,73 but is in line with the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.  In particular, this spirit and the element of ubuntu are contained 
in section 26(3) of the Constitution, which regulates evictions.  The 
section provides in a clear language that one may only be evicted from 
one‘s home, or have one‘s home demolished, with an order of court, 
made after considering all relevant circumstances.  In this manner, the 
eviction of an unlawful occupier is made cumbersome, requiring motion 
proceedings, which are brought at cost to a litigant seeking relief.  It is 
also worthy of note that the ―home‖ referred to by section 26(3) of the 
Constitution is not defined.  It therefore matters not whether the ―home‖ 
was unlawfully obtained.  The fact of its being unlawfully obtained does 
not justify an ex parte application, nor does it justify self-help, by 
demolishing the ―home‖ arbitrarily on the grounds that the demolisher is 
a lawful owner of the land.  Thus, the interpretation of a provision, having 
regard to section 39, calls for a ―rights-friendly reading of a statutory 
provision‖.74 
                                                 
73  Audi alterm partem means ―hear also the other side‖.  See Paterson T J M Eckard‘s Principles of  
    Civil Procedure in the Magistrates‘ Courts (2005) 5th ed at 48.  It is the principle that, before any  
    court makes a finding, or an order, it must first give the other party in the matter before it an  
     opportunity to be heard. 
74  Du Plessis L  ―Interpretation‖ in Woolman S and Roux T (eds) et al Constitutional Law of South  
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The interpreter of the Bill of Rights is also bound, in terms of section 39,  
to consider international law, whereas there is a discretion in considering 
foreign law.75  In this regard, the South African Constitution is akin to the 
Canadian Charter76, the interpretation of which is guided by international 
treaties.77  The most important of these is the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,78 to which Canada became a party in 1976.79  
The terms of the Covenant are relevant to the interpretation of the 
Canadian Charter on the basis that a statute and a constitution should be 
interpreted, to the extent that this is possible, in the spirit of 
international law.80   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
     Africa Vol 2  (2009) at 32-108. 
75  Subsection (1)(b) and (c). 
76  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 2007.  For example, section 11(g) of the Charter  
     provides that:   
     ―Any person charged with an offence has the right not to be found guilty on account of any act  
     or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under  
     Canadian or international law or was criminal according to the general principles of law  
     recognised by the community of nations‖  [emphasis added].  See also Church J Schulze C    
     Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law Perspective (2007) at 84,  
     where the authors mention that at first Canadian courts were cautious in their approach to the  
     Canadian Charter, which is the Canadian Bill of Rights, since it was only a statute, and judges  
     adhered to the traditional concept of parliamentary supremacy. 
77   Hogg P W  Constitutional Law of Canada  Vol 2 (2007) at 36-39 to 36-40. 
78   Hereinafter referred to as ―the Covenant‖. 
79  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is an international agreement which  
     contains 27 articles defining and circumscribing a variety of rights and freedoms, and  
     imposing an absolute and immediate obligation on each of the State parties to respect and  
     ensure these rights to all individuals within their territories.  See Sieghart P The International  
     Law of Human Rights  (1983) at 25. 
80   Re Powers to Levy Rates on Foreign Legations  [1943] S.C.R. 208. 
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In cases where the Covenant entrenches a right which is also entrenched 
in the Canadian Charter, but in an unclear manner because of the 
wording used in the Charter, the Covenant is relied upon to indicate the 
appropriate interpretation of the right.  A case in point is section 10(b) of 
the Charter, which confers upon an arrested person the right to legal 
representation.81  The subsection is silent on whether an accused person 
may obtain legal representation at state expense if he or she is indigent.  
In the absence of a clear stipulation in this regard, the Covenant is 
considered.  The Covenant provides direction in its article 14(3)(d) by 
conferring upon an accused person the right to be legally represented at 
state expense ―if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it‖.82  Thus, 
the state of Canada feels obliged to provide legal representation at state 
expense to an accused of little or no means.  As to the relationship 
between the Charter and the Covenant, the authors83 of Human Rights 
from a Comparative and International Law Perspective explain that the 
                                                 
81   Section 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides: 
     ―Everyone has the right on arrest and detention 
(a)  to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor; 
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right; and 
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be 
released if the detention is not lawful‖. 
82  Article 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
     ―In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the  
     following minimum guarantees, in full equality: 
(d)  to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of 
his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and 
to have legal assistance, assigned to him, in any case where interests of justice so require, 
and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay 
for it‖.       
83  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
    Perspective  (2007) at 215. 
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Covenant and other similar instruments are tools of interpretation and, as 
such, must be considered alongside other tools.  Moreover, they argue 
that the ability of these tools to guide the courts will depend on the 
comparability of the instrument concerned.   Referring to the Canadian 
courts being bound by the provisions of the Covenant, the Supreme Court 
of Canada held:   
 
      This brief overview of Legal Aid and duty counsel systems reveals the extent of Canada‘s  
      recognition of the importance of the right to counsel for all persons detained in connection  
      with criminal offences.  This recognition extends beyond our own affirmation of the right in  
      the Canadian Bill of Rights, R. S. C, 1985, App III, and the Charter to our international  
      commitments.  For example, Canada is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and  
      Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.84 
 
 
The constitutions of most countries bear some resemblance to some 
degree.  The Constitution of Canada and its Charter is not an exception 
to this.  The drafters of the Canadian Charter drew from the American Bill 
of Rights in drafting their own Bill of Rights, called the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.85  
 
Since there is similarity in the text of the constitutions of different 
jurisdictions, each jurisdiction should therefore be free to consider 
                                                 
84   R. v. Brydges [1990] 1. S.C.R. 190, at 214. 
85  Hogg P W Constitutional Law of Canada Vol 2 (2007)  at 36-38. 
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interpretations of another, in constitutional provisions that bear 
resemblance.  Indeed, Kriegler J subscribed to this view in his words: 
 
      Comparative study is always useful, particularly where Courts in exemplary jurisdictions have  
        grappled with universal issues confronting us.  Likewise, where a provision in our  
        Constitution is manifestly modelled on a particular provision in another country‘s  
        constitution, it would be folly not to ascertain how the jurists of that country have  
        interpreted their precedential provision.86 
 
Kriegler J held this view notwithstanding the opposite view by his 
colleagues on the Constitutional Court Bench, who adopted a cautious 
approach, per Chaskalson J, in Makwanyane,87 that ―in dealing with 
comparative law, we must bear in mind that we are required to construe 
the South African Constitution, and not an international instrument or the 
constitution of some foreign country, and that this has to be done with 
due regard to our legal system, our history and circumstances, and the 
structure and language of our own Constitution‖.88 
 
It is submitted that Chaskalson J lost sight of the fact that, although he 
referred to the South African Constitution as ―our own Constitution‖, our 
Constitution is not original, or unique, but its provisions bear some 
resemblance with the constitutions of other jurisdictions, such as 
                                                 
86  In Bernstein and Others v Bester  NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at  811 I-J to 812A. 
87  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
88  at par. 39. 
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Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia89 in Africa, and Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland in Europe.90 
  
There is a word of caution, though.  A court would have to sift, and not 
transplant blindly everything that there is to transplant.  The special 
circumstances of the country from whose constitution a court is 
borrowing would have to be painstakingly compared with the 
circumstances prevailing in its own country.  This word of caution was 
pointedly phrased  in the words of the Supreme Court of India in Babulal 
Parate v State of Bombay ,91 where the Court cautioned that ―it will be 
improper to import into the question of the construction doctrines of 
democratic theory and practice obtaining in other countries, unrelated to 
the tenor, scheme and words of provisions which we construe‖.92 
 
There is another similarity between Canada and South Africa regarding 
the method used when legislation is impugned for its unconstitutionality.   
This method is called severance.  It is used in the interpretation of 
statutes, where only a part of the statute is bad for constitutionality, 
whereas the rest is constitutionally sound.93  When this is the case, the 
                                                 
89  Heyns C and Kaguongo W ―Constitutional Human Rights Law in Africa‖ 2006 SAJHR  at  
    683, footnote 68. 
90  Van der Walt A J ―Civil forfeiture of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime and the  
     constitutional property clause‖ 2000 SAJHR  at 11, footnote 44. 
91  Babulal Parate v State of Bombay  AIR 1960 SC 51. 
92  at 53. 
93  Devenish G E A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) at 605. 
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court usually excises the bad part, and preserves the part that is 
constitutional. 
 
Care is exercised, however, that the severance does not alter the meaning 
of the remaining part of the piece of legislation under scrutiny.  This is 
because the unchallenged part can stand on its own merit because it was 
enacted within constitutional bounds.94 
 
For example, in the case of R v Hess,95 section 146(1) of the Criminal 
Code of Canada dealing with rape served before the Supreme Court.  The 
provision criminalised the conduct of a male person who had sexual 
intercourse with a girl under the age of fourteen years.  The Criminal 
Code made such conduct an offence whether the male person believed 
that the girl was older than the age of fourteen years.  The wording of the 
provision failed to take into account the essential requirement for a 
criminal offence, namely, mens rea.  The unconstitutionality of the 
provision could be remedied by severing the words: ―whether or not he 
believes that she is fourteen years of age or more‖.  The words of the 
provision which would remain would be sound in law without replacing 
the severed words with new ones.  Accordingly, the Court invoked its 
power of severance to strike out the unconstitutional words.  
 
                                                 
94  Hogg P W Constitutional Law of Canada  Vol  2 (2007) at 36-25. 
95  R v Hess  [1990] 2 S. C. R. 906.   
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Severance also became a tool to remedy the unconstitutionality in 
Tétreault-Gadoury v Canada , 96 where the Unemployment Insurance 
Act97 of Canada restricted the unemployment insurance benefits to 
persons under the age of sixty-five.  If the age restriction of sixty-five 
years were to be removed, the statute would not be in conflict with 
section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which 
prohibited discrimination on grounds of age.98  The Supreme Court 
simply invoked the power of severance to remove the age bar of sixty-
five years from the Act. 
 
The interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights also necessitated the 
severance power of the Supreme Court in Benner v Canada, 99 where the 
Citizenship Act of Canada100 was impugned for discriminating between 
children born abroad to Canadian fathers and Canadian mothers before 
1977.  A child born to a Canadian mother had to apply for citizenship and 
pass a security test, whereas the child of a Canadian father was 
                                                 
96  Tétreault-Gadoury v Canada  [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22. 
97  Unemployment Insurance Act 1970-71-72 c.48, s.1 
98  Section 15 of the Canadian Charter provides: 
    ―(1)  Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection  
           and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular without  
          discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental  
          or physical disability. 
    (2)  Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the  
    amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are  
    disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex age or mental        
    or physical disability‖. 
99   Benner v Canada  [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358. 
100  Citizenship Act, Act of 1977. 
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automatically entitled to citizenship upon the father registering the 
child‘s birth in Canada.  Mothers of children born abroad before 1977 felt 
that the statute was unconstitutional on the grounds of discrimination 
based on age.101 The remedy was to excise the discriminating part of the 
statute, which the Court ordered. 
 
It seldom happens that the interpretation of a constitutional provision 
results in the entirety of a statute being struck down because of 
unconstitutionality.  What usually happens is that only a section thereof is 
unconstitutional and needs to be severed from the rest of the 
constitutionally sound part.  However, the case of R v Big M Drug Mart 102 
was a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of Canada where the 
Court struck down the Lord‘s Day Act103 for violating section 2 of the 
Canadian Charter.104  On a Sunday of 30 May 1982 the Big M Drug Mart 
store was charged with unlawfully selling goods on a Sunday in violation 
                                                 
101  Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter expressly prohibited discrimination on grounds of age. 
102  R v Big M Drug Mart  [1985] 1 S. C. R. 295.  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights  
      from a Comparative and International Law Perspective  (2007) at 92, mention the case of R v  
      Big M Drug Mart  as the only case in which the Supreme Court of Canada has unequivocally  
      rejected the legislative objective. 
103  Lord‘s Day Act of 1906.   
104  Section 2 of the Canadian Charter provides: 
     ―Everyone has the following fundamental rights: 
(a) freedom of conscience and religion; 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and 
other media communication; 
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and 
(d) freedom of association. 
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of the Lord‘s Day Act.  The store was acquitted, but the State appealed 
the Court‘s judgment.  The appeal was dismissed. 
 
The constitutional question was whether the Lord‘s Day Act infringed the 
right to freedom of conscience and religion and, if so, whether the 
infringement was saved by section 1 of the Charter.105   
 
The Court interpreted section 2 of the Charter and the Lord‘s Day Act in a 
way that rendered the statute unconstitutional, as violating section 2 of 
the Charter.  The Court held that there was no justifiable basis for the 
legislation, and its only purpose was to satisfy a state‘s religious based 
requirement, and was therefore invalid. 
 
In South Africa, the reconciling of a statute with the Constitution has also 
necessitated that severance be resorted to as a remedy.  Section 172(1)(a) 
of the Constitution is the authority for such a constitutional remedy.106  
Since the section qualifies the declaration of inconsistency with the 
words:  ―to the extent of its inconsistency‖, it becomes clear that the 
Court may not simply declare the entire statute constitutionally invalid, 
                                                 
105  Section 1 of the Canadian Charter provides: 
      ―The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in  
      it subject to such reasonable limits presented by law as can be demonstratably justified in a  
      free and democratic society‖. 
106  Section 172(1) of the Constitution provides: 
      ―When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court— 
(a)  must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid 
to the extent of its inconsistency‖. 
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but only the part  that is constitutionally invalid.  That gives the Court the 
power to sever the constitutionally invalid part. 
 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa had to invoke this rare remedy in 
Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa.107  The question to 
be decided was the constitutionality of sections 65A to 65M of the 
Magistrates‘ Courts Act,108 which authorised the judgment creditor to 
cause the arrest and detention of the judgment debtor.  It was felt by the 
judgment debtor that this kind of detention amounted to detention 
without a fair trial, and as such, vitiated the provisions of sections 11 and 
25(3) of the interim Constitution.109   
 
The Court, per Kriegler J, in considering severance as a remedy, held that: 
 
      Although severability in the context of constitutional law may often require special 
        treatment, in the present case the trite test can properly be applied:  if the good is not  
        dependent on the bad and can be separated from it, one gives effect to the good that  
        remains after the separation if it still gives effect to the main objective of the statute.  The  
        test has two parts:  first, is it possible to sever the invalid provisions and, second, if so, is  
        what remains giving effect to the purpose of the legislative scheme? 
                                                 
107  Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa  1995 (4) SA 631 (CC).  Church J Schulze  
      C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law Perspective (2007) at  
      217 refer to this case in the context of showing that South African courts have shown a  
      willingness to make use of binding and non-binding convention law and of non-binding  
      instruments.   
108   Act 32 of 1944. 
109  Sections 11 and 25(3) of the interim Constitution dealt with the freedom and security of the  
     person, and the right to a fair trial, respectively. 
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Severance saves the legislature a lot of time and effort, since they would 
have to enact an entirely new piece of legislation if the impugned piece of 
legislation were to be struck down in its entirety as constitutionally 
invalid. 
 
2.10  Progressive interpretation 
 
The Appeal Court of Canada110 has invented a doctrine of constitutional 
interpretation which the Court has called the progressive 
interpretation.111  In terms of the progressive doctrine, a constitution 
cannot be compared with an ordinary statute because a constitution is 
couched in a language sufficiently broad to accommodate a wide and 
unpredictable range of facts. The doctrine also takes into account that a 
constitution is difficult to amend, and it is likely to remain in force for a 
long time.   
 
In terms of the doctrine, these considerations require that a constitution 
be given a versatile interpretation, so that the constitution can be 
adapted over a period of many years to accommodate changing 
conditions.  Illustrating the elasticity that a constitution should have in 
                                                 
110  Edwards v A.-G. Canada  [1930] A. C. 124 at 136. 
111  Hogg P W  Constitutional Law of Canada  (Vol 2) (2007) at 36-25. 
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the way it is interpreted, Lord Sankey in Edwards v A.-G. Canada, 112 
compared a constitution to ―a living tree capable of growth and 
expansion within its natural limits‖.113 
 
The constitutional issue in Edwards v A.-G. Canada  was whether, in 
terms of section 24 of the British North America Act,114 the words 
―qualified persons‖ in section 24 include a woman, and consequently 
whether women were eligible to be summoned to be and become 
members of the Senate of Canada.115 
 
In arriving at the correct interpretation, the majority of the Court took 
into account external evidence derived from extraneous circumstances 
such as previous legislation and decided cases, and internal evidence 
derived from the Act itself.  The Court found that the exclusion of women 
from all public offices was a relic of days that were more barbarous than 
the days during which the Court had to settle this constitutional question, 
and that the necessity of the times often forced on men customs which in 
later years were not necessary.  This, together with the fact that the 
deliberative assemblies of the early tribes were attended by men under 
                                                 
112  Edwards v A.-G. of Canada  [1930] A. C. 124. 
113  at 136. 
114  British North America Act of 1867. 
115  Section 24 of the British North America Act of 1867 provides: 
     ―The governor general shall from time to time, in the Queen‘s name, by instrument under the 
      Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified persons to the Senate; and, subject to the provisions  
      of the Act, every person so summoned shall become and be a member of the Senate and a  
      senator‖. 
45 
 
arms, and women did not bear arms, led to the exclusion of women from 
the Senate.116  The consideration of these factors led the Court to the 
conclusion that the words ―qualified persons‖ included both genders. 
 
The doctrine of progressive interpretation acknowledges that there might 
be conditions which did not exist, and could not have been foreseen, at 
the time that a constitution was drafted.  The advent of technology and 
its endless advancement, for example, makes it necessary for 
constitutional interpretation to be elastic in nature.  Also, the 
advancement made in the methodology of complex crimes necessitates 
that the interpretation of the text of a constitution be flexible in nature.   
 
Although the doctrine of progressive interpretation has its origin in the 
Appeal Court of Canada, its underlying principle seems to be used in the 
United Stated States of America as well, although the United States 
Supreme Court117 has not specifically referred to the doctrine by name.  A 
case in point is the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.  The Fourth Amendment was adopted in the eighteenth century.  
In those years it can hardly be said that electronic technology was 
foreseeable.  But in 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States 
was confronted with a situation where it had to apply the right against 
unreasonable search and seizure in the Fourth Amendment to electronic 
                                                 
116  at 2. 
117  Katz  v United States  (1967) 389 U. U. 347. 
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eavesdropping,118 a practice that could not have been anticipated in the 
eighteenth century when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.  
 
The doctrine of progressive interpretation, however, has its negative side.  
It may tend to give judges an unintended latitude to rewrite a 
constitution.  Their interpretation may be so radical that it amounts to 
rewriting the constitution, a right which can only be exercised by 
politicians. 
 
The view expressed by the Appeal Court of Canada in Edwards v A.-G. of 
Canada is shared by South African courts.119  The view is that the 
interpretation of a constitution differs to some extent from the 
interpretation of legislation.  The common view shared by both the 
Canadian Court and the South African Court is that the interpretation of a 
constitution should have an element of elasticity in order to 
accommodate unpredictable occurrences that can arise in the future.120  
The elasticity of its interpretation also takes into account that a 
constitution is not easy to amend, and is seldom amended.121  However, 
                                                 
118  Katz v United States  (1967) 389 U. U. 347. 
119  Ntenteni v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State  (1994) 1 BCLR 168 (Ck); S v Zuma  (1995) 4 BCLR  
      401 (CC). 
120  Devenish G E A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights  (1999) at 585. 
121  Section 74(1) of the Constitution provides that sections 1 and 74(1) of the Constitution may be  
      amended by a Bill passed by the National Assembly with a supporting vote of at least 75  
      percent of its members, and the National Council of Provinces with a supporting vote of at  
      least six provinces.  Section 74(2) provides that Chapter 2 of the Constitution, which contains  
      the Bill of Rights, may be amended by a Bill passed by the National Assembly with a  
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notwithstanding  the stringent measures for rendering the South African 
Constitution difficult to amend, it has been amended a number of 
times.122 
 
One reason a constitution needs a broader interpretation is that, in terms 
of the decision in Ntenteni v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State,123 a 
constitution is a foundational law on which other laws are enacted.  It is 
not just another statute.  In Ntenteni, the applicant had instituted action 
against the Ciskei Council of State for damages arising from an unlawful 
arrest and detention by members of the police force, acting in the course 
and scope of their employment by the state.  In defending the action, the 
state relied on the provisions of section 2(2) of the Definition of State 
Liability Decree 34 of 1990.124  In this regard, the Supreme Court of 
                                                                                                                                                 
      supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members, and the National Council of Provinces  
      with a supporting vote of at least six provinces.  Subsection (3) provides that any other  
      provision of the Constitution may be amended by a Bill passed by the National Assembly with  
      a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members, and also by the National Council of  
      Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces, if the amendment relates to a  
      matter that affects the Council, that alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or  
      institutions, or that amends a provision that deals specifically with a provincial matter.   
122  For example, in 1997, section 90(4) of the Constitution was amended by section 1 of the 
      Constitution First Amendment Act of 1997; in 2001, section 111(2) was amended by  
      substituted by section 9 of the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act of 2001;in 2001, section  
      120(3) was substituted by section 3 of the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act of 2001, and  
      in 2003, section 139(8) was substituted by section 4 of the Constitution Eleventh Amendment  
      Act of 2003. 
123  Ntenteni v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State  (1994) 1 BCLR 168 (Ck). 
124  Section 2(2) of the Definition of State Liability Decree 34 of 1990 provided as follows: 
      ―No legal proceedings may be brought against the State in respect of any claim arising from  
      any  . . . abuse of power . . . on the part of any member or servant of the Government of the  
      Republic of Ciskei  which was overthrown on 4 March 1990‖ 
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Ciskei125 found that the provisions of the Decree were unconstitutional,126 
as they limited the right of access to courts.127  The Court held that the 
Constitution should be interpreted ―from a broad perspective and it is the 
source of the fundamental rights and reflects the norms against which 
other legislation is to be evaluated and tested‖.128  The Court further 
held129 that, on a proper interpretation, the provisions of section 26(1) of 
the Republic of Ciskei Constitution Decree130  applied to all decrees 
without limiting the section to post-constitution decrees.131  Thus, the 
Court demonstrated that a constitution needs a broader interpretation.   
 
2.11  The presumption of constitutionality 
 
Another principle of constitutional interpretation is that constitutionality 
must be presumed.  This means that when deciding the constitutionality 
of a statute, or the conduct of a member of the executive, the court 
should be inclined towards accepting its constitutionality.  This principle 
                                                 
125  The existence of this Court was terminated by political developments in South Africa. 
126  When tested against the fundamental rights that were contained in Schedule 6 of the Republic  
      of Ciskei Constitution Decree 45 of 1990. 
127  Ntenteni v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State and Another 1994 (1) BCLR 168 (Ck) at 179. 
128  Ntenteni v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State and Another 1994 (1) BCLR 168 (Ck) at 177G. 
129  Ntenteni v Chairman, Ciskei Council of State and Another 1994 (1) BCLR 168 (Ck) at 178G-H. 
130  The Republic of Ciskei Constitution Decree 45 of 1990. 
131  Section 26(1) of the Republic of Ciskei Constitution Decree provided as follows: 
      ―(1)  The Supreme Court shall be competent to enquire into and pronounce upon the validity  
             of a Decree in pursuance of the question: 
(a)  whether the provisions of this Decree were complied with in connection with any law 
which is expressed to be decreed by the Council of State; and 
(b) subject to the provisions of this Decree, whether the provisions of any such Decree 
abolish, diminish or derogate from any fundamental right as set out in Schedule 6‖. 
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of constitutional interpretation is invoked where a statute or the conduct 
of a member of the executive is capable of being interpreted in more than 
one way, one resulting in constitutional validity, and the other in 
constitutional invalidity.  The court should presume that the legislature or 
the executive intended to act in a way that is compatible with the 
Constitution.  This approach is also called the ―reading down‖ 
approach.132   
 
Admittedly, the Constitution of South Africa does not contain in its text 
an express provision which authorises constitutional presumption.  But 
the interim Constitution133  provided for the presumption of 
constitutionality in section 232(3).134   
 
Even though the text of the final Constitution does not prescribe to 
courts that they must presume legislation to be within the spirit of the 
Constitution, the South African Constitutional Court has adopted the 
approach that ―all statutes must be interpreted through the prism of the 
                                                 
132  Currie J and de Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 5th ed at 64;  Chaskalson M et al   
      Constitutional Law of South Africa  (1999) Vol 1 at 9.3(a); S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC);        
      Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa and Others 1998  
      (4) SA 1127 (CC). 
133  Interim Constitution of 1993. 
134  Section 232(3) of the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 provided as  
      follows: 
      ―No law shall be constitutionally invalid solely by reason of the fact that the wording used is  
      prima facie capable of an  interpretation which is inconsistent with a provision of this  
      Constitution, provided such a law is reasonably capable of a more restricted interpretation  
      which is not inconsistent with any such provision, in which event such law shall be construed  
      as having a meaning in accordance with the said more restricted interpretation‖. 
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Bill of Rights‖.135  This is in harmony with the provisions of section 1 of 
the Constitution, which lays the groundwork for every step likely to be 
taken by the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.  These three 
separate arms of state have to bear in mind the values of human dignity, 
equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.   
 
The values with which the Constitution is imbued have been manifest in 
the manner in which the South African Constitutional Court itself has 
dealt with constitutional challenges which it had to resolve.  For example, 
in Daniels v Campbell and Others, 136 the applicant sought a declaration 
of constitutional invalidity of certain provisions of the Intestate 
Succession Act,137 and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act,138 for 
failing to include persons married according to Muslim rites as 
spouses.139 
                                                 
135  Daniels v Campbell and Others  2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) at par. 44; Investigating 
      Directorate:  Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and  
      Others:  In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others  2001 (1)  
      SA 545 (CC) at par. 21. 
136  Daniels v Campbell and Others  2004 (5) SA 331 (CC). 
137  Act 81 of 1987. 
138  Act 27 of 1990. 
139  Section 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act provided: 
      ―If after the commencement of this Act a person (hereinafter referred to as the ‗deceased‘ dies  
      intestate, either wholly or in part, and— 
(a)  is survived by a spouse, but not by a descendent, such spouse shall inherit the intestate 
estate; 
(b) is survived by a descendant, but not by a spouse, such descendant shall inherit the 
intestate estate; 
(c) is survived by a spouse as well as a descendant— 
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In terms of section 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act, 
―survivor‖ is defined as ―the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by 
death‖.  Although both statutes confer rights on spouses who are 
predeceased by their husbands or wives, neither of them defined the 
word ―spouse‖.   
 
The applicant was married to her deceased husband by Muslim rites.  The 
marriage, which was at all times monogamous, was not solemnised by a 
marriage officer appointed in terms of the Marriage Act.140  No children 
were born of the marriage, though the applicant and her deceased 
husband had children from previous marriages.  The deceased died 
intestate.   
 
It would have been easy for the Court to take the line of least resistance 
by simply declaring the statutes unconstitutional in their entirety, but that 
would be the easy route to take only for the Court making such a 
declaration.  For the legislature, however, time and effort would be 
                                                                                                                                                 
(i)  such spouse shall inherit a child‘s share of the intestate estate or so much of the 
intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount fixed from time to time 
by the Minister of Justice by notice in the Gazette, whichever is the greater; and  
(ii) such descendant shall inherit the residue (if any) of the intestate estate‖. 
       Section 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouse Act  provided: 
         ―If a marriage is dissolved by death after the commencement of this Act the survivor shall  
         have a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse for the provision of his reasonable  
         maintenance needs until his death or remarriage in so far as he is not able to provide  
         therefor from his own means and earnings‖. 
140   Act 25 of 1961. 
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required to remedy the defect, within the time that would have been 
stipulated by the Court.   
 
The wisdom of the Constitutional Court in its interpretive approach 
becomes especially evident in the light of the judgment of the High Court 
which heard the matter as a court of first instance.141  The High Court 
had honoured the doctrine of judicial precedent in that it was guided, in 
its interpretation of the term ―spouse‖, by the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in National Coalition v Minister of Home Affairs ,142 
and in Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 
respectively.143  The High Court held the view that the term ―spouse‖ only 
applied to parties to a marriage recognised as valid in terms of South 
African law.   
 
The second consideration of the High Court in interpreting the term 
―spouse‖ was the Estate Duty Act as amended,144 which, under 
definitions, makes provision for the inclusion of Muslim parties.  Since 
this Act created an exception to the general rule that the only marriages 
to which South African law attaches legal consequences are those 
solemnised in terms of the Marriages Act, the High Court was of the view 
                                                 
141   The Cape of Good Hope Division of the High Court, now renamed the Western Cape High  
       Court, in terms of the Renaming of High Courts Act 30 of 2008. 
142   National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and  
       Others  2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
143   Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2002 (6) SA 1(CC). 
144   Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955. 
53 
 
that this Act leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of any deeming 
provision or an express definition, the term ―spouse‖ must be given its 
traditional, limited meaning.  The High Court thus came to the conclusion 
that since the impugned statutes, the Intestate Succession Act and the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act, did not contain a definition that 
covered Muslim marriages, they could not be interpreted to include 
parties to Muslim marriages.  Amendments of these Acts to provide a 
broader meaning lay in the hands of the legislature.145 
 
The High Court proceeded to consider what the consequences of this 
interpretation would be.  Having given the impugned statutes a 
contextual interpretation, the Court found that the interplay between the 
applicant‘s religious beliefs and the cultural practices in her community, 
and the failure of South African law to properly accommodate such beliefs 
and practices, resulted in the applicant being denied relief.146  For this 
reason, the High Court held that the omission of people who hold certain 
religious beliefs and practices in the impugned statutes violated their 
rights, and thus rendered the statutes unconstitutional and invalid.   
 
It is in the light of this background that the wisdom of the Constitutional 
Court becomes evident.  It is true that the Court of the first instance had 
commendably abided by the principle of judicial precedent and followed 
                                                 
145  at 1000A. 
146  Daniels v Campbell and Others  2004 (5) SA 331 (CC)  at 993H-I. 
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the decision of the Constitutional Court in a previous similar matter.  
However, the Constitutional Court, in its endeavours to interpret, begins 
from the premise that a statute is constitutional.  Thus, constitutionality 
is presumed.  In casu, the Court partly resorted to the ordinary meaning 
approach, holding that the word ―spouse‖ in its ordinary meaning 
includes parties to a Muslim marriage.  The Court was of the view that 
―such a reading is not linguistically strained.  On the contrary, it 
corresponds to the way the word is generally understood and used.  It is 
far more awkward from a linguistic point of view to exclude parties to a 
Muslim marriage from the word ‗spouse‘ than to include them‖.147  This 
resulted in the Constitutional Court making the order that the word 
―spouse‖ as used in the Intestate Succession Act, included the surviving 
partner to a monogamous Muslim marriage, and that the word ―spouse‖ 
as used in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act, included the 
surviving partner to a monogamous Muslim marriage, and that the 
applicant, for the purposes of the two impugned statutes, was in fact a 
spouse. 
 
The reasoning of the Constitutional Court in this regard is consistent with 
the reasoning voiced by one of its members148 in a dissenting judgment 
in the early years of its functioning, when Kentridge AJ laid it down as a 
general principle that, where it is possible to decide any case, civil or 
                                                 
147   at par. 19. 
148   S v Mhlungu  1995 (3) SA 867 (CC). 
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criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which 
should be followed.149  This view was eventually adopted by all members 
of the Court later in Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei, 150 where the Court 
emphasised the importance of not formulating a rule of constitutional law 
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.151 
 
The principle of presuming the constitutionality of an impugned statute 
before holding that it is unconstitutional, also prevails in the United 
States of America.  The Supreme Court of the United States has, as early 
as 1938,152 shown itself to be disinclined to pronounce statutes 
unconstitutional and invalid if it is possible to cure the defect without 
resorting to a declaration of unconstitutionality.  In dealing with Zantsi v 
Council of State, the South African Constitutional Court, per Chaskalson J, 
echoed the words of the United States Supreme Court in United States v 
Lovett, 153 that ―the most fundamental principle of constitutional 
adjudication is not to face constitutional questions but to avoid them, if 
at all possible‖.154 
 
                                                 
149  S v Mhlungu  1995 (3) SA 867 at 895 par. 59D.  
150  Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei 1995 (3) 10 BCLR 1424 (CC). 
151  at 1428B. 
152  United States v Carolene Products Co  304 US 144 n 4 (1938). 
153  United States v Lovett  328 US 186 (1962). 
154  at 320. 
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The United States Supreme Court has not only been reluctant to invoke 
the direct application155 of the Constitution when interpreting statutes, 
but has taken a step further.  It has refused to make any pronouncements 
when it considers the matter before it to be purely political.156  This may 
be due to the Supreme Court‘s recognition of the principle of separation 
of powers.  In dealing with political issues in Baker v Carr,157 the Court 
acknowledged that there were questions beyond judicial competence, and 
that where the performance of a duty was left to the discretion and good 
judgment of an executive officer, the judiciary would not compel, one 
way or the other, the exercise of a discretion by the officer.158 
 
Further insight into how the principle of constitutional presumption 
operates is to be found in the view expressed by Georges CJ in Zimbabwe 
Township Developers v Lou Shoes,159 that whenever a constitutional 
challenge is raised by a litigating party, it rests on the shoulders of the 
court to interpret a constitutional provision that is applicable, and 
establish its meaning.  The court must then proceed to consider whether 
                                                 
155  The direct application of the Constitution, or of its Bill of rights,  when interpreting a statute,  
      means interpreting the statute as being unconstitutional.  Indirect application means  
      interpreting a statute in a way that avoids declaring the statute as being unconstitutional, for  
      example, by using the ―reading down‖ technique.  See Currie I and de Waal J The Bill of Rights  
      Handbook  (2005) 5th ed at 64. 
156  Baker v Carr  369 US 186 (1962); Devenish GE  A Commentary on the South African Bill of  
      Rights  (1999) at 603. 
157  Baker v Carr  369 US 186 (1962). 
158  at par. 9. 
159  Zimbabwe Township Developers (Pvt) Ltd  v Lou Shoes (Pvt) Ltd  1984 2 SA 778 (ZS).  See also  
      Devenish GE  A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights  (1999) at 601.   
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the impugned piece of legislation falls within the meaning the court has 
given to the constitutional provision in question.  It may be that the 
challenged piece of legislation is open to two possible meanings.  If one 
meaning falls within the interpretation given to the constitutional 
provision, the court must presume that the lawmakers intended to act 
constitutionally, and the court must then uphold the piece of 
legislation.160   
 
It is submitted that it would be improper to twist a constitutional 
provision by giving it a far-fetched interpretation so as to accommodate a 
meaning the court would like to give to a piece of legislation.  That would 
result in that constitutional provision having to be twisted again in future 
to accommodate a statute that would also have to be accommodated.  
The doctrine of precedent would not allow that.  Rather, the impugned 
statute needs to be studied and given its proper meaning.  The related 
constitutional provision must also be studied and interpreted liberally.161   
Then it should be considered whether the meaning given to the 
impugned statute can fit into the interpretation given to the applicable 
constitutional provision.162 
 
                                                 
160   at 783C-D. 
161  Devenish G E  A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights  (1999) at 599. 
162  Minister of Home Affairs v Bickle  1984 2 SA 439 (Z). 
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Magid J163 introduced a new angle to constitutional interpretation which 
serves as a warning to courts with the jurisdiction to interpret a 
constitution.  He recognises that section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution 
requires a liberal interpretation.  However, he warns that this provision, 
peremptory though it is, does not permit or encourage courts to ignore 
the actual language used in the Constitution.  Referring to the rights of 
detained persons, Magid J opined that if their rights should be extended, 
that should be achieved by means of legislative action, and not by means 
of judicial activism, nor by reading words into a statutory provision which 
were not there, or by excising words which were.164 
 
Closely related to the principle of constitutional presumption, is the 
principle not to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of 
the necessity to decide it, and never to formulate a rule of constitutional 
law broader than is required.165  This means that while a court is dealing 
with a matter before it, the matter before it may lend itself to the 
interpretation of another constitutional issue which is not before court at 
that particular time.  The court may then unwisely succumb to the 
temptation to also deal with the interpretation of that constitutional issue 
which is only hypothetical at that stage. 
 
                                                 
163   S v Gumede and Others 1998 (5) BCLR 530 (D). 
164   at 542A-C. 
165   Liverpool, New York and Philadelphia Steamship Co v Commissioners of Emigration  113 US  
       33, 39 (1885); Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei and Others  1995 (10) BCLR 1424 (CC) 1428.  
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In South Africa, this principle of constitutional interpretation became 
necessary to apply when the Constitutional Court166 was considering 
whether the interpretation of the right to life as applied to the death 
penalty conflicted with the common law right of self-defence.  In terms of 
section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act,167  a police officer had a legal 
right to shoot at an escaping suspect who was under lawful arrest.  The 
act of a police officer shooting at an escaping suspect raised the 
constitutional question of the right to life of the escaping suspect.  
However, that was not the constitutional issue the Court was asked to 
settle.  If the Court decided the question, it would be anticipating a 
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity to decide it.  It 
would also be formulating a rule of constitutional law broader than was 
required by the precise facts before it. 
 
Recognising this principle of not anticipating a constitutional issue before 
it is raised, the Court stated:  ―We are not concerned here with the validity 
of section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and I specifically refrain 
from expressing any view thereon‖.168  Interestingly, however, having 
refrained from expressing its view on the constitutionality of the section, 
the Court nearly succumbed to the temptation of doing so.  This becomes 
evident in the subsequent words of the Court:  ―But, if one of the 
                                                 
166  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
167  Act 51 of 1977. 
168  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) 391 (CC) at 450A. 
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consequences of this judgment might be to render the provisions of 
section 49(2) unconstitutional, the legislature will have to modify the 
provisions of the section in order to bring it into line with the 
Constitution‖.169  With these words, the Court indirectly pronounced on 
the constitutionality of a statutory provision that was not before it, in 
violation of its own rule. 
 
The principle of avoiding to adjudicate on the constitutionality of 
questions that are moot, or not ripe for decision, is said170 to be 
beneficial in that it allows for the orderly development of law.  Law is 
developed in instalments. 
 
This principle is a salutary rule also in Canada.171  In the 1980s, a litigant 
attacked the validity of section 251(4), (5) and (6) of the Criminal Code172 
in relation to abortion on the ground that these sections contravened the 
right to life, security and equality, of the foetus as a person.  These 
rights, according to the litigant, were protected by sections 7 and 15 of 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  The litigant‘s locus standi  
was based on the fact that he was seeking a declaration that the 
legislation was invalid; that there was a serious issue as to its invalidity; 
                                                 
169  S  v  Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) 391 (CC) at 450B-C. 
170  Devenish G E  A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) at 604; De Waal J and  
      Currie I The Bill of Rights Handbook  (2005) 5th ed at 94, 95; Hogg P W Constitutional Law of  
     Canada  Vol 2 (2007) at 59-17. 
171  Borowski v The Attorney-General of Canada  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342 
172  These sections have since been struck down. 
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that, as a citizen, he had a substantial and legally protectable interest in 
the validity of the legislation, and that there was no other reasonable and 
effective manner in which the issue could be brought before court. 
 
It had to be determined in limine before court whether the matter was 
moot.  The question also arose as to whether the litigant had lost his 
locus standi, and indeed whether the matter was justiciable. 
 
The court held that the matter was moot, and therefore the court did not 
have to hear it.173  Furthermore, the litigant had lost his locus standi as 
the circumstances upon which his locus standi  were premised had 
ceased to exist.  It was the court‘s view that the doctrine of mootness is 
part of a general policy that a court may decline to decide cases which 
merely raise a hypothetical or abstract question.  The court held174 that a 
matter is moot when a decision will not have the effect of resolving some 
controversy directly affecting the rights of parties before it.  Parties must 
be actually affected not only at the time when the proceedings are 
commenced, but also up to the time when a court is called upon to reach 
a decision.   
 
                                                 
173  The matter had been rendered moot by the fact that the question of the constitutionality of  
      section 251(4), (5) and (6) had disappeared when section 251 was struck down in R v     
       Morgentaler  (1988) 44 DLR (4th) 385.  
174  at par. 2. 
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The court succinctly crystallised a two-step analysis to be used in 
determining mootness.  The first step is to determine whether the 
requisite concrete dispute still exists or has disappeared, thus rendering 
the issue academic.  If the dispute has disappeared, the court must 
decide whether to exercise its discretion and hear it nevertheless.  The 
second step in the analysis requires that a court considers whether it 
should exercise its discretion to decide the merits of the case, despite the 
absence of a live controversy, that is, despite the fact that no parties are 
actually affected by the issue. 
 
It is clear that courts should be disinclined to decide matters that are of 
general public interest, controversial, but are not before court as directly 
affecting litigants. 
 
2.12  Multilingualism 
 
Du Plessis175 is probably the only one, among constitutional 
interpretation writers, who adds a new feature as an aid to constitutional 
interpretation — multilingualism.176  This approach to constitutional 
interpretation is seldom, if ever, used.  It is true that prior to the 
commencement of the new constitutional dispensation, South Africa had 
                                                 
175  Du Plessis  L  ―Interpretation‖  in Woolman S  and Roux T (eds) et al Constitutional Law of  
     South Africa  Vol  2  (2008). 
176  at 32-115. 
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only two official languages.  However, with the commencement of the 
interim Constitution, the forerunner of the Constitution of 1996, nine 
more languages were added as official languages.  For this reason, the 
text of the Constitution has been translated into all these languages.   
 
The question then arises whether the availability of eleven languages can 
be used as an aid in the interpretation process.  The reality is that, 
although some of the judges speak the other nine languages, other than 
English and Afrikaans, as their mother tongue, they have never resorted 
to the text of the Constitution as printed in their mother tongue, to 
interpret conflicting provisions of the Constitution.  Invariably, judges of 
the High Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Constitutional 
Court, limit themselves to the English text of the Constitution.   
 
Admittedly, during the transitional period of the interim Constitution of 
1993, the Constitutional Court did make use, in its interpretation, of the 
advantage of having two official languages as languages of the 
Constitution, English and Afrikaans.  The issue to be decided177 was 
whether Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution applied to both statute law 
and common law, or to statute law only.  The Court decided that the 
answer was to be found in section 7(2) of the interim Constitution which 
provided that the Chapter would apply to ―all law in force‖.  However, the 
                                                 
177  In Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). 
64 
 
Court felt that the phrase ―all law in force‖ may have some ambiguity, in 
that it was capable of being read as limited to statute law.   
 
This being the case, the Court had regard to the Afrikaans version, and 
found that the Afrikaans version removed all ambiguity by its use of the 
equivalent phrase: alle reg wat van krag is.  The word reg, as distinct 
from wet, unambiguously embraces both common law and statute law. 
 
The Constitutional Court bolstered its view by referring to a well-
established rule of interpretation, that, if one text is ambiguous, and if 
the ambiguity can be resolved by reference to unambiguous words in the 
other text, the latter unambiguous meaning should be adopted.178  The 
Court, per Kentridge AJ, reasoned that there was no reason why that 
interpretation rule could not apply to the interpretation of the 
Constitution.  The Court added that, in any event, Afrikaans remained an 
official language with undiminished status. 
 
In this way, multilingualism,179 as suggested by Du Plessis, was used as 
an aid to interpretation.  However, since then, there has not been any 
more use of bilingualism or multilingualism, involving the use of the ten 
languages other than English, as an aid to interpretation. 
 
                                                 
178  S v Moroney  1978 (4) SA 389 (A) at 409. 
179  In the court case under consideration here, it is, in fact, bilingualism, and not multilingualism.    
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As far as the interpretation of statutes is concerned, the South African 
Constitutions between 1909 and 1994,180 contained a conflict provision 
which resolved the problem of conflicting renditions between the English 
and Afrikaans texts.  It was provided181 that in the case of conflict, the 
version signed by the head of state would prevail. 
In our constitutional democracy, however, it would appear that the fact 
that a particular version is the signed version does not necessarily 
determine that it will be the prevailing version in the case of a conflict.  It 
would appear that the English text prevails, regardless of the version 
signed.  This becomes apparent when one considers the provisions of 
section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment 
Act,182 which expressly provides that:  ―Notwithstanding the fact that the 
Afrikaans text of the Principal text is the signed text, the English text of 
that text shall, for the purposes of its interpretation prevail as if it were 
the signed text‖.  The quoted provision was referring to the interpretation 
of an Act of Parliament.  But the interpretation of the text of the 
Constitution itself is expressly governed by the same principle.  Section 
240 of the Constitution deals with inconsistencies between different texts 
of the Constitution, and it solves any possible differences by providing 
that:  ―In the event of an inconsistency between different texts of the 
Constitution, the English text prevails‖.  It would seem, therefore, that 
                                                 
180  South Africa Act of 1909; the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961. 
181  Section 67 of the South Africa Act of 1909; section 65 of Republic of South Africa Act 32 of  
      1961; section 35 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983. 
182  Act 2 of 1994. 
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multilingualism in the South African constitutional jurisprudence does not 
contribute much as an aid to constitutional interpretation, as Du Plessis 
suggests. 
 
Du Plessis183 enumerates certain features, which he calls conspicuous 
waymarks, which assist in constitutional interpretation. Among these are 
definitions.  It is well known that an Act of Parliament will have a set of 
definitions.  In the South African style of drafting, definitions are 
arranged to be the first section of a Bill or an Act.  Definitions serve as 
guidelines to the reader or interpreter of an Act as to how certain 
concepts are to be understood in that particular Act.  
 
There are pre-determined definitions contained in the Interpretation 
Act.184  They are pre-determined in that the definitions in this Act were 
provided to make it unnecessary for future statutes to define certain 
concepts because these concepts have already been defined in the 
Interpretation Act.  Examples of these are ―day‖, the ―reckoning of 
number of days‖, ―month‖, and ―the Republic‖. 
 
Since these concepts, which are of common use, are already defined in 
the Interpretation Act, it is unnecessary for a legislative drafter to define 
                                                 
183  Du Plessis L  ―Interpretation‖ in Woolman  S and Roux T (eds) et al Constitutional Law of South  
     Africa  Vol 2 (2009) at 32-132. 
184  Act 33 of 1957. 
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them when drafting any Bill, unless a meaning contrary to the meaning 
given in the Interpretation Act is intended. 
 
As far as the Constitution is concerned, it contains only three definitions. 
These are the definitions of ―national legislation‖, ―provincial legislation‖, 
and ―organ of state‖.185  
 
Definitions in the Interpretation Act have been used in constitutional 
interpretation, as they have been used in statutory interpretation.186  
However, if the meaning given to a concept in the Interpretation Act 
would be narrow and unduly prejudicial to a constitutional litigant, the 
interpretation given in the Interpretation Act would be rejected in favour 
of the interpretation given to the concept by the Constitutional Court.  
This is because being bound by the interpretation in the Interpretation 
Act when interpreting the Constitution would imply that the Constitution 
is subordinate to the Interpretation Act.  That would be incorrect.  The 
Constitution is supreme law.  Du Plessis187 shares this view. In analysing 
the definitions of the Interpretation Act, he points out that the 
Constitution, as was the case with the interim Constitution, is a law for 
purposes of the Interpretation Act, and definitions in the Interpretation 
Act have been used for constitutional interpretation in much the same 
                                                 
185  Section 239 of the Constitution. 
186  Zantsi v Council of State, Ciskei and Others  1995 (4) SA 615 (CC) par. 36-37;  Ynuico Ltd v  
      Minister of Trade and Industry  1996 (3) SA 989 (CC) par. 7. 
187  Du Plessis L Re-Interpretation of Statutes  (2002) at 205-206. 
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way they would have been used for statutory interpretation.  He then 
emphasises, however, that the use of the Act‘s definitions to interpret the 
Constitution is precluded ―if this would have the effect of subordinating 
the supreme Constitution to the Act‖.188 
 
Hofman189 supports this view only in passing.  In analysing the proposed 
Interpretation of Legislation Bill,190 he mentions that ―the law on 
interpreting legislation, as with all other law, depends on the 
Constitution‖.191  It is submitted that this statement emphasises that the 
Interpretation Act is subject to the Constitution. 
 
The South African Law Reform Commission itself  acknowledges192 the 
fact that the Interpretation Act  has to be governed by the Constitution.  
The Commission seeks to bring the Interpretation Act into harmony with 
the Constitution and to rename the Act the Interpretation of Legislation 
Act.  In stating its reasons for seeking to bring about changes in the Act, 
the Commission emphasises that the Interpretation Act ―was drafted 
during an era of parliamentary sovereignty, is in line neither with the 
                                                 
188  Du Plessis L Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) at 206. 
189  Hofman J ―Comments on the South African Law Reform  Commission‘s draft Interpretation  
      of Legislation Bill‖ 2007 SALJ 479. 
190  The draft Interpretation of Legislation Bill of 2006.  The draft Bill is the product of the South  
      African Law Reform Commission by which it seeks to bring changes to the Interpretation Act  
      33 of 1957 to bring it in line with the Constitution. 
191  Hofman J ―Comments on the South African Law Reform Commission‘s draft Interpretation of 
      Legislation Bill‖ 2007 SALJ  at 483.   
192  In its Discussion Paper 112 (Project 25) ―Review of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957‖. 
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current constitutional dispensation nor with the principles and practices 
of drafting and interpretation which the legislature and the courts have 
adopted since 1994‖.193  Further emphasising the supremacy of the 
Constitution over the Interpretation Act, the Commission has proposed 
that ―both section 39(2) of the Constitution and the reading down 
principle should therefore be reflected in an interpretation clause in the 
Interpretation Act to ensure compliance with the requirements of the new 
constitutional order‖.194  
 
Prior to 2005, the Constitution was referred to as the ―Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996‖.  By referring to it as an Act of 
1996, its supreme status was reduced to that of an Act of Parliament.  To 
emphasise the supremacy of the Constitution above other laws enacted 
by Parliament, the Citation of Constitutional Laws Act,195 was passed.  
This Act proscribed the reference to the Constitution as an Act.  It 
provided that it must be referred to as the ―Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996‖. 
                                                 
193  Discussion Paper 112 (Project 25) ―Review of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957‖ at (vii). 
194  Discussion Paper 112 (Project 25) ―Review of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957‖ at 39.  The  
      Commission has proposed to emphasise the supremacy of the Constitution by having section  
      4 of the proposed Interpretation of Legislation Bill read as follows: 
              4.  When interpreting legislation — 
                   (a)  the supremacy of the Constitution is paramount; 
                   (b)  the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution  
                         must be promoted; and  
            (c)  any reasonable interpretation that is consistent with the Constitution must be 
                  preferred over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with the  
                  Constitution. 
195  Act 5 of 2005. 
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Although ―definitions‖ are mentioned by Du Plessis as one of the 
conspicuous waymarks in constitutional interpretation, the definitions 
contained in the Constitution itself have a limited role to play, compared 
to the role played by the definitions in the Interpretation Act in 
interpreting statutes.  
 
2.13  When the constitutional text itself is seemingly self-contradictory 
 
It happens that the text of the Constitution itself gives rise to 
interpretation problems, in that the text is actually, or at least seemingly, 
self-contradictory.  For example, section 8(3) of the Constitution196 uses 
the article ―a‖ in relation to the word ―court‖.  The ordinary meaning 
conveyed by the indefinite article ―a‖ in any context is that, that which is 
being referred to can be any of the available kinds.  In this particular 
case, since the article ―a‖ is used in relation to the word ―court‖, the 
proper understanding would be that any court — whether higher court or 
lower court — has the jurisdiction to develop the common law.  A similar 
provision is section 39(2), which provides that:  ―When interpreting any 
                                                 
196  The full provisions of section 8(3) of the Constitution are as follows: 
      ―When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of  
      subsection (2), a court— 
      (a)  in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the  
           common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
     (b)  may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in  
           accordance with section 36(1)‖. 
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legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights‖.197  The use of the two words, ―every court‖, 
wipes off any distinction between lower and higher courts.  The meaning, 
therefore, would be that higher courts and lower courts are all competent 
to develop the common law. 
 
On the other hand, section 173 expressly assigns the jurisdiction of 
developing the common law to higher courts, by stating that:  ―The 
Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the 
inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop 
the common law, taking into account the interests of justice‖.  Further 
uncertainty is caused by the use of the word ―inherent‖ in relation to 
power.  Higher courts have the inherent power to develop the common 
law.  This would imply that the competence of these courts to develop the 
common law is something to be accepted without questioning, by virtue 
of their status, whereas lower courts do not have this competence 
automatically, but would have it if bestowed upon them, by legislation, 
for instance.  These are self-contradictory, or at least seemingly self-
contradictory provisions of the Constitution, which require a wise 
interpretation approach.   
 
                                                 
197  emphasis added. 
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In a situation of this nature, it is prudent to proceed from the departure 
point that the drafters of the Constitution did not intend to contradict 
themselves.  Once this departure point has been accepted, efforts will be 
aimed at finding an interpretation which will reconcile the conflicting, or 
seemingly conflicting, provisions.  Also, the approach recommended by 
the Constitutional Court, per Ngcobo J,198 contributes to harmonising 
seemingly self-contradictory provisions of the Constitution.  Ngcobo J 
recommended: 
 
      The proper approach to constitutional interpretation involves a combination of textual  
        approach and structural approach.  Any construction of a provision in a constitution must be  
        consistent with the structure or scheme of the Constitution.  This provides the context within  
        which a provision in the Constitution must be construed.199 
 
Since section 173 stipulates that only higher courts have the jurisdiction 
to develop the common law, and since other provisions do not have this 
stipulation, it follows that the provisions which do not make this 
stipulation should be understood in the light of the provision which 
makes the stipulation.  This would mean, therefore, that when section 
8(3) uses the words: ―a court‖, it refers to any court of the rank of a 
higher court.  Once the rank has been identified, the indefinite article ―a‖ 
would refer to any court in that rank.   
                                                 
198  In Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others   
      2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC). 
199   Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2007  
      (1)  BCLR 47 (CC)  at pars. 36-37. 
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The same applies to section 39(2).  With this understanding, ―every court‖ 
would refer to every court in the rank of higher courts.  Indeed, section 
170 throws some light on how sections 8(3) and 39(2) are to be 
understood.  Although section 170 does not specifically mention the 
development of the common law, it draws a line of distinction between 
higher and lower courts.  The section empowers magistrates‘ courts and 
all other courts to decide any matter determined by an Act of Parliament, 
but to any court of a status lower than a High Court, the section denies 
the right to enquire into, or rule on the constitutionality of, any 
legislation, or any conduct of the President. 
 
The Constitutional Court reasoned along these lines when it dealt with 
Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions.200  However, the Constitutional 
Court went beyond the text of the Constitution itself in its endeavour to 
reconcile the seemingly conflicting provisions.   It considered the 
Magistrates‘ Courts Act201 itself.  Section 110 of that Act, in the spirit of 
section 170 of the Constitution, prohibits a Magistrate‘s Court from 
pronouncing on the validity of any law or conduct of the President.  It 
must be emphasised, however, that it is the pronouncing of invalidity that 
is prohibited by both section 110 of the Magistrate‘s Court Act and 
section 170 of the Constitution, and not the developing of the common 
                                                 
200  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC). 
201  Section 110 of the Magistrate‘s Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
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law.  Whereas the text of the Constitution itself leaves the matter unclear, 
the Constitutional Court has, by way of interpretation, brought clarity on 
the issue in Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions.202 The 
developments leading to this case were that, in a criminal case before a 
regional court magistrate, the accused was charged with the rape of a 
nine-year old girl.  The evidence was that the accused had penetrated the 
complainant per anum.203  At that stage, the facts before the learned 
magistrate, if accepted, justified a conviction of indecent assault as a 
competent verdict to the charge of rape. In fact, the State sought a 
conviction for indecent assault.  Likewise, the defence contended for such 
a conviction if the accused were to be found guilty.  However, the 
regional court magistrate, despite being a judicial officer of a lower court, 
took it upon himself to develop the common law of rape to include non-
consensual sexual intercourse with a female per anum.  In giving reasons 
for his unusual decision, the learned magistrate stated, inter alia, the 
following: 
 
1. The archaic common law definition of rape (and the concomitant  
                  penal provisions upon a conviction of the offence of rape provided  
                  for in Act 105 of 1997) discriminates arbitrarily against all (males  
                  and females, children and adults) with reference to which kind of  
                  sexual penetration is to be regarded as most serious — such  
                  discrimination is illogical, unjust, irrational and unconstitutional and  
                                                 
202  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC). 
203  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2006 (2) SACR 357 (T) at 363. 
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                  negates the rights to values of human dignity, equality and freedom  
                  (s 7(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
2.              Where necessary the Court, even a lower court, is mandated to    
            develop the common law in terms of s 8(3) of the Bill of Rights to  
            give effect to victims‘ and society‘s rights and interests and to limit  
            the rights of accused.204 
 
 
In terms of section 52(1) and (3) of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act,205 the proceedings were thereupon stopped, 
and the accused was committed to the High Court for the 
purpose of determining whether the conviction was in order, 
and if so, the appropriate sentence. 
 
When the matter came before the High Court, the Court 
rejected206 the State‘s submission that section 173 of the 
Constitution does not permit a lower court, which is a creature 
of statute, to develop the common law, by reasoning that the 
matter was in any event before the High Court at that stage, 
and therefore the question whether the lower courts were 
permitted to develop the common law was somewhat irrelevant.  
                                                 
204  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2006 (2) SACR 357 (T) at 363H-364A     
      [emphasis added]. 
205  Act 105 of 1997. 
206  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and  Others 2006 (2) SACR 357 (T) at 373G-H. 
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The High Court extended the definition of rape and declared207 
the common law definition of rape unconstitutional, and the 
matter was referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation 
of the order. 
 
Of relevance here for purposes of this discussion is the 
Constitutional Court‘s finding on the question whether lower 
courts may develop the common law.  The Constitutional Court 
held208 that the suggestion by the High Court that magistrates 
are empowered to develop the common law was incorrect.  As 
reasons for this finding, the Constitutional Court referred to a 
principle of law, namely, the doctrine of stare decisis. The 
Constitutional Court reasoned209 that if magistrates‘ courts 
were allowed to develop the common law, their 
pronouncements would create a fragmented and possibly 
incoherent legal order.  An effective operation of the 
development of the common law principles depends, reasoned 
the Court, on the maintenance of a unified and coherent legal 
system, a system maintained through the recognised doctrine 
of stare decisis.  It is submitted that this view is correct. The 
                                                 
207  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2006 (2) SACR 357 (T) at 380J. 
208  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC) at 464C. 
209  Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (2) SACR 435 (CC) at 463G-464C. 
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Court‘s resorting to some consideration outside the text of the 
Constitution, was a plausible approach in the circumstances.   
 
There is a dearth of academic writing on the propriety of the 
development of common law by lower courts.  Dersso,210 
however, aligns himself with the view that lower courts are, by 
inference, barred from developing the common law. 
 
Indeed, the interpretation of seemingly conflicting provisions of the 
Constitution may require a consideration of law, or considerations 
outside the text of the Constitution itself. 
 
This approach of taking into consideration factors outside the text of the 
Constitution leads to the question of giving effect to competing rights.  
The question arises whether, where rights compete, it is in the spirit of 
the Constitution with its Bill of Rights, to decide a constitutional issue in a 
manner repugnant to common sense, public policy, or boni mores of 
society.  It is submitted that the answer is no.   
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This issue arose in Afrox Health Care Bpk v Strydom.211  The parties, a 
hospital and a patient, had signed a contract at the time of the admission 
of the patient to the hospital.  The contract contained a clause 
indemnifying the hospital from liability for negligence on the part of its 
medical staff or its agencies.    
 
The patient was operated on and, after the operation, complications 
developed which were alleged to have been caused when a nurse acted 
negligently by bandaging the patient too tight so that blood circulation 
was restricted to an area that was sensitive after the operation.  This 
negligent conduct by the nurse, contended the patient, was a breach of 
the contract that resulted in him suffering damage amounting to R2 
million.  The patient conceded that he had personally signed the contract 
on admission, but contended that he signed the document without 
having read it. He had merely signed on the part of the document 
indicated to him by means of a cross.  He contended that he was not 
aware of the content of the clause in question when he signed the 
admission document, and that the onus was on the hospital clerk to draw 
to his attention the content of the clause in question.  He contended that 
the reason he believed there was a legal duty on the clerk to draw the 
content of the clause to his attention was that he was not expecting a 
provision such as was contained in the clause to be in a contract with a 
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hospital.  For these reasons, the patient based his claim for damages on 
the legal point that the clause was against public interest, that it was 
contrary to the principles of good faith, and that the admission clerk had 
a legal duty to draw his attention to the unusual content of the clause in 
question. 
 
In deciding the question, the Supreme Court of Appeal should have had 
regard to one of the principles of the law of contract, namely, that 
contracts that are against the boni mores of society, or are against public 
policy, are unenforceable by law.212  Indeed, it is against public policy for 
a health institution to hold itself not liable for negligence.  Negligence 
cannot be condoned in any social system, and no law, statute or common 
law, may condone negligence.  For this reason, negligence is a form of 
fault that is prosecutable in criminal law.  If a criminal charge which rests 
on intention as a form of fault, fails, prosecution may fall back on 
negligence.213  Negligence also sustains an action for civil damages.214  
 
A court can also take into consideration that some contracts are often 
presented in fine print on the reverse side of the document, and that it is 
                                                 
212  Kerr A J  The Principles of the Law of Contract  (2002) 6th ed at 187; Christie R H The Law of  
     Contract in South Africa (2006) 5th ed at 382; Guest A G (ed) et al Chitty on Contracts —  
     General Principles (1977) 24th ed at 414. 
213  For example, should a charge of murder fail, which requires intention as a form of fault, it may  
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      be convicted.  In terms of criminal law, culpable homicide is a competent verdict for the crime  
      of murder.  See Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law (2006) at 159-160. 
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a common human failure not to read the fine print on the reverse side of 
a document.  This common human failure is something that manifests 
itself in situations which do not involve illness.  If this is so, then a court 
should be even more prepared to take judicial notice of it in the case of a 
patient who is being admitted to a hospital for a serious procedure like 
surgery.   
 
According to Du Plessis,215 this is a matter in which the Court, with 
prudent reliance on existing law, could resolve in a manner quite 
consistent with, and indeed conducive to, constitutional values, the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, without deducing the answer 
directly from the provisions of the Constitution.  But the Court failed to 
do so.  Instead, the Court raised a constitutional right that was irrelevant 
in the circumstances of the case — freedom.  It is submitted that the 
Court inappropriately invoked the parties‘ right to freedom to enter into 
contract.  The Court thus refused to interfere in a contract which, 
according to the Court, the parties had entered into voluntarily in the 
exercise of their freedom of choice.   
 
It is submitted that it could only be said that the parties had exercised 
their freedom to choose if the one party had drawn special attention of 
the other party to those clauses of the contract which would work 
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prejudicially to the other party, so that the other party entered into 
contract with informed choice.  Freedom to choose without informed 
choice is no freedom. 
 
In any event, the constitutional right to freedom envisaged by section 12 
of the Constitution, is not freedom in the context of entering into 
contracts.  The freedom envisaged and expressed by section 12 is 
freedom from arbitrary detention, physical assault, or cruel treatment.  
Invoking section 12 of the Constitution to justify the freedom of majors 
to enter into contract is to invoke that right out of its intended context. 
 
The patient also relied on section 27(1)(a)  of the Constitution, which 
entrenches the right to health care.  According to Du Plessis,216 there was 
an even more important right which both parties and the Court failed to 
discern that it was at the central stage of the issue, namely, the patient‘s 
right to the security of his person, as entrenched in section 12(1) of the 
Constitution.  A patient who goes to a hospital, argues Du Plessis, 
typically puts his or her physical and psychological well-being in the 
hands of the hospital and its personnel, because he or she needs special 
care.  An indemnifying clause in a contract, construed with due regard to 
the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights, could thus hardly 
indemnify a hospital against negligent non-performance of precisely that 
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which the patient sought to procure by contracting with the hospital, 
namely, the diligent and expert care for the security of his or her person.  
It is submitted that this reasoning is correct, and is in the spirit of the Bill 
of Rights. 
 
2.14  Neutrality in interpretation 
 
A factor that has been a silent challenge to judges interpreting a 
constitution has been the maintenance of neutrality.  As will be seen in 
the next Chapter, the fact that judges who have to interpret a constitution 
are part of society, poses a challenge for them when called upon to 
adjudicate on matters which they can take judicial notice of.  They 
witness developments in the communities in which they live.  They have 
their own personal feelings about developments.  These  developments 
sometimes end up in their courts for a legal settlement. 
 
Acknowledging the difficulty that he personally had in the enforcement of 
a discriminatory law, the Group Areas Act,217 King J in S v Adams,218 
expressed the difficulty he was faced with in these words: 
 
      An Act of Parliament creates law but not necessarily equity.  As a Judge in a Court of Law I  
       am obliged to give effect to the provisions of an Act of Parliament.  Speaking for myself and if  
                                                 
217  Act 77 of 1957. 
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       I were sitting as a Court of Equity, I would have come to the assistance of the appellant.219 
 
It must be noted that the difficulties judges sometimes face existed even 
prior to our constitutional democracy, as seen in S v Adams.  Du 
Plessis220 mentions as an example of courts‘ failure to maintain 
impeccable neutrality the fact that more often than not, they enforced 
harsh apartheid legislation.221 
 
With the beginning of the new constitutional jurisprudence since 1994, 
some judges of the Constitutional Court of South Africa have been candid 
in admitting the difficulty of maintaining clean neutrality, while some 
have indicated that their integrity in this regard is unquestionable.  For 
example, Kentridge AJ admitted in S v Zuma,222 that it is not easy for a 
judge to avoid the influence of one‘s personal intellectual and moral 
preconceptions.223  On the other hand, Sachs J in Makwanyane,224 
maintained that their function was to interpret the text of the 
Constitution as it was, and that because of this, whatever their personal 
                                                 
219  S v Adams  1979 (4) SA 793 (T) at 801A-B; see also  Du Plessis L  ―Interpretation‖ in Woolman  
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     Africa (2009) Vol 2  at 32-46. 
221  Rossouw v Sachs  1964 (2) SA 551, 562E-H (A). 
222  S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
223  at par. 17. 
224  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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views were on the subject of capital punishment, their response should 
be a purely legal one.225 
 
The expressed stance by Sachs J is a standard that the Court as 
represented by all its members should strive to reach, but not necessarily 
the personal views of each member of the Court.  Some of the factors 
which contribute to the difficulty of maintaining impeccable neutrality are 
dealt with in the next Chapter.   
 
It was as early as before the Constitutional Court could sit for its first 
constitutional case that it expressed its duty to be apolitical in its 
function. The text of the Constitution had not been certified yet, because 
it was in the Certification Judgment 226 that the Court emphasised that it 
had a judicial and not a political mandate, that its function was to certify 
that all the provisions of the interim Constitution complied with the 
constitutional principles.  That could only be described as a judicial 
function, a legal exercise.  A constitution, by its very nature, deals with 
the extent, limitations and exercise of political power.  The Constitutional 
Court  acknowledged that it had no power, mandate, or right to express 
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views on the political choices made by the Constitutional Assembly in 
putting together the text of the Constitution.227   
 
Several judges, both of the Constitutional Court and the High Courts 
respectively,228 have since the time of the Certification Judgment 
acknowledged the fact that constitutional interpretation may, to a certain 
extent, be tainted with considerations other than the purely legal ones.  
In Makwanyane,229  Kriegler J mentioned the folly of denying that the 
adjudication of matters by courts, particularly constitutional matters, calls 
for value judgments in which extra-legal considerations may loom 
large.230  A year later, O‘Regan J231 opined that different courts 
interpreted the right to equality differently not only because of 
differences in the text of their constitutions, but also because of the 
different philosophical understandings of the right to equality by the 
judges.232  However, the most candid acknowledgement of extra-legal 
considerations influencing judgments was made by the South African 
Constitutional Court itself when in President of the RSA v SA Rugby 
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      Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); S v Makwanyane and  
      Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); Brink v Kitshoff NO  1996 (4) SA 197 (CC); President of the RSA  
      v SA Rugby  Football Union  1999 (4) SA 147. 
229  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).   
230  at 476B.  
231  Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (4) SA 197 (CC). 
232  at par.216-I. 
86 
 
Union,233 not just an individual judge, but the entire Court, expressed the 
words that ―absolute neutrality on the part of a judicial officer can hardly 
if ever be achieved‖.234  In feeling this way, the Court quoted as source of 
solace the words of Cardozo J,235: 
 
       There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not,  
         which gives coherence and direction to thought and actions.  Judges cannot escape that  
         current anymore than other mortals.  All their lives, forces which they do not recognise and  
         cannot name, have been tugging at them.236 
 
It would appear, therefore, that despite the best of intentions, 
constitutional interpretation is likely to be tainted by considerations other 
than legal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
233  President of the RSA v SA Rugby Football Union 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC). 
234  at 173C to 175A . 
235  Cardozo B N The Nature of Judicial Process  (1921) 12, 13, 167;  R v S  (1997) 118 CCC (3d)  
      353. 
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CHAPTER  3 
 
Inadequacy of interpretation theories without consistency 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter has outlined the foundation on which constitutional 
interpretation is based.  Other principles have also been considered which 
fall outside the conventional theories, but which may assist, at least in 
the opinion of some writers,237 in coming to a proper understanding of 
constitutional provisions. 
 
However, litigants who are laypersons are not interested in the 
interpretation theories applied by courts in interpreting a constitution, 
but in the certainty that, just as a court ruled in a particular way in a prior 
case with similar facts, their litigation has prospects of success, based on 
previous similar cases.  This is where consistency becomes relevant. 
 
This chapter sets the tone for a discussion, in the next chapter, which 
shows the desirability of consistency in constitutional interpretation, as 
consistency is found to be lacking in different areas of constitutional 
                                                 
237  Du Plessis L ―Interpretation‖ in Woolman Roux et al Constitutional Law of South Africa Vol 2  
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jurisprudence which have been the frequently trodden ground before 
courts.   
 
3.2  Lack of consistency 
 
It is disturbing, for instance, to find that a court uses the generous 
approach together with the purposive approach in a matter where the 
litigant is not in danger of losing his life, but in a more deserving matter 
which involves the loss of life, the court restricts itself to the literal 
meaning approach.238  A case in point is the Makwanyane case,239 which 
will be dealt with at length later, where the right to life was given a 
generous interpretation where the right-bearer was facing death.  
However, in Soobramoney v Minister of Health,240 the right to life was at 
issue, and the right bearer was similarly facing death, but a different 
approach was used, the ordinary meaning approach.241  Thus, Mr 
Makwanyane and his co-accused had their lives saved while Mr 
Soobramoney had his life sacrificed.  Because of inconsistency, a litigant 
whose right to life is under threat, and is approaching a court for relief, 
cannot count on the certainty which should characterise the adjudication 
of rights of a similar nature.  Further, judges interpreting the Constitution 
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have emphasised242 the wisdom of a value judgment which, according to 
Mahomed CJ, as he then was, ―requires objectivity to be articulated and 
identified, regard being had to the contemporary norms, aspirations, 
expectations and sensitivities of the . . . people‖.243  Against this 
background, it was felt in Makwanyane that a court may not allow itself to 
be guided by public opinion in interpreting the Constitution, in casu the 
right to life.  With these two thoughts in mind, it is difficult to draw a line 
between a ―value judgment‖, as endorsed by Mahomed CJ, and public 
opinion. This is because public opinion reflects the values of society.  
 
The combination of all approaches to constitutional interpretation 
without the thread or element of consistency running through, merely 
underscores Solove‘s244 view that courts do not seem to strive at all 
towards consistency in their interpretation approach.  Rather, they are ―all 
over the map when it comes to the method of constitutional 
interpretation.  Sometimes the Court reads the Constitution broadly and 
dynamically; sometimes it interprets the Constitution narrowly; 
sometimes it becomes a textualist; sometimes it becomes obsessed with 
original intent.  And all this can happen in the same year‖.245 
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In South Africa, High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal have had 
the jurisdiction bestowed upon them of pronouncing on constitutional 
matters and interpreting the Constitution.246  The Constitutional Court, 
on the other hand, is the apex court in constitutional matters.247   
 
3.3 Influence of personal beliefs on consistency 
 
In examining the subject of inconsistencies in constitutional 
interpretation, one must not lose sight of the fact that judges are human.  
Of course, once seated on the Bench, they are officers entrusted with the 
onerous responsibility of wielding the sword of justice, and of 
interpreting the Constitution.  Entrusted though they are with this high 
office, judges have to battle with the indisputable fact that they are still 
human beings, and go about their personal affairs of life in the midst of 
society for whom they have to administer justice.  Sometimes judges,248 
mero motu, take judicial notice of certain facts, or events, in the local or 
international community.  True, they exercise restraint in taking judicial 
notice.  The point is, however, the fact that they sometimes do take 
judicial notice, is evidence that they are not detached from the 
communities in which they administer justice. 
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Further, it cannot be gainsaid that judges go to polling stations and cast 
a vote on election day.  This indisputable fact points in the direction that 
judges have political sympathies like the community they serve, and they 
may also have religious and cultural leanings.  Judges may also not be 
immune to feeling a sense of loyalty or allegiance to the government or 
head of government, if that head of government had a role in their 
nomination or appointment. 
 
What Sachs J states in this regard,249 that: 
 
      Our function is to interpret the text of the Constitution as it stands.  Accordingly, whatever  
        our personal views on this fraught subject might be, our response must be a purely legal  
        one250 
 
is a noble principle which should guide judges in interpreting the 
Constitution, but the question of whether this noble principle is, in fact, 
practised to the letter, is a question best answered honestly only by each 
individual judge, when seized with a constitutional matter which 
challenges society‘s, an individual‘s, and the judge‘s own beliefs. 
 
The question whether the political climate, religious or cultural 
idiosyncrasies influence judges or not — and to what to extent — is a 
moot point.  If this influence is conceded, it automatically extends to the 
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question of consistency in constitutional interpretation, especially where 
the same right, in different cases, is at stake. 
 
The point must not be lost sight of as to what consistency is desirable.  It 
is not the consistency of a judge in reading into the Constitution his or 
her preferred idiosyncrasies, so that whenever a constitutional right is at 
stake before court, the judge interprets the constitution consistently 
guided by his or her personal preferences.  Rather, it is consistency in 
employing the conventional methods of constitutional interpretation 
whenever a right which was previously in issue before the same judge 
comes before him or her again for adjudication.  The same right cannot 
be sacrosanct, inalienable, uncompromisable by the limitation clause, in 
one case, and yet be vulnerable, alienable, and subject to the limitation 
clause, in another future case. 
 
Kelly251 is strongly of the view that ―the courts have shown no consistency 
with regard to any particular approach . . . and this gives rise to the 
suspicion that individual judges are willing to rely on any such approach 
as will offer adventitious support for a conclusion which they have already 
reached‖.252   
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The allowing of personal inclinations to becloud judgment may cause a 
judge to depart from a well-decided interpretation precedent, or to stick 
to a badly decided interpretation precedent.  The law, interpretation 
principles, and consistency, may be thrown to the winds. 
 
No human is endowed with the supernatural ability to read hearts and 
minds.  What Sachs J stated in Makwanyane, that regardless of their 
personal inclinations, their duty is to interpret the Constitution as it 
stands, is a desire, a principle, expected of judges, and does not 
necessarily reflect the true position. Constitutional interpretation 
involving the right to life, the right to equality as applied to homosexuals, 
and the right to exercise one‘s culture — can hardly be said to be 
possible without the judge‘s own personal, religious, political, or cultural 
ideologies being touched. 
 
Confirming the fact that personal feelings cannot be dismissed as of no 
consequence in constitutional interpretation is the response given by an 
aspirant Constitutional Court judge, Cameron J, of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal at the time. Asked at the interview as a self-declared HIV-positive 
judge, whether his HIV-positive status would stop him from hearing HIV-
related cases brought before the Constitutional Court, he responded that 
he would not hear cases related to HIV treatment.253  This response 
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confirms two things: first, that it is possible for a judge interpreting the  
Constitution to allow himself or herself to be swayed in his or her 
judgment by personal feelings of whatever nature; second, that it is 
possible, though hard, for a judge interpreting the Constitution to be 
mindful of what is expected of him or her while on the Bench, namely, to 
strip oneself of personal idiosyncrasies, and to interpret the Constitution 
with integrity, having regard to constitutional interpretation precedent. 
 
Consistency in constitutional interpretation does not render the 
Constitution an old obsolete book.  Well has it been said254 that the 
Constitution is a living document, and it must be seen to continuously 
reflect the values of the generations in which it continuously finds itself, 
and the will of the generation it finds itself in at any given time in 
history.255 
 
However, versatile and a living document though a constitution should 
be, this does not render a healthy pattern of consistency impossible.  A 
sound interpretation of a constitutional provision, arrived at after a 
thorough exploration of all factors, will pass the test of time.  It will prove 
to be sound interpretation in good as well as in bad times.  Thus, its 
consistent application will never be regretted.  Not many judges have 
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come to realise the unsurpassed value of this.  Barak J256 is one of the few 
who have come to this plausible realisation.  In a lecture, Barak J made 
this remarkable statement:  ―We should assume that whatever we decide 
when terror is threatening our security will linger many years after the 
terror is over.  Indeed, we judges should strive for coherence and 
consistency.  A wrong decision in a time of war and terrorism plots a 
point that will cause the judicial graph to deviate after the crisis 
passes‖.257  
 
The following chapters will deal with practical situations in constitutional 
interpretation, showing the desirability of consistency in constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
256  In his lecture entitled ―Human Rights in Israel‖, as part of the annual John Foster Lecture  
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CHAPTER  4 
 
Consistency as applied to the right to life 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
Life.  This word probably ranks among the shortest words in humankind‘s 
vocabulary.  Yet, nothing can be performed without life, nor can anything 
be enjoyed without it. In fact, so many rights hinge on it as a pivot.  All 
the rights encapsulated in the Bill of Rights are reduced to no rights at all 
without life as they cannot be enjoyed without it, and once life ceases, 
cease all the rights in the Bill of Rights.258  In the field of human rights 
litigation ―the value of life‖ has been described as being ―immeasurable 
for any human being‖ and life itself has been described as something to 
be protected by the States.259  Viewing the right to life through the prism 
of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, one finds that it is judged as a 
right that is given greater protection than the protection extended to it by 
other jurisdictions.260  For example, article 21 of the Constitution of 
India261 entrenches the right to life by providing that no person shall be 
deprived of his life, but attenuates the entrenchment by adding the 
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qualification ―except according to procedure established by law‖.  Article 
2(2) of the Constitution of Germany262 also protects the right to life and 
other related rights by providing that ―every person shall have the right to 
life‖, but attenuates that protection by adding that this right ―may be 
interfered with only pursuant to law‖.  Likewise, article 4(1) of the 
Constitution of Botswana263 affords protection for the right to life by 
providing that ―no person shall be deprived of his life intentionally‖, but 
that protection is weakened by the addition of the qualification ―save in 
execution of the sentence of a court in respect of an offence under the 
law in force in Botswana of which he has been convicted‖.  By comparison, 
however, section 11 of the Constitution of South Africa does not have 
these qualifications in entrenching the right to life. 
 
Judged by the protection it enjoys and by the immeasurable value it is 
said to have, one logically expects that the right to life will be accorded 
consistent recognition throughout all litigation battles where it features. 
 
There is a need to maintain consistency in the construction of 
constitutional rights, guided by the fundamental principle of judicial 
precedence.264  The construction of the right to life is no exception to the 
                                                 
262  The Constitution of Germany came into operation in 1949. 
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rule.265  Comparative law may be an invaluable guide and international 
law an indispensable instrument in arriving at the appropriate 
interpretation of a constitutional right.266  Comparative law has been 
defined by Church et al 267 as ―a discipline which involves a scientific legal 
discourse relating to two or more legal systems at least one of which is 
one foreign to the comparatist‖.  According to the learned authors, where 
there are gaps, or where there is ambiguity in our law, recourse to other 
systems in comparative perspective would be wise.  Especially would such 
a step be necessary where concepts in our law have been transplanted 
from another jurisdiction.268  A fact cited by the authors269 as an example 
of jurisdictions making use of comparative law is the practice of the 
European Court of Justice of the European Communities where the judges 
from the various Member States of the European Union are bound to draw 
upon their experience as lawyers within those various states. 
 
As far as international law is concerned, section 231(4) of the 
Constitution provides that any international agreement becomes law in 
South Africa when it is enacted into law by national legislation.  In S v 
                                                                                                                                                 
      precedents is, by definition, indispensable‖ [emphasis added]. 
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Makwanyane 270 the Constitutional Court made it clear that both binding 
and non-binding international agreements may be used as tools of 
interpretation.  As such, international agreements and customary 
international law provide a framework within which the Bill of Rights can 
be understood.271   
 
There is a distinction between binding and non-binding international law.  
According to Church et al,272 binding law in the context of the 
pronouncements made by the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane 273 
would refer to human rights conventions ratified and enacted into law274 
by South Africa and such international human rights norms that have 
assumed the status of customary international law.  Non-binding law 
would include a variety of international instruments such as conventions 
not ratified by South Africa, declarations, resolutions by the General 
Assembly and other bodies, decisions and general comments of treaty 
monitoring bodies.  Church et al 275 explain that these sources are tools 
of interpretation, and as such, they must be considered alongside other 
tools.  It is the view of the learned authors that the ability of these tools 
                                                 
270  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 35. 
271  The Bill of Rights was contained in Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution, when S v  
      Makwanyane was decided. 
272  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
     Perspective (2007) at 214. 
273  S Makwanyane and Another 1995(3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 35. 
274  In terms of section 231(1), (2) and (4) of the Constitution. 
275  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
     Perspective (2007) at 215. 
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to guide courts will depend on the comparability of the instrument 
concerned. 
 
However, having made use of comparative law, international instruments, 
and legal interpretation principles, judges should be able to arrive at an 
interpretation in which reasonable consistency rings through.  
 
When the Constitutional Court started functioning, it was probably not 
faced as it is today with accusations of being politically biased and 
handing down judgments which manifest its being swayed by political 
considerations.  Today, however, accusations of this nature are more of a 
reality than a prediction and a perception.  Thus, the words of Rycroft 
written fourteen years ago are today apt.  He expressed the view276 that, 
faced as it is with many challenges, the Constitutional Court would rescue 
itself from the morass of accusations of bias by adhering to stare decisis 
as a guiding rule which will go some way in protecting it from allegations 
of shifting to conform to the prevailing political will. 
 
Where this study deals with consistency in the interpretation of the right 
to life in respect of capital punishment, and in respect of preserving the 
life of the terminally ill, and in respect of extending constitutional 
protection to an unborn life, this study endorses neither side of the 
                                                 
276 Rycroft A ―The Doctrine of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Court Cases‖ 1995 SAJHR  587, 592. 
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controversies surrounding these matters, as that is not meant to be its 
purpose.  This study simply deals with the sorely neglected and yet 
desirable need for consistency at all times when the right to life had 
occasions of becoming the subject matter of litigation before courts and 
the need for consistency in future adjudication.   
 
4.2  Consistency in interpreting ―life‖ as a right 
 
It is a  trite rule of interpretation that interpretation — whether of a 
statute, or a constitutional provision — begins with the most rudimentary 
approach, the ―ordinary meaning‖ approach.277  Almost invariably, in 
harnessing this approach, courts consult a dictionary as a point of 
departure.278  One reference work defines ―life‖, inter alia, as ―all living 
things, taken as a whole‖.279  Webster‘s Third New International 
Dictionary 280 defines ―life‖, inter alia, as ―the quality that distinguishes a 
vital and functional being from a dead body or purely chemical matter.‖  
It becomes vividly clear that on the basis of these reference work 
definitions, life — if one uses the common everyday language — simply 
means the state of being alive, and that this state of being alive 
encompasses, according to Collins, even ―things‖ — not only a person in 
                                                 
277  Crabble V, Understanding Statutes (1994), at 85, emphasises  that if the words are in  
      themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those  
      words in their natural and ordinary sense. 
278  Miers D R and Alan C Page Legislation  (1990) at 164 [emphasis added]. 
279  Makins M et al (eds)  Collins English Dictionary  (1991)  3rd edition. 
280  By Gove P B (ed) 1961 edition. 
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the legal sense, referred to in legal terminology as a legal persona. It is 
worthy of note that reference works shun restricting their definition of 
―life‖ to ―person‖, although this, of course, does not exclude ―person.‖ 
 
The celebrated case of modern times in which the right to life became a 
bone of contention was the Christian Lawyers Association case.281  In that 
case, the salient fact that strikes one‘s mind is that the Court was at pains 
to maintain that the unborn is not a person: 
 
     It is not necessary for me to make any firm decision as to whether an unborn child is a legal  
       persona under the common law . . . There is no express provision affording the foetus (or  
       embryo) legal personality or protection.282 
 
Perhaps this was the first step taken by the Court in the straying 
direction.  Section 11 of the Constitution entrenches the right to life, and 
not the right to personhood, or the right to the status of being a legal 
persona or a legal subject, and therefore the pondering of the question 
when does personhood start was a misguided effort on the part of the 
honourable Court.  The submission that the Court was asked to accept 
was not that the unborn was a person, as the Court misguided itself to 
think, but that the unborn was an organism, something that had life in it, 
and that it was therefore entitled to retain that life.  The Court went on to 
                                                 
281  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others 1998 (11)  
      BCLR 1434 (T). 
282  McCreath J at 1441 G – H 1443 B- C. 
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express its view that if the drafters of the Constitution had wanted to 
protect the foetus in the Bill of Rights, section 28, which specifically 
protects the rights of the child, would have been an appropriate vehicle, 
and that if the drafters had intended to include the right of the unborn to 
life, they would expressly include this in section 11.283  What the Court 
failed to realise is that, by the same argument, if the drafters had 
intended section 12(2) to include the right of a woman to terminate the 
life of her unborn, they would have expressly included this.   
 
It is an inexplicable oversight that each time the interpreters of the South 
African Constitution — the Court in casu included — interpret section 
12(2), they invariably interpret it with narrowly.  The subsection is 
invariably construed as applying only to women.  This is inexplicable.  
The word ―everyone‖ encompasses both sexes.   ―Bodily and psychological 
integrity‖ is a phenomenon claimable by both men and women.  ―Security 
in and control over‖ one‘s body is a desirable phenomenon applicable to 
both sexes.  ―Reproduction‖ is a miracle of nature that takes two — a man 
and a woman — to occur.  The right ―not to be subjected to medical or 
scientific experiments without [one‘s] informed consent‖ is a right 
claimable by both men and women. 
 
                                                 
283 at 1442. 
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It becomes an unsolved puzzle, then, why the subsection, in an 
endeavour to construe it, is made to apply only to women.  Positing that 
the reason therefor is the use of the word ―reproduction‖, that, too, does 
not satisfy the enquiry.  The dictionary meaning of the word 
―reproduction‖ as a noun is:  ―any of various processes, either sexual or 
asexual, by which an animal or plant produces one or more individuals 
similar to itself; the act or process of reproducing; the state of being 
reproduced‖.284  The dictionary meaning of the verb form, ―reproduce‖, is:  
―to produce or exhibit again; to bring back into existence again; to 
recreate; to regenerate‖.285  It may be observed from the dictionary 
phases of meaning that the word has as its meaning  producing  as 
opposed to ―not producing‖.  The construction breathed by the Court into 
section 12(2)(a) is that of ―not reproducing.‖   
 
This point is confirmed if one looks at the argument advanced by  Van 
Oosten286 in his discussion of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy 
Act.287  He pays particular attention to ―reproductive rights‖ as promoted 
by the Act and then comments as follows: 
    
      The use of the expression ‗promotes reproductive rights‘ is in one sense ironic and in  
        another sense redundant, because from the title and provisions of the Act it transpires that  
                                                 
284  Makins M et al  (ed) Collins English Dictionary  (1991) 3rd edition at 1315 [emphasis  
      added]. 
285  Makins M et al (ed)  Collins English Dictionary  (1991) 3rd edition at 1315. 
286  Van Oosten F ―The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act:  Some Comments‖ 1999 SALJ  62.  
287  Act 92 of 1996. 
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        what is promoted is the right not to reproduce.  It may be argued that the right not to  
        reproduce is implicit in the right to reproduce and that these rights simply represent reverse  
        sides of the same coin.  But that does not alter the fact that reproduction and non- 
        reproduction are not quite the same thing, and that the provisions of the Act are concerned  
        exclusively with the promotion of non-reproduction rights [emphasis added].288 
 
The above argument by Van Oosten applies squarely to section 12(2)(a) 
of the Constitution.  The emphasis is on the positive, the ―doing‖ side, of 
the ―coin‖ and not on the negative, desisting side.  The view advanced by 
the Court that if the drafters had intended to include a foetus in the right 
to life they would have expressly expressed such intention, applies here 
with equal force.  If the drafters had intended ―reproduction‖ to mean 
―non-reproduction‖ they would have used that term.  
  
It is submitted that the Court further missed the point in holding that: 
 
      The answer hereto does not depend on medical or scientific evidence as to when the life of a  
        human being commences and the subsequent development of the foetus up to date of birth.   
        Nor is it the function of this Court to decide the issue on religious or philosophical  
        grounds.289 
 
The challenge may well have been brought by a religious entity, but the 
question to be unravelled was not a religious one, nor was it one of 
philosophy, as the Court was inclined to believe, and indeed not even one 
                                                 
288  Van Oosten F ―The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act:  Some Comments‖ 1999 SALJ 62. 
289  at 1438 D. 
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of law, as the Court asserted it was.290  Questions of law do indeed fall in 
the domain of the court, to be resolved by a court by way of 
interpretation.  But there are ―certain matters on which the court is not 
competent to form an opinion, or in which it is not . . . qualified . . . to 
draw an inference from certain facts‖291 since the subject may be one 
which requires sophisticated study.  And there is no doubt that the 
question involved here was one belonging to a particular discipline — 
that discipline being medical science  292 — in which the Court needed to 
be guided by experts of a ―special study‖.293  Undoubtedly, the question 
of the formation of life, since it involves the functioning of the body 
                                                 
290 Fedler J  ―Life‖ 1998 (2) Revision Service at 3. 
291 Scoble C N  The Law of Evidence in South Africa  (1952)  3rd edition at 196;  Hoffman L H  
     and  Zeffert D The South African Law of Evidence (1988) 4th edition at 97. 
292 See in this regard  Davel C J  Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (2000) at 7 where Davel  
     states that in matters of this nature ―medical evidence is used‖. 
     See also Cronjé D S P et al  The South African Law of Persons and Family Law (1986) 2nd edition  
     who write:  ―The courts will naturally rely on medical evidence to prove that a child was born  
     alive and in  medical practice the test applied to determine whether the child was born alive is  
     also to establish whether it has breathed‖ at 14 [emphasis added]. 
     In addition, in her article ―Are the Human Embryo and the Foetus extra uterum  sufficiently  
     protected in terms of South African Law?‖, 2001 (495) TSAR at 498, Slabbert M N makes the  
     point that ―in determining what would be legally permissible or impermissible, the courts will  
     take into account the views of reputable members of a profession as to what activities in the  
     field of their discipline are proper or improper.‖ 
     See also Naudé  T ―A Note on Christian Lawyers Association of SA v Minister of Health‖  
     1999 SAJHR at 541, 547:  ―A careful consideration of these issues might have revealed that  
     medical evidence may be relevant  to the interpretation of s12(2)(a), which, in turn, has a  
     bearing on the interpretation of s11‖ [emphasis added]. 
     See also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 120 ed 2d 674; 112 SCt 2791; 505 
     US 833 at paragraph 95:  ―There may be some medical developments that affect the precise  
     point of viability‖ [emphasis added]. 
293 Buzzard  J H et al Phipson on Evidence (1970) 11th edition at 507.  It is noteworthy that the  
     authors enumerate among subjects which require expert testimony:  ―gestation‖ at 511 and  
     512, which term is defined by Collins English Dictionary as ―the development of the embryo of  
     a viviparous mammal, between conception and birth.‖ 
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cells,294 is a science, and these sciences command deserved respect, 
which respect they are accorded by courts by letting scientists speak the 
first word in their own territory of study.  From as long ago as the 
sixteenth century, in 1556, Saunders J held that: 
 
     If matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or faculties we commonly apply for  
       the aid of that science or faculty which it concerns.  This is a commendable thing in our law.   
       For thereby it appears that we do not dismiss all other sciences but our own, but we approve  
       of them and encourage them as things worthy of commendation.295 
 
Further support for the fact that the formation of life and its development 
in the womb is a science falling in the realm of medical scientists can be 
found in the words of Hiemstra J in Pinchin 296 : 
 
      Why should an unborn infant be regarded as a person for the purposes of property but not  
        for life and limb?  I see no reason for limiting the fiction in this way, and the old authorities  
        did not expressly limit it.  It is probably because the state of medical knowledge at the time  
        did not make it possible to prove a causal link between pre-natal injury and a post-natal  
        condition, that it did not occur to them to deal with this situation [emphasis mine]. 
 
As can be seen from the quotation, Hiemstra J links the ―unborn infant‖ to 
―medical knowledge‖, something which — and in fact a precedent — 
                                                 
294  Jordaan D W ―The legal status of the human pre-embryo in the context of the genetic  
      revolution‖ 2005 237 SALJ at 238: ―Our biological discussion should logically start with the  
      basic building block of life on earth: the ‗cell‘ . . . An adult human will have approximately 100  
      billion cells in his or her body‖ [emphasis added]. 
295  Buckley v Rice-Thomas (1554) 1 Plowd. 118, at 124. 
296  Pinchin and Another, NO v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 (2) SA 254 (W) at 259. 
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McCreath J in Chritian Lawyers Association failed to take notice of or to 
attach due weight to.  Astonishingly, McCreath J himself refers to the 
Pinchin case in his judgment, but apparently failed to appreciate its 
importance. 
 
This was the first time that the Court gave little consideration to the 
golden rule of judicial precedence or stare decisis, and thus failed to give 
effect to the wise guidance given by Saunders J.  If the reasoning of the 
Court in Christian Lawyers Association were to be followed297 it would 
mean, in effect, that in adjudicating questions of the cause of death of a 
human being in criminal cases,298 the Court does not need to listen to the 
evidence of a district surgeon called by the State.  It would also mean that 
in endeavouring to establish how close the gunman was to the deceased 
when he fired a shot,299 it would be unnecessary to call and listen to the 
evidence of a ballistic expert, since these are matters upon which the 
court is competent to adjudicate without the assistance of an expert.  It is 
common knowledge that in law such reasoning is fraught with danger, 
                                                 
297  The reasoning of the Court was that the answer to the question of when does the life of a  
      human being begin does not depend on answers offered by medical or scientific scholars, but  
      was a legal question which fell within the realm of the court to unravel and settle. 
298  Cause of death where criminal prosecution will ensue is often ascertained by means of a  
      postmortem examination, and a postmortem examination report in the form of an affidavit is  
      compiled for the court by the doctor dissecting the dead body.  See, for example, S v Thomo  
      and Others 1969 (1) SA 385 (A). 
299  The gunpowder blackening around the gunshot wound is, according to ballistic experts, a  
      conclusive indication that the gunman shot the deceased at close range.  See, for example, S v  
     Van As 1991 (2) SACR 74 (W) at 89. 
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and any cases decided on this unwise reasoning fall to be set aside on 
appeal. 
 
4.3  ―Life‖ seen through the prism of experts 
 
There is a rich body of embryology textbooks in which the medical 
science fraternity shed convincing light on the subject of how and when 
life begins, thus assisting courts in deciding — in a manner that would 
reflect consistency — the perplexing question of whether the 
constitutional right to life extends to the unborn. 
 
For example, Moore and Persaud300 (their qualifications are indicated in 
the footnote to found their authority in their scientific field)301 write that 
the zygote (the cell resulting from the union of an ovum and a 
spermatozoon) is the beginning of a new human being.  Human 
development begins at fertilisation, they write, the process during which 
a male gamete or sperm unites with a female gamete to form a single cell 
called a zygote.  They state that this highly specialised cell marks the 
beginning of each of us as a unique individual.302 
 
                                                 
300  Moore K L and Persaud T V N The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology (2006)  
      6th ed at 2–18. 
301  More holds a PhD degree, and Persaud an Md (Master of Medicine) degree. 
302  at 2 – 18. 
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O‘Rahilly and Muller303 write that fertilisation is an important landmark 
―because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct 
human organism is thereby formed‖.304 
 
Authors Potter and Craig305 scientifically assert that ―every time a sperm 
cell and ovum unite a new being is created which is alive and will 
continue to live unless its death is brought about by some specific 
condition‖.306 
 
In addition to the consistent scientific findings found in medical 
textbooks, experts have gone on record publicly affirming their 
sophisticated scientific research findings.  For example, in 1981 a United 
States Senate judicial subcommittee listened to the following scientifically 
researched testimony from a sizable number of medical experts: 
 
Professor Micheline Matthews-Roth307 said that it is incorrect to say that 
biological data cannot be decisive, but what is scientifically correct is that 
an individual human life begins at conception. 
 
                                                 
303  O‘Rahilly RR and Muller F Human Embryology & Teratology (1996) at 5 – 55. 
304  emphasis added. 
305  Potter E L and Craig J M Pathology of the Fetus and the Infant (1975) 3rd edition at vii. 
306  emphasis added. 
307  of Harvard University Medical School. 
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Dr Alfred M Bongioanni308 said:  ―I have learned from my earliest medical 
education that human life begins at the time of conception.‖ 
 
Dr Jerome LeJeune309 made these remarks:  ―After fertilisation has taken 
place a new human being has come into being. It‘s no longer a matter of 
taste or opinion.  It is plain experimental evidence.  Each individual has a  
very neat beginning, conception‖.310 
 
Gordon311 remarked:  ―By all the criteria of modern molecular biology, life 
is present from the moment of conception‖ [emphasis mine]. 
 
Faced with these scientific public assertions, the United States Senate was 
persuaded that physicians, biologists and other scientists are in 
agreement that conception marks the beginning of life, something that 
the Court in Christian Lawyers Association dismissed as religious and 
philosophical views, choosing instead to attempt to give a legal answer to 
a scientific question.  By the same token, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court 
missed the mark in S v Jasi 312 when it expressed the view that ―those 
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and 
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus‖ regarding the 
                                                 
308  Professor of Pediatrics and Obstetrics, University of Pennsylvania. 
309  Professor of Genetics, University of Descartes. 
310  emphasis added. 
311  Gordon H is a professor of Mayo Clinic. 
312  1994 (1) SACR 568 (Z) at 571 A. 
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commencement of life.  The true position is that those trained in the 
discipline of medicine are ad idem on the question.  The Court 
erroneously thought that such consensus should exist among the 
professionals of all three disciplines, and in so doing it lost sight of the 
fact that the question involved was one of biology and medical science, 
and that it does not land in the realm of philosophy and theology. 
 
Put simply, death is the antithesis of life.  In fact, death brings an end to 
what is called life.  It also brings an end to legal personality.  Lawyers and 
judges have accepted it as a matter of practice that it is people in the 
medical profession who are scientifically competent to certify a person 
dead.313  By the same token, it is people in the medical profession  who 
are scientifically competent to certify the beginning of the opposite of 
death — life.  Regrettably, however, this simple fact of life eluded the 
Court in Christian Lawyers Association. 
 
In South Africa, scientists at the University of Cape Town Bioethics 
Centre314 are in unison with scientists internationally.  Noteworthy is the 
fact that their scientific findings are in line with the law.  They ascribe the 
                                                 
313  See B Van Heerden et al Boberg‘s Law of Persons and the Family (1999) 2nd ed at 50. 
314  In 1994 these scientists were:  S R Benattar (Director), C Abels, R Abratt, J Anthony, D Benatar,  
     D Brooks, J Degenaar, D Dent, M de Villiers, J Dommisse, F du Preez, A du Toit, K Espley, J  
     Glasewski, W Landman, G Lawrence, A Malan, D Meyerson, E Nash, S Ress, P Reynolds, M F N  
     Shutte, J van den Heever, J G van der Vyver, J P V van Niekerk, R van Zyl Smit and T Zabow. 
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status of personhood to the moment of birth,315 but the status of 
possessing life they ascribe to the foetus stage.316  It is submitted that 
this is the view that the Court should have adopted as this view finds 
support in the legal rule of stare decisis as will be shown below. 
 
4.3.1  Consistent legal view of ―life‖ established by precedent 
 
If one traces the development of law by almost five decades to the 1960‘s 
during the time of cases like Pinchin,317 and if one does not stop there 
but traces further back to the times of Roman and Roman-Dutch law,318 
one finds that there has always been respect — sometimes subdued 
respect — for the unborn child as an entity that has life in itself.  This 
respect does not necessarily mean the recognition of the unborn as a 
person, but as an entity possessing life, and consequently as an entity 
entitled to life.  This respect has consistently manifested itself both in 
common law and statute. 
 
 
                                                 
315  Cronjé D S P Die Suid-Afrikaanse Persone- en Familiereg (1986) 2nd edition at 13. 
316  They wrote in the South African Medical Journal  of August 1994, Volume 84, No. 8 that ―The  
     fetus is unquestionably  a living organism, biologically a member of the human species (human  
      being) and has the potential to mature into a person with the intellectual and emotional  
      features which characterize normal adult life.  However, a fetus lacks these characteristics of  
      personhood and the possession of potential is not the same as actual personhood‖ [emphasis  
      added]. 
317   Pinchin and Another NO v Santam InsurancebCo Ltd  1963 (2) SA 254 (W). 
318  Davel  C J Introduction to Child Law in South Africa  2000  at 3. 
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4.4  At common law 
 
Commendably, the Court in Christian Lawyers Association alluded to 
Pinchin, but as stated in the preceding paragraph, the development by no 
means starts there.   
 
The protection of the interests of the unborn entity can be traced back to 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law where it was embodied in the Latin maxim 
nasciturus pro iam nato habetur quotiens de commodo eius agitur.319  
The maxim was especially invoked in matters of succession.320 Put in 
simple terms, it was applied to the advantage of an unborn child who was 
already in ventre matris (in the mother‘s womb) when the testator made  
a will.  It is of significance that the maxim excluded a child who was not 
yet conceived when the testator made his last will and testament. 
 
The consistent chain of the application of this principle commences in 
1905 in the matter of Estate Lewis v Estate Jackson. 321  It was used to 
justify the inheriting of a benefit by an heir where the testator had died 
prior to the birth of the heir, but where the heir had already been 
conceived.  The fact that a child who was not already conceived at the 
time of the testator‘s death did not inherit is pregnant with significance.  
                                                 
319 Meaning:  ―The unborn is deemed to have been born where his or her inheritance is  
     concerned‖. 
320 Estate Lewis v Estate Jackson  1905 22 S.C. 73. 
321  1905 22 SC 73 75. 
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It established beyond question the recognition given to the life of the 
unborn child, though not regarded as a legal persona, and that since no 
life had started forming in the case of a child who was not already 
conceived at the time of the testator‘s death, there was no basis for such 
a child to benefit from the testator‘s estate. 
 
Later in 1910 the recognition was echoed in Estate Delponte vs De 
Fillipo322 where the child heir was born seven months after the testator‘s 
death, in other words, the child was already conceived when the testator 
made his will.  The next child, however, was born three years after the 
testator‘s death.  Basing its decision on Voet 323 the Court held that: 
 
      as the vesting took place then, it would affect only such nieces and nephews as were then  
        already in ventre matris, and accordingly Luigi Delponte, who was not born until three years  
        after the testator‘s death, cannot share in this bequest; but Loreta Delponte, who was born  
        seven months after the event, and who, in the course of Nature, must then have been in  
        ventre matris, will participate.324 
 
Once again it will be noticed that only the child who was already 
conceived during the lifetime of the testator, and not the child conceived 
thereafter, was entitled to benefit.  This is so notwithstanding the fact 
                                                 
322  Estate Delponte vs De Fillipo and Others  (Supreme Court Reports) 1910 Vol 1 CPD 334 - 346 
323  ―It is clear that this is a case where the principles laid down in Voet  (28, 5, 13) . . . should be  
      applied,‖ held the court at 345 of the Estate Delponte case. 
324  at 346. 
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that the child was not a legal subject in ventre matris, but on the ground 
that life had begun forming. 
 
Twenty-six years later, in 1936, the principle was further consistently 
entrenched when the matter of Botha and Others 325 served before courts.  
The Court upheld the defendant‘s contention that any child in ventre 
matris at the time of the testator‘s death shares in the bequest of the 
residue. 
 
Just before the emergence of Pinchin the chain of recognition for life in 
ventre matris once again had occasion to be entrenched in Boedel 
Steenkamp.326  Worth of mention is the fact that in seeking to arrive at 
the correct interpretation, the Court traced back to the beginning of the 
twentieth century the correct view to be held of the interests of the 
unborn life.  The cases referred to in the preceding paragraphs were 
relied upon, and they led the Court to this order: 
 
     Dit word bevel dat wat die restant van die testateur se boedel betref Paul Johannes beskou  
       moet word as in lewe by die dood van die testateur en geregtig is om gelykop te erf . . .327 
 
Since then the celebrated case of our later times, Pinchin in 1963, has 
been the guide relied upon where the interests of a life in the mother‘s 
                                                 
325  Botha and Others v Thompson, N. O. 1936 SA CPD 1. 
326  Ex Parte Boedel Steenkamp 1962 (3) 954 OPD. 
327  at 958. 
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womb are concerned.  Little did the Court know, or so it would seem, 
when deciding Christian Lawyers Association  that the authority it made 
reference to, Pinchin, was not the beginning, but was just one link in a 
long chain of judicial precedence with its beginning in times of Roman 
and Roman-Dutch law.  Nor did the Court fully appreciate that this case 
has some other significance other than the significance it attached to it.  
As a matter of fact, the Pinchin case propped up the very view the Court 
elected to leave unsupported — that the question of the development of 
life in the womb is one that falls within the purview of medical science,328 
and that life itself begins before birth and not at birth.329  The Court in 
Pinchin did not waiver in holding that these questions had been settled a 
long time ago by our Roman law.330  As a consequence hereof, the 
Court‘s verdict was that the plaintiff was successful on the question of 
law, but the only reason the plaintiff‘s civil claim was not successful was 
                                                 
328  at 259. 
329  at 255. 
330  The Court referred to Roman law which gave an answer in D.1.5.7. where it stated:   
      ―A child in its mother‘s womb is cared for just as if it were in existence.‖ 
 
      And in D.1.5.96: 
 
      ―Those who are unborn are, by almost every provision of the Civil Law, understood to be  
      already in existence; for estates legally descend to them, and if a pregnant woman is taken  
      by the enemy, her child has the right of postliminium.‖ 
 
      And in D.50.16.231: 
 
      ―When we say that a child, who is expected to be born, is considered as already in existence,  
      this is only true where his rights are in question.‖ 
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that on the merits the plaintiff failed to prove the nexus between the 
injury and the damage caused on a balance of probabilities.   
 
The Court then forestalled the likely argument — that the passages 
reproduced in the footnotes on this page are not always regarded as 
decisive of the issue — by stating that it is because all commentators 
have related them to the law of succession and to the question of status, 
that is, whether a person is a slave or a free man.  In this regard, it is 
submitted by this study that it really does not matter whether it was only 
in connection with the law of succession that Roman law accorded an 
unborn infant the status of a person, because the nature or status of a 
thing does not vacillate from one thing to another depending on reasons 
or circumstances.  If something is something, then it is that something.  
A baboon or a guerrilla is not an animal when it is to its disadvantage to 
be an animal, but a human being when it will be in its interests to be 
regarded as a human being.  To illustrate further, theft does not become 
something less than theft if the person stealing was prompted by hunger, 
nor does it become something more serious than theft simply because 
the person stealing was prompted by an incorrigible criminal heart.  By 
the same token, the fact that an unborn infant was regarded in Roman 
law as already being born or in existence when it would be in its 
advantage, that alone establishes the fact that it has life.  And if one 
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thinks of it really, there is no stage when anything good is not to the 
advantage of the unborn infant.331 
 
Further adding weight to the point that courts have consistently — 
though sometimes in a subdued way — shown respect for the unborn as 
possessing life, is the English case of Re S 332 where the Court said: 
 
      The court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction to authorise the surgeons and staff of a  
        hospital to carry out an emergency Caesarian section operation upon a patient contrary to  
        her beliefs if the operation was vital to protect the life of the unborn child.333 
 
And at 672-C the Court again reiterated the point: 
 
      He has done his best, as have other surgeons and doctors at the hospital, to persuade the  
        mother that the only means of saving her life, and also I emphasise the life of her unborn  
       child, is to carry out a Caesarian section operation. 
 
Thus, respect for life has been an identifiable common thread throughout 
common law and case law. 
 
 
 
                                                 
331  Hiemstra J holds at 256:  ―Whether the foetus is a ‗person‘ or not, seems to me to be  
      irrelevant.  If the legal fiction applies that it is to be regarded as if it is already born whenever  
      this should be to its advantage.‖ 
332  Re S (adult: refusal of medical treatment)  [1992] 4 All ER 671. 
333  at 671-E. 
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4.4.1  In statutes 
 
The ring of consistency in recognising the unborn as having life is evident 
not only at common law but also in statutory law.  Invariably, statutes do 
not furnish reasons why they contain a certain provision which protects 
the unborn, but logic makes it sufficiently clear that the underlying 
reason is the recognition of and respect for the life that has started 
forming. 
 
The now obsolete section 278 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
(with its predecessor being section 331 of the same Act of 1955) is a case 
in point.334  The statutory provision provided that if a woman who had 
been sentenced to death happened to be pregnant, her execution would 
be held in abeyance until such time that she had delivered the child.  
However, the onus was, according to the wording of the section, on her 
to bring an application for such a suspension of execution.  This 
consideration was made out of regard  for the fact that what she was 
                                                 
334  Section 278 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provided: 
      ―(1)  When sentence of death is passed upon a woman, she may at any time after the passing  
             of sentence apply for an order to stay execution on the ground that she is quick with  
             child. 
(2) If such an application is made, the court shall direct that one or more duly registered  
             medical practitioners shall examine the woman in a private place, either together or  
             successively, to ascertain whether she is quick with child or not. 
(3) If upon the report of any of them on oath it appears that the woman is quick with child,  
      the court shall order that the execution of the sentence be stayed until she is delivered of  
      a  child or until it is no longer possible in the course of nature that she should be so  
      delivered.‖ 
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carrying was life.  This consideration also stood in stark contrast to the 
theory that the unborn attains personhood after being separated from the 
mother.  The consideration underscores the fact that life begins earlier 
than birth. 
 
Cronjé335 raises a question, left unanswered by section 278, as to what 
the position would be in the case where the woman was in fact pregnant 
but did not bring the application — it could be out of ignorance, or she 
could be refusing to do so.  Cronjé‘s own speculated answer is that the 
state would mero motu stay the execution until the birth of the child.   
 
Further statutes have continued to maintain the chain of the consistency 
of the law in recognising the unborn as life and, accordingly, entitled 
thereto.  Under ―Definitions‖ The Long Term Insurance Act336 defines ―life 
insured‖ as meaning ―the person or unborn to whose life, or to the 
functional ability or health of whose mind or body, a long-term policy 
relates‖.337  Section 1(2) provides that ―for the purposes of entering into a 
long-term policy the life of an unborn shall be deemed to begin at 
conception,‖ something which the Court had difficulty coming to terms 
with, and the long chain of consistency it elected to disregard.  
Interestingly, The Long Term Insurance Act became law in the same year 
                                                 
335  Cronjé D S P et al The South African Law of Persons & Family Law (1986) 2nd edition at 27. 
336  Act No 52 of 1998. 
337  emphasis added. 
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in which the Court interpreted the right to life in a way which runs 
counter to consistency and established precedence. 
 
It is true that this case did not have the benefit of being decided by the 
Constitutional Court.  Even so, however, it was heard and decided by a 
court which, in terms of the Constitution,338 has the jurisdiction to hear 
and decide constitutional conflicts. 
 
At this juncture it is apt to reiterate what was pointed out at the outset in 
this chapter, that it is not the purpose of this study to endorse any side of 
the controversy as to when life begins — albeit it may so sound.  Where it 
does sound like the study endorses one side or the other, it is only 
because consistency resulting from adherence to precedence, yields such 
result. 
 
4.4.2  In the academic sphere 
 
Writers seem to align themselves with the pattern established by courts 
from time fathomable.  For example, Slabbert refers to the Medical 
Research Council guidelines as being consistent with the law, albeit they 
themselves do not constitute law.  One such guideline protects the pre-
natal life by requiring that ―the pre-embryo must be treated with the 
                                                 
338  Section 169. 
123 
 
utmost respect because it is a genetically unique, viable human entity‖ 
and that if it is to be transferred to a woman‘s uterus, special care should 
be taken to ensure its ―welfare‖.339 
 
It must be noted that here Slabbert‘s discussion centred around the 
protection of this living organism prior to its being inserted into the 
woman‘s uterus.  It is informing to note that even at this rudimentary 
stage of an endeavour to form life, the medical discipline is of the view 
that this rudimentary organism warrants protection and welfare 
considerations. 
 
Slabbert then took the subject a step further by considering the question 
after the organism was transferred into the womb.340  She ponders a 
question not covered anywhere in our law of the right to medical 
treatment of an infant born alive prematurely in the course of termination 
of a pregnancy.341  She holds the view that the rights of such an infant 
are similar to those of an infant born prematurely and spontaneously.342  
As pointed out nowhere does our law provide an answer to this question.  
However, this view is not without basis.  The long chain of court  
                                                 
339  Slabbert M N ―Are the human embryo and the foetus extra uterum sufficiently protected in  
      terms of South African law?‖ 2001 (495) TSAR 499. 
340  Slabbert  M N ―Does South African abortion legislation protect the human embryo and the  
      foetus in utero sufficiently?‖ 2001 (729) TSAR. 
341  in terms of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 92 of 1996. 
342  at 740. 
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decisions handed down over the centuries, together with the pattern 
established by some statute law, lends support to this academic view. 
 
Jordaan343 prefaces his scientifically sophisticated and erudite discussion 
of the legal status of the human pre-embryo in the context of the genetic 
revolution by highlighting the great strides made in the scientific 
understanding of life.  He points out that certain mysteries which 
surrounded this subject prior to these historic times of science have 
progressively been replaced by scientific understanding.  He 
distinguishes between a pre-embryo and an embryo and the legal status 
presently afforded the two.  Incidentally, the point is made in his 
discussion of what was referred to earlier in this chapter as a subdued (as 
opposed to overt) recognition of life in its pre-natal beginning. 
 
The National Health Act344 imposes certain limitations to the use of 
certain tissues or fluids extracted from a human body, and it expressly 
prohibits embryo research, although permission may be obtained for 
research on pre-embryos specifically.345  This is another indication of 
subdued recognition of the beginning of life. 
 
                                                 
343  Jordaan D W ―The legal status of the human pre-embryo in the context of the genetic  
     revolution‖ 2005 SALJ 237 – 249. 
344  Act 61 of 2003, which repealed the Human Tissue Act of 1983. 
345  Section 57(4) of the Act. 
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Relying on Silver‘s textbook,346 Jordaan concludes that a pre-embryo is 
alive, that a pre-embryo is human, but that the embryo is not human life 
per se since it does not have any neurological attributes that are ascribed 
to human life in a special sense.  It is, however, a human life in a general 
sense.  This scientific conclusion has, according to Jordaan, found 
backing in our recent case law.  In Clarke v Hurst ,347 the Court made a 
distinction between mere biological life and human life.  The detailed 
distinction, however, falls outside the scope of this study.  Suffice it to 
say that the pre-embryo, argues Jordaan, ―possesses an important 
characteristic that is its moral lifejacket:  it has the potential to become 
human life.‖348  In conclusion, he maintains that ―potential‖ has value and 
therefore if the pre-embryo has that potential, it deserves that 
protection.  Since the potential gradually becomes more of a reality with 
time, so must protection accorded gradually increase. 
 
It should be borne in mind that these arguments relate to the pre-
embryo, and that they apply with even greater force to the embryo.  To 
be sure, academic views do not constitute law, but they are desperately 
consulted by courts as a guide in endeavouring to arrive at an 
                                                 
346  Silver L M Remaking Eden  (1999) 25.  (Lee M Silver is professor of molecular biology and  
      public affairs at the Woodrow School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.   
      He holds a PhD degree in biophysics from Harvard University). 
347  1992 (4) 630 (D). 
348   See fn 133 supra, at 243. 
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appropriate interpretation of the law in general and the Constitution.349  
That being the case, the subject of the desirability of consistency in 
constitutional interpretation is not complete without them. 
 
It is believed that the permissive, free-for-all interpretation and counter-
interpretations of the life of the unborn would be put to an end if the 
Constitution had included a section dealing specifically with abortion by 
name, or if the right to life was crafted in express terms which settle once 
and for all the question of when life begins and, consequently, whether 
the pre-natal life should enjoy legal protection.  This is the view 
entertained by, among others, Sarkin.350  Of course, at the time of his 
writing the article, only the interim Constitution was available, and the 
final Constitution had not yet seen the light of day.  But the final 
Constitution is now our constitution, and it still left it to the courts to 
decide the question. 
 
While it is true that the inclusion of such a section in the Constitution 
would settle the matter once and for all, that would be the case perhaps 
only as far as litigation is concerned.  It would not silence those who 
clamour for the opposite situation.  This can be seen from the fact that 
the matter of capital punishment was settled once and for all, of course 
                                                 
349  See, for example, Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and  
     Others 1998 (11) BCLR 1434 (T) at 13, 14. 
350  Sarkin J ―Why There Should Be an Abortion Clause in the Final Constitution‖ 1995 (582) SAJHR  
      583. 
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not by the text of the Constitution, but by the Constitutional Court.  
Notwithstanding the finality of the matter, a large section of society still 
clamours for the reinstatement of capital punishment.  In fact, there was 
even talk of a referendum by the President of the ANC,  Jacob Zuma, in 
2008 prior to his elevation to the Presidency of the Republic.   
 
It cannot be said with certainty why the Constitutional Assembly and the 
drafters of the Constitution decided to draft the right to life in an open-
ended fashion, being open to more than one interpretation.  It could well 
be that the Assembly itself was not unanimous in abolishing the death 
penalty, or that it was timid in its decision to abolish it.  It is also possible 
that the Assembly simply transplanted a constitution of another 
jurisdiction into South Africa without pondering how the open-ended 
nature of the provision would ramify. 
 
On the other hand, it would appear that the provision was left open-
ended so that it could allow flexible application in the future.  In other 
words, it was left open-ended to allow for the abolishing of capital 
punishment if conditions of the country warrant it and to reinstate it 
when conditions warrant — in both ways by interpreting the provision in 
a way that favours the circumstances at that particular time.  This latter 
supposition finds support in the judgment of the Canadian Supreme 
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Court in Hunter et al v Southam Inc  351 where the Court pointed out that 
a constitution is drafted with an eye to the future.  The Court pointed out 
that provisions of a constitution, once enacted, cannot be repealed or 
amended at will, and therefore it should be drafted with some leeway to 
accommodate unforeseen future circumstances for many years to 
come.352  The view that the section entrenching the right to life, and in 
fact the entire Bill of Rights, was drafted with a view to accommodating 
future developments, finds support in Church et al, 353 who also refer to 
the case of Hunter et al v Southam Inc.  The authors express the view that 
the phrase ―advancement of human rights and freedoms‖ in section 1(a)  
of the Constitution denotes a continuing process of developing and 
improving the existing body of human rights norms.354  It is submitted 
that if human rights and freedoms are to be advanced, their 
interpretation must have some elasticity, depending on the prevailing 
circumstances. 
 
If the judgment in Hunter et al v Southam Inc 355 is anything to be guided 
by, this means that we may  expect vacillation from the Benches with 
regard to some or all of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.  It 
means that we may witness the overturning of the decision to abolish 
                                                 
351  Hunter et al v Southam Inc 1984 2 S.C.R. 145. 
352  Hunter et al v Southam Inc 1984 2 S.C.R. at 584. 
353  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective  (2007) at 170. 
354  Ibid. 
355  Hunter et al v Southam Inc  1984 2 S.C.R. 145. 
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capital punishment if conditions in the land warrant a re-interpretation of 
Makwanyane. 
 
According to Rycroft,356 such a turn of events is more of a certainty than 
just a likelihood.  Writing at the time when the Constitutional Court  was 
only delivering its first judgment in its existence, he said it would seem  
premature to consider how the Constitutional Court should approach 
overruling its own judgments when the time came, but changing 
circumstances and the changing composition of the Court would make 
revision inevitable.  Indeed, a new generation of the Constitutional Court 
judges may feel that some of the decisions of this Court reflect the boni 
mores of society and public policy of generations no longer now 
represented in our present society, and they may feel that a swing to 
another direction is due.357  A case in point is the American case Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey. 358  In this case the 
majority view of the United States Supreme Court was that the Court 
should faithfully adhere to precedence virtually at all costs.  The minority 
view, however, per Rehnquist CJ, was that the court is obliged to correct 
its errors despite reliance on those errors, by reason of precedence.359    
 
                                                 
356  Rycroft A ―The Doctrine of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Court Cases‖ 1995 SAJHR 587. 
357  See Duplessis M A ―Stare Decisis: Is the Onus in Restraints of Trade  Hanging on Thread‖ 2006  
      TSAR 423. 
358  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 120 L ed 674; 112 SCt 2791 (1992). 
359  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 120 L ed 674; 112 SCt 2791 (1992) 
      at 767. 
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Commenting on the decision of the Supreme Court of America in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey,360 Church et al 361 
write that since the seminal decisions of the Supreme Court of America 
on abortion and abortion funding by the state, unborn life forms had the 
misfortune of ending up in the ―hammer and anvil literature of the pro-
choice and pro-life groups‖.362  According to Church et al, these groups 
have not been able to come up with a solution to the dilemma 
surrounding abortion.  One of the negative results of the controversy 
surrounding abortion has, according to the authors, been the attack on 
abortion clinics  and the killing of abortion-performing doctors, a result 
that was probably not foreseen.363 
 
However, for purposes of this discussion, a pertinent point made by 
Church et al is the failure of constitutions and international conventions 
to provide clarity as to when life begins.364 They point out that the  only 
exception is the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights365,  Article 
4(1) of which provides: 
 
                                                 
360  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 120 L ed 674; 112 SCt 2791 (1992).  
361  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective (2007) at 277. 
362  Ibid. 
363  Ibid. 
364  Church J Schulze C Strydom H et al Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective (2007) at 276. 
365  Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which came into effect in 1978 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr4.html (accessed: 2011/08/19). 
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      Every person has the right to have his life respected.  This right shall be protected by law 
        and, in general, from the moment of conception.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his  
        life. 
 
A point is made by Church et al,366 however, that  despite the provisions 
of Article 4(1) which bring some certainty as to when life begins, some 
uncertainty still exists due to the insertion of the words ―in general‖.  
According to the learned authors, the Inter-American Commission 
decided that the drafting history of the American Convention and the 
insertion of the words ―in general‖ left the possibility open that states 
could, by their national legislation, regulate the most diverse cases of 
abortion.367   
  
Thus far it has been established that from the times of Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law the common law has been consistent in recognising — 
whether overtly or in a subdued way — the beginning of life before birth 
and the right of the unborn not to be deprived of what it is entitled to.  
Locally, respect for stare decisis which yields consistency has led courts 
in the earlier centuries to faithfully maintain the pattern which started in 
Roman times.  This pattern has manifested itself — again in some overt 
and subdued ways — in some local statutory provisions.  Regrettably, in 
recent years this consistency based on judicial precedence has been lost 
                                                 
366  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
     Perspective (2007) at 276-277. 
367  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
     Perspective (2007) at 277. 
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sight of by our local court in interpreting the right to life in the case of 
the unborn.  
 
4.5  In the law of the United States of America 
 
In deciding Christian Lawyers Association,368 McCreath J relied heavily, 
inter alia, on the United States case of Roe v Wade.369  Worth mentioning 
at the outset is that the very case McCreath J relied on enshrined the very 
principle he did not honour — precedence.  Also, McCreath J missed the 
most crucial point of the case he relied on.  And finally, while the majority 
judgment in Roe v Wade is to be applauded for honouring stare decisis — 
the majority judgment lacked foundation in interpreting the relevant 
United States constitutional provision in the way that it did.  These three 
points will now be discussed one at a time. 
 
The first consideration is that McCreath J, either unbeknown to him or 
because he simply ignored it, relied on a foreign judgment which 
enshrined the very principle he failed to honour.  Tracing the chain of 
precedence, the Court in Roe v Wade stressed that at common law it is 
undisputed that the termination of pregnancy before ―quickening‖, that 
is, the recognisable movement of the foetus in utero,  was not an 
indictable offence.  Thus, the common law afforded a woman the leeway 
                                                 
368  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others 1998 (11)  
      BCLR 1434 (T) (the first case). 
369  Roe v Wade  410 U. S. 113 (1973). 
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to terminate the life of the unborn in the first trimester, but prohibited 
this after this stage of development. In so doing, the law recognised the 
scientific fact that life had begun forming and that the protection of that 
life should gradually increase as the foetus gradually developed. 
 
The Court then established the chain by referring to the English statutory 
law, a case in point being the Malicious Shooting or Stabbing Act,370 
which made the abortion of a quick foetus a capital crime, but provided 
for a lesser sentence where it was procured before quickening, thus 
preserving the ―quickening‖ distinction.  The emphasis of the Act was on 
the destruction of the life of a child capable of being born alive.  It made 
a wilful act performed with the necessary intent a felony. 
 
The Court then drew attention to the laws of its own jurisdiction which 
provide guidance by way of judicial precedence as to how the life of the 
unborn should be viewed. The Court referred to a case of the early part of 
the twentieth century, Jacobson v Massachusets 371  which dealt with 
vaccination.  In this case the Court refused to recognise an unlimited 
right to terminate the life of the unborn at any stage of the pregnancy. 
 
                                                 
370 Malicious Shooting or Stabbing Act of 1803, which became known as the Lord Ellenborough  
     Act, 1803.  It became known as the Lord Ellenborough Act because it was proposed by the  
     Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Edward Law, 1st Baron Ellenborough.  Lord  
     Ellenborough wished to clarify the law relating to abortion, which at the time was not clearly  
     defined in the common law.   
371  Jacobson v Massachusets 197 U. S. 11 (1905). 
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Further strengthening the correctness of its interpretation of the right to 
life of the unborn, the Court drew attention to another precedent 
authority in its own jurisdiction, that of Buck v Bell, 372 a case which dealt 
in the main with sterilisation.  In casu, the right of a woman to bring an 
end to the life of the unborn at any stage was not allowed to go 
uncurtailed. 
 
In this regard the Supreme Court of the United States acted responsibly in 
arriving at an interpretation of the relevant constitutional provision — the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  As a consequence of this deeply entrenched  
legal view in the history of American law, the American Medical  
Association echoed for the practice of its medical practitioners an oath or 
affirmation which has its origin from an ancient philosopher — 
Hippocrates.  A portion of this oath relevant for the purposes of this 
discussion reads:  ―I will not give a deadly medicine to anyone if asked, 
nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner I will not give to a 
woman a pessary to produce abortion‖.373 This oath or affirmation has 
come to be known as the Hippocratic Oath.  
 
It is submitted that this oath or affirmation is the product of the 
consistent and unwavering view of the courts in the United States.  It is 
                                                 
372  274 U. S. 200 (1927). 
373  Ethical Codes and Declarations Relevant to the Health Professions, by Amnesty International  
     1994, pages 42, 43.  See also Truth and Reconciliation  Commission of South Africa Report    
     (1998) Volume 4, Chapter 5, Appendix 1, page 158. 
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unfortunate that our own court was not exemplary in this regard.  Even 
more unfortunate is the fact that it relied on an American judgment but 
failed to take heed of its way of arriving at an appropriate constitutional 
construction. 
 
A judge will, where necessary, consider foreign law in establishing how 
best to construe a constitutional provision.374  However, in invoking 
foreign law, a judge should not seek to interpret a constitution in a way 
that gratifies his or her personal preferences by being selective in his or 
her use of foreign law.  If a judge decides to rely on the law of a particular 
jurisdiction, then it must be manifest in his or her judgment that he or 
she has thoroughly considered all the laws of that country, even those 
that are unfavourable to the interpretation he or she prefers. And not 
only that, but he or she must state in the judgment the basis of his 
discarding certain laws of the same country.  In this regard, the Court in 
Christian Lawyers Association  fell short of meeting the criteria. 
  
The Court seems to have been selective in invoking the laws of the United 
States.  It elected to overlook the developments in the United States after 
the Roe v Wade 375 decision.  Roe did not mean the final settlement of the 
issue of the right to life of the unborn.  Nineteen years later, the Supreme 
Court of the United States had to deal with the same issue in the Planned 
                                                 
374  Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
375  Roe v Wade  410 U. S. 113 (1973). 
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Parenthood  376 case. Interestingly, this case served before the United 
States Court in 1992, whereas McCreath J was seized with the Christian 
Lawyers Association 377 case in 1998.  Thus, the Planned Parenthood case 
already existed in the body of the United States case law when McCreath J 
had to adjudicate the question of the right to life of the unborn.  
Astonishingly, however, he lets the matter rest at the Roe v Wade stage.   
 
The Planned Parenthood case is of no little significance.  Its whole 
objective was to have the Roe v Wade decision overruled as the feeling 
was intense that Roe was badly decided.  The majority decision in Planned 
Parenthood was that the three pillars of Roe should be retained. The 
Court referred to these three pillars as the ―essential holding‖,378 namely, 
(a) a recognition of the woman‘s right to choose to have an abortion  
before foetal viability; (b) a confirmation of the State‘s power to restrict 
abortions after viability; and (c) the principle that the State has legitimate 
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the 
woman and the life of the foetus that may become a child.379 
 
The crucial significance of the majority decision is that it resisted the 
overruling of Roe because the Court felt that it was bound by stare 
                                                 
376  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 120 L ed 2d 674; 112 SCt 2791 
      (1992). 
377  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others 1998 (11)  
       BCLR 1434 (T) (the first case). 
378  Davis D et al Fundamental Rights in the Constitution — Commentary and Cases (1997) at 64. 
379  at page 2 par. 1. 
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decisis.380  This approach of the Court is indeed commendable as it 
makes for certainty in constitutional litigation.  The Court felt that no 
judicial system could benefit society if it eyed each issue afresh each time 
the issue was raised in courts.  The Court so revered the principle of stare 
decisis that it went so far as to say that even international instruments 
need to be interpreted in the light of all its precedents.381 
 
The second point referred to as worth mentioning at the outset is that 
McCreath J missed the most crucial point of the case he relied on.  As 
stated at the outset, McCreath J got carried away in finding an answer to a 
question that was not an issue raised by the plaintiffs nor was it 
supposed to be — that a foetus is a person.  The issue raised by the 
plaintiffs was that the unborn has life.  McCreath J leaned heavily on Roe 
in dismissing the issue raised. 
 
However, Roe was not the right case law authority to sustain the Court‘s 
view.  On the contrary, Roe pointed in an opposite direction altogether.  
While it acknowledges the right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy 
prior to viability, this case entrenches the duty of the State to protect the 
life of the unborn as soon as ―quickening‖ or viability of the foetus 
                                                 
380  ―After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of  
      institutional integrity, and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential  
      holding of Roe v Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed,‖ was the Court‘s  
       judgment at 42. 
381  at 184. 
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begins.382  This decision also underscored the scientific fact of when life 
is presumed to begin — before birth, though not necessarily at 
conception according to the Roe decision, a fact which McCreath J 
missed.  As a matter of fact, the Court decried the grave defects in the 
country‘s laws — both common and statute — in that the law fully 
acknowledges the foetus in utero and its inherent rights for civil 
purposes, while it fails to do so in criminal law.383 
 
The fact that McCreath J was selective and thus inconsistent further 
becomes manifest in the light of his deliberate failure to take cognisance 
of the Court‘s view of a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy.  In 
response to the appellant and some amici‘s argument  that a woman‘s 
right to terminate her pregnancy was absolute and could be exercised at 
any time and in any way and for any reason, the Court was firm in 
expressing its disagreement.384   Thus, the Court reaffirmed the position 
which, according to the Court, had been established by precedence. 
 
                                                 
382  See Devenish G E  A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) at 106. 
383  at 75 – 76. 
384  ―On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman‘s  
      right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in  
      whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses.  With this we do not agree.  . . . a  
      State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical  
      standards, and in protecting potential life.  . . . The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot  
      be said to be absolute.  . . .  The court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this       
      kind in the past,‖ was the court‘s reasoning per Blackmun J. 
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If McCreath J had referred to the United States case law with a view to be 
guided thereby, he would have arrived at an interpretation consonant 
with the whole body of that case law and different from the interpretation 
he arrived at.385 
 
The third point referred to as worth mentioning at the outset is that while 
the majority judgment in Roe v Wade is to be applauded for honouring 
stare decisis, the majority judgment lacked foundation in interpreting the 
relevant United States constitutional provision in the way that it did.   
 
The constitutional provisions relied upon by the plaintiff in Roe v Wade 
were, inter alia, the First, the Fourth, the Fifth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution.386  It will be noted that 
                                                 
385  Smyth J ―Moving Towards Improvement in SA Abortion Legislation,‖ 2006 Tydskrif vir  
     Christelike Wetenskap 223 – 239,  makes the point that the Planned Parenthood  
     decision reinforced the State‘s legitimate interests in the life of the foetus, and that this  
      interest might be legitimately promoted ―by enacting restrictive measures to encourage  
      childbirth rather than abortion‖, at 223. 
386  The Amendments in question provide: 
      Amendment I 
      ―Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free  
       exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom  of speech, or of the press; or the right of the  
       people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.‖ 
      Amendment IV 
      ―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against  
       the unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,  
       but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the  
       place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‖ 
       Amendment XIV (1868) 
       Section 1 
       ―All persons born or naturalised in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,  
        are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or       
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other amendments have not been reproduced in the footnote.  This is 
because of their irrelevance to the questions raised before the court.  The 
litigant claimed that the laws of Texas infringed on her right to privacy — 
the right to do what she pleased to do in her privacy.  By any stretch of 
the imagination, the Amendments simply fall short of covering the right 
to privacy, let alone the right to terminate a pregnancy. 
On the contrary, the First Amendment merely protects the right to 
practice one‘s religion, the freedom of speech, of the press, to assemble, 
and to express grievances against Government. 
 
The Fourth Amendment deals with physical security to be enjoyed by 
citizens indoors, and the right not to be unduly searched.   
 
The Fourteenth Amendment merely deals with the right of citizens and or 
naturalised citizens, and their right not to be deprived of certain 
privileges without due process of the law.  Indeed the dissenting minority 
was correct in holding that ―a woman‘s decision to abort her unborn child 
is not a constitutionally protected ‗liberty‘ because (1) the Constitution 
says absolutely nothing about it.‖   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
         enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United  
         States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due  
         process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the  
         laws.‖ 
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As a matter of fact, the context of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it 
clear that the ―liberty‖ the Constitution had in mind was liberty from 
being deprived of life, liberty from incarceration, liberty from 
expropriation.  This is underscored by the use of the phrase ―without the 
due process of law‖.  This phrase contextualises the Amendment by 
showing that if any person were to be deprived of his or her life by being 
executed, deprived of his or her liberty by being kept in custody, 
deprived of his or her property through expropriation by the State,  it 
would invariably be by due process of the law, and not arbitrarily.  
Assuming that the ―liberty‖ also envisaged the liberty of a woman to 
terminate a pregnancy, it boggles the mind how a woman would first 
have to go through the ―due process of the law‖.  This glaring lack of 
insight on the part of the majority of the court in this regard betrays its 
failure to make use of the contextual approach to the interpretation of a 
constitutional provision. 
 
Further strengthening the correctness of the view that the word ―liberty‖ 
in the Fourteenth Amendment refers to liberties other than the liberty of 
a woman to terminate the life of the unborn, is the content of the same 
right as contained in the European Convention on Human Rights — an 
international instrument.387  As can be seen from the content of article 5 
                                                 
387  Article 5 of the Convention provides: 
      ―Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.  No one shall be deprived of his  
       liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
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in the footnote, nowhere does this right in any way come near the right of 
a woman to decide on reproduction as was mistakenly so believed in Roe 
v Wade and in Christian Lawyers Association. 
 
The majority decision in Roe v Wade further missed the point in reading 
into the Fourteenth Amendment the right to privacy.  As already pointed 
out in the actual reading of the Amendment, nothing comes near to even 
suggesting the right to privacy, in which privacy a woman could be free to 
do as she pleases with her body or pregnancy.  The minority judgment 
correctly and emphatically maintained, per Rehnquist CJ,  that ―I have 
difficulty in concluding, as the Court does, that the right ‗of privacy‘ is 
involved in this case . . . A transaction resulting in an operation such as 
this is not ‗private‘‖.  Indeed, Douglas J was poignant in stating that 
―there is no mention of privacy in our Bill of Rights.‖  This is significant 
because the South African court relied on this right.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person . . . 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him 
before the competent legal authority . . . 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order . . . 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of . . . 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised 
entry into the country . . .‖ 
See also P van Dijk and G J H van Hoof Theory and Practice of the European  
Convention on Human Rights (1990) 2nd ed at 251. 
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Besides, even if the right to privacy featured in the United States 
Constitution, as it does in the South African Constitution, holding that a 
woman is not answerable to the State for what she does in her privacy — 
in this case, terminating the life of the unborn — would imply that any 
conduct of a citizen is irreprehensible and lawful as long as it is 
committed in the privacy of their home.  It would mean that such 
offences as incest and indecent assault cease to be criminal when carried 
out in privacy.  Such a view is not sustainable. 
It is astonishing, therefore, how the majority of the Court arrived at the 
conclusion that the Amendment extends to the right of a woman to 
terminate the life of the unborn.  Powell388 also finds the interpretation of 
the majority, while commendable in some respects as mentioned earlier, 
to be ―imprecise‖.   
 
Relying on Roe v Wade, the South African court duplicated the same lack 
of insight in the South African counterpart case, Christian Lawyers 
Association.  Just as the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution makes no mention of the termination of pregnancy, its South 
African counterpart — section 12(2)(a) — makes no such mention either.  
The section only mentions  ―reproduction‖. 
 
                                                 
388  Powell D ―BOOK REVIEWS‖  1995 SAJHR 353, reviewing Cachalia A et al Fundamental Rights in  
      the New Constitution (1994) . 
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However, as correctly pointed out by  Naudé,389 section 12(2)(a) of the 
Constitution does not become ―meaningless if abortion is left out of it‖.  
As a matter of fact, section 12(2)(a) could well have been intended to 
entrench the right of a woman to control ―reproduction‖ by means of 
contraceptives or by means of sterilisation,390 or it could have been 
intended to protect the right of a woman to ―reproduce‖ — a verb from 
the word ―reproduction‖ in section 12(2)(a) — as much as she wishes.  In 
addition, the right of a woman to ―make decisions concerning 
reproduction‖ could also extend to the option of offering the undesired 
baby to adoption institutions established by the State.   
 
Crann391 is of the view that ―it is ludicrous to expect to find the specific 
word ‗abortion‘ in a constitutional document‖.  He defends this view by 
pointing out that a constitution is intended to endure a long time, and 
therefore taking into account that the views of society may change over a 
particular issue, constitutional provisions are wisely drafted in a general 
and open-ended language to allow for new circumstances in the future. 
 
                                                 
389  ―CASES AND COMMENTS — The Value of Life — A Note On Christian Lawyers Association of SA   
      v Minister of Health‖ 1999  SAJHR 546. 
390  Van Zyl Smit D ―Reconciling the Irreconcilable?  Recent Developments in the German Law on  
      Abortion‖  1994 Medical Law Review  302 – 320. 
391  Crann  G P ―Morgentaler and American Theories of Judicial Review: the Roe v Wade  
      Debate in Canadian Disguise‘ (1989) 47 (2) University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 499  
      at 508. 
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This may well be so.  But we must understand what this will mean in 
practical terms.  It will mean that a constitution is not a guide nor a 
fundamental law of a nation because that which is supposed to be an 
anchor for all laws, turns out to be shifting sands.  A constitution of any 
nation cannot in one decade countenance the termination of life and in 
the next proscribe it.  It would boil down to such a nation not having a 
supreme law — which is what a constitution is supposed to be.392    
 
As was correctly acknowledged in Hunter et al v Southam Inc 393, a 
constitution ―cannot easily be repealed or amended,‖ and in the South 
African context such a move has been made achievable, but with 
difficulty.394  The latest edition of the South African Constitution in 2010 
shows that it is the ninth edition, indicating the number of times 
amendments have been made to the Constitution. 
 
What the majority of the court did in Roe v Wade 395 is what amounts to 
―reading in‖396 — a remedy often resorted to by judges to cure an 
imperfection in legislation.  The judges attempted to ‗read in‘ into the 
                                                 
392  See Section 2 of the Constitution; see also Chaskalson et al  Constitutional Law of South Africa   
      (2005) 2nd ed at 11-34. 
393  Hunter et al v Southam Inc  1984 2 S. C. R. 145. 
394  See section 74(1)(2)(3) of the Constitution. 
395  Roe v Wade 410 U. S. 113 (1973). 
396  ―Reading in‖ is a mechanism used by judges to cure a defect, usually of unconstitutionality, in  
      a piece of legislation.  See Currie I and de Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 5th ed at  
      204-206. 
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Constitution a right which was not provided for by the Constitution of 
their State.   
 
However, it is unfortunate that judges may not make use of the ―reading 
in‖ remedy in a constitution.  A constitution is the foundation law brought 
into existence by various groups representing a nation.  If judges 
attempted to ‗read in‘ into it something that was obviously omitted by 
either the constitutional assembly or by the drafters, they are presuming 
upon a task falling outside their prerogative, namely, rewriting a 
constitution.  The only appropriate place for the ―reading in‖ is 
legislation.397  It serves the purpose of remedying defects in a piece of 
legislation, which defects become manifest when the piece of legislation 
is tested as to its constitutionality.398  Then the legislation can be tailored 
to be in harmony with the foundation law — the Constitution.  But the 
Constitution itself, being the foundation, cannot be tailored by the 
judges.399 
                                                 
397  Okpaluba C ―Of ‗forgiving new tools‘ and ‗shaping innovative remedies‘:   
      Unconstitutionality of legislation infringing fundamental rights arising from legislative  
      omissions in the new South Africa‖ 2001 Stell LR 462-464. 
      See also in this regard National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs  
      1 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) 
398  See Currie I  & de Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 5th ed, 204 – 206; 
      Furthermore, the following cases all illustrate the point that the ―reading in‖ remedy is  
      invariably utilised to cure a defect in a piece of legislation which does not conform to the   
      Constitution, not to cure the Constitution itself:  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs  2000 (3)  
      SA 936 (CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1)  
      SA 6 (CC); S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA (CC) ; S v Niemand 2002 (4) SA 858 (CC) 
399  In Canada as well, the ―reading in‖ mechanism is used to cure constitutional defect in a 
      statute, not in the text of the Constitution.  See in this regard:  P W Hogg Constitutional  
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The Court in the South African case of Christian Lawyers Association400  
fell into the same pitfall — ―reading in‖ into the foundation document — 
the Constitution, a right which neither the Constitutional Assembly nor 
the drafters of the Constitution had envisaged.  Whether they did so by 
oversight or for a purpose is immaterial.  A judge is not authorised to 
arrogate to himself or herself that responsibility. 
 
In the United States of America, matters came to a head when, after the 
Planned Parenthood 401  case had failed to overturn Roe v Wade,402 
concerned individuals403 did not give up but organised themselves and 
set out to overthrow Roe v Wade by means of legislation this time.  They 
proposed and processed a Bill called the ―Life at Conception Bill‖.  This Bill 
expounded in its long title its purpose as being ―to implement equal 
protection under the 14th article of amendment to the Constitution for  
the right to life of each born and pre-born human person‖. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
     Law of Canada  Vol 2 (2007) at 40-15.  The following cases in Canada substantiate this point:     
     Schachter v Canada [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; Miron v Trudel [1995] 2 S.C.R 418; Vriend v Alberta  
      [1998] 1 S.C.R 493. 
400  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others  1998 (11)  
      BCLR 1434 (T) (the first case). 
401  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 120 L ed 674; 112 SCt 2791 (1992). 
402  Roe v Wade 410 U. S. 113 (1973). 
403  These individuals were:  Mr Wicker; Mr Vitter; Mr Demint; Mr Enzi; Mr Brownback; Mr  
      Martinez; Mr Voinovich; Mr Thune; Mr Coburn, and Mr Inhofe. 
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These concerned individuals introduced the Bill, which was then read 
twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.  The salient point of 
the Bill was its definition of ―human person‖ or ―human being‖.  It defined 
these as including ―each and every member of the species homo sapiens 
at all stages of life, including, but not limited to, the moment of 
fertilisation, cloning, and other moment at which an individual member of 
the human species comes into being.‖ 
 
The Bill did not, however, succeed in becoming an Act due to lack of 
sufficient support in the legislature. 
 
Matters did not reach a dead end with the failed ―Life at Conception Bill‖.  
An unexpected breakthrough was reached in 1997 when an official 
recognition of the life of the unborn became a reality in the United States 
of America by way of legislation.  This became possible by means of the 
Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 1997,  which was assented to and 
signed into law by former President George W. Bush on April 1 2004.  The 
Act was enacted after a five-year effort led by the National Right to Life 
Committee (NRLC).   
 
It is worth mentioning at the outset that the Act does not overturn the 
principles of the Roe v Wade404  decision.  This means that it does not 
                                                 
404  Roe v Wade 410 U. S. 113 (1973). 
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take away the right of a woman to bring an end to a life-threatening 
pregnancy.  It however recognises the right to life of an unborn child 
from another perspective.  The ―Unborn Victims of Violence Act‖ 
recognises that when a law breaker assaults an expecting woman, and 
causes injury to or kills both the woman and her unborn child, such a 
criminal has claimed two human lives.405  The Act406 has established that 
if a child in utero (in the womb) is injured or killed during the commission 
of certain state crimes of violence, in that case the assailant may be 
charged with a second offence on behalf of the second victim, the unborn 
child. 
 
As to which charge exactly would be applicable would depend on which 
federal law is involved, the nature and extent of harm perpetrated on the 
child, and other factors.  The law applies this two-victim principle to 68 
existing federal laws dealing with acts of violence.   
 
Prior to the enactment of this law, an unborn child was not recognised as 
a victim with respect to violent crimes.  If an offender, for example, beat 
a woman and this consequently led to the death of her unborn child, the 
offender would be charged only with the assault of the woman because 
the life of the unborn child was not recognised by the law.  By the same 
                                                 
405   National Right to Life Committee, Inc ―Key Facts on the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (―Laci  
       and Conner‘s Law) (H. R. 1997) April 1 2004 at 1. 
406   Also called the ―Laci and Conner‘s Law‖ because it was initially enacted to protect the life of  
       the mother, Laci, and her unborn son, Conner. 
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token, if a bomb explosion killed an unborn child but its mother was only 
injured and was not killed, the bombing was not regarded as having 
resulted in a loss of life.  
 
The ―Unborn Victims of Violence Act‖ protects the child in utero defined 
as a ―member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, 
who is carried in the womb.‖407 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Act does not conflict with the Roe v Wade 408 
decision, albeit it may ostensibly appear to be so.  As a direct result of 
this ostensible conflict, misinformed citizens have been lured into 
challenging the unborn victim law and other similar laws, basing their 
challenge on the Supreme Court‘s holding in Roe v Wade.  However, these 
attempts failed.  One such attempt is S v Merrill 409 where the Minnesota 
Supreme Court ruled that ―Roe v Wade . . . does not protect, much less 
confer on an assailant, a third-party unilateral right to destroy the 
foetus‖, thus setting a commendable example in honouring precedent.  In 
other words, an accused could not rely on the abortion decision in Roe v 
Wade to minimise the seriousness of his or her offence of bringing about 
the death of a child in its mother‘s womb, even though the mother 
herself survives the assault.   
                                                 
407  at 1. 
408  Roe v Wade 410 U. S. 113 (1973). 
409  S v Merrill 450 N. W. 2d 318 (Minn. 1990). 
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Another misguided attempt to challenge the unborn victim law, based on 
the Roe v Wade decision, was in 1989 in the case of Webster v 
Reproductive Health Services 410 when litigants sought a court order 
invalidating a Missouri statute declaring that ―the life of each human 
being begins at conception,‖ that ―unborn children have protectable 
interests in life, health and well-being‖, and that all state laws (including 
criminal laws ―shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on 
behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, 
privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and 
residents of this state.‖411   A lower court had ruled that Missouri‘s law 
impermissibly adopted ―a theory of when life begins,‖ and blocked its 
enforcement, but the Supreme Court nullified that ruling, allowing the law 
to go into effect as long as the State did not use it to restrict the 
termination of pregnancy in deserving cases, thus setting an example in 
upholding its own precedent. 
 
As was the case in South Africa prior to the demise of the death sentence, 
the United States enacted the Innocent Child Protection Act of 2000.  The 
South African counterpart of this Act was section 278 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977, with section 331 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
of 1955 as its predecessor.  Like the South African Act, the United States 
                                                 
410  Webster v Reproductive Health Services   (1989) 492 U. S. 490. 
411  at 2.  
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Innocent Child Protection Act provided that no state may ―carry out a 
sentence of death on a woman while she carries a child in utero‖.  It 
defined ―a child in utero‖ as a ―member of the species homo sapiens, at 
any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.‖412  The principle 
embodied in the Act was loud and clear:  that carrying out the execution 
would take two human lives, including one convicted of no crime. 
 
Interestingly, the mother and grandmother of the two victims vehemently 
opposed the adoption of a single-victim approach in cases where a 
pregnant mother dies simultaneously with the unborn child.  She decried 
it in these words:  ―Adoption of such a single-victim amendment would 
be a painful blow to those, like me, who are left alive after a two-victim 
crime, because Congress would be saying that Conner [the unborn 
grandchild] and other innocent unborn victims like him are not really 
victims — indeed, that they never really existed at all.  But our grandson 
did live.  He had a name, he was loved, and his life was violently taken 
from him before he ever saw the sun.‖413 
 
Taking stock of the United States jurisprudence, one establishes that, 
admittedly, the United States Supreme Court, at least in the matter of the 
unborn life, was not prone to drawing from the decisions of other 
                                                 
412  Section 2 of the Act. 
413  National Right to Life ―Key Facts on the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (‗Laci and Conner‘s  
      Law)  (H. R. 1997) at 3. 
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jurisdictions.  It did not endeavour to bind itself by judicial precedent of 
other jurisdictions.  However, it did consider itself bound by its own chain 
of precedent, and it stayed faithfully within the bounds of its own 
precedent,414 although in law it is free to depart therefrom.415 
 
4.5.1  In German law 
 
The Basic Law of Germany,416 as the Constitution of Germany is called, 
was relied upon by the South African Constitutional Court in S v 
Makwanyane 417 in dealing with the right to life in the context of capital 
punishment.  According to Church et al,418 the Basic Law419 was called 
such because the Parliamentary Council did not want to bestow the 
dignified term ―constitution‖420 on a document drafted to govern a part of 
Germany for a transitional period that would only last until national 
reunification.  It was envisaged that the Basic Law would cease to exist 
                                                 
414  Jacobson v Massachusetts (1905) 197 U. S. 11; Buck v Bell (1927) 274 U. S. 200; Byrn v New  
     York City Health & Hospitals Corp (1972) 31 N. Y. 2d 194, 286 N. E. 2d 887; Keeler v Superior  
     Court (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P. 2d 617 
415  The best known example is Brown v Bd of Education (1954)  347 U. S. 483 where it refused to  
      follow Plessy v Fergusson (1896) 163 U. S. 537 
416  The Basic Law of Germany came into operation in 1949. 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm  (accessed: 2011/08/22) 
417  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at  par. 108. 
418  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
     Perspective  (2007) at 99. 
419  In German, Grundgesetz.  See Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a  
     Comparative and International Law Perspective (2007) at 99. 
420  In German, Verfassung.  See Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative  
      and International Law Perspective  (2007) at 99. 
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when national reunification was achieved, with the adoption of a German 
constitution by a free decision of the people of Germany.421 
 
There is a striking similarity between the Constitution of Germany and 
the Constitution of South Africa, namely, that in both Constitutions the 
right to dignity  precede  the right to life.422   Church et al 423 write that 
the human rights in the German Constitution are not listed at random, as 
may at first glance seem to be the case, but constitute a system of values 
and rights.  Referring to the decision of the Federal Constitutional 
Court,424 the learned authors write that the right to human dignity is the 
most important of the basic rights.425 
 
As is the case in South Africa, where human rights may be limited in 
terms of a law of general application,426 human rights in Germany are not 
                                                 
421  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective  (2007) at 99.  The vision to replace the Basic Law with a constitution adopted by  
      the people was contained in article 146 of the Basic Law, which provided: 
      ―The Basic Law, which since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany applies to  
      the entire German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely  
      adopted by the German people takes effect. 
422  In the Constitution of South Africa, the right to dignity is entrenched in section 10, followed 
      directly thereafter by the right to life in section 11.  In the Constitution of Germany, the right  
      to dignity is entrenched in article 1(1), followed directly thereafter by the right to life in article  
      2(2). 
423  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective (2007) at 100. 
424  BVerfGE 6 32 at 4; 32 98 at 108; 45 187 at 227. 
425  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
     Perspective (2007) at 100. 
426  In terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution.  
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absolute, a point mentioned by Church et al.427  The fundamental rights 
provisions of the Basic Law are aimed at protecting the individual against 
interference by the state.428 
 
Among the jurisdictions our South African court relied on for its decision 
in Christian Lawyers Association 429 was Germany.  In this regard it is 
informing to look, as a departure point, at the Constitution of Germany 
itself.430  The provision of the Constitution on which Germany based its 
decision to outlaw the termination of a pregnancy is reproduced in the 
footnote.  It is noteworthy that the same provision features in the South 
African Constitution, though in a slightly different wording.  The 
substance remains the same, though.   
 
It must be noted that article 2(2) of the German Constitution which deals 
with the right to life contains no reference to abortion.  If the German 
drafters had intended to include the protection of the right to life of the 
unborn, they would have done so under article 6 which deals with 
marriage, family and children.  However, even article 6, though dealing 
                                                 
427  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective (2007) at 102. 
428  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective (2007) at 103. 
429  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others 1998 (11)  
      BCLR 1434 (T) (the first case). 
430  Article 2(2) of the German Constitution reads: 
      ―Every person shall have the right to life and physical integrity.  Freedom of the person shall  
       be inviolable. These rights may be interfered with only pursuant to a law‖. 
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with children, falls short of expressly protecting the right to life of the 
unborn. 
 
Despite this lack of express protection for the right to life of the unborn 
in the German Constitution, the German Constitutional Court,431 has 
consistently ruled that the protection afforded life in the Constitution 
includes that of the unborn.  In a case decided in 1975,432 and again in a 
case decided in 1993,433 the German Constitutional Court held that a 
foetus does enjoy some constitutional protection under article 2(2) of the 
German Constitution.   
 
Specifically, the State was burdened with the duty to protect the life of the 
unborn even against its own mother.  This burden could only be 
shouldered by the State if the State fundamentally outlawed the 
termination of the unborn life and placed on a woman the responsibility 
of carrying the foetus to term.434  Viewed in this light, the termination of 
the unborn life had to be regarded as against the law throughout the 
pregnancy.  No stage of the pregnancy was to be viewed as a stage where 
the law could be relaxed or compromised.   Thus, the position is that the 
termination of the unborn life is illegal and unconstitutional in Germany.  
It is apropos at this juncture to emphasise that the German Constitutional 
                                                 
431  Called in the German language the Bundesverfasungsgericht. 
432  ( BVerfGE  39, 1). 
433  (BVerfGE 88,  203). 
434  Davis D et al  Fundamental Rights in the Constitution — Commentary and Cases  (1997) at 65. 
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Court came to this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that article 2(2) of 
the German Constitution is silent about the unborn or foetus and does 
not expressly extend the right to life to the unborn.435 
 
With this clear background in mind, it is intriguing how the High Court in 
South Africa considered the position in Germany but did not follow it.  In 
this regard, the South African High Court dismissed the need to be bound 
by precedent by endeavouring to explain the probable reason for the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfasungsgericht)  to so 
decide the issue.  The Court sought to dismiss the German precedent by 
surmising that Germany was trying to make up for the wanton 
destruction of human life during the Nazi regime of Hitler‘s time.  The 
Court further sought to dismiss the German precedent on three other 
grounds.  First, by saying that the two German cases436 referred to earlier 
could not be used to support the contention advanced by the plaintiffs in 
the case before the Court, namely, that section 11 of the South African 
Constitution conferred an absolute right to life on the foetus.  Second, 
the Court sought to dismiss the German precedent by stating that in the 
German case437 the German Constitutional Court did not hold that a 
foetus is a person,438 but that foetal life had an independent legal value 
                                                 
435  See also Devenish G E A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) at 108 -109. 
436  BVerfGE  39, 1and BVerfGE  88, 203. 
437  (BVerfGE  39, 1) 
438  As already pointed out, the South African High Court per McCreath J missed the point when it   
      used its time to persuade the litigants that a foetus was not a person, when in fact the point  
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worthy of protection.  Third, the South African High Court further sought 
to dismiss the German precedent by holding that in both cases of the 
German jurisprudence 439 the German Constitutional Court gave express 
recognition to the constitutional protection of the woman‘s right to her 
own dignity, physical integrity and personal development.  The South 
African High Court also maintained that the German Constitutional Court 
sought to strike a balance between the State‘s obligation to protect foetal 
life, on the one hand, and its obligation to protect the autonomy of the 
woman, on the other.440  
 
In surmising that by protecting the life of the unborn Germany was trying 
to make up for the wanton destruction of human life during the Nazi 
regime of Hitler‘s time, the South African High Court was merely echoing 
the view of an author, Neuman of the Columbian University of Law.441  It 
was not the Court‘s objective and independent assessment of the German 
jurisprudence.442   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
      was that a foetus has life in it. 
439  (BVerfGE  39, 1) and (BVerfGE  88, 203). 
440  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others  1998 (4) SA  
      1113 (T) at 1125, 1126. 
441  In his article ―Casey in the Mirror:  Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United  
      States and Germany‖ published in the American Journal of Comparative Law  (1995) at 273. 
442  Van Zyl Smit D ―Reconciling the Irreconcilable?  Recent Developments in the German Law on 
      Abortion‖ 1994 Medical Law Review  302 - 320 
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4.5.2  In Ecuador, Philippines, Chile and Ireland 
 
Ecuador, Philippines and Chile are jurisdictions which have proscribed the 
termination of the life of the unborn.  The difference between these 
jurisdictions is that Ecuador and the Philippines have done so flowing 
from the interpretation they have given to their constitutions.  The 
constitutional courts of these jurisdictions bowed to the arguments which 
were presented before them that life begins at conception and that, 
accordingly, the termination of an unborn life is unconstitutional.443   It 
would seem that Ecuador bases its interpretation on article 1 of its 
Constitution.444  The relevant section in the Republic of Philippines 
Constitution is Section 1.445 Chile, on the other hand, has drafted its 
Constitution in such a way that the right to life of the unborn does not 
need to be interpreted, but has been expressly entwined in the wording 
of the Constitution in article 19(1).446  
                                                 
443  Hansson  D & Russell D E H ―Made to Fail:  The Mythical Option of Legal Abortion for  
      Survivors of Rape and Incest‖  1993 500 SAJHR at 505, footnote 31. 
444  Article 1 of the Ecuador Constitution provides: 
      ―Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, maintain  
      and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution.  Every  
      person, people, community or nationality, will be able to demand the recognition of rights for  
      nature before public institutions.  The application and interpretation of these rights will follow  
      the related principles established in the Constitution.‖ 
445  Section 1 of the Republic of Philippines Constitution provides: 
      ―No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall  
      any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.‖ 
446  Article 19(1) of the Republic of Chile Constitution provides: 
      ―The right to life and to the physical and psychological integrity of the individual. The law  
      protects the life of those about to be born.  The death penalty may only be instituted for a  
      crime considered in a law approved by a qualified quorum.‖ 
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Therapeutic termination of the life of the unborn was allowed by the 
Health Code of Chile in 1931.  However it was later banned with the 
argument that medical science had advanced far enough that it was no 
longer justifiable.   
 
Today‘s laws against the termination of the life of the unborn are codified 
in the Penal Code of Chile in articles 342 to 345 under the title ―Crimes 
and Offences Against Family Order, Public Morality and Sexual Integrity‖.  
The Code penalises induced termination as well as termination caused by 
a violent act against a woman.  Consent of the woman is legally invalid; 
thus any person inducing the termination with the consent of the woman 
equally risks legal sanctions.  Needless to say, these laws cannot be taken 
on review since the Constitution, which is the basic law of the land, 
―protects the life of those about to be born.‖  The only change can be 
brought about by the amendment of the Constitution itself. 
 
The legal and constitutional position in Chile was not considered by  
South African High Court, nor was the position in the Republic of 
Philippines and the Republic of Ecuador considered.  These jurisdictions 
share the same view of life as Germany, which was cited by the South 
African court court.447  What becomes very salient, however, is that the 
                                                 
447  That  foetal life needs to be protected from the time of conception, and that the State has the  
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text of all four constitutions — the Constitutions of South Africa, 
Germany, Ecuador448 and Philippines449 — contain nothing  relating to the 
life of the unborn.  The same applies to the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States.  Yet, these 
jurisdictions were able to sense the scope of the right to life which the 
South African court inconsistently and contrary to stare decisis failed to 
do. 
 
Ireland enacted the Criminal Justice Act of 1945.450  The relevant section 
25 contains points which can hardly escape one‘s notice:  (a)  It refers to 
the unborn as an entity with life;  (b) it recognises the unborn entity as 
being a child;  (c) it refers to the entity as being susceptible to death; (d) 
a criminal sanction ensues for destroying it even though it does not yet 
exist independently of its mother, that is, while it is in the womb. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
      responsibility of protecting foetal life against its own mother and against others, throughout  
      the period of pregnancy. 
448  The only relevant section on the right to life in the Constitution of Ecuador is Article 1, which  
      provides: 
      ―Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, persist and  
      regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution‖. 
449  Section 1 under Article III of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: 
      ―No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall  
      any person be denied the equal protection of the laws‖. 
450  Section 25 of the Act creates the offence of child destruction as follows: 
      ―Any person who, with intent to destroy the life of a child then capable of being born alive, by  
      any willful act causes a child to die before it has an existence independent of its mother, shall  
      be guilty of felony, to wit, of child destruction‖. 
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This provision of the Act is not unconstitutional.  As a matter of fact, it 
gives effect to the constitutional demands of the Constitution of 
Ireland.451  Like Chile, Ireland elected to expressly recognise the unborn 
as a living organism without the need for such an interpretation to be 
breathed into the Constitution.  It is noteworthy that such recognition is 
not entrenched at the expense of the right to life of the mother, but the 
two lives are each accorded the respect and protection they duly deserve.   
 
One does not have all the underlying considerations which the 
constitutional assembly and the drafters in Ireland had in mind when they 
decided to expressly entrench the protection of the unborn in their 
Constitution.  It would appear, though, that such considerations as are 
brought to the fore by Meyerson452 are germane here.  Meyerson, while 
concurring with the Court in Christian Lawyers Association,453 that a 
foetus does not have the right to life, explores the other extreme.  He 
argues that denying the foetus the right to life does not then 
countenance destroying it.454  The destruction of foetal life, albeit it 
violates no constitutionally protected subject‘s right to life, nevertheless 
undermines human dignity.   
                                                 
451  In its Chapter XII, Article 40(3)(3) the Constitution of Ireland provides: 
      ―The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal  
      right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its  
      laws to defend and vindicate that right . . .‖ 
452  Meyerson D ―Abortion:  The Constitutional Issues‖  1999 SALJ  50.  
453  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others 1998 (11)  
      BCLR 1434 (T). 
454  Meyerson D ―Abortion:  The Constitutional Issues‖ 1999 SALJ at 56. 
163 
 
 
It is interesting to note that Meyerson does not only recognise a fact that 
is not often recognised, that a foetus possesses life in it, but he 
recognises also that it deserves to be treated with dignity.455  He argues 
that ―a foetus is not just a bit of human tissue, comparable to something 
like the appendix.  It is a living human organism, whose destruction is 
not a morally trivial matter but something to be regretted‖.456  He then 
substantiates the point by drawing from Dworkin who compares a foetus 
to a work of art because of the marvellously complex and creative 
processes it embodies.457 
 
Meyerson points out,458 and this could be the rationale behind Ireland‘s 
Constitution and statute forbidding the termination of a pregnancy, that 
if the foetal life were not protected the State could pass laws 
countenancing the killing of foetuses for any frivolous reason right up to 
the moment of birth.  Not only that, argues Meyerson,459 but the State 
could enact laws subjecting embryos and foetuses to experimentation 
and research.  It could even pay women to snuff the life of a foetus in 
order to ensure a ready supply of cadaver foetal brain tissue, since such 
tissue is known to have therapeutic value in the treatment of some 
                                                 
455  Meyerson D ―Abortion: The Constitutional Issues‖ 1999 SALJ at 56; Section 10 of the  
      Constitution. 
456  Meyerson D ―Abortion: The Constitutional Issues‖ 1999 SALJ at 56. 
457  Dworkin  R Life‘s Dominion (1993) 81-84. 
458  Meyerson D ―Abortion: The Constitutional issues‖ 1999 SALJ  at 55. 
459  at 55. 
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diseases.460  Indeed, the assumption or constitutional construction that a 
foetus is not a possessor of life could have far-reaching lamentable 
effects, equal to the ―far-reaching‖ effects which would be our lot if, 
according to McCreath J, women were denied the relief to snuff the life of 
their unborn. 
 
Not so many years ago, Fletcher,461  a columnist in a medical journal, 
spoke of the dilemma of a new category of ―patients‖ — the little patient 
in the womb.  Surgery in the womb reached a new height when California 
surgeons inserted a tiny plastic tube into the bladder of a foetus to drain 
a urinary blockage.  In this connection, Fletcher said that such 
developments in treating the unborn make it appear ―likely that the 
foetus with a treatable birth defect is on the threshold of becoming a 
patient.‖462 
 
Scientists worldwide establish scientifically the fact of the unborn being a 
living organism.   In his book, A Child is Born 463,  Nilsson outlines the 
development of the unborn.  As the brain grows, he explains, connections 
are formed between its neurons.  By the eighth week, these connections, 
                                                 
460  at 55. 
461  Fletcher J C ―The Fetus as Patient:  Ethical Issues‖ The Journal of the American Medical  
      Association  1981  772-777. 
462  Journal of the American Medical Association 1981 August 14, 777; See also    
     1981 November 22 edition, at 22, published by Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New  
     York, Inc (as a matter of policy, the Society‘s articles do not carry a by-line). 
463  Nilsson L A Child is Born  (1976) 4th ed  2.  
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called synapses, are developing and soon number into millions as they 
assume the multitudinous functions of the brain.  By this time all its body 
parts are in place, and it is no longer an embryo.  The earliest movements 
of the foetus begin at seven and a half weeks.  By thirteen weeks taste 
buds are functioning, and later on if sugar is added to the amniotic fluid, 
the rate of swallowing doubles.  But if something distasteful is added, the 
foetus sharply curtails its swallowing and grimaces to impress its 
displeasure.  By fifteen and sixteen weeks, breathing, hiccupping, 
sucking, swallowing, yawning, eye movement, all of these are 
occurring.464   
 
O‘Sullivan‘s465 reasoning is in unison with the above.  She writes that:  
―There are good reasons to allow a state to prohibit abortion after 
viability.  At about that point, foetal brain development is sufficient to 
feel pain, which indicates that the foetus has protectable interests of its 
own‖. 
 
Thus, the recognition of a child in utero as a living organism, not 
necessarily as a legal persona, rings through as a common thread, not 
only the medical field, but also in the legal and political spheres. 
 
                                                 
464  Nilsson L A Child is Born  (1976) 2. 
465  O‘Sullivan M ―Reproductive Rights‖ in Woolman S and Roux T (eds) et Constitutional Law of  
     South Africa (2005) Vol 2 at 37-39. 
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Notably, the right to life of citizens in general is given a casual mention in 
the Constitution of Ireland when compared to the specific mention given 
to the right to life of an unborn child.466  The Constitution therefore 
leaves open the question of the right to life of those facing criminal 
sanctions. 
 
4.5.3  In Canadian law 
 
In 1982 the Constitution Act of Canada467 was proclaimed, of which Part I 
is the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.468  A striking 
similarity between the Constitution of South Africa and the Constitution 
of Canada is that both constitutions regulate the extent to which rights 
protected in them may be exercised.  In the Constitution of South Africa, 
section 36(1) allows the limitation of rights if such limitation is in terms 
of law of general application and takes into account the factors listed 
thereunder.  In the Constitution Act of Canada, the equivalent clause is 
section 33(1)  which provides that: 
  
           ―Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of  
     Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision  
                                                 
466  Article 40(3)(2) of the Constitution of Ireland provides: 
      ― The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the 
        case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every  
        citizen.‖ 
467  Constitution Act, 1982. 
468  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective (2007) at 86.   
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     thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7  
     to15 of this Charter‖. 
 
According to Church et al,469 this limitation clause, the so-called 
―legislative override‖, was a compromise that bridged the political gap 
between those provincial premiers who objected to the entrenchment of 
constitutional rights and those premiers, and the prime minister, who 
supported the Charter‘s adoption.  The fundamental rights that may be 
limited by an Act of Parliament in Canada in terms of section 33 of the 
Charter are the freedoms in section 2, the legal rights in sections 7 to 14, 
and the equality rights in section 15.470  Since the right to life is protected 
by section 7 of the Charter, it is included in the fundamental rights that 
may be overridden.  
 
Another limitation clause of the Canadian Charter is section 1 which 
provides that: 
 
      ―The  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out  
          in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably  
          justified in a free and democratic society‖. 
 
Thus, the rights in the Charter are relative in nature.  In reviewing a piece 
of legislation which has the effect of limiting a right, a Canadian court 
                                                 
469  Ibid at 88. 
470  Ibid at  89. 
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has to decide whether the challenged law has the effect of limiting one of 
the guaranteed rights.  If so, the second stage would be to decide 
whether the limitation is a reasonable one and can be justified.471  Church 
et al do not discuss the right to life, but the remedies that are at one‘s 
disposal if one‘s rights and freedoms have been infringed.472 
 
The South African High Court did not rely in its judgment as heavily on 
Canada‘s jurisprudence as it did on the jurisprudence of the United States 
of America.  What becomes salient, however, is that once again the Court 
reiterated its misguided point — that the foetus is not a person.  As 
pointed out at the outset of this discussion, that was not the point argued 
by the plaintiffs.  It is interesting to note that this jurisdiction which the 
Court lightly relied on, endorsed the view which the Court sought to 
brush aside, which view was the plaintiffs‘ argument:  that though the 
foetus may not be a person in law, it is a possessor of life.  In R v 
Morgentaler,473  a case referred to by the South African Court in its 
judgment, Wilson J stated: 
 
       She is the passive recipient of a decision made by others as to whether her body is to be  
          used to nurture a new life.474  
 
                                                 
471  Ibid at 90. 
472  Ibid at 92-98. 
473  R v Montgentaler 1988 44 DLR (4th) 385. 
474  at 492 [emphasis added]. 
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The authors of South African Constitutional Law — the Bill of Rights 475, in 
their discussion of the right to freedom and security of the person,476 do 
not  interpret this right as containing the freedom to terminate a 
pregnancy.  They merely mention that the concept of bodily integrity of 
section 12(2) was first broached from a gender perspective in the 
Declaration of the 1975 Women‘s Year Conference which declared that 
the ―human body, whether that of a woman or a man, is inviolable  
freedom.‖477   
 
Cheadle et al  then proceed to merely state what Wilson J in R  v 
Morgentaler 478  held in the matter of abortion in Canada.  By and large, 
the authors discuss the application of section 12 of the Constitution in 
other spheres of life such as the detention of offenders, the prohibition of 
torture as part of physical and psychological integrity, cruel and inhuman 
treatment, and the limitations which may be applicable to these 
freedoms. 
 
                                                 
475  Cheadle M H et al  South African Constitutional Law — the Bill of Rights (2005) 2nd ed at 7-1 to  
      7-17. 
476  Section 12(2) of the Constitution. 
477  See section 7 – 34 of the Cairo Programme:  Report of the International Conference on  
      Population and Development, Cairo 5 – 13 1994, UN Doc A/Conf 171/13; footnote 86 of       
      Cheadle et al  South African Constitutional Law — the Bill of Rights 2nd ed at 7-16. 
478  R v Morgentaler  (1988) 44 DLR (4th) 385. 
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In Canada the question of the right to life in respect of an unborn child 
served before courts in the matter of R v Morgentaler .479   Three doctors, 
among them Doctor Morgentaler, impugned the constitutionality of 
section 251 of the Canadian Criminal Code which required a woman to 
obtain a certificate from a therapeutic abortion committee of three 
doctors in order to lawfully terminate a pregnancy.480  It required further 
that the pregnancy not be terminated by one of the doctors on the 
committee.  It further required that the termination be performed in an 
accredited or approved hospital, and not in a clinic.481 
 
The accused doctors argued that section 251 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code was unconstitutional in that it offended the guarantee to life, liberty 
and security of the person as protected by section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.482  Admittedly, the Court did find that 
the Criminal Code was out of harmony with the spirit of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in that the long chain of requirements 
before a pregnant woman would get the relief sought did not take into 
account the urgency that might be involved in some situations.  The 
Court further established that the unconstitutionality of section 7 of the 
                                                 
479  R v Morgentaler  (1988) 44 DLR (4th) 385. 
480  Matthewson G C ―Security of the Person, Equality and Abortion in Canada‖ 
     1989 University of Chicago Legal Forum  251. 
481 Davis D et al  Fundamental Rights in the Constitution — Commentary and Cases (1997) at  
     66. 
482  Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1932) reads: 
      ―Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person and the right not to be 
     deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.‖  
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Charter could not be saved by the limitation clause, namely section 1 of 
the Charter.483  However, what the South African court avoided to unearth 
is the other side of the matter.   The Supreme Court of Canada struck 
down section 251 of the Criminal Code on procedural grounds.484  The 
Supreme Court did not go so far as to expressly pronounce that section 7 
of the Canadian Charter includes the right to abortion.  On the contrary, 
the majority of the Court held that the protection of unborn human 
beings from being aborted is a valid legislative objective, that it is within 
Parliament‘s constitutional jurisdiction to enact a Criminal Code dealing 
with the termination of life of the unborn.485   
 
As a matter of fact, the Court held that the Charter does not prohibit the 
Canadian   parliament from passing a procedurally fair abortion law which 
restricts the termination of pregnancy to cases where the pregnancy 
threatens the life or health of the mother, with ―health‖ defined as 
relating only to therapeutic grounds and excluding grounds of a socio-
economic nature.  What is of even more relevance is that the Supreme 
Court did not rule out the State‘s responsibility to adopt a more stringent 
stance on the termination of a pregnancy towards the late stages of 
                                                 
483 The limitation clause of the Charter, section 1, which is the counterpart of section 36(1) of the  
     South African Constitution, provides: 
     ―The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in  
     it subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a  
     free and democratic society.‖ 
484 Birenbaum J ―Contextualising Choice:  Abortion, Equality and the Right to Make  
     Decisions Concerning Reproduction‖  1996  SAJHR 499, 500. 
485 Hogg P W Constitutional Law of Canada Vol 1 (2006)  at 18-13. 
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pregnancy.  In fact, in later cases the Supreme Court of Canada again 
reiterated that the matter of rights relating to an unborn child is one that 
must be decided by the legislatures, not the courts.  In Winnipeg Child 
and Family Services,486 for instance, McLachlin J wrote in his judgment: 
 
     If Parliament or the legislatures wish to legislate legal rights for unborn children or other  
       protective measures, that is open to them, subject to any limitations imposed by the  
       Constitution of Canada.487 
 
 It is obvious that a pregnant woman‘s right to terminate the unborn life 
is not absolute as Wilson J also advocated an approach that would 
balance the pregnant woman‘s rights with the State‘s interest in 
protecting the foetus, based on the stage of development of the foetus.  
 
Comparing the Canadian majority judgment in R v Morgentaler 488 with 
the United States majority judgment in Roe v Wade,489 one without fail 
notices this striking analogy.  In both constitutions of the two 
jurisdictions the relevant sections are completely silent on either privacy 
or abortion as a constitutional right.  In both cases the majority decisions 
breathed into the respective constitutions a right which neither the 
constitutional assemblies nor the drafters saw fit to expressly include.  
                                                 
486  Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v G. (D. F.), [1997] 3 S. C. R. 925 at par  
      11. 
487  at par 12. 
488  R v Morgentaler  (1988) 44 DLR (4th) 385. 
489  Roe v Wade  410 U. S. 113 (1973).  
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While the majority decisions in both jurisdictions may be plausible in 
some respects, they do not escape objective criticism in this aspect. 
 
On the other hand, one notices some conspicuous analogy also in the 
minority decisions of both jurisdictions.  The minority of the court in both 
cases declined to align itself with the reasoning of the majority for the 
reason that, in the case of the United States matter, nothing in the 
relevant constitutional provisions even suggests the right to privacy, or 
alternatively the right to terminate the life of the unborn.  Similarly, the 
relevant provision of the Canadian Charter was correctly adjudicated 
upon by the minority when they found that the makers or the drafters of 
the Charter deliberately kept the section silent on abortion as an 
entrenched right.  While the minority judgment in both jurisdictions may 
have its flaws, it is submitted that it is, however, correct in this finding. 
 
In general, Canadian courts accept and revere the doctrine of stare 
decisis.490  Before 1949 the Privy Council ranked the highest tribunal in 
Canada in the appeal process.  The Supreme Court of Canada was 
therefore lower in the hierarchy and was accordingly bound by the 
decisions of the Privy Council.  When the Privy Council ceased to be the 
appeal tribunal in 1949, the Supreme Court of Canada then became the 
                                                 
490  Hogg P W Constitutional Law of Canada Vol 1 (2007)  at 8-21 to 8-22.  For examples of cases  
      accepting the doctrine of stare decisis, see Stuart v Bank of Montreal  (1909) 41 S.C.R. 516;  
      Robins v National Trust Co.  [1927] A.C. 515, 519; London Street Tramways Co. v London  
      County Council  [1898] A.C. 375 (H.C.). 
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highest court in the hierarchy.  However, even during the time that the 
Supreme Court of Canada was lower than the Privy Council, it regarded 
itself bound by its own previous decisions.491   
 
When the Supreme Court of Canada graduated to the final appellate 
status, it gradually accepted that, while still bound by its prior decisions 
under normal circumstances, it did not have to stick to its prior decisions 
through thick and thin.492  The House of Lords was unique in holding 
itself bound by its previous decisions,493 although it relaxed this stance 
somewhat in later years from 1966.494 
 
                                                 
491  See in this regard Stuart v Bank of Montreal (1909) 41 S. C. R. 516 where the Supreme Court of  
      Canada said of itself:   
      ―The Supreme Court of Canada occupies a somewhat peculiar position.  From it no appeal lies  
      as of right.  By special leave an appeal may be had to the Judicial Committee.  In the great  
      majority of the cases which it hears it is a final appellate tribunal;  in other cases, it occupies  
      the position of an intermediate appellate court.  But, whether it be regarded as final or  
      intermediate, in view of the current or recent decisions to which reference has been made, the  
      attitude of this court towards its previous decisions upon questions of law should, in my  
      opinion, be the same‖ [emphasis added] at 548. 
492  Some of the cases in this regard are:  Brant Dairy v Milk Comm. of Ont. [1973] S. C. R. 131,  
      152 – 153; Paquette v The Queen  [1977] 2 S. C. R. 189, 197; McNamara Construction v The  
      Queen [1977] 2 S. C. R. 655, 661; Keizer v Hanna [1978] 2 S. C. R. 342, 347.  For example, in  
      the last listed case, Keizer v Hanna, the court said the following: 
      ―Since drafting these reasons, I have had the opportunity of reading and considering the  
      reasons for judgment prepared by Mr Justice Dickson and Mr Justice Grandpré.  I am still of    
      the opinion that if this Court was correct in the view it adopted in The Queen v Jennings,  
     supra, then exactly the same course is proper in the case of an action under the Fatal  
      Accidents Act and I said so for the majority in Gehrmann v Lavoire, supra.  If this Court is now  
     of the opinion that such a course was in error, then the latter aurhority  
     must be considered as overcome‖ [emphasis added] at 365. 
493  London Street Tramways Co. v London County Council [1898] A.C. 375 (H.L.).  
494  Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 W. L. R. 1234; Hogg P W Constitutional  
     Law of Canada Vol 1 (2007)  at 8-22. 
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Canada‘s record of its reverence for precedent can be seen from the 
following subsequent attempts by individuals to have it overturn its 
decision in R v Morgentaler. 495  
 
For instance, in 1989 a legal challenge was brought before the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Tremblay v Daigle 496 when a pregnant woman who had 
recently ended a relationship elected to terminate the pregnancy, but 
before she could proceed, the father of the unborn child obtained a court 
order interdicting her from terminating it.  The judge of the court a quo 
found that an unborn child was a human being under the Quebec Charter 
of Human Rights and Freedoms and accordingly was entitled to the right 
to life under section 1 of the Quebec Charter.497  The judgment was 
upheld by the majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal.  Leave to appeal 
was, nevertheless, granted to the Supreme Court of Canada.  On the day 
of the hearing, counsel for the appellant informed the Court that the 
appellant had in the intervening period gone to the United States to 
terminate the pregnancy.  For this reason the question had thus become 
technically moot.  Due to the importance of the issue the court 
nevertheless decided to go ahead and adjudicate.  The Supreme Court of 
Canada set aside the order of the court below based on its finding that an 
                                                 
495  R v Morgentaler  (1988) 44 DLR (4th) 385. 
496  Tremblay v Daigle [1989] 2 S. C. R. 530. 
497  Section 1 of the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides: 
     ―Every human being has a right to life, and to personal security, inviolability and freedom.  He  
      also possesses juridical personality.‖ 
176 
 
unborn child was not included in the term ―human being‖ as contained in 
the Quebec Charter as there was no concrete indication that the Quebec 
National Assembly intended it to be included.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
of Canada faithfully stuck to its precedent construction of section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter in R v Morgentaler.498 
 
In 1991, in R v Sullivan, 499 two midwives were found guilty of negligence 
by bringing about the death of an unborn child they were trying to deliver 
who died while still in the birth canal.  The question to be decided was 
whether the child, since it fell short of being born alive, was a person in 
the context of the criminal negligence provision of the Criminal Code.  
The Court held that the term ―person‖ in this provision had the same 
meaning with the term ―human being‖ also used in the Criminal Code.  At 
that time the Criminal Code stated that the child must be born alive in 
order for it to be considered a human being for purposes of the Criminal 
Code. 
 
In 1997, another challenge was brought before the Court.  In Winnipeg 
Child and Family Services 500 a woman was pregnant with her fourth child 
and addicted to glue sniffing which has the potential of damaging the 
nervous system of the developing unborn child.  As a consequence of this 
                                                 
498  Roe v Morgentaler  (1988) 44 DLR (4th) 385. 
499  R v Sullivan   [1991] 1 S. C. R. 489. 
500  Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v G. (D. F.), [1997] 3 S. C. R. 925. 
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long-time addiction, two of her previous children had been born 
permanently disabled and were wards of the State.  The Winnipeg Child 
and Family Services brought a motion to the court to have the mother 
placed in the custody of the Director of Child and Family Services and 
detained in a health centre for treatment until the birth of her unborn.  
The Court granted the order, but it was later set aside by the Court of 
Appeal.  By the time the Supreme Court of Canada was seized with the 
matter the mother had completed her treatment and given birth to the 
child.  So the facts of the case were no longer relevant, but the legal 
question remained relevant for adjudication.  The majority of the 
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal that an unborn 
child was not recognised as a legal person with rights.  Accordingly, the 
Court found, there was no legal person in whose interest a court order 
could be made.  Thus, the Court was consistent with its precedent. 
 
What cannot be ignored, however, is that the Court, perhaps unbeknown 
to itself, entrenched a scientific fact that an unborn child, though it may 
not be a legal persona in terms of the laws of a particular jurisdiction, is 
an entity possessing life.  This the Court alluded to and entrenched when 
it referred to the words of a tribunal with an international status, the 
European Commission of Human Rights.  The Court reiterated the words 
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of McLachlin J (as he then was) in Paton v United Kingdom 501 when he 
said: 
 
     Before birth the mother and unborn child are one in the sense that ―the ‗life‘ of the foetus is  
       intimately connected with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant  
       woman‖. 
 
Thus the Court established that the unborn is a possessor of life.   
 
In 1999, a further attempt was made to have the Supreme Court of 
Canada overturn its own decision in R v Morgentaler.502  In Dobson v. 
Dobson, 503 a pregnant woman was involved in a car accident, causing 
prenatal injuries to her unborn child.  The child suffered permanent 
mental and physical disabilities.  The child, acting through its grandfather 
nomine officii, sued its mother for damages alleging that the damage was 
caused by her negligence.  The legal question was whether a mother 
could be liable in delict for damages to her born-alive child arising from a 
prenatal negligent act.  The Court focused on whether a duty of care 
should be imposed upon a pregnant woman in such a situation.  The 
majority of the Court found that no such duty should attach in the light of 
public policy considerations relating to the privacy and autonomy rights 
of women.  Cory J, writing for the majority, referred to the decision of the 
                                                 
501  Paton v United Kingdom 3 EHHR 408 1980 Application No. 8416/78. 
502  R v Morgentaler  (1988) 44 DLR (4th) 385. 
503  Dobson v Dobson   [1999] 2 S. C. R. 753. 
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majority in Winnipeg Child and Family Services,504  and noted that the 
imposition of a duty of care upon a pregnant woman towards her unborn 
child ―would require judicial scrutiny into every aspect of that woman‘s 
behaviour during pregnancy‖ and thus ―would involve severe intrusions 
into the bodily integrity, privacy and autonomous decision-making of 
that woman‖.505 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada consistently manifests its reverence 
for precedent, as all these subsequent cases reflect the basic reasoning of 
the Court in R v Morgentaler.506 
 
4.5.4  In Indian law 
 
In India, human rights are classified under two types of rights:  
fundamental and ordinary rights.507  Fundamental rights are guaranteed 
by the Constitution,508 whereas ordinary rights are protected by 
legislation.509 
 
                                                 
504  Winnipeg  Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v G. (D. F.), [1997] 3 S. C. R. 925.  
505  Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v G. (D. F.),  [1997] 3 S. C. R. 925 at par.  
      31. 
506  R v Mortgentaler (1988) 44 DLR (4th) 385. 
507  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective  (2007) at 113. 
508  The Constitution of India came into effect in 1950. 
http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/coifiles/part.htm (accessed: 2011/08/20). 
509  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective (2007) at 113. 
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A seeming paradox is that the fundamental rights entrenched in Part III of 
the Indian Constitution cannot be waived by citizens,510  whereas the 
same rights can be restricted or limited by law where the Constitution 
permits such.511 For example, the right to life can be taken away by the 
state, according to the wording of article 21, which contains the phrase 
―except according to procedure established by law‖, but the right cannot 
be waived by the citizen.  Emphasising the point that these rights cannot 
be waived, the Supreme Court of India in Basheshar Nath v I.-T. 
Commr512 held that the fundamental rights have not been put in the 
Constitution merely for individual benefit, although ultimately they come 
into operation in considering individual rights.  The Court illustrated the 
point by referring to the right not to be discriminated against entrenched 
by article 15 of the Indian Constitution.  ―A citizen cannot get 
discrimination by telling the state ‗You can discriminate‘‖.513 
 
The phrase in article 21 of the Indian Constitution ―procedure established 
by law‖ has received some consideration by the Supreme Court of India in 
the case of A K Gopalan v State of Madras.514  The majority held that the 
phrase ―procedure established by law‖ meant the procedure legislated by 
                                                 
510  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
     Perspective  (2007) at 118. 
511  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
      Perspective (2007) at 114; Bajwa G S Human Rights in India (1995) 35-49. 
512  Basheshar Nath v I.-T. Comm. AIR 1959 SC 149 at 163, 180-181. 
513  Basheshar Nath v I.-T. Commr. AIR 1959 SC 149 at 181. 
514  A K Gopalan v State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27.  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human  
     Rights from a Comparative and International Law Perspective (2007) at 126. 
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Parliament and State Legislatures,515 whereas the minority held that the 
phrase had to be understood in the same way that the phrase ―due 
process clause‖ was understood in the United States of America.516  The 
question of the proper meaning of the phrase ―procedure established by 
law‖ was finally settled in the cases of Collector of Malabar v E Ebrahim 
Hajee517 and Ram Chander Prasad v State of Bihar,518 where the Supreme 
Court of India confirmed that the phrase ―procedure established by law‖ 
meant procedure legislated by parliamentary or state legislatures.519 
 
In India, the legislative history with regard to the protection of life had its 
beginning in 1860 with the Indian Penal Code.520  The legislature 
protected not only one‘s life from being snuffed out by others, but also 
by oneself.  Thus, an attempt to commit suicide was made a punishable 
criminal offence.  Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code provided: 
 
      ―Whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such  
        offence, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one  
        year [or with fine, or with both.]‖ 
 
                                                 
515  A K Gopalan v State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 at par. 111. 
516  A K Gopalan v State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 at par. 161.  See Church J Schulze C Strydom H        
     Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law Perspective (2007) at 126. 
517  Collector of Malabar v E Ebrahim Hajee AIR 1957 SC 688. 
518  Ram Chander Prasad v State of Bihar AIR 1961 SC 1624 at 1627. 
519  Collector of Malabar v Ebrahim Hajee AIR 1957 SC 688 at 975; Ram Chander Prasad v State of  
     Bihar AIR 1961 SC 1624 at 1627.  See also Church J Schulze C Strydom H  Human Rights from a  
     Comparative and International Law Perspective (2007) at 127. 
520  Indian Penal Code 45 of 1860 http://districtcourtallahabad.up.nic.in/44A7BD1F-1378-4BED-
AAFO-DDCB3A52B23F/FinalDownload/Down (accessed: 2011/09/05). 
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The taking of the life of the unborn was also covered by the Indian Penal 
Code.  Ending the life of the unborn was made a criminal offence except 
where it was done in good faith with the intention of saving the life of the 
mother.  Section 315 provided of the Penal Code provided: 
 
      ―Whoever before the birth of any child does any act with the intention of thereby preventing  
        that child from being born alive or causing it to die after its birth, and does by such act  
        prevent that child from being born alive, or causes it to die after its birth, shall, if such act be  
        not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the mother, be punished with  
        imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or  
        with both‖.   
 
The Penal Code did not specify who was lawfully authorised to act to save 
the life of the mother.   
 
The modern law regulating abortion in India is now the Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Act.521 The Medical Termination of Pregnancy 
Act does not repeal or amend the Indian Penal Code.  Section 3(2) of the 
Medical Termination of Pregnancy requires, however, that the termination 
of pregnancy be carried out by a registered medical practitioner.  Section 
315 of the Penal Code was open to interpretation in this regard as it 
merely provided that to escape criminal liability one had to show that one 
had acted in good faith with the intention of saving the life of the mother. 
                                                 
521  The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 34 of 1971 http://bhind.nic.in/Sparsh_MTP-Act-
1971.pdf (accessed: 2011/09/05). 
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Section 3(2)(i) allows the termination of pregnancy where it would 
endanger the life of the pregnant woman or put at risk her physical or 
mental health.  Section 3(2)(ii) allows the termination of pregnancy where 
there is a substantial risk that if the child were to be born, it would suffer 
from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously 
handicapped.   
 
Section 3(4)(a)  requires that the termination of the pregnancy of a minor, 
or a lunatic, be terminated with the consent of her guardian.  Section 
3(4)(b)  stipulates that any termination of pregnancy be carried out with 
the consent of the pregnant woman.   
 
Section 4 provides that the termination of pregnancy should take place at 
a government hospital, or at  a place approved by government for 
purposes of this Act. 
 
The failure of the Indian legislature to repeal or amend section 315 of the 
Indian Penal Code when enacting the Medical Termination of Pregnancy 
Act has caused problems in that it is not clear to what extent the Medical 
Termination of Pregnancy Act overrules the Penal Code.  For example, in 
the case of Murari Mohan Koley v the State and Another, 522 a woman 
whose baby was only six months old conceived again, and she and her 
                                                 
522  Murari Mohan Koley v the State and Another (2004) 3 CALLT 609 HC. 
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husband agreed that a registered medical practitioner should terminate 
the pregnancy.  However, the medical procedure had complications, and 
the wife died.  The medical practitioner was charged with culpable 
homicide as the prosecution contended that he had acted negligently.  
The medical practitioner sought to have the charge quashed, and relied 
for his defence on the provisions of section 3 of the Medical Termination 
of Pregnancy Act which provided that, notwithstanding the provisions of 
the Indian Penal Code, a registered medical practitioner would not be 
guilty of any offence under that Code, or under any other law, if any 
pregnancy was terminated by him in accordance with the provisions of 
the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act.  The prosecution contended 
that in order to get the protection of the Medical Termination of 
Pregnancy Act, the medical practitioner had to establish that he had acted 
in good faith, but that the stage the court proceedings were at were not 
the appropriate stage for the Calcutta High Court to embark upon an 
enquiry to ascertain the claim of acting in good faith.  Such an enquiry 
would require that the matter proceed to trial, and evidence to that effect 
be led.  The Calcutta High Court refused the application by holding523 
that  the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised 
very sparingly and with circumspection.  
 
                                                 
523  Murari Mohan Koley v the State and Another (2004) 3 CALLT 609 HC at pars. 22, 23. 
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In the case of Dr Nisha Malviya and Another v State of M.P.,524 the Madhya 
Pradesh High Court enforced the legislative requirement of the consent of 
the woman whose pregnancy is terminated or, in the case of a minor, the 
consent of her guardian.  In casu, two registered medical practitioners 
had performed abortion on a 12-year-old girl who had been taken to 
them for the termination of a pregnancy which was the result of rape.  
This attempt  was calculated to conceal the consequence of rape.  The 
medical practitioners relied for their defence on section 3(1) of the 
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act which provides that: 
 
      ―Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), a registered  
       medical practitioner shall not be guilty of any offence under that Code or under any other law  
       for the time being in force, if any pregnancy is terminated by him in accordance with the  
       provisions of this Act‖. 
 
Despite the apparent indemnification provided by this section to the 
medical practitioners, the High Court found525 that the legislative 
requirement of consent by the woman or her guardian could not be 
dispensed with, and neither the minor nor the guardian had consented to 
the termination of the pregnancy. 
 
                                                 
524  Dr Nisha Malviya and Another v State of M.P.  2000 CriLJ 671. 
525  Dr Nisha Malviya and Another v State of M. P.  2000 CriLJ 671 at par. 4. 
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The Supreme Court of India in Suman Kapur v Sudhir Kapur, 526 in a 
matter dealing with divorce matters, extended the requirement of 
consent to the husband by stating, obiter, that if a wife undergoes 
abortion without the consent of her husband, such an act amounts to 
cruelty to her husband.   
 
Germane to this discussion is article 21 of the Constitution of India.  
Article 21 is crafted in a way that purports to protect life and attach value 
thereto.527  As the wording of section 21 of India‘s Constitution shows, 
the right to life is not absolute.  Life may be taken, with the proviso that it 
must be taken in accordance with the ―procedure established by the law‖.   
 
Unlike the Constitution of Ireland,528 for example, which expressly 
includes the unborn as an entity whose life is to be protected,529 thus 
excluding the need to interpret, the Constitution of India does not 
expressly refer to the unborn.  The fact that its interpretation does not 
                                                 
526  Suman Kapur v Sudhir Kapur  AIR 2009 SC 589 at par. 34. 
527  Section 21 of the Constitution of India reads: 
      ―No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure  
      established by law‖. 
528  The Constitution of Ireland came into effect in 1937. 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/Constitution%20of%20Ireland.pdf  
(accessed 2011/09/08).  
529  Article 40(3)(iii)  of the Constitution of Ireland provides: 
      ―The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right  
       to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws  
       to defend and vindicate that right‖. 
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protect the right of the unborn to life is confirmed by India‘s legislation 
which countenances its violation.530   
 
What stands out in the India‘s Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act is its 
regard for not just the informed consent of a woman but also, if the 
woman has not attained the age of eighteen, the consent in writing of  a 
guardian.531  It is noteworthy that the Act prescribes that not only is the 
consent of a guardian a pre-requisite, but it must be in writing.    
 
4.5.5  In South African law 
 
Against this background, it is enlightening to consider the counterpart of 
this piece of legislation in South Africa.  In South Africa, the counterpart 
of the Indian Act is the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act.532  Its 
constitutionality and its clash with the existing body of law was impugned 
by a religious society of lawyers, in Christian Lawyers Association v 
Minister of Health.533   Inter alia, the bone of contention centred around 
                                                 
530  The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act 34 of 1971 . 
531  Section 3(4)(a) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act of 1971, provides: 
―No pregnancy of a woman, who has not attained the age of eighteen years, or, who, having 
attained the age of eighteen years, is a lunatic, shall be terminated except with the consent in 
writing of her guardian‖. 
532   Act 92 of 1996. 
533   Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2005 (1) SA (T) 509 (hereinafter to be  
       referred to as ―the second case‖ of Christian Lawyers Association to distinguish it from the  
       earlier case of 1998 bearing the same name) . 
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the consent of a minor and the minor‘s dispensing with the consent of a 
guardian. 
 
The High Court in the second case of Christian Lawyers Association  
found nothing amiss with the legislation — either when weighed against 
the Constitution, or the existing body of law.  The fact is, however, that 
the impugned provision was, indeed, inconsistent with the established 
body of law.  Such inconsistency found no justification in the Constitution 
nor in other existing laws — either common or statute.   
 
The Age of Majority Act (now repealed), the Guardian‘s Act, a portion of  
the Criminal Procedure Act, the Children‘s Act, all these and other laws 
point out the inconsistency of interpretation the High Court settled for. 
 
The Age of Majority Act534 set the age of majority as the age of twenty-
one.  At any stage of life before reaching this stage a natural person was 
considered a minor.  As such, he or she was incompetent to undertake or 
face certain challenges on his or her own.  The consent of a parent or 
guardian could not be dispensed with in undertaking or facing certain 
prescribed challenges.  The minor did not have locus standi  by reason of 
minority, and consequently could not enter into binding contracts without 
the assistance of the guardian.  The law often resorts to logic in 
                                                 
534   Act 57 of 1972. 
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endeavouring to establish the most probable intention of the legislature 
or drafters.  Applying the same measuring yardstick, it defies logic that a 
minor would be adjudged as incompetent to undertake non-life 
threatening challenges without the assistance of a guardian, and yet 
adjudged as competent to undertake a sometimes-life-threatening 
challenge without the assistance or consent of a guardian.  The Age of 
Majority  Act has now been repealed and replaced by the Children‘s 
Act.535  The Children‘s Act has lowered the age of majority from twenty-
one to eighteen.536 
 
Section 74(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act537 provides as follows: 
 
      Where an accused is under the age of eighteen years, a parent or, as the case may be, the  
        guardian of the accused shall be warned, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2),  
        to attend the relevant criminal proceedings [emphasis mine]. 
 
The section uses the word ―shall‖ to leave no room for doubt that the 
provision is peremptory.  It was not left up to the guardian to elect to 
attend the proceedings or not.  As a matter of fact, subsections (6) and 
(7) provide for a sanction of a fine or imprisonment in case of default.    
Justifying this stern position, Du Toit538 comments that ―the object of s 
74 is to protect the immature offender.‖  Default by guardian to assist the 
                                                 
535  Act  38 of 2005. 
536  Section 17 of the Children‘s Act, 38 of 2005. 
537  Act 51 of 1977. 
538  Du Toit et al  Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (2010) at 11-34. 
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minor is so serious that it renders the proceedings irregular and open to 
review and to be set aside.539 
 
In S v Gibson,540 the lack of assistance by the parent or guardian was 
described as, not only causing ‗difficulty‘ but also ‗unwise‘, especially 
where the minor was to plead to serious criminal charges.  Indeed, the 
correctness of these pronouncements by our courts cannot be 
questioned.  However, such pronouncements on matters involving minors 
need to be weighed against the lack of such pronouncements by our 
courts on surgical matters involving minors.  
 
The most relevant and recent piece of legislation in this regard is the 
Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 which has replaced the Age of Majority Act and 
in fact encapsulates into one piece of legislation all Acts of Parliament 
dealing with children. 
 
Part 3 of the Act deals with ―Protective measures relating to health of 
children‖.541   Thus, section 129 expressly proscribes treatment or 
surgical operation if consent has not been obtained.  It must be borne in 
                                                 
539  S v Khumbusa 1977 (1) SA 394 (N). 
540  S v Gibson  1979 (4) SA 115 (D) 138B – C. 
541  Under Part 3, section 129 of the Act provides: 
      (1)  Subject to section 5(2) of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1996 (Act 92 of  
      1996), a child may be subjected to medical treatment or a surgical operation only if consent  
      for such treatment or operation has been given in terms of either subsection (2), (3), (4), (5),  
      (6) or (7).‖  
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mind that the relevant section of the Act deals with the medical treatment 
of children in cases where their health or life is at stake.  Needless to say, 
if such medical treatment is withheld for any reason, the child would die.  
Even though the child would die, consent is not dispensed with.   
 
On the other hand, and by way of comparison, the termination of a 
pregnancy is not medical treatment — it is not intended to salvage the 
health or life of the individual, save in those rare situations where 
fertilisation took place in the fallopian tubes and its development thus 
poses a threat to the woman.  The termination of a pregnancy is 
intended, rather, in most instances, to save the mother-to-be from 
possible condemnation by society who still uphold high moral standards.  
It is also intended, in some instances, to get rid of an inconvenience of 
having to raise a child which was unwanted, or it is resorted to for 
economic reasons. 
 
The subsections to which section 129 refers provide that a child faced 
with medical treatment may consent to such medical treatment himself or 
herself if he or she is over the age of twelve years; if he or she is of 
sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the 
benefits, risks, social and other implications of the treatment.  As regards 
surgical operation, a child may consent to this procedure himself or 
herself provided he or she is over the age of twelve years, but in addition 
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he or she must have sufficient maturity and the mental capacity to 
understand the benefits, risks, social and other implications of the 
surgical operation.  In addition, the child must be duly assisted by the 
guardian.542  Consent by parent or guardian is further required for 
medical treatment, or surgical operation if the child, though over the age 
of twelve years, but is nevertheless of insufficient maturity, or is unable 
to understand the benefits, risks and social implications of the 
treatment.543   
 
Consent is made so crucial in saving the life of a child that it goes beyond 
the parent or guardian.  The mere fact that the parent or guardian is not 
readily within reach to give consent does not make the requirement of 
consent one that can be dispensed with.  If the parent or guardian is for 
any reason not readily within reach, consent of the medical 
superintendent ought to be sought:  in order to save life, not to get rid of 
a pregnancy!544 
 
The hospital superintendent is by no means the final arbiter in deciding 
whether consent can be dispensed with or not.  Beyond the hospital 
superintendent, there is the Minister of Health whose consent is 
necessary if the parent or guardian unreasonably refuses to give consent, 
                                                 
542  Section 129(3)(a), (b), (c) of the Children‘s Act 38 of 2005. 
543  Subsection (4)(b) of the Children‘s Act 38 of 2005. 
544  Subsection (6) of the Children‘s Act 38 of 2005. 
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or to assist the child in giving consent.  Consent of the Minister of Social 
Development, or any other Minister may also be sought if the parent or 
guardian is incapable of giving consent, cannot readily be traced, or is 
deceased. 
 
Finally impressing the importance of consent is the fact that after all 
these authorities have been approached for consent without quick results 
or success, the High Court as the upper guardian of all minors may be 
approached.545    
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court in the second case of Christian 
Lawyers Association adjudicated the matter in a manner inconsistent with 
the body of existing law, the Children‘s Act itself added its own glaring 
inconsistency.  The opening phrase of section 129(1) says the following:  
―Subject to section 5(2) of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy 
Act‖.546  The Children‘s Act immediately makes itself subject to the 
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act as if the Choice on Termination 
of Pregnancy Act is the underlying law or constitution.  That is a glaring 
inconsistency in itself, especially when one has regard to the objectives of 
the two Acts, namely, for the Children‘s Act, to save the life of a child, 
                                                 
545  Subsection (9) of the Children‘s Act 38 of 2005. 
546  Section 5(2) of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act provides: 
      ―Notwithstanding any other law or the common law, but subject to the provisions of  
       subsection (4) and (5), no consent other than that of the pregnant woman shall be required  
       for the termination of a pregnancy‖. 
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and for the Termination of Pregnancy Act, to save a child or woman from 
a personal inconvenience or social embarrassment.  It remains 
unexplained why, in terms of the Children‘s Act, children below the age 
of twelve years who are of sufficient maturity are not empowered with any 
independent consent-giving authority, whereas in terms of the 
Termination of Pregnancy Act, children below this age who are of 
insufficient maturity are empowered with an independent consent-giving 
authority.547 
 
A more recent piece of legislation which is still a Bill, the Criminal Law 
(Forensic Procedures) Amendment Bill548 does not depart from the 
established legal stance.  In a section dealing with the taking of body 
samples for purposes of DNA analysis, section 15J (1)(b) provides that:   
 
      If the volunteer is a child, a sample may only be taken for the purposes of paragraph (a), with  
       the informed consent of the child‘s parent or guardian. 
 
Thus, the interpretation given to the Termination of Pregnancy Act by the 
Court in the second case of the Christian Lawyers Association fails to 
meet the standard of consistency. 
 
 
                                                 
547  Davel C J Skelton A M  (eds) Commentary on the Children‘s Act  (2007) at 7 – 35. 
548  Bill 2 of 2009. 
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4.5.6  In international instruments 
 
International instruments are binding on those states who are signatories 
at the time an instrument comes into effect and to those who consent 
later to being bound.549 Although international instruments may not be 
binding on non-signatory states, they may be seen by non-signatory 
states as a trend to be followed.  For example, Malanczuk550 states that in 
terms of  the general rule with regard to treaties, a treaty creates no 
rights or obligations for third parties, that is, states which are not parties 
to a treaty.  However, according to Malanczuk, there may be exceptions 
to the rule, for example the United Nations Charter551 and the Vienna 
Convention552.  According to Malanczuk, Article 2(6) is sometimes 
regarded as imposing obligations on states without their consent. 
                                                 
549  Dugard J International Law — a South African Perspective (2005) at 28. 
550  Malanczuk P  Modern Introduction to International Law  (1996) 7th edition at 137. 
551  Article of 2(6) of the United Nations Charter, adopted in 1945, provides: 
      ― The Organisation shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in  
         accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of  
         international peace and security‖. 
552  Articles 35 – 37 of the Vienna Convention, adopted in 1969, provide as follows, respectively: 
      ―Article 35   
       Treaties providing for obligations for third States 
       An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty  
       intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State  
      expressly accepts that obligation in writing‖. 
      ―Article 36 
       Treaties providing for rights for third States 
1. A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty 
intend the provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to 
which it belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto.  Its assent shall be 
presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless the treaty otherwise provides. 
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It is submitted in this work that although treaties are only binding on 
member states, they may have a persuasive or influential effect on non-
member states.  This view is supported by Dugard,553 and is an exception 
to the general rule known as pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.554   
 
Sometimes, certain conduct among states develops into settled practice, 
commonly referred to in international law language as usus.  Settled 
practice is, admittedly, difficult to prove in court, and courts may be 
reluctant to take judicial notice of thereof.  However, once settled practice 
is codified, it may afford evidence of a widespread customary rule.  In 
such a case, an international customary rule may have a persuasive effect 
on a non-signatory state.555 
 
For consistency in constitutional interpretation to be a valuable common 
thread, it must entwine in it international instruments.  International 
                                                                                                                                                 
2. A State exercising a right in accordance with paragraph 1 shall comply with the conditions 
for its exercise provided for in the treaty or established in conformity with the treaty‖. 
―Article 37 
Revocation or modification of obligations or rights of third States 
1. When an obligation has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 35, the obligation  
     may be revoked or modified only with the consent of the parties to the treaty and of the  
     third State, unless it is established that they had otherwise agreed. 
2. When a right has arisen for a third State in conformity with article 36, the right may not be  
      revoked or modified by the parties if it is established that the right was intended not to be            
      revocable or subject to modification without the consent of the third State‖. 
553  Dugard J  International Law — a South African Perspective  (2005) 3rd ed at 28. 
554  Meaning, treaties do not confer obligations or benefits upon non-signatory states. 
555  Dugard J International Law — a South African Perspective  (2005) 3rd ed at 28. 
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instruments have a bearing on how the constitution of a state is 
interpreted by courts since a state must honour its international 
obligations. 
 
Some international instruments are express in the manner in which they 
expect certain human rights to be regarded.  An example in this regard is 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  On the 
subject of whether the right to life extends itself to the unborn, the ICCPR 
expressly provides that:  ―Sentence of death shall not be imposed for 
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not 
be carried out on pregnant women‖.556   
 
As pointed out earlier, the now repealed section 278 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act was worded similarly.  It is abundantly clear that even 
before the repeal of the section as a consequence of the abolition of the 
capital punishment, the international trend was to regard the unborn as a 
possessor of life.  This trend manifested itself in the drafting of the 
ICCPR. 
 
What becomes salient is the fact that the subsection provides that the 
―sentence of death . . . shall not be carried out on pregnant women‖.557  
Thus, a woman is contrasted with her unborn.  Put differently, the life of 
                                                 
556  Section 6 subsection (5) of the Covenant. 
557  Sieghart  PThe International Law of Human Rights (1983)  at 128. 
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the expectant woman is contrasted with the life of the unborn.   When 
weighed on the scales of life, the interpretation that cannot be avoided is 
that the life of the unborn carried by the mother weighs more heavily 
than the life of the carrier — the mother.  This is because the mother‘s 
execution is held in abeyance until such time that she has delivered her 
unborn.  After delivery, the death sentence is carried out on the mother, 
and the baby survives.558 
 
South Africa ratified the Covenant in 1998.559  This fact has far-reaching 
dimensions in the interpretation of the right to life in South Africa.  Up to 
this far, the discussion has shown the consistent common thread as a 
guide in adjudicating the question whether the unborn possesses life, not 
whether it is a legal persona or not.  This international covenant, the 
ICCPR, is the zenith of this long, winding common thread in the field of 
law and constitutional interpretation.  The question is whether the South 
African Court in the earlier case of Christian Lawyers Association 560 
applied its mind enough to be guided by all of this common thread.  
 
                                                 
558  In the now obsolete section 278 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the section provided that the  
      woman was at liberty to apply for an order ―to stay execution‖ on the ground that she was  
      quick with child [subsection (1)].  Subsection (3) provided that execution would be stayed  
      ―until she is delivered of a child or until it is no longer possible in the course of nature that  
      she should be so delivered‖ [emphasis added]. 
559  Olivier M E ―South Africa and international human rights agreements:  procedure, policy  
      and practice (part 1)‖  2003 TSAR  293. 
560  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others  1998 (11)  
      BCLR 1434 (T) (the first case). 
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In the international sphere there is also the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR).561  The relevant portions of the Convention in this 
regard are section 4 subsections (1) and (5).  Subsection (1) provides that:   
 
      Every person has the right to have his life respected.  This right shall be protected by law,  
        and, in general, from the moment of conception.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his  
        life. 
 
Subsection (5) of the Convention provides as follows: 
 
      Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was  
        committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be applied to  
        pregnant women. 
 
The ACHR is the only international instrument which dares to address the 
much avoided question of when life begins.562  Accordingly, an 
international voice is heard guiding courts in their adjudication of this 
right.   
 
Besides establishing the fact of possessing life ―from the moment of 
conception‖, the ACHR, like the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights, prohibits the execution of a mother together with the 
contents of her womb.   
                                                 
561  The American Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1969. 
562  Sieghart P The International Law of Human Rights  (1983)  at 131.  
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It is perhaps for these international guidelines that states such as Ireland 
have included in their constitutions provisions which leave no doubt as to 
how courts should interpret issues relating to life and the unborn.   As 
discussed above on page 73, O‘Sullivan563 expresses the view that even if 
the unborn does not have a right to life, the state still has a detached 
interest in fostering the sanctity of human life by protecting potential life 
and by regulating its termination in the last stages of pregnancy.  Again 
in the international sphere, this reasoning finds backing in the statement 
by the European Court of Human Rights when it held in VO v France 564: 
 
      At best, it may be regarded as common ground between states that the embryo/foetus 
       belongs to the human race.  The potentiality of that being and its capacity to become a  
       person enjoying protection under the civil law, moreover, in many states, such as France, in  
       the context of inheritance and gifts, and also in the United Kingdom, requires protection in  
       the name of human dignity, without making it a ‗person‘ with the ‗right to life‘ for purposes  
       of Article 2.‘565 
 
Therefore, an earnest examination of the history of how the unborn life 
was regarded from the time of Roman and Roman-Dutch law, the case 
law since then and in our modern times, foreign law, foreign 
constitutions, foreign constitutional interpretations, medical science and 
                                                 
563 O‘Sullivan M ―Reproductive Rights‖ in Woolman S and Roux T (eds) et al Constitutional Law of  
     South Africa (2005) Vol 2  at 37-8. 
564 VO v France  [2004] 2 FCR 577. 
565  at 84. 
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its practitioners, and international instruments — all reveal an amazing 
consistency in constitutional interpretation. 
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CHAPTER  5 
 
Consistency as applied to capital punishment 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The interpretation of the right to life in the context of capital punishment 
and in the context of each jurisdiction‘s constitution has proved to be a 
challenging task.  There is no uniformity in the manner in which each 
country‘s constitution is worded; there is thus no uniformity also in the 
wording of the right to life.   
 
Some jurisdictions566 have elected to word the right to life in their 
constitutions in unambiguous terms, thus eliminating the need for courts 
to interpret.  Other jurisdictions567 have crafted their constitutions in 
such a way that they can manoeuvre at any time in the future to 
accommodate any unforeseen circumstances.568 
                                                 
566  Examples are the United States and Uganda.  The Fourteenth Amendment of  
      the United States Constitution is crafted thus:  ―. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of   
      life, liberty, or property, without due process of law‖.  Section 22 of the Uganda Constitution is  
      almost similarly crafted, thus:  ―(1)  No person shall be deprived of life intentionally except in  
      execution of a sentence passed in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of  
      a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda and the conviction and sentence have been  
      confirmed by the highest appellate court.  (2)  No person has the right to terminate the life of  
      an unborn child except as may be authorised by law‖. 
567  South Africa is one example, with section 11 of its Constitution crafted thus:  ―Everyone has  
      the right to life‖. 
568  Theophanous v The Herald and Weekly Times (1194) 182 CLR 104 at 173. 
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As in the case of the right to life in respect of the unborn, the South 
African Constitution is silent on capital punishment.  The Constitution 
does not render capital punishment unlawful, nor does it condone it.  
Hence, this right in this context has had to be interpreted.  The 
Constitution does, however, express itself on the right not to be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.569 
 
5.2  Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
 
This right has been associated by courts to the right to life in the context 
of the death penalty.  Closer examination of this prohibition — not to 
subject anyone to pain-inflicting treatment — will determine whether 
there is any nexus between the right to life and the right not to be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
 
The South African Constitutional Court abolished capital punishment 
mainly on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the right not to be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.  To start with, the 
Constitution, unlike Acts of the legislature, does not contain ―definitions‖, 
and consequently, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is not defined 
                                                 
569  Section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
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in the Constitution.570  However, resorting to some of the methods of 
constitutional construction may shed some light.  In this regard, the 
contextual approach proves to be an aid.   
 
Looking at the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, one finds that it appears under the subheading ―Freedom and 
security of the person‖.571  The various sub-rights making up the main 
right to ―freedom and security of the person‖ are a clear indication that 
the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution did not 
have in mind the rights of a sentence-awaiting, convicted person under 
this heading. 
 
This view is reinforced by the right contained in section 12(2) which 
deviates completely from anything that has to do with the sentencing of 
convicted prisoners — whether they should be treated cruelly or with 
mercy.  Rather continuing in the line of torture, cruel and inhuman 
treatment, the subheading goes on to include unrelated subjects, namely, 
the making of decisions concerning reproduction, and medical or 
scientific experiments. 
 
                                                 
570  Maduna P M ―The Death Penalty and Human Rights‖ 1996 SAJHR 193, 196. 
571  For convenience, this work uses the Constitution of the Republic, 1996, whereas the Court  
      used the Interim Constitution, 1993 since the final Constitution, 1996 had not been finalised  
      at that time. 
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The Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution made 
special provision for the rights of convicted persons who are awaiting, or 
are undergoing sentence under a special section, namely, section 35(2), 
under the subheading, ―Arrested, detained and accused persons‖.572  If 
the Constitutional Assembly and the drafters of the Constitution had 
intended the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment to be specifically applied to sentences of convicted persons, 
they would list the right under section 35. 
 
It goes without saying, therefore, that the right not to be subjected to 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment was applied to convicts.  
Admittedly, this right is a right of general application — it stands to be 
claimed by all citizens, law-abiding and those who are not.  However, 
upon proper construction, this would have been listed under rights of 
persons who are dealt with in terms of the criminal law.  As a matter of 
fact, this is the construction that was arrived at by the Court in Christian 
Lawyers Association 573, that if the drafters had intended to include the 
unborn under the right to life by crafting the provision to say ―everyone‖, 
they would expressly have stated this; they would have expressly stated 
that the intention was to include another species of right-bearers.  The 
                                                 
572  Section 35(2) starts with the words:  ―Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced  
      prisoner, has the right . . .‖ [emphasis added]. 
573  Christian Lawyers Association of SA and Others v Minister of Health and Others  1998 (11)  
      BCLR 1434 (T) (the first case). 
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same reasoning applies here in respect of the right of convicts and the 
right not to be subjected to pain-inflicting treatment or punishment. 
 
It is particularly worthy of note that section 12(1)(e) uses the words 
―treated or punished‖.  It does not use the word ―sentence‖.  This is an 
indication that the section was intended for punishment in its general 
use, and not in the context of sentence, which is punishment for 
convicted persons by a court of law.  On the other hand, section 35(2) 
does not use the word ―treat‖ or ―punish‖, but uses the word ―sentenced‖ 
— an indication, coupled with the subheading — that a particular 
category of citizens was intended, namely, the punishment of convicted 
persons. 
 
5.3  Consistency in interpretation  
 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa, in analysing the propriety of the 
death penalty, dwelt at length on its characteristic — that of being cruel, 
inhuman and degrading.  It is noteworthy that the Court pointed to the 
execution itself as being cruel, inhuman and degrading.574  The  Court 
then substantiates the view by referring to foreign judgments, inter alia  
judgments of India, Zimbabwe and Jamaica.575 
                                                 
574  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 26. 
575  Zimbabwe v Attorney-General, Zimbabwe and Others 1993 (4) SA 239 (ZSC); 
      Pratt v Attorney-General for Jamaica [1993] 3 WLR 995 (JPC). 
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True, courts in these jurisdictions did find that there was an element of  
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, but the point not given much 
attention by the South African Court is that the finding was not in relation 
to the death itself, but in relation to the prevailing circumstances prior to 
execution.  These circumstances have been generally referred to as the 
death row phenomenon.576 
 
In the authority the Court placed reliance on, namely, the Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace, 577 the applicant (the Catholic 
Commission) was a human rights organisation and they sought an order 
interdicting the execution of four convicted prisoners who were faced 
with the death penalty.  The condemned prisoners had been nervously 
waiting for the execution of the sentence since February 1987.  The state 
was ready to execute them in March 1993.  The human rights 
organisation, the applicant, brought an application interdicting the 
execution on the grounds of the inordinate delay between the date of 
their conviction and their execution, worsened by the harsh and 
degrading conditions under which they had been confined.  It was 
submitted in the application that these conditions, considered jointly, 
rendered undesirable and, in fact, unconstitutional, the carrying out of 
                                                 
576   Bojosi K N  ―The death row phenomenon and the prohibition against torture and  
      cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment‖ 2004 AHRLJ  303. 
577  Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney General of Zimbabwe and  
      Others 1993 (4) SA 239 (ZS). 
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the sentence of death as they militated against the provisions of section 
15(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution.578   
 
Like its South African counterpart, the Zimbabwean Constitution does not 
define  torturing, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, nor does it 
attempt to contextualise it.   
 
A closer scrutiny of both constitutions — the South African and the 
Zimbabwean — makes one thing stand out, namely, that both sections579 
do not provide that should a prisoner suffer inhuman treatment, such 
treatment would balance scales of justice and thus render subsequent 
execution inexcusable.  As pointed out, in Makwanyane580   it was the 
execution that was judged to be inhuman and an affront  to human 
dignity.  So the Court‘s reliance on the Zimbabwean precedent was 
misplaced.  The Zimbabwean precedent was not the appropriate authority 
for the construction favoured by the Court.   
 
There is another dimension to the problem not to be overlooked 
whenever a court, in seeking to come to the relief of condemned 
prisoners, relies heavily on the harsh treatment experienced by them.  
                                                 
578  The last amendment to the Zimbabwean Constitution is the 19th Amendment, incorporated in  
      2009.  Section 15(1) of the Zimbabwean Constitution provides: 
      ―No person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other  
       such treatment.‖ 
579  Section 12(1)(e) in the South African Constitution. 
580  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 409. 
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The harsh conditions suffered by condemned prisoners are not the lot of 
condemned prisoners to the exclusion of trial-awaiting prisoners.581  It 
has become a world phenomenon that trial-awaiting prisoners who have 
organised themselves into prison gangs subject one another to the most 
brutal inhuman treatment so much so that some even lose consciousness 
at the hands of other prisoners.582  Knife stabbings and assaults by 
means of other objects or instruments totally forbidden to be in the 
possession of a prisoner and inside the walls of any prison have become 
the norm rather than an exception in some lands.583   
 
The question then arises whether the treatment meted out to prisoners 
by other prisoners who are awaiting trial should not be a legal or 
constitutional justification for the courts to exempt trial-awaiting 
prisoners from sentence after conviction.  The reasoning behind this is 
that these prisoners have already suffered enough, and justice has been 
done to them, not just by individuals — the trial-awaiting prisoners — 
but indeed by the state.  Since the treatment is meted out while all the 
prisoners are in the custody of the state, having been arrested by the 
state, and awaiting to be tried by the state, justice has indeed been 
meted out to them by the state. 
                                                 
581  S v Masuku and Others  1985 (3) SA 908 (A). 
582  Gaum  L ―The use of mechanical restraints by correctional services in South Africa and  
     Namibia:  Namujero v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison  [2000] 6 BCCR 671 (NmS)‖ 2002  
     AHRLJ 175. 
583  Pete S ―The good, the bad and the warehoused: The politics of imprisonment during the  
      run-up to South Africa‘s second democratic election‖  2000 SACJ  1-56. 
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The fact of the matter is that indeed such harsh treatment of trial-
awaiting prisoners by other trial-awaiting prisoners cannot be overlooked 
and does serve as a mitigating factor when such prisoners are eventually 
convicted and sentenced.  This is borne out by the appeal judgment in 
the case of S v Brophy  584 where Schwartzman J, Masipa J and Saldulker J 
held as follows: 
 
     What cannot be disputed is that the lot of the awaiting-trial prisoner is harsher than that of  
       a sentenced prisoner in that he or she cannot participate in the programmes that  
       a prison may run.  What he or she is condemned to is a seemingly endless routine of  
       boredom in the course of which he or she cannot earn any privileges for which serving   
       prisoners can qualify by reason of good conduct.585 
 
In the above case, the Court relied on a Canadian case586 in the Quebec 
Court of Appeal, where it was held that imprisonment whilst awaiting trial 
is equal to double the time served by a sentenced prisoner. 
 
It is debatable whether the fact of mistreatment by other prisoners, or by 
the state should go as far as replacing a duly considered sentence of a 
court in the form of capital punishment, since prisoners who receive this 
extreme sentence are legally beyond rehabilitation. 
 
                                                 
584  S v Brophy and Another  2007 (2) SACR 56 (W). 
585  at 59. 
586  Gravino  (70/71) 13 Crim LQ 434. 
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The Court further leaned on India, in Francis Coralie Mullin v The 
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,587  as its pillar in construing 
capital punishment as flying in the face of the spirit of the Constitution.  
A scrutiny of the Indian Constitution, framed from 1948 to 1950, 
discloses, however, that there is no provision in the Indian Constitution, 
as there is in the South African Constitution, which expressly proscribes 
torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.   
 
The Supreme Court of India became painfully aware of this deficiency in 
the fundamental law of the land and pondered how best to remedy the 
defect.588  The Supreme Court filled the void by bringing the Bill of Rights 
in the Indian Constitution into unison with international norms as set out 
in article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,589 and in article 7 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.590 
                                                 
587   Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1983 SC 746. 
588   Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1983 SC 746 at par.  
       518. 
589  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, of  
      1950, which came into force in 1953, with its latest amendments having come into force in  
      1971.  Source: http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.SecI (accessed: 2011/08/04). 
      Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and  
      Fundamental Freedoms provides: 
      ―No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment‖ 
590   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of 1996, which was adopted by the United  
       Nations General Assembly in 1996, and came into force in 1976.  Source:  
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm  (accessed: 2011/08/04). 
  Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
   ―No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or  
        punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or  
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This endeavour of the Court became clear in the Francis Mullin case.591  
In its judgment the Supreme Court of India held that the right to dignity 
which, in the Court‘s view, was intrinsic to the right guaranteed under 
article 21, included the right not to be subjected to torture, or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.  This right was, 
therefore, breathed by the Supreme Court of India into the right to life 
and made part of domestic jurisprudence. 
 
The point here is:  a court seized with the construction of a constitutional 
provision has the latitude to draw from the constitutions of other 
jurisdictions.  The Constitutional Court of South Africa, in interpreting the 
right to life as being violated by execution in the hands of the state, drew 
parallels from, inter alia, India and the instruments referred to above.  But 
India was not the perfect jurisdiction as its Constitution contains no 
provision expressly proscribing torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
 
A court is not the drafter of a constitution, nor is it the compiler thereof 
as the constitutional assembly is.592  Just as a court is not the legislature 
and does not enact laws, but is restricted to interpreting them, by the 
same token it may not bring into the text of the constitution what is 
                                                                                                                                                 
      scientific experimentation.‖ 
591  Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1983 SC 746. 
592  Okpaluba C ―Constitutionality of legislation relating to the exercise of judicial power:  the  
      Namibian experience in comparative perspective (part 1)‖ 2002 TSAR  308. 
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missing, or was an oversight on the part of the constitutional assembly or 
drafters.  The latitude it has is to interpret the text of the constitution 
within the limits of what is already in the text. 
 
5.4  In Indian law 
 
Indian law has cases593 pointing in the direction opposite the one 
favoured in Makwanyane.   Francis Coralie Mullin ,594 referred to above, 
was just one among many.  Especially instructive is the Vatheeswaran 
case.595  It was not the Court, but the applicants themselves who, in their 
application, recognised that it was not the sentence of death itself that 
could be constitutionally challenged, but the circumstances surrounding 
it.  They argued that to take away their lives after they had been left for 
eight years in illegal solitary confinement was a gross violation of the 
fundamental right guaranteed by article 21 of the Constitution.596 
 
                                                 
593  Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR  1983 SC 746;  
     Vatheeswaran v State of Tamil Nadu AIR  1983 SC 361; Javed Ahmed v State of Maharashta AIR  
     1985 SC 231. 
594  Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR  1983 SC 746. 
595  Vatheeswaran v State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1983 SC 361. 
596  Article 21 of the Indian Constitution bears the following subheading and provides: 
      ―Protection of life and personal liberty 
       No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure  
       established by law‖. 
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Understandably, the Court did not rescue the applicants on the basis of 
the sentence itself, but on the basis of the supervening circumstances.597  
However, whether the Court was correct or not in basing its decision on 
article 21 of the Indian Constitution, is another matter and open to 
argument.  It falls, in any event, outside the parameters of this 
discussion.   
 
Interestingly, it is not just the supervening circumstances in the form of 
harsh treatment that may serve as a reprieve to a condemned prisoner in 
India, but such things as a change in the personality of the convict.  In 
Javed Ahmed , 598 the petitioner had been found guilty of murder and 
sentenced to death.  His appeal against the sentence had brought no 
desirable result and a petition for clemency was rejected by the President 
of India.  In an unprecedented approach, the Court examined the conduct 
of the petitioner while waiting for execution for two years and nine 
months.  It was found that he had behaved satisfactorily in prison, was 
genuinely repentant and anxious to atone for the grave wrongs he had 
committed.  The hanging was substituted for life imprisonment.   
 
The Court‘s reasoning in this regard raises questions of legal propriety.  
It is trite that the question of remorse and preparedness to make 
restitution is, in terms of criminal procedure, considered after conviction 
                                                 
597   Vatheeswaran v State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1983 SC 361 at par. 367. 
598   Javed Ahmed v State of Maharashtra AIR  1985 SC 231. 
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but prior to sentencing, and it serves as a mitigating factor.  The question 
of genuine repentance is determined by courts at the time of sentencing, 
not extra-judicially, in prison.  The question of remorse and good 
behaviour is something considered by prison authorities in determining 
the propriety of affording a sentenced prisoner early release after the 
prisoner has served a satisfactory portion of the sentence. 
 
Whether it was proper for the Court or not to take into consideration the 
factors that it did, is beside the point.  The point is that whereas the 
South African Constitutional Court leaned heavily on the jurisprudence in 
India in coming to a proper construction of the right to life when applied 
to capital punishment, the entire foundation of Indian jurisprudence does 
not reinforce the interpretation the South African Court sought to give to 
the right to life. 
 
This view finds support in the Indian jurisprudence that the delay from 
the time of the imposition of sentence to the time of hearing the appeal 
cannot be taken into account by the Supreme Court in determining 
whether the sentence of death should now be commuted to life 
imprisonment.   The view of the Supreme Court in India is that the 
incidence of delay does not qualify as a circumstance capable of reducing 
an appellant‘s moral guilt in perpetrating a murder.  The view of the 
Court is that the delay is entirely irrelevant to the commission of the 
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offence of which the appellant was convicted.  In other words, it is not the 
circumstances outside the convict‘s personal circumstances at the time 
these were weighed by the Court during the mitigation-of-sentence 
stage, which cause the Court to commute the sentence of death to life 
imprisonment.  The circumstances outside the personal circumstances of 
the convict have nothing to do with the reprehensibility or otherwise of 
the accused. 
 
If the accused wants to escape the sentence of death he or she must 
establish on a balance of probabilities the existence of extenuating 
circumstances.599  These extenuating circumstances are invariably to be 
shown prior to the imposition of sentence, not many years after the 
imposition of sentence.600 
 
5.4.1  In the United States law 
 
A glance at the position in the United States of America is informative.  It 
must be borne in mind that the United States is one of the jurisdictions 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa drew from.  As the analysis of the 
system in the United States will show, consistency in interpretation would 
not have supported the reasoning of the South African Constitutional 
                                                 
599  Section 314A(a) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, Chapter 59. 
600  S v Chaluwa 1985 (2) ZLR 121 (SC) 130B. 
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Court with regard to the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment as applied in the context of the right to life. 
 
As a departure point, it is appropriate  to state at the outset that the 
Supreme Court of the United States had never, at the time that the South 
African Constitutional Court decided Makwanyane,601 directly addressed 
the question of delay in the execution of the death sentence, nor the 
question of harsh conditions as a ground for commuting the sentence of 
execution to life imprisonment.  When it eventually had occasion to do 
so, it is revealing to find that it did not set precedent for the 
interpretation that the South African court settled for.   
 
As was the finding of the Zimbabwean Supreme Court in the Catholic 
Commission case,602 it was not the execution of the death penalty that 
was found to be unconstitutional in Ex Parte Medley,603 the first case to 
be considered by the United States.  But it was the uncertainty as to the 
precise time when execution would take place.  Waiting for the unknown 
moment was a horrible feeling.  To this  kind of  feeling, the Court added 
limitations on visitations as ―an additional punishment of the most . . . 
painful character‖.604 
                                                 
601  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) (SA) 391 (CC). 
602  Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney General of Zimbabwe and  
     Others  1993 (4) SA 239 (ZS). 
603  Ex Parte Medley  134 U S 160 (1890) at 172. 
604  at 171. 
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In a later development in the United States, in People v Chessman,605 the 
applicant himself did not claim that it was his punishment by death that 
was inhuman, but the mental suffering occasioned by the years he had 
spent on the death row.  The applicant had spent eleven years waiting, 
and had felt that this unusually prolonged confinement was due to 
unconstitutional delays on the part of the California judiciary.   
 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the California courts 
had proceeded without unreasonable delay and the state of California 
was, accordingly, not guilty of cruel and unusual punishment.  Referring 
to this case, Gubbay CJ, in delivering judgment in Catholic 
Commission,606 reasoned that this rationale implies that regardless of the 
extent of Chessman‘s mental agony because of his confinement, and 
regardless of the length of the confinement, his suffering would not have 
been a factor in determining whether cruel and unusual punishment had 
occurred as long as there was a legitimate reason for him to be confined.  
It seems reasonable to infer that that ―legitimate‖ reason was, in the mind 
of Gubbay CJ, that the applicant was not a law-abiding citizen.   
 
                                                 
605  People v Chessman  52 Cal 2d 469 (1959). 
606  Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v Attorney General of Zimbabwe and  
     Others  1993 (4) SA 239 (ZS). 
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This last thought, that the applicant was not a law-abiding citizen, ties in 
with what Chaskalson J said in Makwanyane, 607 that we are long past the 
time of the old biblical injunction of ―tooth for a tooth‖ and ―eye for an 
eye‖. 
 
5.4.2  In international instruments 
 
International instruments are an indispensable asset in an endeavour to 
come to a proper construction of constitutional provisions. This is 
because not a few constitutions have been drafted with international 
instruments in mind so as not to have the constitution of a country 
deviate significantly from the general trend of the world.  This would 
result in a country with such a constitution being isolated on its own 
island, as it were.  In South Africa, the important role of international 
instruments is emphasised by the inclusion in the country‘s Constitution 
of a section608 which compels courts to consider international law when 
they interpret the Bill of Rights.   
 
Dugard609 endorses the view that international instruments influence, not 
only the interpretation, but also the drafting, of constitutions.  He writes: 
 
                                                 
607  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) (SA) 391 (CC) at 446A. 
608  Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
609  Dugard J ―BOOK REVIEWS‖1992 SAJHR 602, reviewing Schabas W A International Human Rights  
      Law and the Canadian Charter:  A Manual for the Practitioner (1991).    
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      It is highly likely that our courts will adopt a new approach to legislative history in the  
        interpretation of both constitution and bill of rights and therefore turn to the international  
       human rights conventions for the purpose of interpreting the bill of rights as it is already  
       clear that these conventions will influence the drafting of such an instrument.610 
 
Tobin611 examines the transformative effect of international law, and the 
extent to which human rights instruments, particularly the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,612 have influenced the treatment 
of children in national constitutions.  Tobin makes the point613 that the 
rights of children and other rights in the United Nations Convention of 
the Rights of the Child find expression in the constitutions of countries 
such as Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and others.  He expresses the view614 
that it would be necessary to examine the drafting debates for each 
constitution to determine the extent to which any of the international 
human rights instruments influenced the drafting of the constitutions. 
 
Adding weight to the point that constitutions have been drafted with 
international instruments in mind is Cockrell,615 who writes that: 
 
      Given that the Bill of Rights has clearly been influenced in its drafting by international human  
                                                 
610  at 603-604 [emphasis added]. 
611  Tobin J ―Increasingly seen and heard:  The constitutional recognition of children‘s rights‖ 2005  
      SAJHR 86. 
612  The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by the United Nations  
      General Assembly resolution 44/25 of November 20 1989, and came into force in 1990.  
      http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm  (accessed: 2011/08/04). 
613  at 115. 
614  at 115. 
615  Cockrell A ―Rainbow jurisprudence‖ 1996 SAJHR 1. 
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        rights instruments, it is likely that international human rights law will, as a result of the  
        constitutional interpretation clause, play a very significant role in the development of a South  
        African human rights jurisprudence.616 
 
It must be borne in mind, however, that international instruments are not 
the sole guidance, but they, together with other factors to have regard to,  
shed some light on the direction that can safely be taken by a court 
seized with the interpretation of a constitutional provision. 
 
Admittedly, not all international instruments contain a definition  
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  But at least 
two617 contain a definition of torture, which is a concept similar to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.     
 
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment defines torture in article 1 as follows: 
 
     For the purposes of this Convention, the term ―torture‖ means any act by which severe pain  
       or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such  
       purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him  
       for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or  
                                                 
616  at 415. 
617  The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or  
      Punishment, which was adopted in 1984, and came into effect in 1987 
      http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf  (accessed: 2011/08/05); and the Inter- 
      American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, which was adopted in 1985, and came  
      into effect in 1987 http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-51.html  (accessed:  
      2011/08/05). 
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       intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of  
       any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the  
       consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.  It  
       does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful  
       sanctions. 
 
The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture defines 
torture in article 2 as follows: 
 
      For the purposes of this Convention, torture shall be understood to be any act intentionally  
        performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for purposes  
        of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive  
        measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose.  Torture shall also be understood to be the  
        use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to  
        diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental  
        anguish.  The concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or suffering that is  
        inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided that they do not include  
        the performance of the acts or use of the methods referred to in  this article. 
 
It is necessary to mention that these Conventions use the word ―torture‖ 
as opposed to the phrase ―cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment‖.  It is 
submitted that constitutions of various countries618 all use slightly 
                                                 
618  United States Constitution, 8th Amendment  (1791):  ―Excessive bail shall not be required, nor  
      excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted‖; 
      Uganda Constitution (1995), article 24:  ―No person shall shall be subjected to any form of  
      torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment  or punishment‖; 
      Japan Constitution (1946), article 36:  ―The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel  
      punishments are absolutely forbidden‖; South African Constitution (1996), section 12(1):   
      ―Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right . . . (d)  
      not to be tortured in any way; and (e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or  
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varying wording, but one thing discernible is that the basic concept 
prohibited is the same. 
 
In terms of this Convention, the proscribed treatment is any act which 
inflicts severe pain.  Therefore, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment 
must essentially inflict pain, and this pain may either be felt physically or 
mentally.  For treatment to be cruel, inhuman or degrading it must have a 
motive behind it; it must have been intentionally inflicted.619  The motive 
must be to obtain from the sufferer information or a confession.  This 
immediately calls to mind that such treatment is often at the hands of the 
state where police officials endeavour to extract a confession from a 
suspect.  One then immediately asks oneself whether the prohibited 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment envisaged in various 
constitutions, is the kind of treatment meted out for this purpose. 
 
It will be recalled that the context in which the phrase ―cruel, inhuman or 
degrading‖ was referred to in Makwanyane 620  was absolutely not in the 
context of obtaining information or a confession.621   
                                                                                                                                                 
      degrading way‖. 
619  Keightley R   ―Torture and Cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment in the  
      U N Convention Against Torture and other instruments of international law: recent  
      developments in South Africa‖  1995 379 SAJHR  382-3. 
620  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) (SA) 391 (CC). 
621  In terms of the requirements of a confession or a pointing-out in criminal prosecutions, a  
      confession or a pointing-out must be made freely and voluntarily, in one‘s sober and sound  
      senses, and without undue influence, failing which the confession or pointing-out falls to be  
      ruled as inadmissible evidence. 
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However, the most enlightening aspect of the definition of painful 
treatment in terms of this Convention is that the definition itself excludes 
―pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions‖.622  In terms of this exclusion, lawful sanctions, such as being 
confined after conviction, invariably bring with them a measure of 
suffering whether physical or mental.   
 
Against this background, it was not the death-row conditions that were 
found to be cruel, inhuman or degrading in S v Makwanyane,623 but the 
execution of convicts.  This conclusion in interpretation is not in 
consonance with this definition of cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment in 
the United Nations Convention Against Torture. 
 
This dissonance in interpretation becomes clear especially in view of the 
fact that the Convention came into force on 26 June 1987, eight years 
before the Constitutional Court of South Africa was seized with the duty 
of interpreting the right not to be subjected to painful treatment in 
relation to the right to life.  Not only that, South Africa is a member state 
of the Convention, and  therefore bound by it. 
 
                                                 
622  emphasis added. 
623  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 26. 
225 
 
As indicated, there is a slight variation in the wording of various 
constitutions of various jurisdictions in their prohibition of inhuman, 
degrading treatment.  The Constitution of the United States of America 
and the Constitution of South Africa omit ―torture‖ in their prohibition.  
But whether or not the word ―torture‖ is left out, this presents no 
significant change.  In fact one writer624 describes these variations as 
being ―academic‖ in the sense that all this kind of treatment is prohibited 
by international instruments. 
 
This is underscored by the fact that in the case of Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece , 625 it was held that all torture is 
essentially inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment is 
essentially degrading.  This means that the underlying idea is the same.   
 
In that case, the European Commission of Human Rights,626 in 
endeavouring to elucidate the notion of inhuman treatment, held that it is 
treatment which at least deliberately causes severe mental or physical 
suffering, which in the particular circumstances is unjustifiable.   
  
                                                 
624  Sieghart P The International Law of Human Rights  (1983) at 162. 
625  Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece, Application 3321-3/67; 3344/67  
      before the European Commission of Human Rights. 
626  Hereinafter referred to as the ―Commission‖. 
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In  Ireland v. United Kingdom 627, the European Commission of Human 
Rights gave an example of inhuman, degrading, or cruel treatment.  The 
Commission cited as an example the coercing of an interrogated person 
to stand for an extended period on his toes against the wall.  It would 
add to the inhuman treatment if such a person were to have his head 
covered with a black hood, subjected to constant intense noise, and be 
even deprived of sleep and sufficient food and water.  Such treatment was 
described by the Commission as contrary to the spirit of article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.628 
 
What stands out in this and the previous example, is that these examples 
are dissimilar to the view held by the South African Constitutional Court 
on the cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The South African 
Constitutional Court viewed the death penalty itself as fitting the 
description of being inhuman and degrading.  Furthermore, all these 
cases have a common denominator, and that is, for treatment or 
punishment to be classified as inhuman, the person must be alive to 
continue to experience the treatment.  By comparison, however, the 
sentence of execution is instant and the person does not continue to 
experience any treatment. 
    
                                                 
627  Ireland v. United Kingdom Application No 5310/71. 
628  European Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted in 1950, and came into effect in  
     1953 http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html  (accessed: 2011/08/05). 
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Of interest is the interpretation and ruling of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Soering case,629 where Mr Soering was to be 
extradited to his country of origin, the United States, where he could 
possibly face execution if convicted.  In its interpretation of article 3, the 
Court was of the view that the European Convention on Human Rights 
was to be read as a whole, and that article 3 of the Convention should 
therefore be interpreted in harmony with the provisions of article 2.630  
Based on this approach, the Court held that article 3, which enshrines 
freedom from torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment, could 
not have been intended by the drafters of the Convention to include a 
general prohibition of the death penalty since that would nullify the 
unambiguous wording of article 2, paragraph 1.631  
 
In conjunction with inhuman treatment, one must consider the view 
held632 by the Commission regarding degrading treatment or 
punishment.  The Commission expressed the view that for punishment or 
                                                 
629  Soering v United Kingdom 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), Series A, No 161, Application No 14038. 
630  Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights is drafted as follows: 
     1.   Everyone‘s right to life shall be protected by law.  No one shall be deprived of his life  
           intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a  
           crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2.  Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it  
     results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:  
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.   
631  Van Dijk P and Van Hoof  G J H Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human  
      Rights (1990) at 239. 
632  In Soering v United Kingdom  11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), Series A, No 161, Application No 14038. 
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treatment to fit the description of being inhuman, the humiliation or 
degrading treatment must reach the level where it is beyond the usual 
element of humiliation involved in judicial punishment.  To determine 
whether the humiliation reaches the level where it is beyond the usual 
element of humiliation involved in judicial punishment, certain factors 
come into play, such as the nature and context of the punishment itself 
and the manner and the method of its execution.633  In this regard, one 
must bear in mind that courts have held that some humiliation that is 
inherent in the sentences of a court cannot be avoided and does not 
count as inhuman, degrading treatment. 
 
The upshot of the guidance that can be gleaned from international 
instruments and judgments of human rights courts of international status 
is that the view held by the South African Constitutional Court in 
interpreting the right to life in conjunction with the right not to be 
subjected to cruel treatment, is not consistent with the general 
interpretation that can be generally gleaned from foreign jurisdictions 
and international instruments.634 
 
The striking fact of the matter is that almost all these international 
instruments, while they uphold the right to life, they do not put an end to 
                                                 
633  Soering v United Kingdom  11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989), Series A, No 161, Application No 14038,   
      at 171. 
634  European Convention on Human Rights, 1950; American Convention on Human Rights, 1978;  
      International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966. 
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sentences which take away life.  For example, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,635 adopted in 1966 and having come into 
force in 1976, provides that ―no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life.‖636  This wording suggests that although life is protected by the 
Covenant, room is left for the taking of life in circumstances which are 
not arbitrary.  Such circumstances undoubtedly include the state powers 
to end life in extreme circumstances.   
 
The same Covenant goes on to provide that: 
 
      In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed  
        only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the  
        commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to  
        the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.  This penalty  
        can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court  
         [emphasis mine].637 
 
The Covenant thus regulates the imposition of a sentence which takes 
away life by prescribing circumstances in which such a sentence would be 
justified, and by directing that the imposition of such a judicial penalty 
should not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Covenant itself and 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
                                                 
635  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was adopted in 1966, and came into  
      force in 1876. 
636  Article 6(1). 
637  Article 6(2). 
230 
 
Genocide.638  The name of this Convention suggests that an equivalent 
sanction in the case of genocide would be the judicial ending of the life of 
the one guilty of genocide.   
 
It is crucial to mention at this stage that South Africa is party to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.639 
 
Further, another international aid, the American Convention on Human 
Rights,640 throws light on the subject.  Instead of applying the prohibition 
of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment to capital punishment, the 
Convention regulates capital punishment by providing, in part, that ―no 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life,‖ 641 and that ―the death 
penalty shall not be re-established in states that have abolished it.‖642 
Finally, the Convention provides that ―in no case shall capital punishment 
be inflicted for political offences or related common crimes,‖643 and that 
―capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time 
the crime was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of 
age; nor shall it be applied to pregnant women.‖644 
                                                 
638  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). 
639  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996).  South Africa became party to the  
      Covenant on 28 August 2002. 
640  American Convention on Human Rights, adopted in 1969, came into force in 1978  
      http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html  (accessed: 2011/08/05). 
641  Article 4(1). 
642  Sub-article (3). 
643  Sub-article (4). 
644  Sub-article (5). 
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With the above position in mind, as found in the American Convention on 
Human Rights, it is enlightening to take a glance at what authors have to 
say and compare their remarks with what the South African Constitutional 
Court held in its interpretation of the right to life as it applies to the 
sentence of execution. 
 
The South African Constitutional Court, basing its interpretation on the 
fact that the wording of the right to life in the Constitution simply reads:  
―Everyone has the right to life‖ and has no qualifications, came to the 
conclusion that the right to life is given more protection and is therefore 
absolute.645   In contrast,  Sieghart646 remarks that ―international 
instruments do not in fact accord [the right to life] any formal primacy:  
on the contrary, ICPR, HER, and AMR all contain qualifications rendering 
the right less than absolute, and allowing human life to be deliberately 
terminated in certain specified cases.  [AFR] too prohibits only the 
‗arbitrary‘ deprivation of the right to respect for life‖.647 
 
Sieghart draws a further comparison between the right to life and the 
right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.  He points 
                                                 
645  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 39. 
646  Sieghart P The International Law of Human Rights  (1983) at 130. 
647  Sieghart P at 130. ICPR stands for International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights.  EHR  
      stands for the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and  
      Fundamental Freedoms.  AMR stands for American Convention on Human Rights. 
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out that the right to freedom from torture and other related kinds of ill-
treatment together with the right not to be subjected to slavery and 
servitude are both absolute in the way they are drafted in international 
instruments, and they are subject to no exceptions of any kind 
whatsoever.  This stands in stark contrast to the right to life which, 
although no other rights can be enjoyed without it, is construed as being 
relative by international instruments.  At this juncture it is proper to 
consider the construction of the South African Constitutional Court of this 
right.  The Court, in its leading judgment per Chaskalson P,648 did refer to 
international instruments.  However, it did not honour the provisions of 
these international interpretation aids, justifying its position by saying 
that the South African Constitution is worded without qualifications in 
entrenching the right to life.  
 
Sieghart goes on to make the observation that international instruments 
rather accord a higher value to the quality of life one leads than to life 
itself.  In other words, attention is given to bettering the lives people 
enjoy than to preventing at all cost the ending of life.  
 
In analysing the construction of the right to life by the South African 
Constitutional Court as regards capital punishment, one finds that the 
Court is to be commended for having considered international 
                                                 
648  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 at pars. 63-69. 
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interpreting aids.  However, the result yielded by their consideration is 
not in line with the totality of the guidance provided by these 
international interpreting aids.   
 
There is no approved definition, nor any definition for that matter, of 
inhuman or degrading treatment — neither in the various constitutions 
which include the prohibition hereof in their Bill of Rights nor in the 
international instruments.649  But what international instruments do not 
do is to place an embargo on death as a form of sentence by a competent 
court.650  
 
5.5  Comparison with various jurisdictions 
 
There has been an attempt by the Supreme Court of Canada to give 
guidance by holding that the words ―cruel and unusual‖ are interacting 
expressions colouring each other, as it were, and that they should 
therefore be considered together and not disjunctively in breathing 
meaning to the phrase.651     
 
                                                 
649  Hogg P W Constitutional Law of Canada Vol 2 (2007)  at 53-3. 
650  Keightley R  ―Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment in  
      the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Instruments of International Law:  Recent  
      Developments in South Africa‖ 1995 379 SAJHR 389. 
651  R v. Miller and Cockriell [1972] 1 S. C. R. 711, 736. 
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The United Nations Convention Against Torture652 did define ―torture‖.  It 
did not, though, define inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.  
It is submitted that whether a constitution uses the words ―inhuman or 
degrading treatment‖, or includes the word ―torture‖, or includes or does 
not include the word ―unusual‖, the concept is the same; and therefore 
what is prohibited can be summed up in one word: cruel.   
 
What has thrown the concept into even deeper confusion, however, is the 
fact that there is almost no end to things to which the adjectives ―cruel‖, 
―inhuman‖, ―degrading‖, ―torturous‖ are applied.  Even court sentences 
which are not the death penalty have been described as sentences to 
which these adjectives can properly be applied. 
 
For example, in Makwanyane 653  the South African Constitutional Court 
concluded that life imprisonment is an alternative to the sentence of 
death.  However, even this very sentence has been adjudged in some 
jurisdictions654 as being cruel, inhuman and degrading if it means what it 
means, that is, imprisonment for life, with no hope of possible release.   
 
                                                 
652  United Nations Convention Against Torture, which was adopted in 1984, and came into effect  
      in 1987 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/cat.pdf  (accessed: 2011/08/05). 
653  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
654  For example in Namibia, in S v Tcoeib  1996 1 SACR 390  399; and in Canada in R v Lyons   
      [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309. 
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Indeed, if one seriously thinks about it, the sentence of death may be 
preferable to some when compared to a mind-torturing thought of 
languishing inside prison walls indefinitely.655      
 
There are jurisdictions, such as the United States of America and England, 
where a sentence of life imprisonment means nothing less, but just that.  
The question arises whether a sentence which carries with it no prospect 
of release at any time in the future, is not cruel.  And if it is, the question 
arises as to where the line can be drawn between capital punishment and 
life imprisonment.  In South Africa, a prisoner may be considered for 
parole after serving 25 years.  This does not mean that at the end of that 
period the prisoner will automatically be released; certain requirements 
have to be met.  In some cases the only reprieve is if the President 
exercises his powers and extends pardon.  The words expressed by the 
European Court of Human Rights confirm this point.  This international 
tribunal held that the early release of a prisoner, the remission, the 
release of a prisoner with conditions attached, or the parole as it is often 
called, is not a right.  The Court stated that such a release may be a 
legitimate expectation, but in the final analysis, it remains a privilege.656 
                                                 
655  Wright  J ―Life without parole: The view from death row‖ 1991 Criminal Law Bulletin  334 –  
      357.   
     In his article, J Wright observes that to lock up a prisoner and take away all hope of release is  
     to resort to another form of death sentence.  As a matter of fact, the author says that convicts  
     who are undergoing life imprisonment oppose their sentences with all their might and prefer  
     instead to be hanged  to being kept alive behind bars for the rest of their natural lives. 
656  Ezeh and Connors v The United Kingdom  (Application 39665/98 & 40086 [2003]  
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The judgment of the Namibian Supreme Court in Tcoeib 657 further 
underscores the fact that imprisonment for life is tantamount to death 
penalty.  The Court expressed its view that a sentence of life 
imprisonment cannot be constitutionally sustainable if it effectively 
throws a prisoner into a cell for the rest of his or her natural life as if the 
prisoner was a thing and not a person.  It is especially interesting to note 
that the Namibian Supreme Court linked imprisonment for life to the very 
constitutional right which the South African Court said was affected by 
the death sentence — dignity.  If then the death penalty should be 
avoided because it is an affront to a person‘s right to dignity and to the 
right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, and life 
imprisonment is preferred, and yet life imprisonment also infringes these 
rights, it follows that the conclusion that the death penalty is inhuman or 
degrading is not an impeccable conclusion, as it is not the only sentence 
which can be described as infringing these rights. 
 
Interestingly, even in the South African context, a tribunal that is not the 
final arbiter in constitutional matters, the Supreme Court of Appeal, saw 
the matter in its correct perspective when it expressed that it is only the 
prospect of parole that saves a sentence of life imprisonment from being 
                                                                                                                                                 
      ECHR 48F. 
657  S v Tcoeib  1996 1 SACR 390 399. 
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in conflict with section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution.658  By the same token, 
it can be added that not only does the preferred sentence of life 
imprisonment also constitute inhuman, degrading treatment, but it is 
also an affront to one‘s dignity.659 
 
It becomes clear, then, that it is not only the sentence of taking away life 
that fits the description of inhuman, degrading, cruel treatment, and that 
it is not only the sentence of taking away life that violates a person‘s 
dignity.660  And since this is the case, and especially in the light of the 
position taken by various international instruments which have been 
considered, pinning the label of ―inhuman, degrading‖ treatment to 
capital punishment only, and preferring instead a term of imprisonment 
for the rest of one‘s conscious life, is not in harmony with the 
international spirit of placing the right to life in its proper place. 
 
What comes to light in the final analysis is that what can be construed as 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, is punishment which is out of 
proportion to the offence committed, or punishment which is out of 
proportion to the manner in which the offence was committed.  Facet661 
upholds this view when he writes that: 
                                                 
658  Bull and Another v The State 2001 ZASCA  105, par 23. 
659  In S v  Tcoeib  1996 1 SACR 390  399, the Namibian Supreme Court  held that imprisoning a  
      convict for life is tantamount to treating the convict as a ―thing‖ and not a person. 
660  Which is protected by section 10 of the Constitution. 
661  Facet J E S The Application of the Human Convention on Human Rights (1969) 34, 41. 
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      ‗inhuman treatment‘ would then be the deliberate infliction of physical or mental pain or  
       suffering against the will of the victim, and, when forming part of criminal punishment, out of  
       proportion to the offence.662 
 
This view was aptly brought to the fore by Stewart C J in S v Chabalala 663 
wherein he maintained that notwithstanding the fact that some foreign 
law had made it appear that capital punishment was inhuman and 
degrading, it was not necessarily so.  Stewart C J accepted for purposes of 
S v Chabalala  that degrading punishment would include all forms of 
punitive process that would dishonour or treat a convict with contempt.  
However, he was not prepared to accept that the concept of inhuman and 
degrading punishment was to be applied when the Bill of Rights was 
considered.  He maintained that if it was to be, then imprisonment would 
not be permissible.  It was his view that imprisonment indeed brings 
dishonour to the one imprisoned, that it is not kind to shut a person up 
in prison, that it was cruel to do so.  Imprisonment was, however, 
specifically authorised in the Bill of Rights.664  
 
The South African Constitutional Court in Makwanyane 665 somehow 
failed to observe what has been observed by various courts in the 
international domain, namely that what constitutes cruel punishment, 
                                                 
662  emphasis added. 
663  S v Chabalala 1986 (SA 3) 623. 
664  S v Chabalala  1986  (3) SA 623, 626 D – F. 
665  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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really, is not what the sentence is, but whether the punishment weighs 
more heavily when compared to the gravity of the offence, or the manner 
in which the offence was committed.  Surprisingly, in a later matter 
serving before the same court in 2002, the Court came to this realisation, 
thus becoming inconsistent with its own previous reasoning on a similar 
issue.  In S v Niemand ,666 the Court had to settle the question of 
sentences of indeterminate imprisonment imposed in terms of section 
286 of the Criminal Procedure Act on convicts who are declared by 
Regional Courts or High Courts as habitual criminals.  The Court came to 
the conclusion that a sentence of indeterminate imprisonment, where 
there is no prospect of release at the time the sentence is imposed, 
effectively amounts to life imprisonment.  It labelled such a sentence as a 
cruel, inhuman, degrading sentence and consequently one that is 
unconstitutional.  It was held that a remedy to this would be to end the 
open-endedness of the sentence by placing a ceiling of fifteen years as a 
maximum. 
 
Interestingly, when the same court expressed its preference of life 
imprisonment over capital punishment, it did not have in mind that life 
imprisonment would be tempered in its harshness by the Correctional 
Services Act667 by providing for parole after a term of twenty-five years.  
It had in mind that life imprisonment would be just that — life 
                                                 
666  S v Niemand 2002 (1) SA (CC).  
667  Section 73(6)(b)(iv) of Act 8 of 1959. 
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imprisonment.  But the Court did not consider that life imprisonment, as 
a sentence without the prospect of release, was a cruel, inhuman, 
degrading sentence. 
 
In the case of S v Niemand,668 however, the Constitutional Court came to 
a balanced interpretation of inhuman, degrading punishment as a 
punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the offence. 
 
Likewise, in a Canadian counterpart of the South African section 286 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, namely, section 18 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code Amendment Act,669 the ―habitual criminal‖ provisions were found by 
the Canadian Supreme Court670 to constitute cruel, inhuman, degrading 
punishment if a habitual criminal was sentenced to indeterminate 
sentence — an open-ended sentence with no ray of hope on the other 
side of the tunnel.  Consequently, these provisions were repealed by the 
legislature in 1977.  The ―habitual criminal‖ phenomenon was replaced by 
―dangerous criminal‖, as a distinction had to be drawn between an 
offender who is a social nuisance and an offender who was dangerous to 
society.   
 
                                                 
668  S v Niemand  2002 (1) SA (CC). 
669  The Criminal Code Amendment Act of 1947. 
670  Hatchwell v The Queen  [1976] 1 S. C. R. 39 at 43. 
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Thus, in R v Lyons ,671 the Supreme Court of Canada found that in the 
case of a convict who has been declared a dangerous offender, a 
sentence of indeterminate sentence is not unconstitutional, as such an 
offender is less of a harm than an offender who commits crime 
habitually.672 
 
There are judicial decisions673 pointing to the direction that inhuman, 
degrading punishment can fittingly be defined as punishment which does 
not correspond to the seriousness of the offence committed in the sense 
that the punishment is more severe whereas the offence is less serious.  
First, though, it is proper to point out that inhuman, degrading 
punishment can be divided into two classes of punishment, namely, 
punishment that is barbaric in itself, and punishment that is grossly 
disproportionate to the offence or to the modus operandi of the 
offence.674  An example of the first category, namely, barbaric 
punishment, is the castration of sexual offenders.675 
 
                                                 
671  R v Lyons [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309. 
672  at pars. 118-125. 
673  R v Smith  [1987] 1 S. C. R. 1045; R v Luxton  [1990] 2 S C R 711; Namunjepo v Commanding  
     Officer, Windhoek Prison  2000 6 BCLR 671 (NmS); S v Williams and Others  1995 (7) BCLR 961  
     (CC); Ex-Parte Attorney-General, Namibia (1991) 3 SA 76 (NmS) 861. 
674  Hogg P W Constitutional Law of Canada Vol 2 (2007) at 53-3. 
675  Sieghart P The International Law of Human Rights (1983) at 163. 
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An example of the second category can be found in the case of R v 
Smith,676 where the accused had been convicted of importing drugs.  The 
minimum sentence imposed for this offence was seven years.  He was, 
however, sentenced to eight years imprisonment. The question before the 
Supreme Court of Canada was whether the minimum sentence itself 
provided for by section 5(2) of the Narcotics Control Act of Canada 
constituted an inhuman, degrading punishment, let alone a sentence of 
eight years which exceeds the prescribed minimum sentence by one year, 
thus infringing sections 7, 9 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.677 
 
In its analysis, the majority of the Court held that the sentence infringed 
section 12 of the Charter, that is, it amounted to ―cruel and unusual‖ 
punishment, as the mandatory sentence had no regard for factors such as 
whether the narcotics in question were a small quantity.678   
 
                                                 
676  R v Smith [1987] 1 S. C. R. 1045. 
677  Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, assented to on 29 March 1982,  
       provides: 
      ―Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be  
       deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.‖ 
       Section 9 of the Canadian Charter provides: 
       ―Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.‖ 
       Section 12 of the Canadian Charter provides: 
       ―Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or  
       punishment.‖ 
678   R v Smith [1987]  1 S. C. R. 1045 at par. 117. 
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The point that is being emphasised here is that the concept of cruel or 
inhuman punishment is so open-ended that it finds application, not only 
in serious court sentences such as capital punishment, but also in 
sentences of a term of imprisonment, even in shorter sentences. 
 
By way of contrast, whereas a short term of imprisonment for eight years 
was considered cruel in the above scenario, in R v Luxton 679 — another 
Canadian case — the sentence was not a short term one, but life 
imprisonment for first degree murder.680   The convict challenged, not 
the sentence of life imprisonment, but the denial of parole attached to a 
conviction for first degree murders.  In terms of section 745(a)  of the 
Canadian Criminal Code,681 a prisoner in these circumstances cannot be 
considered for parole until after 25 years.  The convicted murderer 
submitted that the denial of parole constituted cruel punishment.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the challenge on the grounds that 
―the punishment is not excessive and clearly does not outrage our 
standards of decency‖.682 
 
                                                 
679  R v Luxton  [1990] 2 S C R 711.           
680  In Canada a ―first degree‖ murder is a murder where the murder was planned and deliberate or  
      the deceased was a police officer.  In South Africa such murders also attract a minimum 
      sentence of life imprisonment in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
681  The Criminal Code R. S. C., 1985, C. C46. 
682  R v Luxton [1990] 2 S. C. R. 711 at 716. 
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What stands out here is the fact that in R v Smith ,683 a sentence of eight 
years of imprisonment was held to be cruel and unusual, whereas life 
imprisonment was held to be a proper sentence.  This illustrates the point 
that what determines whether a sanction imposed by a court is inhuman 
or degrading is not whether it takes away life as in the case of capital 
punishment, but whether the sanction balances the scales when the 
offence or the manner in which the offence was committed is considered. 
 
The concept of inhuman, degrading, or cruel treatment is found not only 
in connection with sentences of imprisonment, but also in treatments 
that are not a punishment imposed by a court.  In Namunjepo , 684 the 
appellants were awaiting-trial prisoners who had escaped from prison.  
They were subsequently rearrested.  Upon re-incarceration, they were 
kept in leg irons for more than five months.  They were unable to wash 
their bodies as the chains prevented the taking off of their trousers.  They 
were unable to perform any form of exercise, and they could not sleep 
properly.   
 
An application was brought by the prisoners in terms of section 80 of the 
Namibian Prison Act, 685 which proscribed the chaining of prisoners 
beyond a specified time limit, namely, one month, with the extension of 
                                                 
683  R v Smith [1987] 1 S. C. R. 1045. 
684  Namunjepo v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison  2000 6 BCLR 671 (NmS). 
685  The Prisons Act of 1959. 
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up to three months in extraordinary circumstances.  In particular had the 
Court to determine whether the restraining of the prisoners was within 
the spirit of article 8 of the Namibian Constitution.686   
 
It will be noted that the relevant article of the Namibian Constitution does 
not only prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
but it also encapsulates dignity.  Thus, had the Court to find that the 
chaining violated the spirit of article 8, it would find that both the dignity 
of a person has been violated and the person has also been subjected to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
 
The Court found that the keeping of the prisoners in leg irons reduced 
the prisoners to hobbled animals who were restrained to prevent them 
from straying.  It was the Court‘s view that the chaining was reminiscent 
of the age of slavery.  That being the case, it followed, so held the Court, 
that the mechanical restraint of prisoners flew in the face of, at least, 
sub-articles (1) and 2(b) of article 8 of the Constitution — utter disregard 
for human dignity and subjecting a person to cruel treatment. 
                                                 
686  The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, which came into effect in 1990                       
http://209.88.21.36/opencms/export/sites/default/grnnet/AboutNamibia/constitution/constituti
on1   (accessed: 2011/08/06) 
      Articles 8 of the Namibian Constitution provides:        
        ―(1)  The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable.   
         (2)(a)   In any judicial proceedings or in other proceedings before any organ of the State, and  
                   during the enforcement of a penalty, respect for human dignity shall be guaranteed. 
             (b)  No persons shall be subject to torture or to cruel , inhuman or degrading treatment or  
                   punishment‖. 
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What is not clear is whether — as it appears to be so — the Court found 
to be cruel the leg-ironing of prisoners irrespective of the duration of 
such leg-ironing, or only the leg-ironing which exceeds the time limit 
fixed by statute.  There exists a view in the academic fraternity that it is 
not the leg-ironing itself that constitutes cruel treatment, but the 
continuation of it ―in the manner and excessive length‖ as pointed out by 
Gaum.687  
 
What is clear, though, is that the concept of cruel, inhuman, degrading 
treatment cannot be pinned down to and construed only in terms of the 
death penalty.   
 
There is nothing that can create worse confusion than a court showing 
itself as having different views of a legal or constitutional concept when 
that concept comes under consideration by the same court on separate 
occasions and in different matters.  What would save anybody from such 
confusion would be for the court to state in no unclear terms that it 
proposes, and does in fact adopt, a new stance on the concept.688  
                                                 
687   Gaum L ―The use of mechanical restraints by correctional services in South Africa and  
       Namibia:  Namunjepo v Commanding Officer, Windhoek Prison  [2000] 6 BCLR 671 (NmS)  
       2002 AHRLJ  175. 
688  In terms of the doctrine of stare decisis, a court has the prerogative of correcting itself and  
      deviating from its  previous decisions if it realises that subsequent developments since its  
      previous decision have  thrown more light on a previously mysterious issue.  However, such a  
      departure must not be subtle, but must be stated in certain terms. 
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In this regard the Constitutional Court of South Africa had occasion to 
interpret or define the perplexing issue of inhuman, degrading, cruel 
treatment in the case of Makwanyane.689  One of its main findings leading 
to its abolishing of the death penalty was that such a sentence was 
inhuman, cruel, or degrading.690 
 
This observation was based on the fact that the execution of the death 
sentence is final and irrevocable and puts an end to other rights which 
cannot be enjoyed without life.  Furthermore, the death penalty strips the 
executed person of humanity as it treats the person as an object to be 
eliminated by the state.  For lack of definition of what is to be regarded 
as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the Court felt that it had to 
give meaning to this concept itself.691 
 
Then the Court had further occasion to refine the concept of cruel, 
inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment in S v Williams.692  
However, when this occasion presented itself it was a totally different set 
of facts and circumstances.  The Court had to adjudicate whether the 
imposition of corporal punishment by a court of law to juveniles 
constituted the concept of inhuman, degrading treatment.   
                                                 
689  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
690  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 26. 
691  Ibid at par. 8. 
692  S v Williams and Others  1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC). 
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Interestingly, the Court preferred to consider the dictionary definition of 
the words forming the concept, doing so disjunctively.  As an additional 
feature, the Court adopted the view that the interpretation of the concept 
involved the making of a value judgment which ―requires objectively to be 
articulated and identified, regard being had to the contemporary norms, 
aspirations, expectations and sensitivities of the . . . people as expressed 
in its national institutions and its Constitution, and further having regard 
to the emerging consensus of values in the civilised ―international 
community‖.693 
 
It has to be noted that in advocating a value judgment in S v Williams, 
which approach stands in stark contrast from the approach in 
Makwanyane where the same issue was under consideration, the 
Constitutional Court, albeit drawing from Mahomed CJ in Ex parte 
Attorney-General,694 saw the need to be guided, regardless of the extent, 
by the contemporary norms, aspirations, expectations, and sensitivities 
of the people.  Mahomed CJ correctly pointed out695 that such aspirations, 
expectations and contemporary norms are reflected in the national 
institutions and the Constitution.   
 
                                                 
693  S v Williams and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC) at par. 22.  
694  Ex parte Attorney-General, Namibia (1991) 3 SA 76 (NmS). 
695  at pars. 13, 16. 
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It is interesting to note that in Makwanyane,696 the Court felt strongly that 
in its endeavour to weigh the propriety of the death penalty, it should not 
let itself be guided by what public sentiments may favour.697  In its 
observation that the issue could not be decided by having regard to 
public sentiments — and it is submitted that the Court was correct — the 
Court noted that the majority view would prevail.  This was certainly the 
correct decision, but it has to be kept in mind that nothing can prevent 
the same majority of the population to exercise their majority in 
Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to clearly provide for the 
death penalty for certain crimes, as is the case in Botswana and Lesotho.  
As a matter of fact, California is one such jurisdiction which has gone 
back and forth, amending its constitution for the sole purpose of 
sanctioning capital punishment, as seen from the paragraph below. 
 
It was in 1972 when the California Supreme Court held in the case of The 
People of the State of California v Robert Page Anderson,698 that the 
death sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment when 
measured against the constitution of that state.  Nine months after that 
decision, the public, through its elected representatives in the legislature, 
amended the Constitution and thus overruled the Supreme Court‘s 
                                                 
696  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
697  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at pars. 87 to 89. 
698  The People of the State of California v Robert Page Anderson  493 Pd .2d 880, 6 Cal. 3d. 628  
      (Cal. 1972). 
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decision. The amendment came in the form of Proposition 17 of 1972, 
which added Article 1, Section 27, which provided as follows: 
       
     All statutes of this state in effect on February 17, 1972, requiring, authorising, imposing, or  
       relating to the death penalty are in full force and effect, subject to legislative amendment or  
       repeal by statute, initiative, or referendum.  The death penalty provided for under those  
       statutes shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual  
       punishments within the meaning of Article , Section 6 nor shall such punishment for such  
       offences be deemed to contravene any other provision of this Constitution.699  
 
Acting independently of the California legislature in its move to amend 
the state Constitution, in 1973 the United States Supreme Court found in 
the case of Furman v Georgia,700 that the death sentence was 
unconstitutional in the manner in which it was being administered at that 
time.  In the meantime, California had passed legislation701 in 1973 which 
made the death sentence mandatory in some circumstances. 
 
In the late part of 1976, the California Supreme Court, relying for its 
decision on the ruling of the United States Supreme Court earlier that 
year,702 found in the case of Roberts v Louisiana 703  that the California 
statute providing for the death penalty was unconstitutional under the 
                                                 
699  http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/California_Proposition_17_(1972) (accessed:  2011/08/06). 
700  Furman v Georgia 408 U. S. 153 (1972) at 408. 
701  Stats. 1973, ch 719,  p. 1300 http://law.justia.com/cases/california/calapp3d/55/23.html   
      (accessed: 2011/08/06). 
702  Gregg v Georgia 428 U. S. 1976. 
703  Roberts v Louisiana 428 . S. 325 (1976). 
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Federal Constitution for the reason that it denied the accused the 
opportunity to give evidence in mitigation of sentence.704   
 
As a direct response to this decision, the California legislature re-enacted 
the death sentence statute in 1977.  Under the new statute,705 the 
legislature permitted the giving of evidence in mitigation of sentence.  
Thus, the death penalty was reinstated.706  This back-and-forth 
movement of court and legislature surrounding the constitution 
demonstrates that while public opinion cannot directly determine the 
direction to be taken by a court, public opinion can make itself a force to 
be reckoned with from another angle. 
 
While dealing with the facet of public opinion, it is necessary to state that 
the desirability of consistency in constitutional interpretation becomes 
evident when regard is had to the court‘s standpoint with regard to public 
opinion in Makwanyane 707 and in Williams.708  Both matters served 
before the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the same year.  As 
already pointed out, it was the position taken by the Court that the public 
opinion is not a factor in arriving at the correct construction of 
constitutional provisions.  Indeed, in his own judgment, Sachs J took the 
                                                 
704  at 428. 
705  Proposition 7, of 1977. 
706  Currently the California Constitution in article 7(a) provides, in part, that: 
      ―A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law‖. 
707  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
708  S v Williams and Others  1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC). 
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view that their function as judges is to interpret the text of the 
Constitution as it stands and that, accordingly, whatever their personal 
views on a subject, their response must be a purely legal one.709 
 
However, in Williams, the same court per Langa J had regard to public 
opinion on an international scale when it expressed the view that ―there is 
unmistakably a growing consensus in the international community  that 
judicial whipping . . . offends society‘s notions of decency ‖.710  The Court 
further acknowledged that this consensus had found expression through 
the courts and legislatures of various countries and through international 
instruments.711  The acknowledgment by the Court that this consensus 
found expression through the courts and legislatures confirms the view 
espoused here that public opinion, though it may be overlooked by 
courts, binds the courts within the parameters of legislation enacted by 
the representatives of the public. 
 
It is submitted that it makes no difference whether public opinion is on a 
smaller scale such as local public opinion, or on an international scale, 
such as the ―international community‖.712 What matters is that a court 
                                                 
709  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 349. 
710  S v Williams and Others  1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC) at par. 39. 
711  S v Williams and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC) at par. 39.  
712  Ex parte Attorney-General, Namibia (1991) 3 SA 76 (NmS) at 861. 
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would be allowing itself to be swayed, at least to some extent, by the 
opinion of the public.713   
 
It is also significant that while the South African Constitutional Court took 
the view in Makwanyane 714 that the South African Constitution is unique 
and therefore the court does not have to follow foreign jurisdictions, the 
Court appeared to have compromised its consistency in Williams 715  
when determining the constitutionality of corporal punishment, by stating 
that ―corporal punishment has been abolished in a wide range of 
countries‖, 716 and by stating that ―already South Africa has lagged 
behind. The Constitution now offers an opportunity for South Africans to 
join the mainstream of a world community‖.717   From this passage it 
becomes abundantly lucid that the Court was no longer guided by the 
proper construction of the ―text of the Constitution‖718 and stare decisis 
consistency. 
 
                                                 
713 In S v Chabalala 1986 (3) SA 623, 626D-F,  Stewart CJ made abundantly clear that public  
     opinion is something that courts, advertently or inadvertently, rightly or wrongly, find  
     themselves considering when he said at 629 C - D:  ―The fact that some courts in other  
     countries as well as various legal writers have expressed the view that, for one reason or  
     another, the death penalty is inhuman or degrading, cannot override its express acceptance by  
     the representatives of the people of Bophuthatswana, in formulating the Bill of Rights, as the  
     usual and appropriate punishment in certain prescribed circumstances.  Since such acceptance  
     on 6 December 1977 nothing has happened to make me believe that the people of  
     Bophuthatswana now think otherwise‖ [emphasis added]. 
714  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
715  S v Williams and Others  1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC). 
716  S v Williams and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC) at par. 40. 
717  S v Williams and Others  1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC) at par. 50 [emphasis added]. 
718  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) (SA) 391 (CC) at par. 349. 
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It must be borne in mind that the crux of the matter was the placing of 
the concept of inhuman and degrading treatment in its proper 
perspective.  In its endeavour to do so, the Court echoed the words of 
Aguda JA in S v Petrus and Another 719:   
 
      Any punishment involving torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the  
        stretching of limbs, burning alive or at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel,  
        embowelling alive, beheading, public dissection and the like, or involving mutilation or a  
        lingering death, or the infliction of acute pain and suffering, either physical or mental, is  
        inherently inhuman and degrading720. 
 
What is striking in the definition which was approvingly reiterated by the 
Court for purposes of invalidating corporal punishment, is the fact that in 
the list of cruel acts which constitute cruel, inhuman, degrading 
punishment, punishment by death does not feature in the list. 
 
It is enlightening to find that the elasticity of inhuman and degrading 
punishment extends itself from such serious punishments as the 
execution of capital punishment to such less serious punishments as 
judicial corporal punishment, and further down to corporal punishment at 
schools and, questionably enough, further down to the administering of 
corporal punishment in the home.  If the definition of cruel, inhuman, 
degrading treatment is so elastic, the question appropriately arises 
                                                 
719  S v Petrus and Another [1985] LRC (Const) 699. 
720   at 725g-726b. 
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whether the right to life could be construed as excluding capital 
punishment on the grounds of being cruel, inhuman, and degrading. 
 
Since judicial corporal punishment was condemned in Williams,721 it was 
expected that the Constitutional Court would have occasion to express 
itself on a closely related matter of corporal punishment by schools and, 
by way of extension, on another closely-related matter of disciplinary 
chastisement by parents.  In the case of corporal punishment by schools,   
the legislature, in response to the spirit of the Court in Williams, decided 
that the same reasoning of the Court in Williams applies ipso facto to 
corporal punishment by schools.  Thus, the South African Schools Act722 
was produced by the legislature.723   
 
Whether the definition of cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment was elastic 
enough to stretch to the schools was now ripe for decision.  This decision 
was prompted by the constitutional challenge brought by a voluntary 
association representing certain private schools.  In the case of Christian 
Education South Africa v Minister of Education 724,  the voluntary 
association impugned the constitutionality of section 10 of the South 
                                                 
721  S v Williams and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC). 
722  South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. 
723  Section 10 of the South African Schools Act provides: 
      ―No person may administer corporal punishment at a school to a learner‖. 
724   Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education  2000 (4) SA 757 (CC). 
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African Schools Act 725 on the grounds that it encroached on the 
constitutional right to religious freedom.  It was submitted that corporal 
punishment in private learning institutions was an indispensable part of 
instruction, which was scripturally based.  It was further argued by the 
appellant that parents had consented to corporal punishment being 
administered to their children. 
 
Adjudicating the matter, the Constitutional Court held that the legislative 
enactment was not unconstitutional on the grounds claimed, that is, 
religious.  It went so far as to say that even if the enactment was 
unconstitutional, its unconstitutionality was condoned by the limitation of 
rights provided for by the Constitution.  It is obvious that the Court relied 
heavily on its previous decision in Williams 726 that corporal punishment 
constituted inhuman, degrading punishment.  The Court, however, fell 
short of pronouncing itself on disciplinary chastisement of children by 
their parents and left this question open.   
 
However, it is inconceivable how the reasoning behind the decision in 
Williams 727  should have influenced the Court in Christian Education.728  
For one, in Williams the Court had stated the following as its reason for 
declaring judicial corporal punishment unconstitutional:  ―it involves the 
                                                 
725  South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. 
726  S v Williams and Others  1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC). 
727  S v Williams and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC). 
728  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education  2004 (4) SA 757 (CC). 
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intentional infliction of physical pain on a human being by another 
human being at the instigation of the State‖.729  In the case of private 
schools the element of ―the instigation of the state‖ was unquestionably 
not involved.  Needless to say, in the case of disciplinary chastisement of 
children by parents the element of state instigation is missing. At 
common law the defence of parental authority of disciplinary 
chastisement is available as a ground of justification.  This results in an 
unresolved question of where to draw the line: does all chastisement 
constitute inhuman, degrading punishment?   
 
The South African legislature has also not filled the void created by its 
enactment of the South African Schools Act, namely, the uncertainty as to 
the legal or constitutional propriety of disciplinary chastisement in the 
home.730 
 
A jurisdiction that has pioneered an exemplary way in this regard is 
Scotland.  In 2003, the Scotland legislature enacted the Criminal Justice 
Act.731  Section 51 of the Act set clear guidelines as to what constitutes 
reasonable chastisement by setting out factors to be considered.732  This 
                                                 
729  S v Williams and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 961 (CC) at pars 89, 90. 
730  Burchell  J Principles of Criminal Law  (2008) 3rd ed at 291. 
731  Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act of 2003, which came into effect in 2003 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/2008/0814090217/opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/a  
cts2003/pdf  (accessed: 2011/08/06). 
732  Section 51 provides: 
      ―Where a person claims that something done to a child was a physical punishment carried out  
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would also make clear what constitutes cruel, inhuman, degrading 
punishment.733 
 
Though not guided or influenced by the Scotland Criminal Justice Act, the 
Israel Supreme Court was able to distinguish between inhuman, 
degrading punishment, and the right of parents to corporally punish their 
children.  In Plonit v Attorney-General 734, the appellant had struck her 
children on the buttocks and slapped them in the face over a period of 
time.  She had thrown a vacuum cleaner at her daughter and thrown a 
punch at her son.  Her defence was that her actions had an educational 
purpose.  Beinisch J showed insight and saw beyond the veneer of 
disciplinary action and found that the chastisement amounted to 
inhuman, degrading punishment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
       in exercise of a parental right or of a right derived from having charge or care of the child,  
       then in determining any question as to whether what was done was, by virtue of being in such  
       exercise, a justifiable assault a court must have regard to the following factors— 
(a) the nature of what was done, the reason for it and the circumstances in which it 
took place; 
(b) its duration and frequency; 
(c) any effect (whether physical or mental) which it has been shown to have had on 
the child; 
(d) the child‘s age; and 
(e) the child‘s personal characteristics (including, without prejudice to the 
generality of this paragraph, sex and state of health) at the time the thing was 
done.‖ 
733  Pete S ―To Smack or not to smack?  Should the law prohibit South African parents from  
      imposing corporal punishment on their children?‖ 1998 SAJHR 430. 
734  Plonit v Attorney-General  1998 54 (1) PD 145. 
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In a similar vein, in 1997, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
the repeated beating of a young boy by his stepfather with a cane 
amounted to inhuman, degrading treatment.735  It would seem that the 
Court based its decision on the fact that the beatings were repeated.   
 
This aspect alone of inhuman, degrading punishment illustrates the  
desirability of consistency in constitutional interpretation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
735  A v United Kingdom  27 EHRR 611 (1997). 
260 
 
CHAPTER  6 
 
The right to life of the terminally ill 
 
It was emphasised in Makwanyane 736  that the right to life reigns 
supreme and over all other rights since other rights cannot be enjoyed or 
exercised if one is dead.  Therefore all other rights hinge on life as a 
pivot.   
 
In view of the pivotal nature of the right to life, it was the Court‘s view 
that this right, of the various available approaches to constitutional 
interpretation, must be given a generous and a purposive 
interpretation737, as was the case in Zuma.738  It was also the Court‘s view 
that South Africa‘s right to life was unqualified and therefore was given 
more protection.739  A comparison was drawn740 between the Hungarian 
Constitution741 which prohibits only the arbitrary deprivation of life, and 
the South African Constitution which merely states that everyone has the 
right to life without qualification.  Because of the absence of the phrase 
―arbitrarily deprived‖ in the South African Constitution, the Court held 
that in South Africa the right to life is more securely protected in its 
                                                 
736  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
737  Ibid at par. 9. 
738  S v Zuma and Two Others  1995 (2) SA 642 (CC). 
739  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 85. 
740  Ibid at pars. 83-86. 
741  Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, as adopted in 1949 and amended in 1989. 
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Constitution than the right to life in section 54(1) of the Hungarian 
Constitution.742  Nothing wrong can be found in this interpretation, as 
long as it is consistently maintained throughout with regard to the right 
to life. 
 
Indeed, the South African Constitution itself lists743 rights which are non-
derogable.  Among these is the right to life, and the extent to which it is 
protected is indicated as ―entirely‖.  This listing by the Constitution of the 
right to life as being non-derogable, together with the interpretation and 
importance attached by the Constitutional Court as explained above, 
must be borne in mind as the discussion unfolds. 
 
Three years after the Court had asserted the non-derogability of the right 
to life in Makwanyane,744 little did the Court foresee that the same right 
would have to be weighed on constitutional scales, but from a different 
angle.  A man whose life depended on the ruling of the same Court for 
the prolonging of his life approached the Court.  Mr Soobramoney745 was 
a diabetic suffering from heart disease, and a cerebro-vascular disease 
which caused him to have a stroke.  Later his kidneys also failed.  His 
                                                 
742  Section 54(1) of the Hungarian Constitution provides: 
      ―In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the inherent right to life and to human dignity.  No  
      one shall be arbitrarily denied of these rights‖. 
743  The listed rights are equality (section 9), human dignity (section 10), life (section 11),  
      freedom and security of the person (section 12), slavery, servitude and forced labour (section  
      13), children (section 28), and arrested, detained and accused persons (section 35). 
744  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
745  Soobramoney  v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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condition was diagnosed as being irreversible and, at the time of seeking 
relief from the Court, he was at the final stages of renal failure.  His life 
could be prolonged, however, by means of regular kidney dialysis.   
 
He had sought such medical relief from a local state hospital.  The 
hospital was constrained in its ability to offer relief as it only could do so 
to a limited number of patients who had to fall within a particular 
category, and according to the hospital Mr Soobramoney did not fall 
under that category, and was therefore turned away —  to die. 
 
Mr Soobramoney was a man of limited means who had become 
impoverished by his kidney ailment.  In this regard, Liebenberg746 makes 
a valid point, that socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights must be 
interpreted in the light of the constitutional commitment to eliminate 
poverty and deprivation.   The writer links the rescue of poverty-stricken 
individuals to the values of human dignity, equality and freedom, and 
expresses the view that concern for the material and social context of 
human life is integral to the development of a jurisprudence that gives 
effect to the underlying purposes and values of the Constitution.747 
 
                                                 
746  Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights:  Adjudication Under A Transformative Constitution   
      (2010) at 100. 
747  Ibid. 
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Mr Soobramoney relied for relief on the constitutional right to life,748 and 
the right to emergency medical treatment,749 and the proper 
interpretation of these was the bone of contention.  With regard to the 
right to life, the Court deliberately avoided the challenge of interpreting 
the right to life as it applied to the situation placed before it by the 
appellant, that is, the right to life as it applied to the prolonging or 
sustaining of life if so desired by a litigant.  The additional judgment by 
Sachs J gave an interpretation to the right to life in a way which is 
completely at odds with the approach adopted by this same court with 
regard to the right to life in the context of capital punishment.   Sachs J 
came to the conclusion that regardless of the definition of the right to 
life, there is in reality no meaningful way in which it can constitutionally 
be extended to encompass the right to evade death indefinitely.750  
Indeed, if this interpretation is correct and were to be applied, it would 
mean that:  any sick persons, even those admitted to treatment by 
hospitals, may as well have their treatment terminated by the hospitals, 
since they are endeavouring to achieve the ultimately impossible goal, 
namely, to evade death.   
 
                                                 
748  Section 11 of the Constitution. 
749  Section 27(3) of the Constitution. 
750  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)  at par. 57. 
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What is more, the Court‘s judgment in this matter may also be subject to 
criticism on the ground that it violates the right to equality.751  Though 
not constituting automatically unfair discrimination, in that it is not based 
on the subsection 3 criteria,752 it nevertheless constitutes discrimination, 
as it treats differently patients who are terminally ill as against those who 
are ―normally‖ ill.753 
 
Surely, this approach runs counter to the principle of legality, which 
principle has a part to play in the interpretation of statutes and, by way of 
extension, in the interpretation of a constitution.  The principle of legality 
lays down that where a statutory provision is open to more than one  
interpretation, one interpretation being favourable and the other being 
prejudicial to a party, the interpretation favoram libertatis must be 
preferred.754  By the same token, if a constitutional provision is vague, or 
its interpretation is uncertain or, if it is open to more than one 
interpretation, one being favourable to a party and the other being less 
favourable, it is submitted that the interpretation favourable to a party 
should prevail.   
 
                                                 
751  As guaranteed in section 9 of the Constitution. 
752  Race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual  
      orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
753  De Waal J ―Equality and the Constitutional Court‖ 2002 South African Mercantile Law  
     Journal  148. 
754  Snyman C R Criminal Law  (2008) 5th ed at 44;  See also Jonathan Burchell J Principles of  
      Criminal Law  (2008)  3rd ed at 101. 
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A strong indication that the principle of legality was woven in the text of 
the Constitution is section 35(3)(l) and (n), which prohibits the conviction 
of a person for an act or omission that was not an offence under either 
national or international law at the time it was committed or omitted.  
The section also reflects the principle of legality by providing that a 
convicted person shall be entitled to the benefit of the least severe of the 
prescribed punishments or sentences, if the prescribed punishment for 
the offence has been changed between the time that the offence was 
committed and the time of sentencing. 
 
6.1  The law in the United States of America 
 
It is necessary to observe the trend in other jurisdictions with regard to 
the interpretation of the right to life.  The Constitutional Court of South 
Africa has in various matters before it, including the matter of the right to 
life, made reference to the position in the United States as one of the 
jurisdictions with a long history of democracy.  The United States of 
America  has set a generous pattern which differs from the one followed 
by the South African Constitutional Court.  On the issue of preserving life, 
the United States legislature has honoured the right of an individual to 
life by enacting the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labour 
Act.755 
                                                 
755  The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labour Act, which came into effect in 1986       
266 
 
 
The objective of the Act was to combat the practice of ―patient dumping‖, 
that is, the refusal to treat patients because they are unable to pay for 
their treatment, or their medical cover is insufficient.  It was also 
intended to put an end to the transferring, or discharging of patients due 
to high treatment costs.  The Act requires hospitals and ambulance 
services to provide care to anyone needing emergency medical treatment 
regardless of citizenship, or their ability to pay for treatment.  Patients 
who are in need of emergency medical treatment can only be discharged 
with their informed consent, or when their condition requires that they be 
transferred to a hospital better equipped to administer treatment.756  In 
terms of the Act, if the hospital does not have the capacity to treat a 
condition, as was the case in Soobramoney,757 the hospital must transfer 
the patient to another state medical institution, in honour of the right to 
life.  Further, an overloaded hospital may not discharge a patient who is 
unable to pay for treatment in order to make room for a patient who is 
able to or who is viewed by society as a more valued citizen.  If the 
emergency room is overloaded, patients must be treated in an order 
based on their determined medical needs, not their ability to pay.758 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
      (hereinafter referred to as ―the Act‖)  
http://www.medlaw.com/healthlaw/EMTALA/statute/emergency-medical-treatme.shtml 
(accessed: 2011/08/08). 
756  Sections 2 and 3 of the Act. 
757  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
758  This is laid down in section 3 of the Act. 
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The Act provides for the enforcement of a hospital‘s responsibility to 
render medical assistance to patients who are in need of such assistance.  
To this end, the Act provides in section 2A for civil action to be taken 
against a hospital should it fail to discharge its obligations under the Act. 
  
The South African Constitutional Court declined to grant an order of relief 
to a terminally ill patient who wanted to preserve his life, but was turned 
down by a state hospital on grounds of financial constraints, as pleaded 
by the state hospital.  On the other hand, the United States legislature has 
deemed it necessary to preserve the life of even a terminally ill patient by 
providing759 that a hospital may start the process of enquiring about 
payment and billing only after the patient has been stabilised to a certain 
degree.   
 
The failure in South Africa to preserve life must be seen in the light of an 
unwavering defence for the right to life of a convict, whereas a law-
abiding citizen cannot have this right enforced if his or her life is at stake.  
This must also be seen against the right to life which was described by 
the South African Court as being ―unqualified‖ and thus warranting 
unqualified protection.  By way of comparison, the United States 
Constitution qualifies the right to life by stating in its Fifth Amendment 
that one cannot be denied it arbitrarily.  Yet the same jurisdiction 
                                                 
759  Section 3(5)(h) of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labour Act of 1986. 
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honours its qualified constitutional right to life by extending or 
preserving life, if the person who is about to lose that life so desires. 
 
Mr Soobramoney placed reliance on the phrase used by section 27(3) of 
the Constitution, namely, emergency medical treatment. While the South 
African Court does have regard to public international law and foreign law 
as an aid to constitutional interpretation,760 its interpretation of human 
rights does not reflect this.  Foreign jurisdictions such as the United 
States of America have for many years had their definition of ―emergency 
medical treatment‖.  The South African Court interpreted an ―emergency‖ 
narrowly and strictly, contrary to the principle of legality, and to the trend 
in interpreting constitutional provisions.  It construed an emergency 
merely as ―a dramatic, sudden situation or event which is of a passing 
nature in terms of time‖.761  According to this construction, an emergency 
resulting from a chronic condition does not constitute an emergency.  But 
constitutional provisions are to be interpreted generously and 
purposively, as was explained by the same Court in Makwanyane 762 and 
Zuma. 763  
 
The difficulty is caused by the fact that the Constitution of South Africa 
itself contains no definition of ―emergency‖; nor do our pieces of 
                                                 
760  Section 39(1) of the Constitution. 
761  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 38. 
762  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 24. 
763  S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at 15. 
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legislation which are pertinent in this regard:  the National Health Act of 
2003; the Health Professions Act of 1974; the Health Professions 
Amendment Act of 2007; the Nursing Act of 1978; the Department of 
Health‘s Ethical Rules of Conduct of 2009, and the Department of 
Health‘s Patients‘ Rights Charter of 2002 and 2008, are all silent on the 
definition of ―emergency‖.  What is astonishing is that the legislator did 
not see the need created by Soobramoney  to define ―emergency‖ in those 
Acts764 that were enacted after the Soobramoney 765 judgment.  The only 
exception is the Medical Schemes Act of 1998, which defines ―emergency 
medical condition‖ as ―the sudden and, at the time, unexpected onset of a 
health condition that requires immediate medical or surgical treatment, 
where failure to provide medical or surgical treatment would result in 
serious impairment to bodily functions or serious dysfunction of a bodily 
organ or part, or would place the person‘s life in serious jeopardy‖.766 
 
On the other hand, the United States Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labour Act of 1986 defines ―emergency medical treatment‖ 
generously and purposively as ―a condition manifesting itself by acute 
symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the 
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to 
result in placing the individual‘s health [or the health of an unborn child] 
                                                 
764  The National Health Act of 2003; the Health Professions Amendment Act of 2007. 
765  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
766  Section 7 of the Act. 
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in serious jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious 
dysfunction of bodily organs‖. 767  The generous approach is seen in the 
fact that the definition is so encompassing that it also covers pregnancy 
as a condition that may give rise to an emergency.  It is instructive to find 
that the United States Bill of Rights768 does not contain any provision 
relating to emergency medical treatment.  Therefore, the United States 
was and is not under constitutional obligation to provide for the needs of 
those who are suddenly overtaken by indisposition and need emergency 
medical treatment.  Despite being free from any constitutional obligation 
to provide for the needs of those who need emergency medical 
treatment, it is submitted that the United States legislature has seen 
reason to provide for the preservation of life of those who need that care, 
especially if they are indigent, by enacting the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labour Active Act. 
 
If the interpretation of the concept ―emergency medical treatment‖ by the 
South African Constitutional Court is a guideline, whatever life-
threatening condition arises from the pregnancy of a woman would not 
constitute an emergency in terms of section 27(3) of the Constitution, 
since the woman had known for months that she is pregnant.  A fact that 
escapes the reasoning of the Court is that even a condition that has a 
long history can suddenly develop life-threatening symptoms, thus 
                                                 
767  Section 1. 
768  As contained in the fourteen amendments to the United States Constitution, 1791. 
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becoming an emergency.  In the case of Soobramoney,769 this turned out 
to be just so.  The appellant had had his condition of renal failure for 
quite some time, and it was accompanied by other complications.  Since 
the condition was chronic, it can, on the face of it, not be seen as an 
emergency.  However, the sudden turn of developments in the ailing 
person actually changes a known condition to that of an emergency 
needing swift medical attention.  A sudden change of developments in 
the ailing person may be called a novus actus interveniens.770  An HIV-
positive person would be classified in this category.  It is submitted that a 
patient enduring illness as a result of this virus has a known and a long-
standing condition, but an episode of vomiting as a result of an infection 
which is untreatable because of full-blown AIDS is an intervening episode 
which has now become an emergency, calling for emergency medical 
treatment.771 
 
The Court acknowledged that the words ―emergency medical treatment‖ 
are open to a broad construction, and would include ongoing treatment 
of chronic illnesses for the purpose of preserving life, but at the same 
time the Court took the view that this is not the ordinary meaning of 
these words, and that if this is what the meaning which section 27(3) was 
                                                 
769  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
770  Meaning, a new intervening act, cause, or development.  See Neethling J Law of Delict (2006)  
      5th ed at 189. 
771  Van der Walt A J ―Dancing With Codes — protecting, developing and deconstructing property  
      rights in a constitutional state‖ 2001  SALJ  309. 
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intended to serve, one would expect that to be expressed in positive and 
specific terms.772 
 
Certainly, this approach is inconsistent with the generous and purposive 
approach recommended by the same court in matters of this nature, 
especially where life is at stake.  If the Court expected that the intention 
to extend section 27(3) to the preservation of life should have been 
expressly stated in the text of the Constitution, then by the same token, 
the Court should have been consistent and expected that section 11 (the 
right to life) should have been stated unambiguously in the text of the 
Constitution to include the express prohibition of capital punishment.  
But this was not the case.  Instead, the Court was prepared to afford 
section 11 a generous and purposive approach on the basis that the right 
to life was unqualified.   
 
Defending its approach in denying Mr Soobramoney the much needed 
emergency treatment, the Court referred to the words of section 27(3):  
―No one may be refused medical emergency treatment‖.  The Court 
held773 that these words ought to be understood in the context of 
sections 26 and 27(1) and (2). 
 
                                                 
772  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par 13. 
773  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 11. 
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This conclusion is untenable.  Both sections 26 and 27(1) and (2) 
respectively are expressly qualified by the words ―within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation‖ of these rights.  This 
qualifying statement does not appear in section 27(3).  Section 27(3) does 
not say: no one may be refused emergency medical treatment ―within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation‖ of this right; 
nor does section 27(3) say: no one may be refused emergency medical 
treatment, subject to the availability of resources.774   
 
The drafters of the Constitution applied the qualification of the 
availability of resources, and the progressive nature of realisation to 
housing, in section 26 of the Constitution, for the simple reason that the 
provision of houses is not an emergency that is life-threatening, but can 
be realised gradually and to the extent of available resources.   
 
Similarly, the drafters of the Constitution applied the qualification of the 
availability of resources and the gradual nature of realisation to health 
care services, reproductive health care, sufficient food, water, social 
security and social assistance (section 27(1)(a), (b) and (c)),  with the 
understanding that the provision of these sorely needed services is not a 
life-threatening emergency, though the lack of these services could prove 
to be life-threatening if ignored over a long stretch of time. 
                                                 
774  Van der Walt  J ―Law as sacrifice‖ 2001 TSAR  at  724. 
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However, as long as the state ensures that they are gradually or 
progressively provided, lives can be saved.  But, the same cannot be said 
about emergency medical treatment.775   The mere fact that this 
treatment is qualified by the drafters of the Constitution not just as 
medical treatment, but as ―emergency‖ medical treatment, is sufficient to 
show that the provision of this service cannot be gradual, or progressive, 
or made to be dependent on the availability of resources, at a time when 
a patient is about to lose his or her life.  For these reasons, the view that 
the Court could not order the state to save the life of a terminally ill 
patient due to constraints of financial resources, does not pass 
constitutional scrutiny.  The fact that the Court made a mistake in 
holding this view is evidenced by the fact that the same Court did make 
similar orders later, as will be shown later in this Chapter.  By so doing, 
the Court opened the door to further inconsistencies in construing certain 
constitutional provisions.   
 
Liebenberg776 explains that the phrase ―progressive realisation‖ was 
borrowed from the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.777  Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides as follows: 
                                                 
775  Section 27(3) of the Constitution. 
776  Liebenberg S Socio-economic Rights:  Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution   
      (2010) at 107; Liebenberg S ―Socio-economic Rights‖ in Chaskalson M et al  Constitutional Law  
      of South Africa  Vol 1 (1999) at 41-39. 
     Africa  Vol 1 (1999) at 41-39. 
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      Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through  
        international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the  
        maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation  
        of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including  
        particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
 
Liebenberg778 explains the context in which the phrase ―progressive 
realisation‖ should be understood by referring to the General Comments 
No 3 of The Nature of States Parties Obligations,779 a document prepared 
by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.  In the document the Committee imposes an obligation on states 
parties to the Covenant to ―move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible towards‖ the goal of achieving the full realisation of economic 
and social rights.780  Liebenberg concludes from the words of the 
Committee that the latitude to achieve the realisation of the rights 
―progressively‖ should therefore not be interpreted as an invitation for the 
state to drag its feet interminably.781 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
777  Hereinafter referred to as ―ICESCR‖.  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cesr.htm  
      (accessed: 2012/03/25).  The ICESCR came into effect in 1976. 
778  Liebenberg S ―Socio-economic Rights‖ in Chaskalson M et al  Constitutional Law of South  
      Africa  Vol 1 (1999) at 41-39. 
779  The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par. 1) :  1214/1990, par. 9. 
http:///www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CESCR+General+comment+3.En?OpenDocument 
(accessed 2012/03/25). 
780  The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par. 1) : 1214/1990 at par. 9. 
781  Liebenberg S ―Socio-economic Rights‖ in Chaskalson M et al  Constitutional Law of South  
      Africa  Vol 1 (1999) at 41-40. 
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It was submitted on behalf of the appellant in the Soobramoney case782  
that section 27(3) should be construed consistently with the right to life 
as entrenched in section 11.  It is true that section 27(3) is a separate 
section dealing with separate rights, to the exclusion of the right to life 
contained in a separate section.  But it does not take wild reasoning to 
acknowledge that the treatment of ailments has as its purpose the saving 
of life, and that the denial of medical treatment can lead to loss of life.  
Thus, section 27(3) is inseparably linked to section 11.  The Court, 
however, failed to acknowledge this fact, justifying its failure by arguing 
that it is its duty to apply the obligations imposed on the state as 
formulated in the Constitution, and not to draw inferences that would be 
inconsistent therewith. 
 
In this context, it is appropriate to reflect on the reasoning of the Court in 
Makwanyane.783  The right under scrutiny was the right to life.  The right 
to life is and was a separate right contained in its own section, then in 
section 9 of the Interim Constitution.  Finding it difficult to do justice to 
its interpretation without tapping other sections, especially since the 
death sentence was not mentioned in the Constitution, the Court felt 
obliged to link the section under scrutiny to other sections which contain 
rights of their own nature.  Thus the Court linked the right to life in the 
then section 9 to the right to dignity in the then section 10; it further 
                                                 
782  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  (1998) SA 765 (CC). 
783  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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linked the right to life to the right not to be subjected to inhuman, 
degrading treatment or punishment in the then section 11(2).   
 
In justifying the propriety of linking the right to life to other pertinent 
rights, though, contained in other sections, the Court reasoned that 
section 11(2) must not be construed in isolation, but in its context which 
includes the history and background to the adoption of the Constitution.  
It felt obliged to construe the section in a way which secures for 
individuals the full measure of its protection.784 
 
It is submitted that, by the same token, if the Court could depart from the 
section under scrutiny in order to arrive at an appropriate construction of 
another section, the Court could expand its territory on which it relied for 
interpretation, in order to come to a relief-giving interpretation of section 
27(3) where life was at stake. 
 
When dealing with the right to life of the unborn, reference was made to 
the words of Saunders J in Buckley v Rice-Thomas, 785  that where there 
are professionals in a particular field, the Court is best guided by the 
prevailing tested ideas of the professionals in that field, rather than 
relying on its own view. With that point in mind, the incorrectness of the 
definition of ―emergency medical treatment‖ formulated by the Court in 
                                                 
784 S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par.10. 
785  Buckley v Rice-Thomas  (1554) 1 Plowd. 118 at 124. 
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Soobramoney 786 is shown by professionals in the medical practice.  
Medical professionals agree with the view submitted above that the 
Court‘s definition of ―emergency‖ is narrow and causes serious life-
threatening problems.  Kramer,787 a medical professional, refers in his 
article to the definition of ―emergency‖ as found in the Medical Schemes 
Act.788  In this Act, ―emergency‖ is defined as ―the sudden and, at the 
time, unexpected onset of a health condition that requires immediate 
medical or surgical treatment, where failure to provide medical or 
surgical treatment would result in serious impairment to bodily functions 
or serious dysfunction of a bodily organ or part‖.   
 
It is submitted that this definition, though not crafted by constitutional 
interpreters, is attune to one of the principles of constitutional 
interpretation, namely, that a constitution must be interpreted 
generously.789  This definition takes into consideration that an emergency 
does not only arise, and not always arise, from an accident, as the Court 
in Soobramoney 790  was inclined to think.  A chronic condition can 
suddenly take a turn for the worse and become an emergency, and it is 
                                                 
786  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
787  Kramer  E ―‘No one may be refused emergency medical treatment‘ — ethical dilemmas in  
      South African emergency medicine‖  December 2008 South African Journal of Biothics and  
      Law Vol 1 No 2 at 53. 
788   Act 131 of 1998. 
789  Currie I and de Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) at 150. 
790  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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an emergency if, as defined in section 1 of the Medical Schemes Act, it 
would result in serious impairment to bodily functions.   
 
In his medical article, Kramer makes it clear that this definition of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa may pose particular difficulties in the 
South African context.  He illustrates the point with a known asthmatic 
patient, who may develop breathing problems, which may or may not be 
related to the asthma, and which a patient may initially treat at home, as 
medically recommended, with medication that has been prescribed.  He 
hypothesises that the breathing problem may linger without receiving 
attention due to financial, logistical transport, or personal domestic 
problems.  In the meantime, the breathing problem may worsen, and by 
the time it finally receives the attention of doctors, the patient is about to 
lose his or her life.  This medical writer makes a very significant point 
which eluded the Court, that many acute life-threatening medical 
emergencies involve diseases already diagnosed in the past, and 
therefore which both the doctor, or hospital, and the patient are aware of.  
HIV/ADIS patients fall, according to medical experts, under this category 
of patients.  They usually present to the emergency department with 
symptoms of being malnourished, sapped of strength and life, 
dehydrated, immuno-compromised, with chronic diarrhoea.  By 
‗constitutional‘ interpretation these patients who are reaching the end of 
their lives may, sadly, not be defined as a medical emergency.  Kramer 
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writes emphatically that these patients are, in fact, a medical emergency.  
He highlights791 that the Court‘s interpretation may have major legal 
implications in common law, namely, that there may be significant 
numbers of patients with genuine medical emergency symptoms who 
may be excluded from urgent care, as their presenting condition may not 
have been sudden, dramatic, unexpected, or catastrophic.  His pertinent 
view is contained summarily in the concluding part of his article: 
 
      It therefore mandates the medical fraternity, not the legal profession, to consider and redefine  
      what medically constitutes an appropriate definition of a medical emergency in modern-day  
      South Africa for purposes of section 27(3).  This is fundamental in order to prevent the ‗socio- 
      economic injustices, imbalances and inequities of health services of the past‘.792 
 
The question of an appropriate definition of ―emergency‖ in the spirit of 
the Constitution is a question that needs circumspection.  It obviously did 
not occur to the Court at the time that it adjudicated the question of 
―emergency‖, that not only chronic illnesses and sudden catastrophes like 
accidents can present themselves as an ―emergency‖.  But the medical 
profession maintains that rape constitutes a sudden catastrophe which in 
the light of the incidence of HIV/AIDS calls for immediate medical 
attention to prevent the survivor from contracting HIV.793  According to 
                                                 
791  Kramer E ―‘No one may be refused emergency medical treatment‘ — ethical dilemmas in South  
     African emergency medicine‖ December 2008 South African Journal of Biothics and Law  Vol 1  
     No. 2 at 54. 
792  at 54. 
793  McQuoid-Mason D; Dhai A; Moodley J ―Rape survivors and the right to emergency medical  
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medical professionals,794 the sooner prophylactic treatment is 
commenced and evidence collected, the better the chances of protecting 
the health of the patient.  Rape is ―sudden‖ and may have catastrophic 
consequences for the victim.795  According to medical professionals, the 
consequences may be severe both physically and psychologically and, 
when considering the high risk of HIV infection, may be catastrophic, 
since the survivor may be confronted with the possibility of contracting a 
fatal illness.  It is the view of these medical professionals796 that a rape 
survivor qualifies for the constitutional right to emergency medical 
treatment as defined by the Constitutional Court. 
 
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that, by comparison, a rape victim is 
not facing death immediately, but may face death later in life, perhaps 
after five to seven years.  No doubt, however, the fluids left in her body 
need to be removed, or decisive measures need to be taken now to 
forestall the future possibility of death.  It is also worth mentioning that 
the future death is more of a possibility than a reality.  It may be that the 
rapist is not a bearer of the virus.  Be that as it may, action needs to be 
taken now and not later, as a matter of medical emergency.  Against this 
                                                                                                                                                 
     treatment to prevent HIV infection‖ January 2003 South African Medical Journal  Vol 93, No 1at  
     42. 
794  Hansson D and Russell D E H ―Made to fail:  The mythical option of legal abortion for survivors  
      of rape and incest‖ 1993 SAJHR  505. 
795  Ibid. 
796  McQuoid-Mason D; Dhai A; Moodley J ―Rape survivors and the right to emergency medical  
      treatment to prevent HIV infection‖ January 2003 South African Medical Journal  Vol 93, No 1  
      at 42. 
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background, there is a chronically ill patient, whom the Court judged as 
failing to meet the definition of ―emergency‖, and his life is at the 
breaking point now, not in the future.   In terms of the Court‘s 
definition797 of ―emergency‖, such an immediately dying patient is turned 
away in compliance with the Constitution. 
 
It is also worthy of note that the Court, in entrenching the right to life of 
convicts, deemed it wise and beneficial, as an aid to interpretation, to 
consider the historical background giving rise to a provision in the 
Constitution.798  By contrast, the right to life was relied upon in seeking 
relief for an appellant whose only hope for life depended on the Court. 
 
The historical background as an aid to interpretation was passively 
considered in this matter-of-life-or-death appeal.799  Among various 
historical factors, which had given rise to the constitutional provision, 
and which were enumerated by the Court, were the great disparities in 
wealth, the deplorable conditions in which people were living in extreme 
poverty, inadequate social security, and the lack of access to health 
services.  The Constitution was adopted with the commitment to address 
                                                 
797  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 38. 
798  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 12. 
799  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 16 where,  
      having regard to the historical background in Soobramoney, the Court held that the rights in  
      issue should not be construed in isolation, ―but in (their) context, which includes the history  
      and background to the adoption of the Constitution, other provisions of the Constitution itself  
      and, in particular, the provisions of (the bill of rights) of which (they are) part‖.   
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these socio-economic reversals.  The Court made a sobering 
acknowledgement that for as long as these socio-economic setbacks 
persisted, the aspiration of a new constitutional order would have a 
hollow ring.800 
 
Adding weight to the propriety of this interpretational approach is the 
preamble to the Constitution itself.  In view of the injustices of the past, 
the preamble echoes the determination of the representatives of the 
nation to improve the quality of life of all citizens, and to free the 
potential of every citizen.  The Court accurately pointed out that this 
determination is reflected in the provisions of the Bill of Rights, such as 
sections 26 and 27, which deal with housing and health care respectively.  
However, this approach to constitutional interpretation inconsistently led 
to a different conclusion on a right which was so highly protected by the 
Court. 
 
In view of the non-derogable nature of the right to life, the question 
arises whether the constitutional right to life extends itself to a terminally 
ill person who wishes his or her life to be prolonged or preserved.  A 
related question is whether it is a state health care institution, or the 
person whose life is at stake, who has the right to decide whether he or 
she should give up on his or her life. It should be borne in mind that in 
                                                 
800  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 8. 
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Soobramoney, it was held that the right to life does not encompass the 
right to indefinitely evade death.801 
 
A starting point in answering this question is the consideration of the 
right of a person to direct that life-supporting systems be disconnected 
so that he or she should die sooner rather than later, perhaps due to 
unbearable pain.  In English law, it is a trite rule that an adult person who 
has the necessary mental capacity and who has been fully informed of the 
consequences of his or her decision, has the right to refuse medical 
treatment, even though his or her only intention in such refusal is to 
precipitate death.802   
 
In the United States law, the position is similar. In Schloendorff , 803 the 
New York Court of Appeals held that every human being of adult years 
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his or 
her own body.  It emerges from  these cases that it is not the health care 
institution that had to determine the fate of a patient whose life was 
hanging by a thread, but it was the patient.  It emerges also that the view 
to be adopted by a state health care institution is that it has the duty to 
                                                 
801  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 57. 
802  In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment)  [1992] 3 WLR 782; See also Sidaway v Bethlehem Royal  
      Hospital Governors  [1985] 1 AC All ER 643 where Lord Scarman held that a doctor who  
      operates without the consent of a patient is guilty of the civil wrong of trespass to the patient,  
      and that he is also guilty of the criminal crime of assault to the patient.  It follows from this  
      judgment that a patient who is sound in mind may: (1) refuse treatment, and (2): treatment  
      may not be forced upon such a patient against his or her will. 
803  Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital  211 NY 125, 105 NE 92 (a 1914 case). 
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sustain life, and that the choice to give up on life can only be exercised 
by the patient, not by some other person — and definitely not by the 
state.  The state, through its institutions — clinics or hospitals — must 
assume the position that life is worth saving unless the patient, after 
being adequately informed of the consequences of withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, still gives his or her life up. 
 
Further guidance on this constitutional question whether a terminally ill 
patient is entitled to medical relief from a state health care institution 
notwithstanding the institution‘s defence of constrained funds, is to be 
obtained from the World Medical Associations.804  World Medical 
Associations can be a source of guidance to courts in reaching an 
appropriate and informed decision when seized with motions where 
applicants seek medical relief which has been refused by a hospital or any 
health care facility of the state.   
 
In this regard, the World Medical Association‘s Declaration of Venice805 
proves to be of assistance.  This Declaration confirms806 without mincing 
words that the duty of a medical practitioner when faced with a terminally 
ill patient is to heal and, if possible, to relieve suffering.  The Declaration 
                                                 
804  World Medical Associations are international organisations representing medical practitioners,  
      which were created in order maintain a high standard of ethical behaviour.  
805  World Medical Association on Terminal Illness was Adopted by the 35th World Medical  
      Assembly, Venice, Italy, and came into effect in October 1983. 
806  World Medical Association‘s Declaration of Venice on Terminal Illness, on page 1. 
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states that a physician may relieve suffering of a terminally ill patient by 
withholding treatment with the consent of the patient or that of his 
immediate family member if the patient is unable to express his or her 
will.807  The Declaration further provides that there shall be no exception 
to this principle even in the case of incurable disease or malformation.808  
This consent requirement emphasises the fact that a physician is not at 
liberty to deny the patient necessary relief simply because the patient is 
going to deny anyway, as was suggested by the Court in Soobramoney.809  
Even when the patient or family member consents to the withholding of 
treatment, the declaration does not free the physician from his or her 
obligation to assist the dying person by giving him or her the necessary 
medication to attenuate the painful terminal phase of his or her illness.  
 
Since the declaration was adopted in 1983, it was already in existence to 
be consulted by courts, and since the Soobramoney matter came before 
court for consideration in 1998, the Court could have had regard to this 
source of guidance. 
 
This obligation contained in the World Medical Association‘s Declaration 
of Venice should be seen against the failure of the health care institution 
                                                 
807  on page 1. 
808  on page 1. 
809  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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and the failure of the Court to act in harmony with the spirit of this 
Declaration.   
 
There is also the World Medical Association Declaration of Lisbon on the 
Rights of the Patient.810  This Declaration contains principles by which 
those in the medical profession should be guided in circumstances such 
as those we find in Soobramoney.  Among other principles, it lays down 
that in circumstances where a choice must be made between potential 
patients for a particular treatment that is in limited supply (as was the 
case in Soobramoney), all such patients are entitled to a fair selection 
procedure for that treatment.  It lays down that this choice must be based 
on medical criteria and made without discrimination.811 
 
This World Medical Association Declaration also stipulates that the patient 
has the right to continuity of health care, and that the physician has an 
obligation to cooperate in the co-ordination of medically indicated care 
with other health care providers treating the patient.  The physician may 
not discontinue treatment of a patient as long as further treatment is 
                                                 
810  This Declaration was adopted by the 34th World Medical Assembly in Lisbon, Portugal, in  
      September/October 1981.  It was amended by the 47th World Medical Association General  
      Assembly in Bali, Indonesia, in September 1995.  It was editorially revised at the 171st Council  
      Session in Santiago, Chile in October 2005. 
811  Principle 1(e) of the Declaration provides: 
      ―In circumstances where a choice must be made between potential patients for a particular  
      treatment that is in limited supply, all such patients are entitled to a fair selection procedure  
      for that treatment.  That choice must be based on medical criteria and made without  
      discrimination‖. 
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medically indicated, without giving the patient reasonable assistance and 
sufficient opportunity to make alternative arrangements for care.812 
 
The Court in Soobramoney 813  denied him the right to life which he 
believed he was constitutionally entitled to, denying him that right 
because the Court‘s interpretation of ―emergency medical treatment‖ was 
that of a ―dramatic, sudden situation or event which is of a passing nature 
in terms of time‖. 814 
 
It is self-evident from this interpretation that it did not matter whether 
the situation giving rise to an emergency was not one set in motion by 
the patient himself.  In other words, even if the patient was not 
responsible, or was not at fault for the sudden emergence of an 
emergency, he could still be refused medical relief simply because his 
situation was not a ―dramatic, sudden situation or event which is of a 
passing nature in terms of time‖.   
 
Against this background, it is proper to bring to the fore a principle 
contained in the World Medical Association Declaration adopted in 
                                                 
812  Principle 1(f) of the Declaration provides that: 
      ―The patient has the right to continuity of health care.  The physician has the obligation to  
       cooperate in the coordination of medically indicated care with other health care providers  
       treating the patient.  The physician may not discontinue treatment of a patient as long as  
       further treatment is medically indicated, without giving the patient reasonable assistance and  
      sufficient opportunity to make alternative arrangements for care‖. 
813  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
814  Ibid at par. 38. 
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Lisbon, already referred to above.  The fourth principle contained therein 
stipulates that ―physicians should always try to save the life of a patient 
unconscious due to a suicide attempt‖.815 
 
This principle specifically refers to a suicide attempt.  Needless to say, an 
emergency arising from a suicide attempt is an emergency brought about 
by the person himself.  It is a medical condition over which the patient 
had control, or could be blamed for.  Thus, the patient is, viewed from all 
angles, to blame for his ―catastrophe‖, even though there may be 
depressing situations which he felt he could not live with.  Yet, even in 
such a self-perpetrated condition, the World Medical Association 
Declaration stipulates that physicians should always endeavour to save 
the life that is hanging by the thread.  This principle establishes the 
sanctity of life as was entrenched in Makwanyane,816 but inconsistently 
less honoured in Soobramoney .817  
 
Then the Declaration turns to directly addressing the plight of terminally 
ill patients.  It is informing to see that the plight of terminally ill patients 
is dealt with under the subheading ―The Right to Dignity‖.  It must be 
borne in mind that in Soobramoney  the right to life was construed as not 
                                                 
815  Principle  4(c) of the Declaration [emphasis added]. 
816  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
817  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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encompassing ―the right indefinitely to evade death‖.818  It was also held 
that ―dying is part of life, its completion rather than its opposite‖.819  It is 
abundantly clear that a terminally ill patient had to come to grips with his 
situation and nothing further could be done for him or her.  In fact, this 
stance becomes clear from the Court‘s words that ―we can, however, 
influence the manner in which we come to terms with our mortality‖.820 
 
With this approach of the Court in mind, the World Medical Association 
Declaration of Lisbon stipulates that ―the patient is entitled to humane 
terminal care and to be provided with all available assistance in making 
dying as dignified and comfortable as possible‖.821 
 
From the foregoing it emerges that, in view of the non-derogable nature 
of the right to life as stated by the Constitution itself, the constitutional 
right to life extends itself to a terminally ill person who wishes his or her 
life to be prolonged or preserved.  It emerges also from the foregoing 
that it is not a state health care institution, but the patient himself or 
herself whose life is at stake who can decide whether he or she should 
give up on his or her life.  But a court, or a health care institution, 
especially a state health care institution, may not tell a patient or even 
                                                 
818  Ibid at par. 57. 
819  Ibid. 
820  Ibid. 
821  Principle 10(c) of the Declaration [emphasis added]. 
291 
 
insinuate that a patient should give up on his or her life, while the patient 
still wants to hold on to life. 
 
Apparently with the painful realisation of the plight of the terminally ill 
brought about by the Court‘s interpretation of the right to life in 
Soobramoney,822 no sooner had the Court construed the right to life in 
this fashion than the South African Law Reform Commission823 released 
its recommendations in the same year in which the Court reneged on its 
previous construction.  The Commission came to the conclusion that it 
was essential that more attention be given to pain management, medical 
care, and spiritual care of those who are terminally ill.  The Commission 
emphasised the need for health workers to be oriented to view end-of-
life care as important. 824  
 
Clearly as a response to the court decision in Soobramoney, the 
Commission further recommended that all people who are terminally ill, 
notwithstanding their poor financial standing, should have access to 
palliative care services.  Since for many persons in South Africa palliative 
care would in all likelihood be the only available and affordable 
treatment, the Commission recommended that access to, and availability 
of, palliative care in South Africa should be improved.  The Commission 
                                                 
822  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
823  Hereinafter referred to as ―the Commission.‖ 
824  Project 86 of the South African Law Reform Commission on ―Euthanasia and Artificial  
      Preservation of Life‖ –  page (x). 
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endorsed the proposal that the availability of palliative care in South 
Africa be thoroughly examined with a view to expanding the provision of 
such care.  It also supported the development of policies or regulations 
by the Minister of Health with regard to increased provision of palliative 
care.825 
 
The Commission went on to recommend826 that legislation be enacted 
with a view to entrenching its recommendations made after assiduous 
research into the subject of terminal illnesses and the plight of the 
terminally ill.  The recommendation dealt with the conduct of a medical 
practitioner in relieving distress.  The Commission recommended827 that 
should it be clear to a medical practitioner, or a nurse responsible for the 
treatment of a patient who has been diagnosed as suffering from a 
terminal illness, that the dosage of medication that the patient is 
currently receiving is not adequately alleviating the patient‘s pain or 
distress, the medical practitioner or nurse should, with the object to 
provide relief of severe pain or distress, and with no intention to kill, 
increase the dosage of medication to be given to the patient until relief is 
obtained.  This dosage of medication could be in the form of analgesics 
or sedatives.  It was recommended that the dosage should be increased, 
                                                 
825  South African Law Reform Commission, Report 86 on ―Euthanasia and Artificial  
      Preservation of Life‖ – page 4.  
826  South African Law Reform Commission, Report 86 on ―Euthanasia and Artificial on  
      Preservation of Life‖ –  page (x). 
827  South African Law Reform Commission, Report 86 on ―Euthanasia and Artificial  
      Preservation of Life‖— page (xvi). 
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even if the secondary effect would be to shorten the life of the patient, 
since the objective would be to attenuate the pain suffered by the patient, 
and to create a condition in which the patient would die as comfortable 
as possible.    
 
What emerged in this recommendation of the South African Law Reform 
Commission reflects the worldwide trend of respecting the sanctity of life 
of a patient, even if the patient considers it necessary to end the life 
which he or she regards as his or her own and nobody else‘s.  In Oregon, 
United States, for example, legislation was proposed with the intention to 
make it legal for a patient to enlist the help of a physician to end his or 
her life.  This legislation emerged in the form of the Die With Dignity 
Act.828 
 
This Act permits a terminally ill patient to obtain a doctor‘s prescription 
for a fatal drug‘s dose for the sole purpose of terminating his or her life.  
In terms of the provisions of the Act, however, a doctor himself may not 
carry out the ending of life, but the patient must administer the drug 
himself or herself.829  It was a prerequisite that a patient not be allowed 
to receive a prescription for medication to end his or her life in a humane 
and dignified manner, unless he or she had made an informed decision.  
                                                 
828  Oregon Die With Dignity Act, (Act of 1994) http://public.health.oregon.gov/Pages/Home.aspx 
(accessed: 2011/08/08). 
829  Section 2 of the Act. 
294 
 
Immediately before writing a prescription for medication, the attending 
physician had to verify that the patient is making an informed decision.830  
The patient was afforded the right to rescind his or her request at 
anytime and in any manner before obtaining and administering the 
medication.  The attending physician was also obliged to afford the 
patient an opportunity to rescind his or her request.831   
 
6.1.1  In Australian law 
 
It comes as no surprise that Australia‘s Northern Territory Legislative 
Assembly attempted to have a piece of legislation similar to the Oregon 
Die With Dignity Act, in the form of the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act.  
The Act legalised active euthanasia at the instance of the terminally ill.  
However, a medical practitioner was not supposed to assist a patient in 
terms of the Act if in the medical practitioner‘s opinion there were 
palliative care options reasonably available to the patient to alleviate the 
patient‘s pain and suffering.  The important point to mention, however, is 
that the Act did not survive long, as the Australian Federal Parliament 
challenged it as failing to pass the constitutional muster,832 and enacting 
the Euthanasia Laws Act833 instead.  The latter did not formally repeal the 
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, which had been passed by Australia‘s 
                                                 
830  Section 7 of the Act. 
831  Section 10 of the Act. 
832  In 1997 the Australian Federal Parliament challenged the Act. 
833  Euthanasia Laws Act of 1997. 
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Northern  Territory Legislative Assembly.  The result is that the Rights of 
the Terminally Ill Act remains technically in force in the Northern 
Territory, but to the extent that it permits euthanasia, it is 
constitutionally invalid and of no legal effect. 
 
6.1.2  In Canadian law 
 
In the same spirit, a Canadian court was seized with a similar matter in 
which a woman sought a declaratory order to the effect that she could be 
assisted to end her life in the event of her situation becoming 
unendurable.834  The woman had a disorder of the nerves, which had the 
potential of rendering her speechless and motionless.  The Canadian 
Supreme Court refused the application.  The basis of the refusal was that 
life was so sacred that even the person who could ordinarily be viewed as 
the owner of the life concerned did not have the right to terminate it as 
and when he wanted to do so, but had to let it end on its own.  The view 
held by the Court is clear from the following extract from its judgment: 
 
      Assisted suicide, outlawed under the common law, has been prohibited by Parliament since  
        the adoption of Canada‘s first Criminal Code.  The long-standing blanket prohibition in  
        s. 241(b), which fulfils the government‘s objective of protecting the vulnerable, is grounded  
        in the state‘s interest in protecting life and reflects the policy of the state that human life  
        should not be depreciated by allowing life to be taken.  This state policy is part of our  
        fundamental conception of the sanctity of life.  A blanket prohibition on assisted suicide  
                                                 
834  Re Rodriguez and Attorney-General of British Columbia 1993 3 S. C. R. 519. 
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        similar to that in s. 241 (b) also seems to be the norm among Western democracies, and such  
        a prohibition has never been adjudged to be unconstitutional or contrary to fundamental  
        human rights.835 
 
Substantiating its view, the Court further pointed out that no consensus 
can be found in favour of the decriminalisation of assisted suicide.  On 
the contrary, the consensus that can be found is that human life must be 
respected, and that this consensus finds legal expression in the Canadian 
legal system, which prohibits capital punishment.  The prohibition 
against assisted suicide serves a similar purpose. 
 
This case underscored the high regard with which life is to be viewed, as 
was held in Makwanyane,836 but inconsistently held in Soobramoney.837  It 
is also to be noted that the Canadian courts have, on their part, been 
consistent in their interpretation of the right to life.  The view which they 
held in dealing with capital punishment was not warped when dealing 
with assisted suicide, or when dealing with circumstances where the life 
of the terminally ill had to be preserved.  It is this kind of consistency that 
is desirable in constitutional interpretation. 
 
This consistency manifests itself also in Indian law as will be seen under 
the next subheading. 
 
                                                 
835  Ibid at par.14  [emphasis added]. 
836  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
837  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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6.1.3  In Indian law 
 
The South African Constitutional Court, in dealing with Soobramoney,838 
made reference to the Indian case, Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity 
and Others v State of West Bengal and Another 839 .   The fact of the 
matter is that India was exemplary in following the route which the South 
African court did not want to follow.  The Court excused its failure to 
follow the pattern established by the Indian court by stating that, 
although the Indian jurisprudence contains valuable insights, our 
Constitution is structured differently from the Indian Constitution.840  The 
difference in the text of the two Constitutions is that section 11 of the 
South African Constitution provides that ―everyone has the right to life‖,  
whereas section 21 of the Indian Constitution provides that ―no person 
shall be deprived of his life or personal property except according to 
procedure established by law‖.  According to the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa in Makwanyane,841 this difference in the wording of the two 
respective Constitutions means that the question we have to consider is 
not whether the imposition of the death sentence is totally devoid of 
reason and purpose.  It is whether in the context of the South African 
                                                 
838  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
839  Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity and Others v State of West Bengal and Another (1996)  
      AIR SC 2426. 
840  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par.15. 
841  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) 391 (CC) at par. 77. 
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Constitution the death penalty is cruel, inhuman or degrading, and if it is, 
whether it can be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
It is submitted that this view of the Court is untenable.  Firstly, it is 
actually the South African Constitution that protects the right to life in the 
case of an emergency by providing that no one may be refused 
emergency medical treatment.  On the other hand, the Indian 
Constitution is totally silent on the right to be admitted to emergency 
treatment.  As a matter of fact, the Indian Constitution does not even 
allude to health matters.  The only pertinent right in this connection is 
the right to life, which is not even protected absolutely by the Indian 
Constitution.  The Indian Constitution qualifies the right to life, by stating 
that ―no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure established by law‖.842  This provision is placed 
under the subheading ―Protection of life and personal liberty‖.  
The paradox is that although the Indian Constitution contains  no 
provision dealing with health or emergency treatment, as the South 
African Constitution does, it is actually the Supreme Court of India that 
has come out as the defender of the right to have one‘s life saved from 
an emergency regardless of the cost to the state.  It is also remarkable 
that this is the position in India notwithstanding the fact that the 
                                                 
842  Section 21 of the Constitution of India. 
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Constitution does not make the right to life absolute, as life may be 
forfeited if it is ―according to procedure established by law‖.843 
 
Thus, the South African Constitutional Court‘s stance844 that it could not 
follow the pattern established by Indian jurisprudence, because the 
Constitution of India is structured differently from the South African 
Constitution, leaves something to be desired. 
 
Although the Constitution of India does not make the right to life an 
unqualified one, as the Constitution of South Africa does, that jurisdiction 
sacrifices only the life of offenders.  As regards the life of law-abiding 
citizens, who are on the verge of losing their precious lives, such life is 
too dear in the eyes of the courts of that land. 
 
Hakim Seikh845 fell off a train in West Bengal, India.  As a result, he 
sustained serious head injuries and brain haemorrhage.  The germane 
aspect of the case is that he was taken from one state health institution 
to another — a total of ten in all.  The reasons given for these transfers 
were that necessary facilities for treatment were not available.  
The constitutional question which needed to be considered was whether 
the scarcity, or non-availability, of facilities for the treatment of the 
                                                 
843  Section 21 of the Constitution of India. 
844  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par. 77. 
845  Second Applicant in Paschim Banga Khet Samity v State of West Bengal  1996 AIR SC 2426. 
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serious injuries sustained by Hakim Seikh in various state health 
institutions had resulted in the denial of his fundamental right as 
allegedly found under article 21 of the Constitution of India.846 
 
In unravelling this question, the Supreme Court of India approached the 
question from the angle that the Indian Constitution envisaged the 
establishment of a welfare state at the federal level, as well as at the state 
level,847  and that in a welfare state the crucial duty of the government is 
to secure the welfare of the people.  As opposed to the judgment of the 
South African Constitutional Court848 that the right to life does not 
extend to preserving life indefinitely, the Supreme Court of India 
constructed the right to life as obliging the state to safeguard and 
preserve the life of every person.  Preservation of human life was thus 
ruled to be of unparalleled importance.  The Supreme Court found that 
government hospitals run by the state and medical officers employed 
therein are duty-bound to extend medical assistance for preserving 
human life, and that failure on the part of a government hospital to 
provide timely medical treatment to a person in need of such treatment 
results in violation of his right to life guaranteed by article 21.   
                                                 
846  As pointed out earlier, article 21 of the Indian Constitution does not contain any reference to  
      the right to emergency medical treatment.  It merely refers to the right to life in broad terms  
      in the context of capital punishment, guaranteeing that no life shall be taken away except in  
      the manner established by law. 
847  By way of comparison, one finds that the situation is similar in South Africa.  Sections 27 and  
      28 of the Constitution are examples of this. 
848  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 57. 
301 
 
 
Not only was there a violation under that article, but the Court went 
further and found that in respect of the deprivation of constitutional 
rights entrenched under Part III of the Constitution, the position is well 
settled that adequate compensation can be rewarded by the court as a 
way of redress.  Indeed, the applicant in this case, Hakim Seikh, was 
awarded with an order that he be suitably compensated for the breach of 
his right to the preservation of his life.   
 
It is also interesting to note that the Indian Court did not rationalise that 
the patient had brought about his own predicament, and that therefore 
the element of emergency was quashed by his own negligence.  Since the 
patient had fallen off a moving train, this could only occur if the doors 
were kept open while the train was in motion and the patient was riding 
on the edge of the doorway, or was riding between coaches.  
Notwithstanding this possible negligence on the part of the patient, the 
generous approach adopted by the Court in its interpretation led the 
Court to be the protector of life.  By way of contrast, the patient in 
Soobramoney 849 also found his life hanging by the thread — a situation 
which was not of his own making.  But the interpretation by the South 
African Constitutional Court of the right to emergency medical treatment 
denied him relief.  The Court refused to be persuaded that his condition 
                                                 
849  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
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was a proper case for invoking the right to life, notwithstanding the fact 
that denial of access to emergency medical treatment would cost him his 
life, which it did in a matter of days thereafter. 
 
The exemplary adjudication of claims to constitutional rights in the Indian 
jurisprudence is also pointed out by Liebenberg,850 who makes reference 
to directive principles of state policy in the Constitution of India.  
Regarding these directive principles, the writer draws attention to article 
37 of the Constitution of India851 which provides that the principles 
contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India are not enforceable by 
courts, but are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the 
country, and that it is the duty of the state to apply these principles in 
making laws.  Liebenberg points852 to the exemplary course followed by 
the Supreme Court of India in that notwithstanding the fact that the 
directive principles are unenforceable by courts, the Supreme Court of 
India has drawn on them to enlarge the scope of rights such as the right 
to life, and to infuse the principles with substantive content.  On this 
basis, points out the learned writer,853 that the right to life in India has 
been held to include the right to basic necessities of life such as adequate 
                                                 
850  Liebenberg S Socio-Economic Rights:  Adjudication Under a Transformative Constitution  
      (2010) at 122. 
851  http://hcmimphal.nic.in/Documents/constitutionofindiaacts.pdf  (accessed:  2012/03/23). 
852  Ibid. 
853  Ibid. 
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nutrition, clothing, reading facilities,854 the right to livelihood,855 the right 
to shelter,856 and the right to education.857  
 
The South African Court also based its denial of relief to the appellant on 
the interpretation that section 27(3) of the Constitution is couched in 
negative terms — it is a right not to be refused emergency treatment.858  
It is submitted that it eluded the Court that a right in negative terms 
imposes positive duty, and because it imposes positive duty, it becomes a 
right in positive terms.  For example, if a constitution obliges the state 
not to refuse emergency medical treatment, the state is prohibited from 
refusing, and it has no option but to provide emergency medical 
treatment.  Thus, the prohibition not to refuse becomes an injunction to 
perform. 
 
The right to have access to emergency medical treatment, which is 
expressly provided for in the South African Constitution,859 but only by 
way of a remote interpretation in India, was enforced by the Court that 
measures were taken by the Court to prevent a recurrence of incidents of 
refusal of treatment due to bureaucratic requirements.  These measures 
                                                 
854  Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator (1981) 1 SCC 608. 
855  Olga Tellis and others v Bombay Municipal Corp (1985) 3 SCC 545. 
856  Shanti Star Builders v Narayan K Totame  (1990) 1 SCC 520; Ahmedabad  
      Municipal Corporation v Nawab Khan Gulab Khan  (1997) 11 SCC 123. 
857  Jain v State of Karnataka  (1992) 3 SCC 666; Krishnan v State of Andhra Pradesh & others   
      (1993) 4 LRC 234. 
858  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 20. 
859  Section 27(3). 
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were recommended by a committee that was appointed to investigate 
whether the state health institutions had failed in their constitutional 
obligation.  The findings of the committee resulted in recommendations 
by the committee, and in turn the recommendations were made an order 
of court.  The justiciability of the committee recommendations is 
something that the South African Constitutional Court had to learn, as it 
believed that courts ought to be slow in enforcing socio-economic rights, 
due to its belief that they fell within the province of political organs and 
medical authorities.860  By contrast, in the case of Paschim Banga,861 the 
Supreme Court of India ordered that in hospitals the emergency medical 
officer, in consultation with the senior specialist on duty, should admit a 
patient whose condition is life-threatening.  The Court further ordered 
that if necessary, the patient may be kept on the floor, or on the trolley 
beds.862  This part of the order is reasonable, since what a patient needs 
in an emergency is not comfort, but the preservation of life.  The order of 
the court also becomes significant when one considers that a patient did 
not have to be in an emergency condition in the strict sense of the word, 
as was the view adopted by the South African court, but only had to be a 
patient and in need of treatment. 
 
                                                 
860  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 29. 
861  Paschim Banga Khet Samity v State of West Bengal  1996 AIR SC 2426. 
862  Paschim Banga Khet Samity v State of West Bengal  1996 AIR SC 2426 at par. 10(ii). 
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This question of justiciability or judicial activism with regard to socio-
economic rights, life included, is a point to be returned to shortly, since 
there is lack of consistency in the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions in this area.863 
 
The preservation of life has been regarded as a constitutional 
requirement in other jurisdictions as well.  For example, in Cruz 
Bermudez ,864  the right to health care was intertwined with the right to 
life, as HIV-positive citizens sought relief from the government‘s failure 
to come to their rescue.  A few aspects of the Court‘s judgment are quite 
pertinent to the judgment of the South African Court in Soobramoney.865  
In the latter, the Court leaned towards judicial avoidance,866 feeling that it 
should be ―slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by 
the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to 
deal with such matters‖.867  In the former, the Court leaned towards 
judicial activism, forthrightly making an order ordering the state to 
provide medicines to the patients; not only that, but also to cover the 
                                                 
863   Lenta P ―Judicial restraint and overreach‖ 2004 SAJHR 544; 
       See also Haysom N and Plasket C L ―Judicial Activism and the Appellate  
       Division 1988 SAJHR 303; 
       See also Ziff B ―The irreversibility of commodification‖ 2005 Stell LR  544. 
864   Cruz Bermudez and Others v Ministerio de Sanida y Asistencia Social  Supreme Court of  
       Justice of Venezuela, Case No 15.789, Decision No 916  15 July 1999. 
865   Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
866   Van Marle K ―In support of a revival of utopian thinking, the imaginary domain and ethical  
       interpretation‖ 2002 TSAR 501. 
       See also O‘Regan C ―From form to substance: The Constitutional jurisprudence of  
       Laurie Ackermann‖ 2008 Acta Juridica 1. 
867   Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 29. 
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costs of undergoing tests.  The Court also ventured into a territory which 
is generally believed, and was believed by the South African Court, to be 
out of bounds for the Court, namely, the policy-making of the 
government, and the question of budget.  In this regard, the Supreme 
Court of Justice of Venezuela ordered the Ministry of Health to develop 
policies and programmes for the treatment of those infected, and ordered 
the Ministry to go out of its way to make funds available so that there 
should be no excuse for failing to implement the Court‘s order.868  
 
The law of delict with its aspect of the duty of care 869 also provides 
insight into this issue.  In terms of the law of delict, a cause of action may 
arise from an omission where the defendant is in a protective relationship 
towards the plaintiff and the defendant has failed to live up to the legal 
convictions of society as far as the discharging of the duty of care is 
concerned.  There must, however, be an undeniable legal duty resting on 
the shoulders of the one party to protect the other party.  This was 
underscored in Minister van Polisie v Ewels,870 where the state as 
represented by the police was regarded as being in a protective 
relationship towards the plaintiff, and had failed to live up to the legal 
                                                 
868  Kiromba  T B  ―Exploring judicial strategies to protect the right of access to 
      emergency obstetric care in Uganda‖  2007  AHRLJ  303. 
869  Neethling J et al Law of Delict  (2006) (4th ed) 148 – 150. 
870  Minister van Polisie v Ewels  1975 (3) SA 590 (A). 
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convictions of society by protecting the plaintiff from assault at the hands 
of a police officer who represented the state.871 
 
By the same token, the state as represented by its Department of Health 
was in a protective relationship towards the patient in Soobramoney.872  
There was a duty of care which, in terms of the legal convictions of 
society, it had to discharge — preserving life.  This duty to preserve life 
was emphasised in R v Chenjere 873 by Briggs FJ: 
 
      To cause death by inaction may be criminal if there is a positive duty to preserve life of the  
        person in question.  The duty arises where the potential victim is helpless through . . . illness  
        and the potential killer stands, either naturally or through a deliberate acceptance of  
        responsibility, in a protective relationship to the victim.874 
 
As argued, the state stands in such a protective relationship towards a 
patient through its Department of Health, and hospitals. 
 
The right to be alive has been viewed by courts875 as being so deeply 
rooted that not only factors that are a direct menace to it are to be 
removed, but even factors that are an indirect menace.  The denial of 
                                                 
871  Minister van Polisie v Ewels  1975 (3) SA 590 (A) at 597. 
872   Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
873  R v Chenjere  1960 (1) SA 473 (FC). 
874  at  482. 
875  Attorney-General v Salvatori Abuki  Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 1998; State  
     of Himachal Pradesh v Umed Ram Sharma  1986 AIR SCR 847; Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal  
     Corporation  1986 AIR SCR 180; People‘s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India and Others  
     (Civil) No. 196 of 2001. 
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emergency medical treatment would fall under such factors that are a 
direct menace to life. 
 
However, in Uganda, courts have construed even such things as 
banishment from one‘s home as a threat to life, and consequently such 
banishment as being unconstitutional.  In Attorney-General v Salvatori,876  
the respondents who were convicted of practicing witchcraft were, in 
addition to their court sentence, banished from their homes by the Court 
for ten years after serving a sentence of two years imprisonment.  The 
appeal court held in their favour that the legislation providing for such a 
sentence was unconstitutional, since it deprived the respondents of the 
means of sustenance, which constituted a threat to their life in 
contravention of articles 22877 and 44(a)878 of the Constitution879 
respectively.  By depriving the respondents of access to their property, 
the Court found that there was also a contravention of article 26 of the 
Constitution.  
 
                                                 
876  Attorney-General v Salvatori Abuki  Supreme Court Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 1998 
877  Article 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda simply provides that no one shall be  
      deprived of one‘s life intentionally except in the case of a court sentence after conviction for a  
      criminal offence. 
878  Article 44(a) merely protects the citizens of Uganda from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading  
      treatment or punishment. 
879  Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, which came into effect in 1995 
http://www.ugandaonlinelawlibrary.com/6F24D36C-AEB8-4001-AF4F-
B18D9EE4DC5B/FinalDownload (accessed: 20//08/10). 
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The courts‘ reasoning in these foreign cases provide insight into another 
perspective in which the right to life must be interpreted.  It is that not 
only should life itself be protected, but also elements which help to buoy 
it up.  Indeed, the matter boils down even to the quality of life citizens 
are subjected to.  This becomes clear in the Indian case of State of 
Himachal Pradesh v Umed Ram Sharma,880 where the Supreme Court of 
India construed the right to life as being dependent upon certain socio-
economic rights.  Aggrieved citizens referred their complaint to the Chief 
Justice, complaining about the poor condition of their road in their area.  
The citizens felt that this did not only affect their livelihood, but also their 
development as citizens.  The Court expanded on its construction of the 
right to life and came to the conclusion that the right to life as provided 
for in article 21 of the Indian Constitution embraced not only the right to 
a physical existence, but also included the question of quality of life. For 
these Indian citizens who lived high up in the hills, having proper roads 
was not less critical than having life itself.881  Similarly, in Olga Tellis v 
Bombay Municipal Corporation,882 the Supreme Court of India made it a 
trite position that the importance of life demands that factors supporting 
                                                 
880  State of Himachal Pradesh v Umed Ram Sharma  1986 AIR SCR 847. 
881  Davis D et al  Fundamental Rights in the Constitution — Commentary and Cases  
      (1997) at 69. 
882  Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation 1986 AIR SCR 180.  Church J Schulze C Strydom H     
      Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law Perspective (2007) at 128 refer to  
       this case in the context of the procedure prescribed by law for the deprivation of the right to  
       life conferred by article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 
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its continuation be viewed in the appropriate light.  How these factors 
should be viewed is indicated in the words of the Court‘s judgment: 
 
      The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching.  It does not  
        mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the 
        imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established  
        by law.  That is but one aspect of the right to life.  An equally important facet of that right is  
        the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the  
        means of livelihood.  If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional     
        right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him  
        of his  means of livelihood to the point of abrogation.883 
 
The point that is driven home is that if even such trifling situations as 
lack of proper roads infringe the quality of life, how much more so the 
denial of medical treatment which has a more direct consequence on life 
itself.  It is submitted that the generous approach adopted by the Indian 
Supreme Court in its construction of the right to life is the correct 
approach.  This approach becomes even more commendable when one 
considers that the text of the Indian Constitution itself is very mean, and 
indeed silent, on the right to have access to health care, or to emergency 
medical treatment.884  Interestingly, the South African Constitutional 
                                                 
883  Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180 at par. 2.1 [emphasis added]. 
884  The closest the Indian Constitution comes to mentioning anything about health, but not 
      ―access to health care‖ and ―emergency medical treatment is its Article 47 which provides:   
      ―Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve  
       public health.—The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of  
       living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in  
       particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about the prohibition of the consumption except  
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Court which denied the right to life to a terminally ill patient, reiterated 
with approval the point of the Indian case, Himachal Pradesh,885 but failed 
to recognise its import in its own case and in its own jurisdiction.886 
 
The approach that not only life itself, but also socio-economic pillars 
supporting it should be sustained if justice is to be done to the 
constitutional right to life, manifests itself not only in different 
jurisdictions, but also in international instruments.  Since article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enshrines the right to 
life, the Human Rights Committee recommended that in ensuring that the 
right to life is given the protection it deserves, each member state is 
under the obligation to go beyond the negative duty of preventing the 
taking of life. Each member state must take decisive steps which 
encapsulate civil and political rights, which are sometimes referred to as 
the ‗first generation rights‘.887  Also, each member state must  take 
decisive steps which encapsulate socio-economic rights, which are 
                                                                                                                                                 
      for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health‖. 
885  State of Himachal Pradesh v Umed Ram Sharma  1986 AIR SCR 847. 
886  In S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 3 SA 391 (CC) at paragraph 326  O‘Regan J said:  ―the  
      right to life was included in the Constitution not simply to enshrine the right to existence.  It is  
      not life as a mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes but the right to human life:  
     the right to live as a human being, to be part of the broader community, to share in the  
     experience of humanity.‖  See also Devenish G E  A Commentary on the South African Bill  
     of Rights (1999) at 10. 
887  See Currie I and de Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 5th ed at 567.  Examples of ‗first  
      generation rights‘ are the right to equality, personal liberty, property, free speech, assembly  
      and association.  These are thought of as negative rights because they take power away from  
      government by imposing a duty not to act in a particular way.  On the other hand, examples of  
      ‗second generation rights‘ are medical treatment, housing, and education.  They are thought  
      of as positive rights, since they impose a duty on government to act in a positive way. 
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sometimes referred to as the ‗second generation rights‘. The Human 
Rights Committee holds that, in practical terms, this should include 
efforts aimed at extending life expectancy, combating malnutrition, and 
pestilences.888 
 
Leaning towards judicial avoidance, the Court in Soobramoney 889  held 
that ―a court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good 
faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility 
it is to deal with such matters‖.890  This raises the question of 
justiciability of the right to life and the right to social and economic rights 
on which the continuation of life pivots.   
 
A view has been expressed that social and economic rights end up not 
justiciable, because they fall within the realm of social policy, which realm 
is best controlled by politicians.891  It is submitted that this should not be 
the position.  If a right is entrenched in a constitution, it becomes 
justiciable.  A constitution is supreme law, and therefore if any right or 
provision has been made part of the law, it becomes enforceable by 
courts.  Socio-economic rights, notwithstanding the fact that they were 
created by politicians, once inscribed in a constitution, become justiciable 
                                                 
888  Sisk J ―The international human rights norms in South Africa:  The jurisprudence of the  
      Human Rights Committee‖ 2005  South African Mercantile Law Journal  452. 
889  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
890  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 29. 
891  Stanley I  ―Beyond justiciability: realizing the promise of socio-economic rights in Nigeria‖  
      2007 225 AHRLJ 231. 
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by any party who is aggrieved by the denial of these rights.  This position 
is confirmed by Liebenberg.892  The learned writer explains that the mere 
fact that a right has social policy implications does not preclude judicial 
intervention to protect the right.  Without elaborating on reasons for this 
view, Liebenberg states that judgments concerning the constitutionality 
of the death penalty and abortion clearly have social policy implications, 
and that the right to equality has implications for a wide range of social 
programmes.893  Liebenberg adds that the enforcement of some rights by 
courts will inevitably have budgetary implications for the state.  However, 
such enforcement by courts does not amount to a breach of the doctrine 
of separations of powers.  In strengthening this view, the learned writer 
refers to the Certification Judgment, 894 where the Constitutional Court 
held that the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights does 
not burden the Court with a task so extraordinary that it results in a 
breach of the separation of powers.895    
 
The only disturbing factor is that courts are lamentably inconsistent in 
discharging the duty of enforcing socio-economic rights.  It is particularly 
notable that courts are ―slow‖, or reluctant, to enforce rights where such 
                                                 
892  Liebenberg S  ―Socio-economic Rights‖ in Chaskalson M et al  Constitutional Law of South  
      Africa  Vol 1 (1999) at 41-7. 
893  Liebenberg S ―Socio-economic Rights‖ in Chaskalson M et al  Constitutional Law of South  
     Africa  Vol 1 (1999) at 41-7, footnote 2. 
894  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly.  In re Certification of the Constitution of  
     the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 at par. 77. 
895  Ibid. 
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enforcement would have budgetary implications for the state.  The 
question is whether judicial activism in defence of the rights of citizens 
can go so far as to make a court order which has financial implications 
for the state.  Indeed, India has pioneered the way in this regard.  
Reference has already been made to the case of State of Himachal 
Pradesh v Umed Ram Sharma,896 but later in 2001, the Supreme Court of 
India elaborated on the rights of citizens as embedded in the Constitution 
of India.  In the case of People‘s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India 
and Others 897 citizens had died from starvation in the state of Rajasthan.  
The state had offered the excuse that grain supplies were being stored 
for famine times.  The People‘s Union for Civil Liberties brought an 
application for the release of food supplies to the indigent.  It is 
significant that they could not point to the right to food in the 
Constitution, but by way of extension, they derived this right from the 
right to life.  The state had displayed a recalcitrant frame of mind towards 
previous court orders, only manifesting a meagre implementation of the 
court orders.  Finally, the Supreme Court of India handed down a 
powerful judgment in view of the lives which were facing extermination 
due to famine.  Of paramount relevance in the order of the Court is its 
refusal to entertain the state‘s submission of scanty resources.  The Court 
ordered that grain allocation be doubled and financial support 898 for 
                                                 
896  State of Himachal Pradesh v Umed Ram Sharma 1986 AIR SCR 847. 
897  People‘s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India and Others (1997) 3 S. C. C. 43. 
898  emphasis added. 
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schemes be increased;899  the Court also ordered that ration shops 
remain open so as to provide grain to families who could hardly make 
ends meet, and  further that such grain be provided at a set price. In 
addition, the Court ordered that all needy citizens such as widows, the 
elderly, and the disabled be granted a ration card for free grain; and that 
government departments gradually implement the mid-day meal scheme 
in schools.  This case is a shining example of the justiciability of rights 
even where this would have budgetary implications for the state — as 
long as life is involved.900  The rights involved here were not the right to 
life directly, but were socio-economic rights, whose failure to honour 
would have a consequential denial of the right to life.  If rights to things, 
which only sustain life, are so precious in the eyes of courts entrusted 
with constitutional interpretation, how much more so if life itself is 
directly at stake, especially in the case of an emergency. 
 
6.2  Inconsistency in South African law 
 
The South African Constitutional Court itself has on more than one 
occasion made orders that were either intended to alter policy, or to 
enforce it with cost implications.901  These orders were made despite 
                                                 
899  Something the Court in Soobramoney  thought was impractical. 
900  Ibe S ―Beyond justiciability: realizing the promise of socio-economic rights in Nigeria‖  
      2007  AHRLJ 234. 
901  Premier, Mpumalanga and Another v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided  
     Schools, Eastern Transvaal  1999 (2) SA 91 (CC); August and Another v Electoral Commission  
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urgings that courts should observe the separation of powers of the 
executive, the legislature, and the judiciary.  These urgings were to the 
effect that courts cannot make orders that have the effect of requiring the 
executive to pursue a particular policy.   
 
To these urgings the South African Constitutional Court in Minister of 
Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others,902 has 
responded that albeit there are no clear lines of demarcation which 
separate the roles of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, 
there are certain matters which are clearly within the jurisdiction of one 
arm of government, but not within the others.  However, the Court held 
that although all arms of government should be sensitive to, and respect 
this separation, this does not mean that courts cannot, or should not, 
make orders that have an impact on policy.903 
 
Indeed, there have been instances where the Court made orders along 
these lines.  For example, in the case of Mpumalanga  Premier v Executive 
Committee,904 the Court overruled a provincial government‘s policy 
                                                                                                                                                 
     and Others 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC); Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others;  
     Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of  
     Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
902  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA  
      721 (CC). 
903  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA  
      721 (CC) at par. 98. 
904  Premier, Mpumalanga and Another v Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided  
     Schools, Eastern Transvaal  1999 (2) SA 91 (CC). 
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decision which terminated subsidies to certain schools, and ordered that 
subsidies continue beyond the time stipulated by the provincial 
government.  No doubt, this order would not leave the provincial 
government‘s coffers unaffected. 
 
Also, in August and Another v Electoral Commission,905 in order to afford 
prisoners the right to vote, the Court ordered the Electoral Commission to 
alter its election policy, planning, and regulations, with manifest cost 
implications. 
 
Further, in Dawood  v Minister of Home Affairs,906 the Court issued a 
mandamus 907 directing the Director-General of Home Affairs and 
immigration officials to exercise the discretion conferred upon them in a 
manner that took account of the constitutional rights involved.   
 
The fact of the matter is that the Constitutional Court itself, in spite of its 
inconsistent judicial avoidance, has more than once ruled in favour of the 
justiciability of socio-economic rights.  As submitted earlier, socio-
economic rights cannot be justiciable, but the position be different in 
                                                 
905  August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others  1999 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
906  Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of  
      Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others  2000  
      (3) SA 936 (CC). 
907  A mandamus is an order of court which orders a person to do something, usually in  
      circumstances where a person has failed to act. It is the opposite of an interdict, which  
      prevents a person from doing something. 
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respect of the right to life, as socio-economic rights are, by their nature, 
only supporting life.   
 
It was early in the so-called certification judgment908 of the 
Constitutional Court that the question of whether socio-economic rights 
are justiciable was settled once and for all time.  There the Court 
entrusted with the responsibility of being the final arbiter in 
constitutional matters came to this conclusion:   
 
      These rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable.  As we have stated in the previous  
        paragraph, many of the civil and political rights entrenched in the [constitutional text before  
        this Court for certification in that  case] will give rise to similar  budgetary implications  
        without compromising their justiciability.  The fact that socio-economic rights will almost  
        inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability.   
        At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively protected from improper  
        Invasion.909   
 
In case this judgment of the Court in the certification of the text of the 
Constitution is second-guessed, the Court reaffirmed its position in 
Grootboom,910 when it held that ―while the justiciability of socio-
economic rights has been the subject of considerable jurisprudential and 
political debate, the issue of whether socio-economic rights are 
                                                 
908   Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly:  In re Certification of the Constitution of  
       the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4)  (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253. 
909   Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly.  In re Certification of the Constitution of  
       the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) (CC) at 78  [emphasis added]. 
910   Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others   
      2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).   
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justiciable at all in South Africa has been put beyond question by the text 
of our Constitution as construed in the Certification judgment.‖ 911   
 
As if this position was not trite sufficiently, the position of socio-
economic rights being enforceable in a court with the jurisdiction to 
interpret and enforce the Constitution was reiterated in yet a later matter 
serving before the Constitutional Court, namely, the Treatment Action 
Campaign.912  There, the Court hit the final nail, so to speak, when it 
bound itself with the words:  ―The question in the present case, therefore, 
is not whether socio-economic rights are justiciable.  Clearly they are.‖913 
 
That being the position, the issue to be determined now is whether the 
Court passed the test of maintaining consistency in its view of the 
indisputable justiciability of socio-economic rights.  Closely intertwined 
with this issue, is the issue whether the Court maintained consistency in 
holding that socio-economic rights are constitutionally enforceable 
regardless of the availability of state resources. 
 
                                                 
911  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly.  In re Certification of the Constitution of  
      the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) (CC) at  par. 20. 
912  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2)  2002 (5)  SA           
      721  (CC). 
913  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA  
      721 at par. 25. 
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It will be recalled914 that, when faced with the decision to come to the 
rescue of a terminally ill applicant, the Court declined to grant the relief 
sorely needed by the applicant, on the ground that the Court should be 
slow to interfere in policy decisions taken in good faith by political and 
medical authorities, notwithstanding the pattern set by other 
jurisdictions, even though these jurisdictions were not expressly bound 
by the text of  their constitutions to enforce the rights in question.  These 
jurisdictions enforced the rights in question simply on the basis of their 
generous and purposive construction. 
 
First, it stands as a departure from its own precedent that the 
Constitutional Court was reluctant in Soobramoney 915 in upholding rights 
where the upholding of those rights would have budgetary or cost 
implications for the state, whereas in its founding judgment,916 the Court 
acknowledged that the enforcing of many of the rights in the Constitution 
would give rise to budgetary implications, and yet these budgetary 
implications would not compromise the enforceability of the rights.  It 
was the Court‘s own informed view that ―the fact that socio-economic 
rights will almost inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem 
                                                 
914  In Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
915  Ibid. 
916  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of  
     the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253. 
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to us to be a bar to their justiciability.  At the very minimum, socio-
economic rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion‖.917 
 
The Court reiterated its position in the certification judgment when 
dealing with socio-economic rights in Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others,918  emphasising that 
socio-economic rights have been interwoven in a convincing manner in 
the Bill of Rights, and that they cannot be said to exist on paper.  That 
being the position, these rights had to be respected, protected, and 
promoted.  Courts are looked up to, to ensure that expectations of the 
citizens concerning these rights are fulfilled, as required by section 7(2) 
of the Constitution.   
 
Socio-economic rights are included in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.919  As a reliable measure to ensure 
that state parties discharge their obligations as stipulated in the 
Covenant, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights920 devised what it termed the minimum core.   
                                                 
917  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the  
      Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 at par. 78. 
918  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others  2001 (1) SA  
      46 (CC). 
919  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was adopted in 1966,  
      and came into effect in 1976, hereinafter referred to as ―the Covenant‖.   
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm   (accessed: 2011/08/09). 
920  United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, hereinafter referred to as  
     ―the Committee‖. 
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The minimum core was described in Grootboom  as the minimum 
expected of a state in order to comply with its obligation under the 
Covenant.  It was said to be the floor beneath which the conduct of a 
state must not drop, if there is to be a compliance with the obligation.921 
According to the Court in Grootboom, each right has a minimum 
essential level that must be satisfied by the state parties.922   
 
In view of the foregoing, it is submitted that if rights which support life, 
that is, socio-economic rights, have a floor beneath which they must not 
drop, logic dictates that this should be even more so with life, the right 
which socio-economic rights are supporting.   
 
In Soobramoney,923  the Court acknowledged that the state‘s resources 
were limited, and therefore the hospital could not be ordered to do even 
what could  be called ―simple humanity‖924 to just one individual who 
wished to have his life end in a dignified manner.  In Grootboom, the 
Court specifically expressed its consciousness of the fact that it was an 
extremely difficult task for the state to meet its constitutional obligations 
                                                 
921  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA  
      466 (CC) at par. 31. 
922  Ibid at par. 31. 
923  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). 
924  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others  2001 (1) SA  
      466 (CC) at par. 80. 
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amid the conditions that prevailed in the country. 925 In fact, the difficulty 
the state had to contend with was acknowledged by the Constitution 
itself by expressly providing that the state is not obliged to go beyond 
available resources, nor to realise the rights in the Constitution 
immediately, but could do so progressively and within available 
resources.  Notwithstanding the consideration shown by the 
constitutional text toward the state, the Court took the view that ―despite 
all these qualifications, these are rights, and the Constitution obliges the 
State to give effect to them.  This is an obligation that courts can, and in 
appropriate circumstances, must enforce.‖926  
 
If one compares the far-reaching effect the order of the Court in 
Grootboom would have on the ―available‖ resources of the state in 
accommodating the needs of a large community, and immediately so, in 
providing them with large scale housing, and comparing this with the 
effect the order of the Court would have had on the state‘s resources, if 
only one individual was accommodated by ordering the hospital to offer 
the necessary medical relief to him, it becomes lucid that somewhere, 
something is amiss with the interpretation of the Constitution in this 
regard.  Liebenberg‘s927 argument in this regard becomes appropriate.  
                                                 
925  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others  2001 (1) SA  
      466 (CC) at par. 94. 
926  Ibid. 
927  Liebenberg S ―Socio-economic Rights‖ in Chaskalson M et al  Constitutional Law of South  
      Africa  Vol 1 (1999) at 41-43. 
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The learned writer argues that the minimum core obligation that was 
emphasised in Grootboom 928 enjoins the state to ensure that groups in 
especially vulnerable and disadvantaged circumstances have access to a 
basic level of the socio-economic rights.  According to Liebenberg,929 this 
should be sufficient to preserve human life and dignity. 
 
In section 27(2) of the Constitution, it is acknowledged that the 
realisation of the rights contained therein will be progressive and not 
instant; it is also acknowledged that the availability of resources will be a 
factor to be considered.  For this reason, in Soobramoney  the relief 
sought was denied.930  
 
The Court had further occasion to exercise its judicial powers in granting 
constitutional relief in the Treatment Action Campaign 931 case.  It must 
be borne in mind that the similarity between Soobramoney and TAC is 
that life was at stake — the life of an individual on the one hand, and the 
life of a section of the nation on the other, due to the AIDS epidemic.  In 
both cases, there were bureaucratic impediments created by the state 
which prevented the obtaining of the necessary medical relief speedily. 
                                                 
928  Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others  (2001) 1 SA  
      466 (CC) at par. 31. 
929  Liebenberg S ―Socio-economic Rights‖ in Chaskalson M et al  Constitutional Law of South  
     Africa  Vol 1 (1999) at 41-43. 
930  Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal  1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at par. 37. 
931  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others  (No 2) 2002 (5) SA  
      721 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as ―the TAC‖). 
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In Soobramoney,  the Court felt that it should be slow to interfere with  
government policies.  In the TAC case, however, the Court agreed with 
the finding of the High Court that the policy of government, insofar as it 
confined the use of Nevirapine to hospitals and clinics which were 
research and training sites, constituted a breach of the State‘s obligations 
under section 27(2) read with section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.  In the 
circumstances, the Court was prepared to, and did in fact, order the 
government to remove ―without delay‖ the restrictions which prevented 
Nevirapine from being made available for the purpose of reducing the 
risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV at public hospitals and clinics 
which were not research and training sites.932 
 
In South Africa the adjudication of the right to life has not been 
consistent as a right that is the most important, and as the right that is 
unqualified in the Constitution of South Africa.  It is unqualified in that 
section 11 of the South African Constitution does not make the right to 
life subject to conditions in which one may lawfully lose it.  This would be 
the position if the Constitution provided that no one may be deprived of 
his or her life without the due process of law.   
 
 
 
                                                 
932  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA  
      721 (CC) at 765. 
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CHAPTER  7 
 
Consistency as applied to the right to privacy 
 
7.1  Background to the right to privacy  
 
The right to privacy is unique.  Unlike equality, privacy is not a creature of 
the Constitution.  It was not bestowed on us by the Constitution.  It is an 
inborn human need which existed long before countries developed and 
drafted constitutions.  A baby is not aware of this need at birth, but as 
the baby grows to become a child, it naturally gets to sense the need for 
privacy.  A child gets to sense this natural need even before adulthood, 
while still in teenage years.  The child will get to a stage where he or she 
needs some secluded space for dressing, or for bathing.  This need is not 
inculcated into a child by a parent, but the child becomes conscious of it 
as he or she grows up. 
 
In fact, it has been suggested933 that this need is inborn even in the 
animal world.  The need expresses itself in the desire for territoriality.  
This refers to the personal distance which occurs between individual 
members of the same group, and social distance which is observed 
between different groups of animals.  McQuoid-Mason likens these traits 
                                                 
933  McQuoid-Mason D J  The Law of Privacy in South Africa  (1978) at 1; Ardrey R The Territorial  
      Imperative  (1969) at 180. 
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which are observed in the animal kingdom to traits which are also 
manifest in the human creation.  The privacy required by members of the 
same family may be referred to as personal distance, while the 
relationship of the family itself to other families in the community can be 
regarded as social distance.934   
 
However, with the civilisation of the human population, mankind began 
experiencing gradual inroads into privacy.  The decline in morals also 
contributed to the invasion of privacy.  Spouses who suspected infidelity 
on the part of their partners sometimes tried to gather evidence of 
infidelity by monitoring their spouse‘s movements.  Strides made in 
technology have probably been the most to blame in the crumbling of 
privacy walls within which communities have been living. 
 
For these reasons, even before the advent of the Constitution, people‘s 
privacy was defended by common law, as discussed from the paragraph 
below. 
 
7.2  Privacy in Roman and Roman-Dutch law 
 
Privacy is not specifically mentioned as a right in Roman-Dutch law, but 
Roman-Dutch law contains several injuriae or affronts to one‘s 
                                                 
934  McQuoid-Mason D J The Law of Privacy in South Africa  (1978) at 1. 
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personality which closely resemble the modern right to privacy.  These 
personality injuriae are so intertwined that it becomes difficult to seek 
remedy for an affront in one aspect without the other aspects of 
personality being affected.  For instance, an invasion of one‘s privacy 
becomes linked to the infringement of one‘s dignity. An infringement of 
one‘s good name, or fama, becomes linked to an infringement of one‘s 
dignity or dignitas.   
 
It was an intrusion in Roman-Dutch law to forcibly enter into a person‘s 
home, as it was felt that it was an individual‘s right to keep free from 
intruders and enjoy his life in private and away from the public gaze.935   
 
Divorce was viewed as publicly and formally ending any kind of 
relationship between spouses. This is evident from the fact that if an ex-
husband  subjected his ex-wife to a medical inspection of her womb to 
establish whether she was pregnant by him or not, that would constitute 
an invasion of her privacy.936 
 
Since then, law has developed in various jurisdictions, and privacy has 
been a basis of litigation in a variety of circumstances.  It would appear 
that in South Africa privacy was first acknowledged in the nineteenth 
                                                 
935  Voet 47.10.7.  
936  McQuod-Mason D J  The Law of Privacy in South Africa  (1978) at 31; Voet 47.10.2. 
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century where, in De Fourd v Cape Town Council , 937 policemen entered 
premises suspected of being a brothel without a warrant.  Since it was a 
crime to keep and make a living from the proceeds of a brothel, one 
would naturally reason that this would authorise the state to enforce the 
law by storming into premises which gave an indication of a crime of 
keeping a brothel.  It was the Court‘s view, however,  that even 
prostitutes, whom the Court referred to as ―abandoned women‖, had 
rights, and without their permission or a warrant, no policeman was 
justified in interfering with their privacy.938  It should be borne in mind 
that this was the holding of the Court in the nineteenth century, more 
than a century ago before our constitutional dispensation.  This Chapter 
will deal with the right to privacy as it relates, among other things, to 
brothels and prostitution under our constitutional dispensation.   
 
The point has been made in this background information that sometimes 
a line of distinction is faint between privacy and dignity, as these 
personality infringements are intertwined.  If two ladies, for instance, 
consent to a photograph being taken of them, as was the case in Kidson v 
SA Associated Newspapers Ltd ,939 for the purpose of demonstrating a 
point in a magazine, but the photograph is unexpectedly published with a 
caption:  ―Lonely and nowhere to go‖, that would naturally be 
                                                 
937  De Fourd v Cape Town Council  (1898)  15 SC 399. 
938  Ibid at 402. 
939  Kidson v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd  1957 (3) SA 461 (W). 
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disappointing.  But the problem facing a court would be whether the 
remedy should be based on the infringement of privacy or dignity.  In this 
case, one lady was married, and the other was engaged.  The Court was 
of the view that the ladies‘ private lives were unnecessarily exposed to 
the public.  Although privacy was at issue, it could not be excised clean 
from dignity.   
 
In the twentieth century, the United States of America realised the need to 
protect the privacy of individuals in the matter of reporting on the 
creditworthiness of individuals.  Thus, the Fair Credit Reporting Act940 
was enacted.  The Act promotes accuracy, fairness, and privacy of 
information in the files of agencies reporting on consumers.  The United 
States has reporting agencies of different kinds, the well known being the 
credit bureau, which keeps credit records of individuals.  Other reporting 
agencies of a different kind are agencies which sell information about the 
issuing of cheques, medical records, and rental history records. 
 
In terms of the Act, it is the right of an individual to be informed if the 
information in the individual‘s file has been used against the 
individual.941  Section 608 of the Act stipulates that access to one‘s file is 
limited, in order to protect privacy.  A consumer reporting agency may 
                                                 
940  Fair Credit Reporting Act, which came into effect in 1970 
http://www.cardreport.com/laws/fcra.html  (accessed: 2011/08/09). 
941  Section 604 (5) (i) (I). 
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provide information about an individual only to people with a valid need.  
Such a need usually arises for a creditor, a potential insurer, a potential 
employer, or landlord.  The Act lists entities who may legitimately have a 
need for access to an individual‘s information. 
 
As a measure of privacy protection, consent is a requirement for reports 
to be provided to employers.  A consumer reporting agency may not give 
out information about an individual without the individual‘s written 
consent to the employer.   
 
It is the right of an individual to know what is in the individual‘s file.  To 
this end, an individual may request and obtain all the information relating 
to him or her contained in the files of a consumer reporting agency.  No 
inaccurate information may be kept.  If an individual discovers that the 
information in his or her file is incomplete or inaccurate, the agency is 
obliged to investigate unless the dispute has no basis.  If negative 
information is removed as a result of a consumer‘s dispute, it may not be 
reinstated without the knowledge of the individual concerned.942   
 
The Act is a legislative endeavour aimed at protecting privacy in the 
private sector.   
 
                                                 
942  Section 609. 
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The public sector has not been left unregulated.  The aftermath of the 
Watergate scandal in the United States943 has been a constant flow of 
legislation aimed partly at giving access to government records, but 
mainly at providing some control over the collection of private 
information by government agencies.  Almost daily, police need to access 
criminal records of arrested persons, but the Crime Control Act944 of the 
United States provides limited access to criminal records. 
 
In South Africa, the Constitution entrenches the right of access to 
information.  However, as of this writing, a recent Bill, the Protection of 
Information Bill, is seen by political parties to be aimed at limiting that 
right.  It remains to be seen to what extent, when the Bill has finally been 
promulgated into law, it will protect privacy with regard to information 
held by the state.  It also remains to be seen to what extent it will conflict 
with the constitutional right of access to information. 
 
In California, privacy was protected in a unique way by the Appeal 
Court.945  The appellant was a one-time prostitute who was tried for 
murder and acquitted.  According to her, she had abandoned her former 
way of life in 1918, rehabilitated herself, and got married a year later.  In 
                                                 
943  The Watergate scandal was a political scandal during the 1970s in the United States where the  
      headquarters of the Democratic National Committee were broken into in search of  
      information.  The incident led to the resignation of the United States President, Richard Nixon,  
      and the incarceration, trial and conviction of some of the officials of his administration. 
944  The Crime Control Act (United States) came into effect in 1970. 
945  Melvin v Reid  112 Cal. App. 285, 297 (1931). 
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1925 the respondents released a film about the appellant‘s life, using the 
facts from the record of her murder trial, and using her maiden name. 
 
The film was viewed by the respondents to be a story which accurately 
reflected the facts of her life.  The appellant protested that this caused 
her harm and to be ill-spoken of. In particular, she based her action on 
the violation of her right to privacy.   
 
The Appeal Court held that had the respondents used the facts from the 
appellant‘s murder trial, there would have been no cause of action, as 
those facts were public record.  However, it was unnecessary, in the 
Court‘s view, to use the appellant‘s real name in conjunction with the 
facts of the case.  That is what constituted violation of the right to 
privacy.  The Court pointed out that the rehabilitation of the fallen and 
the rehabilitation of the criminal was the main objective of the criminal 
penal system, and that once an individual has been rehabilitated it would 
be a violation of the individual‘s privacy to rake up the past immoral way 
of life.946 
 
In our era, privacy is no longer just a common law aspect of our 
personality.  It is now entrenched as a right in the Constitution.  The 
Constitution specifically protects privacy in its various forms — it protects 
                                                 
946  Melvin v Reid 112 Cal. App. 285,  287 (1931) at 91. 
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citizens from having their person and homes searched, their property 
from being searched, their possessions from being seized, and the 
privacy of their communications from being infringed.947 
 
Now that privacy is a constitutional right, the question arises whether all 
previous common law notions of privacy will now be forgotten and fall 
into disuse.  McQuoid-Mason948 is of the view that this will not be the 
case.  The learned author believes that it is unlikely that in the immediate 
future, courts will develop an independent constitutional delict of 
invasion of privacy, unless circumstances arise where such invasion 
cannot be accommodated by the common law, and courts are thus 
required to fashion some other appropriate remedy.949 
 
7.3  Interpretation consistency of the right to privacy 
 
During the pre-Constitution era, it was necessary for courts to maintain 
consistency in interpreting any law, be it statutory law, common law, or 
customary law.  Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis enjoined courts to 
do so.  In South Africa, a supreme law, the Constitution, has emerged.  
The need to be consistent in interpreting  any constitutional right, in this 
                                                 
947  Section 14 of the Constitution. 
948  McQuoid-Mason D ―Privacy‖ in Constitutional Law of South Africa  Vol 2 (2005) Chapter 38  
      at 2. 
949  Chapter 38 at 2. 
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context the constitutional right to privacy, is even greater than it was 
back then when courts had to interpret the common law right to privacy. 
 
The right to privacy has been the subject of litigation in various forms — 
 in questionable conduct, in searches and seizures, in interference with 
private life in day-to-day activities, such as communication, and in legal 
professional privilege. 
 
7.4  In questionable conduct 
 
In 1998, a voluntary association called National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality, approached court, in the case of National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice and Others.950  The 
voluntary association represented gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 
transgendered people in South Africa.  The South African Human Rights 
Commission joined itself as an amicus curiae  in the relief sought.951 
 
The parties approached court seeking relief in the form of an order 
declaring the common law offence of sodomy to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid.  Sodomy was defined at common law as 
                                                 
950  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others   
      1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
951  The South African Human Rights Commission is one of the  institutions of the  
      Constitution, supporting constitutional democracy, established by section 181 of the  
      Constitution. 
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―unlawful and intentional sexual intercourse per anum between human 
males‖.952  A related statutory offence which was also impugned by the 
applicants was section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act.953  For purposes 
of this discussion, the relevant portion of section 20A is reproduced: 
 
      ―(1)  A male person who commits with another male person at a party  any act which is 
        calculated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual gratification, shall be guilty of an  
        offence‖. 
 
The common law offence of sodomy, together with the above statutory 
provision, were impugned on the basis of the constitutional right to 
equality,954 dignity, and privacy. The right to privacy almost invariably 
links itself to the right to dignity.  Thus, the common law and the 
                                                 
952  Milton J R L South African Criminal Law and Procedure (1996) 3rd ed at 248. 
953  Sexual Offences Act of 1957. 
954  The interim Constitution was used at the time when this matter served before the  
      Constitutional Court.  However, for convenience, the final Constitution will be used for  
      purposes of this discussion.  The relevant subsections of Section 9 of the Constitution provide  
      as follows: 
      ―(1)  Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the  
             law. 
       … 
 
       (3)  The State may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or  
 more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social    
 origin, colour, sexual orientation, age disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,   
 language and birth.   
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly  against anyone on one or more      
      grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation must be enacted to prevent or  
      prohibit unfair discrimination.     
(5)   Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it        
       is established that the discrimination is fair. 
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statutory law offence of sodomy was impugned on the basis of these 
rights.  This Chapter, though, concerns itself with the right to privacy. 
 
As a prelude to analysing consistency or inconsistency in the 
interpretation of the right to privacy, it is proper to look at the definition 
of privacy.  Privacy has been defined as ―an individual condition of life 
characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity, the extent of 
which is determined by the individual himself.  This implies an absence of 
acquaintance with the individual or his personal affairs in this state‖.955 
 
In interpreting the right to privacy, the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality ,956  per 
Ackermann J, acknowledged that we all have a right to a sphere of private 
intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human 
relationships without interference from the outside community.  The 
Court held that the way in which we give expression to our sexuality is at 
the core of this area of privacy.957 
 
In holding thus, the Court can safely be understood to mean that of all 
activities we perform in privacy, sexual activity is an activity that occurs in 
                                                 
955   Neethling J  et al Law of Delict (2006) 5th ed at 322. 
956   National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality  and Another v  Minister of Justice and  
      Others  1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
957   National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others   
       1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at par. 32. 
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the innermost of our privacy walls.  It is an activity no other person can 
have access to, or is entitled to know about.  If this is the view of privacy 
the Court had in mind, it is submitted that view is indeed correct.  
However, the question arises as to whether the State is also excluded 
from interfering in what is taking place in the bedrooms.   
 
By its wording, the right to privacy is, on the face of it, absolute.  This is 
especially so if the reasoning of the South African Constitutional Court in 
S v Makwanyane958 is a principle to be guided by.  In casu, the Court held 
that the wording of the right to life in the South African Constitution:  
―everyone has the right to life‖, differs from the wording of this right in 
the Constitutions of other jurisdictions, such as India and Hungary.959  
This difference, held the Court, made our constitutional right to life 
absolute.960  In so holding, the Court inferred that the right to life was not 
subject to limitation by section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
In a similar vein, upon examination of section 14 of the South African 
Constitution, which entrenches the right to privacy, one finds that the 
introductory part of the section is similarly  worded with section 10 of the 
Constitution.  It merely reads:  ―everyone has the right to privacy‖.  The 
section then continues to enumerate aspects of this right  which may not 
                                                 
958   S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
959   Ibid at pars. 15 and 77. 
960   Ibid at par. 84. 
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be compromised.  Also noteworthy is the fact that the section uses the 
word ―includes‖ in enumerating aspects of the right  which may not be 
infringed.  The word ―includes‖ indicates that the list is not exhaustive.  
There may be other aspects of privacy  which are not covered by the 
section.  It becomes interesting, then, how the Court would interpret this 
right in future cases brought before it. 
 
After the judgment in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality,961 
the Court was seized with a matter which similarly relied, among other 
rights, on the constitutional right to privacy.  This was in the case of S v 
Jordan.962  Women involved in prostitution approached the Constitutional 
Court for an order declaring a statutory provision963 unconstitutional and 
invalid on the ground that it violated the right to privacy. 
 
A claim to the right of privacy in this regard was based on the same 
reasoning of the Court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality,964 the case dealing with the constitutionality of laws prohibiting 
sodomy, that an activity of a sexual nature is the most private activity 
humans can engage in, and as such it lies outside any intrusion by third 
parties, whether the parties are private individuals, or public officers.   
                                                 
961  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and  
      Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
962  S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6 ) SA  642 (CC). 
963  Section 20(1)(aA) of the Sexual Offences Act of 1957. 
964  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
     1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
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The doctrine of stare decisis dictates that there be consistency in the 
adjudicating of matters which bear resemblance in material aspects.  Both 
the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 965  case and the S v 
Jordan 966 case deal with sexual activity that can only be engaged in 
behind closed doors.   
 
Comparing the two cases which served before it, the Court endeavoured 
to shift from its previous view967 by expressing doubt that the prohibition 
contained in section 20(1)(aA) affected the right to privacy.968  The Court 
endeavoured to establish some differences between the two cases, but in 
doing so it failed to realise that the common thread between the two 
cases was ―the sphere of private intimacy and autonomy‖ which should be 
―without interference from the outside community‖.969 
 
Section 9 of the South African Constitution deals with the right to 
equality.  Interestingly, section 9(3) of the Constitution lists grounds on 
                                                 
965  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
      1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
966  S v Jordan  and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). 
967  The previous view was that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and autonomy  
      which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without interference from the  
      outside community.  The way in which we give expression to our sexuality is at the core of this  
      area of privacy.  See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of  
      Justice and Others 1991 (1) SA 6 (CC) at par. 32.  
968  S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at par. 27. 
969  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
      1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at par. 32. 
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which the state may not discriminate directly or indirectly.  Among these, 
it lists ―gender‖ and ―sex‖.  Our South African superior courts, including 
the Constitutional Court, have as yet not had occasion to deal with ―sex‖ 
as a ground on which the state may not discriminate.  The two concepts, 
―gender‖ and ―sex‖, are often thought of as closely related.  In fact, they 
are often, correctly or carelessly, used as interchangeable in meaning, 
when referring to the distinction of being male or female. 
 
It is submitted that ―gender‖ in the context of section 9(3) refers to the 
distinction of being male or female.  Therefore, it is submitted, that 
subsection (3) prohibits discrimination based on the distinction of being 
male or female.   
 
The question remains, however, what the related concept, ―sex‖, refers to 
in the context of subsection (3).  It is submitted that ―sex‖ is to be given 
its ordinary dictionary meaning, namely, ―sexual intercourse‖.970  This, 
therefore, leads to the conclusion that, just as no one may be 
discriminated against based on his or her ―sexual orientation‖, no one 
may be discriminated against based on an act of sexual intercourse in its 
natural and widely known form.  Consequently, just as the right to privacy 
was successfully invoked by men practising sodomy as their sexual 
orientation, in the privacy of their rooms, it is hard to find any reason why 
                                                 
970  ―Sex‖ is defined as a shortened form of ―sexual intercourse‖ by Makins M et al  (eds)  Collins  
      English Dictionary  3rd ed 1991at 1417. 
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the same right cannot be invoked by prostitutes practising sex in the 
privacy of their rooms. 
 
In terms of section 9(5), discrimination based on ―sexual orientation‖ and 
―sex‖ is presumably unfair unless it is established that the discrimination 
is fair.  It follows, then, that just as homosexuals were not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of their sexual orientation, in terms of 
section 9(3), prostitutes are not to be discriminated against on grounds 
of sex, in terms of the same subsection.  Further, if homosexuals had 
their right to privacy protected by the Court, it becomes an inconsistency 
for the Court to deny prostitutes that right, since both homosexuals and 
prostitutes engage in sexual conduct in the privacy of their rooms. 
 
In dismissing the claim to the right of privacy, the Court in the S v Jordan 
case971 refused to accept that a person who commits a crime in private, 
by the nature of which can only be committed in private, can necessarily 
claim the protection of the privacy clause.  This reasoning is untenable, 
because sodomy, like prostitution, could only be practiced in private.  
The minority judgment in a similar case dealing with sodomy in the 
United States, in Lawrence et al v Texas,972 raises a pertinent thought, 
where Thomas J reasons: 
 
                                                 
971  S v Jordan and Others  2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). 
972  Lawrence et al v Texas  539 U. S. 558 (2003). 
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      I do not know what ―acting in private‖ means; surely consensual sodomy, like heterosexual  
       intercourse, is rarely performed on stage.  If all the Court means by ―acting in private‖ is ―on  
       private premises, with the doors closed and windows covered,‖ it is entirely unsurprising that  
       evidence of enforcement would be hard to come by.973 
 
In further rejecting the right to privacy as claimed by women involved in 
prostitution, the Constitutional Court of South Africa reasoned that ―what 
compounds the difficulty is that the prostitute invites the public generally 
to come and engage in unlawful conduct in private‖.974  This line of 
reasoning, it is submitted, does not dismiss the case of women involved 
in prostitution.  Admittedly, if one thinks of it, what ends up being an act 
in the privacy of a room, is something that started on the street, for those 
women who are street prostitutes.  But the Court lost sight of the fact 
that the same reasoning could be applied to the practice of sodomy.  It 
can hardly be argued that homosexuals suddenly find themselves as total 
strangers in a closed room and, as total strangers, suddenly engage in 
sodomy.  Men practising homosexuality, like heterosexuals, initiate their 
relationship in the public arena, both agree to be involved in such a 
relationship, and finally end up behind closed doors.   
 
The claim to the right of privacy by women practicing prostitution, 
therefore, could not be dismissed on the basis that they engage in 
                                                 
973  Lawrence et al v Texas 539 U. S. 558 (2003) at 597 [emphasis added]. 
974  S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at par. 28. 
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conduct which started in the public arena, because the sexual conduct of 
homosexuals is also conduct which started in the public arena. 
 
Furthermore, not all prostitutes solicit outside in the streets.  Some 
women in the sex trade are in the employ of another person in a brothel, 
and as such, they get clients by waiting indoors.  Therefore, not all 
prostitutes invite the public in the public arena.  
 
The judgment of the Court in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality 975 case presents a further problem of inconsistency.  Two years 
earlier, in Case v Minister of Safety and Security,976  the Court, per Didcott 
J, expressed the following regarding the viewing of pornographic material 
in the privacy of one‘s room: 
 
     What erotic material I may choose to keep within the privacy of my home, and only for my  
       personal use there, is nobody‘s business but mine.  It is certainly not the business of society  
       or the state.  Any ban imposed on my possession of such material for that solitary purpose  
       invades the personal privacy which section 13 of the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993)  
       guarantees that I shall enjoy.977 
 
Interestingly, in the same year that the above matter was adjudicated 
upon, the Court had occasion to deal with yet another matter which 
                                                 
975  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
     1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
976  Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others  1996 (3) SA 617 (CC). 
977  Ibid at par. 91 [emphasis added]. 
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claimed the right to privacy.  It was in the case of Bernstein v Bester.978  
The issue before Court was whether the statutory duty979 resting on a 
company to disclose all its affairs to liquidators violated the constitutional 
right to privacy.   
 
In dealing with the question, the Court distinguished between the privacy 
enjoyed by a person in the sphere of his or her home, and the privacy 
enjoyed in the sphere of business: 
 
      The truism that no right is to be considered absolute, implies that from the outset of  
        interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to another  
        citizen. In the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a  
        person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home environment, which is  
        shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community.  . . .  Privacy is acknowledged  
         in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and activities  
         such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.980 
 
The fact that the Court in Case v Minister of Safety and Security 981 held 
that what a person does in the privacy of his or her home is nobody‘s 
business but his or hers, and the fact that in Bernstein v Bester 982 it 
referred to one‘s home as ―the inner sanctum‖, is significant.  The view 
held by the Court on both occasions firmly established a precedent — 
                                                 
978  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
979  Sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
980  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at par. 67 [emphasis  
      added]. 
981  Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) at par. 91. 
982  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at par. 67. 
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that within one‘s walls is a sacred place, one of total privacy and 
inviolability. 
 
There is another side to the issue of privacy in the context of sexual 
activities, particularly in sexual activities involving prostitution.  The 
Court endeavoured to divert attention from the constitutional issue of 
privacy by pointing out that what was at the heart of the prostitutes‘ 
complaint was that they were prohibited from selling their sexual 
services. The Court emphasised that they were in the industry solely for 
money, and that the statutory prohibition was directed solely at the sale 
of sexual activity.983 
 
Indeed, that may be so.  But to dismiss the prostitutes‘ claim to privacy 
on the basis of this argument only leads to another problem.  There are 
other sexual activities which do not involve trading which are also 
proscribed by law.  Incest is one such activity.  In this regard, one must 
recall what the Constitutional Court held in the National Coalition  case 
regarding sodomy.  The relevant phrase is:  ―If, in expressing our 
sexuality, we act consensually . . .‖.984 
 
                                                 
983  S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at par. 29. 
984  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
      1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at pat. 32. 
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This means that any act committed by two consenting adults, in private, 
is, indeed, ―no body‘s business, but‖985 that of the two individuals 
engaging it.  This view causes confusion in the minds of society, because 
incest is a common law offence which still stands even after we have 
entered the new constitutional dispensation.  Incest, which is not rape, is 
a sexual act engaged in by two consenting adults.  True, it is engaged in 
by adults who are closely related to each other.  But if the act is 
consensual, between adults, in private, without harming one another, it 
would, to follow the interpretation of the Court in the National Coalition  
case, be free from interference by the state. 
 
Unlike sodomy, the continued existence of the common law offence of 
incest has not as yet been challenged in the Constitutional Court.  
Although it has not been challenged in Court, the feeling is that in so far 
as it punishes consenting adults, it has no utilitarian purpose.986  
Admittedly, as part of its objective, the prohibition of incest protects 
children in any family from being sexually exploited by adults.  But it has 
been argued by Milton987 that the effect of this prohibition is limited, in 
that the offence is committed by a relative having vaginal intercourse with 
a child.  It does not include anal intercourse with a child or indecent 
assaults upon a child in the family, nor does it punish a female relative 
                                                 
985  per Didcott J, in Case v Minister of Safety and Security  and Others  1996 (3) 617 (CC) at par.  
      91. 
986  Milton J L R South African Criminal Law and Procedure (1996) 3rd ed  at 236, 237. 
987  Ibid. 
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abusing a female child.  These offences are punishable under the Sexual 
Offences Act.988 
 
One other objective of the crime of incest, in the light of its definition,989 
is to prevent genetic defects which may be passed on from one 
generation to the next among individuals who are related by blood.  
However, the definition of incest also prohibits marriage and sexual 
intercourse between persons who are related by marriage or adoption.  
Such individuals are not related by blood.  Milton990 argues that it is hard 
to think of any genetic defects which may be transmitted from generation 
to generation if two individuals related by marriage ties engage in sexual 
intercourse.  For this reason, he is of the view that since adultery is no 
longer a crime, and since there does not seem to be any eugenic reasons 
why intercourse between affines 991  should be prohibited, the day may 
yet come when, as in England and as under the Transkei Penal Code of 
1885,992 incest is restricted to consanguines.993 
 
                                                 
988  Sexual Offences Act of 1957. 
989  Milton J L R South African Criminal Law and Procedure (1996) 3rd ed at 234 defines incest as 
      unlawful and intentional sexual intercourse between two persons who on account of  
      consanguinity, affinity or adoptive relationship may not marry one another. 
990  Ibid at 235. 
991  People related by marriage. 
992  Section 123 of the Transkei Penal Code of 1885. 
993  Milton J L R South African Criminal Law and Procedure (1996) 3rd ed at 236; consanguines are  
      people related by blood. 
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In his more than a century old article, Hull994 lamented the unreasonable 
prohibition of relations between a man and his wife‘s sister as amounting 
to incest.  In particular,  he found the unreasonableness of incest when 
one considered that a statutory provision of that time995 had the effect 
that a man could marry a deceased‘s wife sister, but he could not marry 
the sister of a wife who was still alive, even if the wife was divorced.  
Indeed, it is hard to imagine how such a relationship would result in 
genetic defects being transmitted down to posterity. 
 
What does happen in society, is that a man and his wife‘s sister do have 
relations, whether this was viewed as incest by moral standards, or by 
law.  But the fact is that they do so as consenting adults.  Such a conduct 
constitutes adultery.  It also constitutes incest.  True, such conduct 
strains the relationship between the married couple.  It may also be 
frowned upon by society, though not necessarily by every individual in 
society.  Since adultery is no longer punishable by criminal law, 
regardless of the relationship between the individuals therein, the 
question then arises why incest is still criminally punishable in terms of 
the law, when engaged in by consenting adults in private.  The 
undeniable fact is that there are very few cases, if any, of accused 
                                                 
994  The Hon. Henry Charles Hull  ―Notes on Some Controverted Points of Law — Incest as Between  
      a Man and His Wife‘s Sister‖  1910 SALJ  522. 
995  Cape Act 40 of 1892. 
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persons in our modern times, who appear before courts accused of 
incest.  It would appear that this crime is being abrogated by disuse. 
 
The inconsistency of the Court in dealing with acts committed in private 
by consenting adults is further pointed out by Nel.996  According to Nel, 
the Court‘s adjudication in matters of this nature is not only inconsistent 
with regard to the right to privacy, but also with regard to the right to 
dignity.     
 
Nel points out that ―an extensive incest prohibition prevents persons 
from being a party to the sexual relationship of their choice without state 
intervention‖.997  Just as the Constitutional Court, in countenancing the 
decriminalisation of consensual sodomy, emphasised the degradation 
and devaluation of those who ―are at risk of arrest, prosecution and 
conviction . . . simply because they seek to engage in sexual conduct 
which is part of their experience of being human‖,998 consistency requires 
that this interpretation should stand in favour of those who engage in 
consensual sexual conduct as adults, but who are frowned upon as 
committing the crime of incest.  Nel argues999 that the stigma attached to 
                                                 
996  Nel M ―The constitutionality of the crime of ‗affinity‘ incest:  An argument based on the  
      recognition of Customary Marriages Act‖ 2002  Stell LR  347 to 351. 
997  at 346. 
998  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others   
     1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at par. 28. 
999  Nel M ―The constitutionality of the crime of ;affinity‘ incest: An argument based on the  
     recognition of Customary Marriages Act‖ 2002  Stell LR  at 346. 
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being convicted of incest is as great as that of being convicted of 
sodomy, when sodomy was still punishable.  The view held by the Court 
regarding sodomy that the sphere of private intimacy and autonomy 
which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without 
interference from the outside community, should apply with equal force 
to other activities engaged in privately.   
 
In any event, types of conduct which were traditionally frowned upon as 
being immoral and abhorrent, have now passed constitutional muster, 
and are countenanced by our courts.  Same-sex marriages are an 
example of such conduct.   
 
One of the reasons why the prostitution case in S v Jordan 1000 was dealt 
with differently from the sodomy case in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality 1001 was that in prostitution the nature of commercialised 
sex negates the nurturing aspect of intimate relationships by emptying 
the sex act much of its private and intimate character.1002  The Court 
augmented this view by adding that the prostitute is not nurturing 
relationships or taking life-affirming decisions about birth, marriage or 
family, but she is making money.1003 
                                                 
1000  S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). 
1001  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
      1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
1002  S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at par. 83. 
1003  S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) at par. 83. 
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In this regard, the views held by some writers become relevant.  For 
instance, Jivan and Perumal1004 are of the view that even if the sexual 
activity of a prostitute is done for commercial gain, this does not justify 
removing it from the realm of privacy.  
 
They admit that the commercial aspect might remove it from the inner 
core privacy, thus making it easier to justify the prohibition, but it does 
not remove it from the scope of privacy altogether, because even if the 
expression of sexuality in this context is loveless, it is still very personal.  
What the Court finds problematic, argue Jivan and Perumal, is that a 
prostitute has dared to venture into the public arena to make money from 
a sexual engagement which other women provide for free.1005   
 
In finding the two decisions of the Court in sodomy and prostitution to be 
irreconcilable, the two writers contend that the moment two people 
choose to be private, and express their choice by occupying a private 
room or cubicle out of public sight, they choose to be private, and their 
interaction is accordingly private. The writers therefore feel that any 
argument which suggests that the commercial element in the interaction 
                                                 
1004  Jivan U and Perumal D  ―‘Let‘s talk about sex, baby‘ — but not in the Constitutional Court:   
      Some comments on the gendered nature of legal reasoning in the Jordan  case‖ 2004 SACJ   
      375. 
1005  Jivan U and Perumal D ―‘Let‘s talk about sex, baby‘ — but not in the Constitutional Court:   
      Some comments on the gendered nature of legal reasoning in the Jordan case‖ 2004 SACJ   
      at 375. 
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takes the conduct out of the private domain is strained and should be 
rejected.1006 
 
Another writer, Kroeze,1007 finds some inconsistency on the part of the 
Court when it dealt with the limits of state interference  in questions of 
morality.  She makes reference to the words of the Court, per Ackerman J 
in the sodomy case: 
 
      The enforcement of the private moral views of a section of the community, which are based  
        to a large extent on nothing more than prejudice, cannot qualify as such a legitimate  
         purpose.1008 
 
Kroeze sees it as inconsistency that the Court did not hold this view in 
the Jordan case with regard to the question of prostitution.  She asserts 
that opinions about prostitution are based on moral considerations, and 
that people judge prostitution to be wrong or right on the basis of their 
moral convictions. She finds it disturbing that the Court, in coming to this 
decision, chose to enforce these private moral views, a step it was 
unwilling to take in the sodomy case.1009 
 
                                                 
1006  at 376. 
1007  Kroeze I J ―Sin and Simulacra: Some comments on the Jordan case‖ 2003 TSAR 563. 
1008  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others   
      1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at par. 37. 
1009  Kroeze I J ―Sin and Simulacra: Some comments on the Jordan case‖ 2003 TSAR at 563. 
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The approach adopted by the Court in dealing with the discrimination 
aspect complained of in sodomy, is worth mentioning.  It was submitted 
that the statutory provision is discriminatory in that it punished men who 
practiced sodomy on other men, but does not punish women who 
perform lesbian sexual acts on other women.1010 
 
A similar anomaly was complained of in the prostitution case.  It was 
brought to the attention of the Court that the statutory provision 
prohibiting prostitution is discriminatory to the extent that it strikes at 
the prostitute, and not at the client.1011 
 
In dealing with this anomaly, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
provision, holding that it is not irrational for the legislature to criminalise 
the conduct of only one group, and not the other.  The Court reasoned 
that the legislative purpose may have been to target the purveyors of sex 
for reward, rather than the purchasers.   
 
This reasoning could apply with equal force on the sodomy complaint, 
but was not followed. It could similarly be reasoned that the statutory 
provision targeted men because it is men who practiced sodomy, whether 
on other men, or on women.  On the other hand, women, by their 
                                                 
1010  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
      1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at par. 11. 
1011 S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 242 (CC) at par. 8. 
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physiological nature, cannot perform sodomy, although they may perform 
other sexual acts on other women, which fall short of being sodomy.   
 
By reasoning thus, the Court could be sending a signal to the legislature 
that if the statutory prohibition could be extended to women as well, it 
would cease to be discriminatory.  The Court cannot usurp the functions 
of the legislature, and amend the impugned piece of legislation.  It would, 
however, be up to the legislature to decide what to do with the impugned 
statutory provision. 
 
The question of what one does in the privacy of one‘s room is not only 
about sexual intimacies, but it extends to what one can rightfully 
possess, or watch.  Pornography is, for example, something that some 
citizens frown upon.  It is also something that one would not view in 
public.  When featured in home entertainment DVDs, it is often marked in 
a way that serves as a warning to individuals whose moral standards are 
high, and for that reason would scruple at the explicit nature of sex 
scenes featured. 
 
It was on this basis that the legislature enacted a law1012 which 
criminalised the possession of material which features explicit sex 
scenes.  This statute became a subject of constitutional litigation in 
                                                 
1012  The Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act 37 of 1967, as amended.   
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which, among other rights, the right to privacy was relied upon.  It was in 
connection with the constitutional adjudication of this matter that Didcott 
J held that what one does within the walls of one‘s room is nobody‘s 
business, but one‘s own, not even that of the State.1013  This means, in 
effect, that one‘s home is one‘s castle.  It also has the effect that 
whatever wrongdoing one practices within the inner recesses of one‘s 
home is beyond the jurisdiction of the law.  Whether this is the position in 
practice is another question, but this is the logical conclusion.  For 
example, the question that arises is what the position should be if one 
consumes illegal drugs in the privacy of one‘s home.  It may be asked 
whether such consumption becomes illegal if it takes place outside one‘s 
premises, in the public arena. 
 
If the doctrine of judicial precedent in matters similar in nature was 
something to rely on, women who make prostitution their career, 
particularly if they do so within the walls of their own homes, could 
understandably count on the Court‘s judgment in the pornography case 
of Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1014. 
 
Unbeknown to the Court, it would soon be faced with a similar challenge 
dealing with what takes place in the privacy of one‘s home.  This 
                                                 
1013  Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) at par.  
        91. 
1014  Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) at par.  
        91. 
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challenge came in the form of a constitutional challenge to section 27(1) 
of the Films and Publication Act,1015 prohibiting possession of child 
pornography, in De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions.1016 
 
It is appropriate at this early juncture to point out that the Court in De 
Reuck  acknowledged that possession and consumption of child 
pornography often takes place in the inner sanctum of the home.1017  
However, although possession and consumption of child pornography 
often takes place in private, the legislative purpose was to curb child 
pornography which is universally condemned, as it strikes at the dignity 
of children, and grooms children to engage in sex. 
 
Indeed, the objective is a noble one.  To accomplish its noble objective, 
the Films and Publications Act defined ―sexual conduct‖ in Schedule 11 as 
follows: 
 
      ―For the purposes of these Schedules, ‗sexual conduct‘ means genitals in a state of stimulation  
       or arousal; the lewd display of genitals; masturbation; sexual intercourse, which includes anal  
       sexual intercourse; the fondling, or touching with any object, of genitals; the penetration of  
       a vagina or anus with any object; oral genital contact; or oral anal contact‖.1018 
 
                                                 
1015   The Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996. 
1016   De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions  2004 (1) SA 406 (CC).   
1017   at par. 90.   
1018  emphasis added. 
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The definition of ―sexual conduct‖ includes anal intercourse, that is, 
sodomy.  It is a fact that not all men who practice sodomy do so on 
adults, but they have been known to exploit the ignorance of young boys.  
For this reason, the law proscribes sexual abuse of children in any form.   
 
Admittedly, the Constitution forbids discrimination on the ground of 
sexual orientation.  It is for this reason that the crime of sodomy passed 
constitutional muster.  But homosexual men do not practice sodomy only 
on other adult consenting men; they are also known to exploit unwary 
young boys.  This hard fact was acknowledged by the Court in the De 
Reuck  case: 
 
      Although possession and consumption of child pornography often takes place in the inner  
        sanctum of the home, the legislative purposes identified above remain of great importance.   
        It should not be overlooked that many of the resultant acts of abuse against children take  
        place in private.  In other words, where the reasonable risk of harm to children is likely to  
        materialise in private, some intrusion by the law into the private domain is justified.1019 
 
It is submitted that consistency should have guided the reasoning of the 
Court to at least come to the realisation that the statutory provision 
which prohibited acts of sodomy even in the privacy of one‘s home 
served the same purpose served by the prohibition against the 
possession of child pornography, namely, to protect innocent male 
children against the sodomy acts of adult men. 
                                                 
1019 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC) at par. 90.    
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7.5  ―Without harming one another‖ 
 
In dealing with the question of privacy as adjudicated upon by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in the National Coalition case, it is 
appropriate to give some consideration to an aspect of the Court‘s 
pronouncements, namely, ―without harming one another‖.  This utterance 
was part of the Court‘s holding:  ―If, in expressing our sexuality, we act 
consensually and without harming one another, invasion of that precinct 
will be a breach of our privacy‖.1020 
 
It is clear that by using the phrase: ―without harming one another‖, the 
Court was not referring to harm that could be done to a third party, or to 
society, when two men practice sodomy, but to harm that could be done 
to either of the two men.  Thus, the Court expressed the view that there 
is no harm inflicted in an act of sodomy. 
 
Medical evidence proves otherwise.  In their article, Cooper and 
Scherer1021 write that the use of the anus for sexual penetration is an 
unnatural use.  They emphasise that since it was not meant for sexual 
                                                 
1020  at par. 32. 
1021  Cooper A and Scherer C ―Is Anal Sex or Anal Penetration Safe?‖  1998 Self-Help  
       Magazine  March 18, at 1, edited by Marlene M. Maheu, Ph.D.  Dr Al Cooper was the clinical        
       director at the San Jose Marital and Sexuality Centre, California, USA, and ran the training  
       program for Counseling and Psychological Services at Stanford University, California, USA.  Dr  
        Coralie Scherer co-ordinates online services for the Centre and specialises in sexual trauma,  
        women‘s issues, and marital therapy. 
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penetration, ―the rectum is not self-lubricating like the vagina or even the 
mouth.  The delicate tissues there are easily irritated or damaged and can 
be an easy route into the body for infecting agents‖.1022   
 
They further warn that there is also the matter of faeces remains in the 
anus.  The anus ―is filled with bacteria that can cause very painful 
infections if transferred to the mouth, penis or vagina.  It‘s not a good 
idea to have anal intercourse followed by vaginal intercourse without 
carefully washing the penis and using a fresh condom.  If not, unseen but 
highly infectious faecal matter might be introduced into the vagina, often 
leading to serious infections within a week or two‖,1023 warn the two 
medical authorities. 
 
Furthermore, the Journal of the American Medical Association 1024 
acknowledges that generally, men and women who engage in same-sex 
behaviour have the same health afflictions as individuals who engage in 
opposite-sex behaviour.  Some diseases, however, warns the journal, are 
of particular concern to men and women who engage in same-sex 
                                                 
1022   Cooper A and Scherer C ―Is Anal Sex or Anal Penetration Safe‖ 1998 Self-Help Magazine  
        March 18  at 4. 
1023   Cooper A and Scherer C ―Is Anal Sex or Anal Penetration Safe‖ 1998 Self-Help Magazine  
        March 18 at 4. 
1024   Davis R M et al  ―Health Care Needs of Gay Men and Lesbians in the United States‖ 1996  
        JAMA 275(17) 1 May,  at 2. 
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behaviour, and therefore are important in a differential diagnosis and 
treatment plan.1025 
 
Among such diseases, the journal lists HIV infection.  It states that 
infection with HIV is a major health concern for the gay community.  It 
reports that men who have sex with men account for more cases of the 
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome1026 in the United States than 
persons in any other transmission category.1027  During 1994, 34 974 
new cases of AIDS were reported among men whose only exposure to HIV 
was having sex with other men.  In San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York 
City, and Chicago, the prevalence rate of HIV infection among sexually 
active gay men has at times reached between thirty percent and fifty 
percent since 1981.1028 
 
The HIV-AIDS plague is the health concern brought to the attention of 
society by the journal.  Hepatitis has also taken its toll among men 
practicing sodomy.  ―All forms of hepatitis can occur in gay male patients.  
Because of the risk for hepatitis B virus infection, sexually gay and 
bisexual men should receive the hepatitis B vaccine.  In general, gay men 
                                                 
1025   Davis R M et al  ―Health Care Needs of Gay Men and Lesbians in the United States‖ 1996  
        JAMA 275(17) 1 May,  at 2. 
1026   AIDS. 
1027   Davis R M et al  ―Health Care Needs of Gay Men and Lesbians in the United States‖ 1996  
        JAMA  275(17) 1 May,  at 3. 
1028   Davis R M et al  ―Health Care Needs of Gay Men and Lesbians in the United States‖ 1996  
        JAMA 275(17) 1 May,  at 3. 
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are at greater risk for contracting hepatitis B virus than hepatitis C virus 
infection, which is frequently transmitted by injecting drugs‖.1029 
 
Nor are men who practise sodomy immune from a fourth plague — 
cancer of the anus.  The journal reports that ―in a 1992 retrospective 
study, researchers determined an 84 to 1 relative risk of anal cancer after  
AIDS diagnosis among gay men compared with the incidence of anal 
carcinoma in age-and sex-matched persons in the  general 
population‖.1030  In a 1982 study of the cancer of the rectum in the 
Washington State, the incidence among men who reported homosexual 
behaviour was 25 to 50 times that of age-matched heterosexual 
controls.1031 
 
The report concludes by pointing out that most cases of anal syphilis 
occur in homosexual men. 
 
On the other hand, a medical report by a medical scientist, Diggs,1032 
confirms what medical practitioners Cooper and Scherer in the Self-Help 
Magazine 1033 pointed out, that there are greater health risks among men 
                                                 
1029   Davis R M et al  ―Health Care Needs of Gay Men and Lesbians in the United States‖ 1996     
        JAMA 275(17) 1May at 4. 
1030   Ibid. 
1031   Ibid. 
1032   Diggs J R ―The Health Risks of Gay Sex‖ 2002 Corporate Resource Council at 1. 
1033   Cooper A and Scherer ―Is Anal Sex or Anal Penetration Safe?‖ 1998 Self-Help Magazine March  
        18, at 1. 
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having sex with other men because of the nature of sex among men.  
Drawing attention to the nature of sex among men, Diggs states that 
human physiology makes it clear that the body was not designed to 
accommodate this activity.1034  He points out that the rectum is 
significantly different from the vagina with regard to suitability for 
penetration by a penis.  The vagina, he points out, has natural lubricants 
and is supported by a network of muscles.  It is composed of a mucus 
membrane that allows it to endure friction without damage, and to resist 
certain actions caused by semen.1035 
 
When compared with the vagina, the anus is a delicate orifice of small 
muscles which is designed to be an ―exit-only‖ passage.  In other words, 
it was not designed to take anything in, but was designed to be a conduit 
for expelling substance out of the body. Consequently, with the repeated 
trauma, friction, and stretching that takes place during anal intercourse, 
the sphincter, the inner muscle around the outlet of the rectum, becomes 
weak and loses its tone and its ability to maintain a tight seal of the anus.  
The sad consequence of this chafing of the sphincter is that it can no 
longer hold faeces, and faeces can leak out of the body without control, 
as the control muscle has become weak and loose, warns Diggs.1036 
 
                                                 
1034  Diggs J R ―The Health Risks of Gay Sex‖ 2002 Corporate Resource Council at 3. 
1035  Ibid. 
1036  Ibid. 
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According to Diggs, there is a further potential for injury which is 
exacerbated by the fact that the intestine has only a single layer of cells  
separating it from highly vascular tissue, that is, blood.  As a result of 
this, any organisms that are introduced into the rectum have a much 
easier time establishing a foothold for infection than they would in a 
vagina.  The single layer tissue cannot withstand the friction associated 
with penile penetration, resulting in traumas that expose both men who 
participate in sodomy to blood, organisms in faeces, and a mixing of 
bodily fluids. 
 
Diseases, according to Diggs, which are found with extraordinary 
frequency among male homosexuals as a result of anal intercourse are, 
among others:  anal cancer, herpes simplex virus, HIV, gonorrhoea, 
syphilis, hepatitis B, haemorrhoids, and anal fissures.1037 
 
Medical evidence produced above is produced in the light of the Court‘s 
assumption that in expressing our sexuality, acting consensually, we act 
―without harming one another‖.  The Court expressed this in an 
assumption, yet medical evidence leaves no room for uncertainty that 
sodomy acts bring harm to the men engaged in them. 
 
                                                 
1037  Diggs J R  ―The Health Risks of Gay Sex‖ 2002 Corporate Resource Council at 3 to 4. 
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Against this background, it should be borne in mind that the Court, in 
rejecting the prostitutes‘ right to privacy in the S v Jordan 1038 case, it 
reasoned that the prohibition against prostitution serves a legitimate 
governmental purpose, that of criminalising the commercialising of sex.  
An analysis of sodomy in the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality  1039 case reveals that the prohibition of sodomy served a 
legitimate governmental purpose, that of protecting men against the 
medically documented health risks.   The unfortunate fact, however, is 
that the Constitution makers decided, advertently or inadvertently, to 
decriminalise sodomy by listing it among grounds on which 
discrimination is prohibited. 
 
This leads to the question of values surrounding the right to privacy in 
the Constitution.  The text of the Constitution of South Africa does not 
contain the word or words: ―morals‖, or ―morality‖, or ―moral principles‖.  
It does, however, contain the word: ―values‖.  There is uncertainty as to 
what the Constitutional Assembly or the drafters of the Constitution had 
in mind when, for example, they provided that the Bill of Rights 
―enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom‖.1040   
However, the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word ―values‖ is:  ―the 
                                                 
1038  S v Jordan and Others 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). 
1039  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality  1996 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
1040  Section 7(1) of the Constitution. 
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moral principles and beliefs or accepted standards of a person or social 
group‖.1041  It is doubtful that this is the context in which the word 
―values‖ is used in the Constitution. 
 
This point is raised by the question: whose values, in the sense of moral 
principles, should be followed in a country which has a Constitution as 
the supreme of the law of the land?  Some moral standards endorsed by 
the Constitution are hard to accept in some sections of society.  The 
countenancing of sodomy by the Constitution is one such example.   
 
It may also be asked whether courts may take it upon themselves to be 
the custodians of high moral standards, or whether they should only 
enforce these if they are entwined in legislation, or in the Constitution. 
 
This issue became a relevant issue before Court in the United States in 
dealing with the question whether homosexuals have the constitutional 
right to practice sodomy in private.  
 
7.6  The position in the United States law 
 
It was in 1982 when a police officer entered the bedroom of a man and 
found him engaging in sodomy with another man.  He was arrested, and 
                                                 
1041   Makins M  et al (eds) Collins English Dictionary  3rd ed (1991) at 1694. 
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the matter finally came before the Supreme Court of the United States, as 
the Bowers v Hardwick 1042  case.   
 
The sodomy case of Bowers v Hardwick in the United States becomes 
relevant in the issue of consistency as required by the doctrine of stare 
decisis.  The challenge brought before Court was that, while sodomy was 
a crime, it should be viewed differently when practised in the privacy of 
one‘s home.  The challenge relied on consistency, from an earlier 
decision of the Court, in Stanley v Georgia,1043 where the Court held that 
the First Amendment1044 prevents conviction for possessing and reading 
obscene material in the privacy of one‘s home.  The Court had held that:  
―If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no 
business telling a man, sitting alone in his house, what books he may 
read or what films he may watch‖.1045 
 
In the United States, the decision of the Court in Stanley v Georgia 1046 
protected conduct that would otherwise not have been protected if it 
were taking place outside the home.  In particular did the decision 
prevent the enforcement of laws which regarded certain activities as 
                                                 
1042  Bowers v Hardwick  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
1043  Stanley v Georgia  394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
1044  The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
       Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free  
       exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the  
       people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
1045  Stanley v Georgia 394 U. S. 557 (1969) at 565. 
1046  Stanley v Georgia 394 U. S. 557 (1969).  
368 
 
obscenity, but the decision was based on the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  
 
Frankly, like the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, which had little or 
no connection with the right of privacy to which they were linked,1047 it is 
also difficult to understand how the right to privacy has anything to do 
with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The First 
Amendment has to do with the right to practise one‘s religion, to be 
guided by one‘s principled conscience, the right to freedom of speech, 
the right of the press, and the right to assemble. 
 
The problem of the Court in dealing with sodomy in Bowers v Hardwick 
was that, although it was inclined to countenance sodomy when practised 
in the privacy of one‘s home, in other laws of the United States, conduct 
which was otherwise illegal was not rendered non-criminal just because it 
took place inside the walls of one‘s home.  Crimes which do not have a 
victim, for instance, such as the possession or use of illegal drugs, do not 
escape the law when they are committed inside one‘s home.  Possession 
of unlicensed firearms, or the keeping of stolen goods, in one‘s home, 
certainly does not become legal just because such possession is inside 
the home. Countenancing sodomy, even if it is done on the basis of a 
                                                 
1047  The Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments were linked to the right to privacy in connection  
       with abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey  120 L ed 2d 674;  
       112 SCt 2791 (1992). 
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constitutional provision such as, for example, section 9(3) of the 
Constitution of South Africa, which prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, presents problems.  It raises questions as to what 
should then happen to other intimate and indoor crimes, such as incest, 
or bestiality, if they take place where the public eye cannot penetrate.  
These were some of the problems the United States Supreme Court was 
faced with before taking a decision on the indoor crime of sodomy.  The 
Court‘s holding was in these words:   
 
    And if [the] submission is limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults,        
      it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while  
      leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are  
      committed in the home.  We are unwilling to start down that road.1048 
 
Indeed, there is close resemblance between sodomy and incest, in that 
both crimes are committed where the public eye cannot penetrate.  They 
are both intimate criminal conduct and, although they both may be 
performed by an adult on a child, they both may be performed by two 
adults, and they both may be performed by mutual consent. If the state 
were to ban incest on the ground that the other partner may be a 
defenceless victim, a child, the same argument applies to sodomy.  The 
other partner may be a defenceless and unwilling participant.   
 
                                                 
1048  Bowers v Hardwick  478 U. S.  186 (1986)  at 6 [emphasis added]. 
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However, the Court‘s determination:  ―we are unwilling to start down that 
road‖, becomes significant when one considers the subsequent 
determination of the Court some years later.  From the tenor of the 
words: ―we are unwilling to start down that road‖, one senses that judicial 
precedent would prevent the Court from holding differently in future on 
the same matter.   
 
Some seventeen years later, the same Court, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, had to reconsider its own decision in Bowers v 
Hardwick.1049  Whether its ‗unwillingness to start down that road‘ would 
still stand was put to the test in the case of Lawrence v Texas.1050  In this 
case, responding to a weapons complaint in a private residence, police in 
Texas entered Lawrence‘s apartment, and found him and another adult 
male engaging in a private consensual sexual act.  The two men were 
arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a 
Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in 
certain intimate sexual conduct.   
 
The matter ultimately came before the Supreme Court of the United 
States, notwithstanding the fact that this Court had already ruled against 
homosexual acts between adult males in Bowers v Hardwick.1051  Thus, 
                                                 
1049  Bowers v Hardwick  478 U. S. 186 (1986). 
1050  Lawrence et al v Texas  539 U. S. 558 (2003). 
1051  Bowers v Hardwick 478 U. S. 186 (1986). 
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the consistency of the Court would be put to the test.  If the Court was 
going to be persuaded to dishonour its own judicial precedent, it had to 
be clear what considerations would determine such a course. 
 
The question arises whether developments in the area of jurisdiction of a 
court should have the effect of altering its reasoning on matters, even 
causing to it consider stare decisis unbinding.  Such developments in the 
area of jurisdiction of a court could be such things as the political 
climate, legislative developments, and perhaps the change in the 
composition of the court.   
 
In the case of Lawrence v Texas,1052 such considerations turned out to be 
legislative developments.  The Court felt that deficiencies in its earlier 
holding in Bowers v Hardwick  ―became even more apparent in the years 
following its announcement.  The 25 States with laws prohibiting the 
conduct referred to in Bowers are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce 
their laws only against homosexual conduct‖.1053    The rate at which the 
state enforced sodomy laws through criminal courts also had an effect on 
the changed attitude of the Supreme Court towards its earlier decision.  
This becomes evident in the words of the Court that ―in those States, 
including Texas, that still proscribe sodomy (whether for same-sex or 
heterosexual conduct), there is a pattern of non-enforcement with 
                                                 
1052  Lawrence et al v Texas 539 U. S. 558 (2003). 
1053  Lawrence et al v Texas 539 U. S. 558 (2003) at 559. 
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respect to consenting adults acting in private‖.1054  Concerned that the 
overturning of its earlier ruling in a similar matter would not be taken 
lightly by the legal fraternity, the Supreme Court prepared itself by saying 
that ―stare decisis is not an inexorable command‖ and that ―Bowers was 
not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is hereby 
overruled‖.1055 
 
The overruling of Bowers v Hardwick  by Lawrence v Texas is 
informative.1056  The intervening period between the two decisions is 
seventeen years, with Bowers v Hardwick having been decided in 1986, 
and Lawrence v Texas having been decided in 2003.  This may answer 
some questions relating to the possibility of a court overturning its own 
previous decisions, such as how long a period of time may pass before 
such a possibility can become a reality.  Also, whether a court would have 
to be composed differently.  Put differently, whether the generation of 
members of the Bench who arrived at a particular decision would all have 
to retire, or die, and the court would have to be composed of a 
completely new generation, for an earlier  decision to be overruled. 
 
If the two cases of Bowers v Hardwivck and Lawrence v Texas are 
anything to be guided by, it appears that it is unlikely that a court would 
                                                 
1054  Lawrence et al v Texas 539 U. S. 558 (2003)  at 559. 
1055  Ibid at 560. 
1056  Hunter N D ―Living With Lawrence‖ 2010 Georgetown Law Faculty Publications  1103. 
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review and overrule its own earlier decisions in a short interval.  Several 
years would have to pass.  As regards the two cases, seventeen years 
passed.   
 
With regard to the generation of judges composing the Bench, it appears 
that the Bench would have to be composed differently for any overruling 
to take place.  In the case of Bowers v Hardwick and Lawrence v Texas, 
the Court was composed differently almost entirely, with the exception of 
one judge who was part of the majority in the earlier decision, and part of 
the majority in the later decision.1057 
 
Since the the doctrine of stare decisis should result in consistency in the 
decisions arrived at by courts, it is necessary, for purposes of this 
discussion, to look at the factors which persuaded the Court to deviate 
from its previous reasoning on an analogous matter. 
 
In overturning its decision in Bowers v Hardwick, the Supreme Court of 
the United States was influenced to a large extent by the developments in 
its jurisdiction since its earlier decision.1058  Among other things, it had 
taken note of the changed attitude of law enforcement authorities in 
                                                 
1057  In Bowers v Hardwick, the judges of the majority decision were:  Kennedy, Stevens, Souter,  
       Ginsburg, Breyer JJ, with O‘Connor J concurring.  In Lawrence v Texas, the judges of the  
       majority decision were:  White, Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist JJ. The only judge who was a  
       member of the Bench in the majority judgment in Bowers v Hardwick, but who was also a  
       member of the Bench in a later case when the earlier case was overturned was O‘Connor J. 
1058  Lawrence et al v Texas 539 U. S. 558 (2003)  at 559. 
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bringing to justice men who had committed sodomy.  There had been a 
steady decrease of cases brought before courts for homosexual acts.   
 
The attitude of law enforcement authorities can hardly be separated from 
that of society at large.  If law enforcement authorities had begun to view 
homosexuality with understanding, this was most likely how society 
viewed homosexuality. 
 
Another factor which persuaded the Supreme Court to abandon its earlier 
holding was, noticeably, the deteriorating moral values over the years. 
For example, in Grisworld v Connecticut,1059 the Court was faced with the 
issue of abortion, where some state laws prohibited the use of drugs for 
contraception.  The Court invalidated  such laws.  The Court found that 
what one does in the privacy of one‘s home in the matter of 
contraception falls under the right to privacy, and the prohibition of 
contraception by state laws was an unconstitutional infringement of the 
right to privacy.  Significantly, this right was protected among married 
couples who decided to control birth by using contraceptive drugs.  The 
Court felt that the marital bedroom was a protected space.1060  
 
There was a further development along this line.  Since the use of 
contraceptives was legally the privilege of those who were in a marriage 
                                                 
1059  Grisworld v Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
1060  Grisworld v Connecticut 381 U. S. 479 (1965) at 565. 
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relationship, it remained to be seen for how long this protection would 
continue to apply in a discriminatory manner.  
 
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v Baird,1061  in a decision further reflecting 
the deteriorating trend of moral values, the Supreme Court of the United 
States relaxed its decision in Grisworld v Connecticut 1062 by invalidating 
a law which prohibited the distribution of contraceptives among 
unmarried persons.  It thus allowed unmarried persons to take 
advantage, within the protection of the law, of birth control measures 
previously available only to married couples.  The Court expressed its 
view in the following words: 
 
     It is true that in Grisworld the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship  
       … If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to  
       be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a  
       person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.1063 
 
The trend observed by the Court which resulted in it abandoning its 
earlier decision included the fact that the Grisworld  and Eisenstadt 
decisions were part of the background for the decision in Roe v Wade,1064 
which invalidated laws prohibiting abortion.  Commenting on the case of 
                                                 
1061  Eisenstadt v Baird  405 U. S. 438 (1972). 
1062  Grisworld v Connecticut  381 U. S. 479 (1965). 
1063  Eisenstadt v Baird  405 U. S. 438 (1972) at 453. 
1064  Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Roe v Wade, Church et al 1065 refer to pro-choice and pro-life groups who 
have failed to provide a way out of the abortion dilemma.  The authors 
further mention that the emotionally charged environment of the abortion 
debate and the radical divisions caused by it have also provided fertile 
ground for the mushrooming of Hollywood jurisprudence,1066 which is 
not necessary to delve into for purposes of this discussion. 
 
A further deterioration of moral values was observed by the Court.  It will 
be recalled that the distribution of contraceptives was originally limited to 
married couples, but the Court subsequently deemed it necessary, based 
on the claim to equality, to extend the legal use of contraceptives to 
unmarried persons.  As if this was not enough, the Court deemed it 
necessary to further relax the restrictions on contraceptives.  The law had 
limited the legal use of contraceptives to persons aged 16 and older.  The 
Court, in Carey v Population Services,1067 was faced with a New York law 
forbidding the sale or distribution of contraceptives to persons under the 
age of 16.  The Court relaxed the age restriction by invalidating the law. 
 
                                                 
1065  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
       Perspective  (2007) at 277. 
1066  Church J Schulze C Strydom H Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law  
       Perspective (2007) at 277. 
1067  Carey v Population Services Int‘l  431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
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Thus, the trend of developments over many years were the main factor in 
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to overturn its 
own earlier decision on male homosexuality.  
 
Whether a court of law should allow itself to be influenced by academic 
writing on a judgment it has already delivered, is a debatable question.  
On the one hand, it may be argued that, indeed, academic writers are law 
scholars who may open the judges‘ eyes to a mistake of law they may 
have overlooked, or treated lightly.  On the other hand, it may be argued 
that judges only need to focus their attention on their own research, and 
decide matters according to their own informed interpretation of the law 
and the Constitution.  If it is accepted that courts should allow 
themselves to be influenced by academic writing, obviously such 
influence cannot be of immediate assistance to a judge in connection 
with the matter that a judge is seized with, since academics will not know 
that a judge will make a mistake of law in the matter before him or her 
until a mistake has actually been made.  Academics will only express their 
views in law journals after a mistake has been made.  Their views will only 
be of assistance to the judge in future cases which are similar to the one 
in which a mistake was made.  On the other hand, if academics were to 
express an opinion, perhaps through the media, on a matter that is 
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serving before a judge, that could amount to contempt of court ex facie 
curiae.1068  
 
 The Constitutional Court of South Africa has already pronounced itself in 
S v Mamabolo (E TV and others intervening)1069 on the constitutionality of 
the crime of contempt of court ex facie curiae in the form of scandalising 
the court.  In this case, the appellant had been convicted by a High Court 
of contempt of court in the form of scandalising the court in that, as 
spokesperson of the Department of Correctional Services, he had caused 
to be published in a newspaper article his view that the judge had erred 
in refusing bail to a detained person.  The learned judge read the 
criticising newspaper report, and later the same day issued an order to 
the effect that the appellant, together with other officers of the 
government department, appear before him to explain whether they had 
indeed said what was reflected in the newspaper report, and if so, to 
explain on what basis the judge had erred, and ―what right they had to 
cause to be published in the newspapers that a Judge had erred if they 
had no grounds for such a statement‖.1070       
 
The first issue to be determined by the Constitutional Court was whether 
the crime of contempt of court in the form of scandalising the court was  
                                                 
1068   Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law  (2008) 3rd ed at 949; Milton J L R South African Criminal  
        Law and Procedure (1996) 3rd ed at 177. 
1069  S v Mamabolo (E TV and others intervening)  2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at 433-434.  
1070  S v Mamabolo (E TV and others intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at 416H-I. 
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constitutional since it had the effect of encroaching on the right to 
freedom of expression in terms of section 16 of the Constitution.  The 
Court found1071 that the right to freedom of expression is not a pre-
eminent freedom ranking above all others.  The right itself,1072  was the 
Court‘s finding, is carefully worded, enumerating specific instances of the 
freedom, and is immediately followed by a number of material limitations 
in the succeeding subsection.  Further, the Constitution, in its opening 
statement,1073  and repeatedly thereafter,1074 proclaims three conjoined, 
reciprocal and covalent values to be foundational to the Republic, namely,  
human dignity, equality and freedom.  The Court found1075 that the right 
to freedom of expression cannot be said automatically to trump the right 
to human dignity, and that the offence of scandalising the court brings 
the administration of justice into disrepute.1076  It would seem, therefore, 
that any influence on courts‘ judgments should be exercised with 
caution. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the Court in Carey v Population Services 
                                                 
1071  S v  Mamabolo (E TV and others intervening)  2001 (3) SA 409 at 430E-431A. 
1072  Entrenched in section 16 of the Constitution. 
1073  Section 1 of the Constitution reads as follows:   
       ―The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following  
        values: 
(a)  Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms‖. 
1074  See sections 7(1), 9, 10, 12, 36(1) and 39(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
1075  S v Mamabolo (E TV and others intervening)  2001 (3) SA 409 at 431A. 
1076  S v Mamabolo (E TV and others intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 at 432B. 
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 Int‘l 1077 also excused male homosexual conduct, in violation of its own 
precedent, by reasoning that the case it was dealing with did not involve 
minors.  It did not involve persons who might be injured, or coerced, or 
who were situated in relationships where it would be difficult to refuse to 
consent.  Nor did it involve public conduct or prostitution.  It involved two 
adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices 
common to a homosexual lifestyle.  The Court held the view that the 
litigants were entitled to respect for their private lives, and that their right 
to liberty under the Due Process Clause1078 gave them the full right to 
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.1079  In its 
decision the Court relied on its finding in the Casey  case,1080 where it 
had  held, in connection with abortion, that:  ―It is a promise of the 
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the 
government may not enter‖.1081 
 
The reasoning of the Court in this manner leaves a question unanswered 
as to why, if homosexual acts enjoy constitutional protection, the Court 
has not come to the defence of women in the prostitution industry.  
Prostitution remains illegal in the states of the United States but one, 
                                                 
1077  Carey v Population Services Int‘l  431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
1078  The Due Process Clause is derived from the Fifth Amendment of the United States  
       Constitution  which provides that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without  
       the due process of law.  Due process means that certain established legal procedures must be  
       followed because a particular action can be taken. 
1079  Carey v Population Services Int‘l  431 U. S. 678  (1977) at 578. 
1080  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). 
1081  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) at 847. 
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Nevada.  This is the position despite the fact that each state has the 
power to decide what to do with prostitution within its area. 
 
In a sensitive matter such as this one, of disturbing what has become 
settled law by overturning an earlier decision, it would be a miracle if the 
Court had become unanimous.  As would be expected, some judges 
dissented.  The dissenting judges knew and accepted that it is within the 
discretion of any court of final instance to overrule its own earlier 
decision if the decision was manifestly wrong.  They stated that they also 
do not believe in rigid adherence to stare decisis in constitutional 
matters, but that they believe they should be consistent rather than 
manipulative in invoking the doctrine.1082   
 
The dissenting judges found it disturbing that Bowers v Hardwick  1083 
was being overruled simply on frivolous reasons such as that the decision 
had attracted a lot of criticism, had been eroded by subsequent decision, 
and had not induced ―individual or societal reliance‖ that counselled 
against overturning‖.1084 
 
At this juncture, it is necessary to highlight, though, that there is a 
difference between the Constitution of South Africa and the Constitution 
                                                 
1082  Lawrence et al v Texas  539 U. S. 558 (2003) at 559. 
1083  Bowers v Hardwick  478 U. S. 186 (1986). 
1084  Lawrence et al v Texas 539 U. S. 558  (2003) at 587.   
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of the United States.  The Constitution of South Africa specifically 
provides that no one may be discriminated against on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  That would extend protection to persons whose sexual 
inclinations are considered as falling short of being natural. 
 
By comparison, though, the Constitution of the United States is silent on 
sexual orientation.  It is silent also on matters such as abortion, which is 
also carried out of the public eye.  The Constitution of South Africa does 
not mention abortion by name either, but comes close to it by providing, 
at least, that everyone has the right ―to make decisions concerning 
reproduction‖.1085 
 
In deciding in favour of abortion, an act that, like sodomy and incest, is 
carried out in private, the United States Supreme Court had to rely on a  
right which is also not named by the Constitution of the United States, 
privacy, but had to be inferred from the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth 
Amendments.   
 
In rejecting its citizen‘s application for the right to practice sodomy, in 
Bowers v Hardwick,1086 the Supreme Court emphasised that ―in 
constitutional terms there is no such thing as a fundamental right to 
                                                 
1085  Section 12(2)(a)  of the Constitution. 
1086  Bowers v Hardwick  478 U. S. 186 (1986). 
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commit homosexual sodomy‖.1087  Indeed, there was no such 
fundamental right.  But the inconsistency of the Court‘s finding was that, 
in terms of the Constitution of the United States as it stands, there was 
no constitutional right either to abort.  The Court had to countenance 
abortion by reading into the Constitution what was not drafted by the 
drafters.  It is hard to understand the reason why the Court could not 
interpret generously and purposively any of the constitutional provisions 
in a way that would accommodate sodomy as a practice that should enjoy 
privacy without interference by the state. 
 
If the reasoning of the Court was that there is a difference between 
abortion and sodomy in that sodomy is against the boni mores of a large 
portion of society, so is abortion. 
 
Then, there is the question of morality with regard to practices which are 
claimed to be constitutional rights.  The question arises as to whose 
moral standards should guide courts and society at large.  There is 
society, there is a Constitution, and there are courts.  All these entities 
may differ when it comes to moral standards.  What makes the issue 
more entangled is the fact that in a democratic society, society as a whole 
does not speak.  But society speaks through elected leaders who 
constitute a legislature.  Just as members of society as an entity do not all 
                                                 
1087  Bowers v Hardwick 478 U. S. 186 (1986) at 5. 
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share the same moral values, the elected representatives of society in the 
legislature do not all share the same moral principles. 
 
Members of a court may also be from different backgrounds, and may 
have different beliefs, convictions based on conscience, and divergent 
religious views. 
 
Thus, in adjudicating matters which are controversial, courts have the 
difficulty of whose moral values to be guided by.  This difficulty loomed 
prominently in the sodomy case of Bowers v Hardwick1088 before the 
United States Supreme Court.  The Constitutional Court of South Africa 
was also faced with the problem.   
 
In dealing with sodomy, the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that 
―a state that recognises difference does not mean a state without morality 
or one without a point of view.  It does not banish concepts of right and 
wrong, nor envisage a world without good and evil.‖1089  Referring to the 
role of the Constitution in the matter, the Court held that ―the 
Constitution certainly does not debar the state from enforcing 
morality‖.1090 
 
                                                 
1088  Bowers v Hardwick  478 U. U. 186 (1986). 
1089  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others   
       1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at par.136. 
1090  Ibid. 
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The view that ―the Constitution certainly does not debar the state from 
enforcing morality‖ amounts to closing one‘s eyes to reality.  It is the 
state that enacted section 20A of the Sexual Offences Act.  The Act 
proscribed acts of homosexuality between men, in particular sodomy.  
The Act provided a sanction to follow upon conviction.  It is the 
Constitution that provides that no one may be discriminated against on 
the basis of his or her sexual orientation.  Without a doubt, the two laws, 
the statute and the Constitution, are in conflict.  Adding to the conflict 
are the views of society.  As pointed out, the Constitution was brought 
into existence by society through its elected representatives, the 
Constitutional Assembly, and the impugned statute was enacted by 
representatives of society, the legislature.  Notwithstanding the fact that 
both entities are representatives of the same society, the products 
produced by the two entities, and indeed, by the same society, are in 
conflict.   
 
In a democratic state, the voice of the majority determines how the 
country should be governed.  In an election, once the results of an 
election have been officially made known and accepted, the minority 
citizens have to accept the results and adapt to, and learn to live with, the 
will of the majority.  Whenever this should be the position in matters of 
morality, problems arise.   
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The judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the sodomy 
case of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 1091 suggests that 
the Constitution is the final arbiter in matters of morality.  The Court, per 
Sachs J, held that ―what is central to the character and functioning of the 
state, however, is that the dictates of the morality which it enforces, and 
the limits to which it may go, are to be found in the text and spirit of the 
Constitution itself‖.1092 
 
The view of the Court that moral standards are to be set by the 
Constitution is what causes a great deal of dissatisfaction in society.  This 
is because the Constitution is a document compiled by politicians, and  
politicians are from all walks of life.  On the other hand, if religion were 
to be allowed to be the final arbiter of moral issues, there would still be a 
problem, since religions are also diverse, and so are their beliefs. 
 
It is submitted that after all sources of views have been considered, 
whether constitutional, religious, or legal, the reality of the situation 
under consideration should be the main consideration.  In the case of 
sodomy, the reality of the situation is that medical evidence, as discussed 
earlier in this Chapter,1093 shows the practice to be harmful to both 
                                                 
1091  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
       1999 (1) SA (6) (CC). 
1092  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
       1999 (1) SA (6) (CC) at par. 136. 
1093  Under the subheading ―Without harming one another‖, pages 359-364. 
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participants, willing and mutually consenting though they may be.  As a 
matter of fact, this approach has already been adopted by the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa in a matter where it found that 
medical considerations weigh more heavily than a constitutional right. 
 
This challenge where health or medical considerations weighed more 
heavily came before Court in the case of Prince v President of the Law 
Society and Others.1094   Prince, the appellant, was a candidate attorney 
who was a Rastafarian by religion and, as such, contended that by virtue 
of section 15 of the Constitution,1095 he was constitutionally entitled to 
possession, and consumption, of cannabis,1096 and that a statutory1097 
prohibition proscribing possession and consumption of cannabis is 
unconstitutional, as it violates his constitutional right to exercise his 
religion freely.  He contended that cannabis was part of the Rastafarian 
religion.  Although section 15 of the Constitution deals with freedom of 
religion, it is section 31(1), by virtue of its wording, that adds more 
weight to the right, by providing: 
 
      ―Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the  
                                                 
1094  Prince v President of the Cape Law Society and Others  2002 (2) SA 794 (CC). 
1095  The interim Constitution was used at that time.  The relevant section in the interim  
       Constitution was section 13.  The final Constitution is being used here for convenience.  
       Section 15(1) of the final Constitution provides: 
       ―(1)  Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion‖. 
1096  Commonly known as dagga. 
1097  Section 4 (b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, and section 22A of the  
       Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965. 
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      right, with other members of that community (a)  to enjoy their culture, practice their religion 
      . . . and (b)  to form, join and maintain . . . religious . . . associations and other organs of  
      civil society‖.1098 
 
The Court accepted that Rastafarianism is a religion, and that the 
impugned legislation proscribing possession and use of cannabis 
infringed on the religious practices of the Rastafarians.  The question the 
Court had to determine was whether this infringement was justifiable 
under the limitation of rights as provided for by section 36 of the 
Constitution.   
 
It is appropriate at this juncture, for purposes of drawing comparisons in 
the adjudication of this matter and that of the sodomy matter in the 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 1099 case, both matters 
having being heard and decided by the same Court, to have regard to the 
appellant‘s evidence in the form of his affidavit.  The appellant stated that 
the casual or recreational use of cannabis is condemned by true 
Rastafarians, that true Rastafarians use cannabis for religious purposes 
only.1100 
 
The appellant described his own use of cannabis as being for the 
performance of the rituals prescribed by his religion according to the 
                                                 
1098  emphasis added. 
1099  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
       1999 (1) SA (6) (CC). 
1100  Prince v President of the Cape Law Society and Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at par 99. 
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tenets of his religion.  He stated that he observed religious ceremonies 
and other gatherings.  One such ceremony was the Nyabinghi, which, 
according to the appellant, is similar to a church service.  The appellant 
emphasised that at these occasions, cannabis is used as a symbol, by 
either burning it as an incense or smoking it.  The object of using 
cannabis at these gatherings, stated the appellant, is to create unity and 
to assist them in re-establishing their eternal relationship with their 
creator.1101 
 
The inconsistency of the Court in its interpretation becomes glaringly 
apparent if one considers the Court‘s view of the consumption of 
cannabis, and comparing this view with the Court‘s view of sodomy.  In 
dealing with the constitutional challenge of possessing and making use 
of cannabis, the Court held that in a democratic society the legislature 
has the power and, where appropriate, the duty to enact legislation 
prohibiting conduct ―considered by it to be anti-social and, where 
necessary, to enforce that prohibition by criminal sanctions‖.1102 
 
The Court outspokenly expressed recognition of the fact that the 
smoking of cannabis is ―anti-social‖.  In other words, the Court 
acknowledged that the legislature, as representatives of society, has the 
                                                 
1101  Prince v President of the Cape Law Society and Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at par. 99. 
1102 Prince v President of the Cape Law Society and Others  2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at par. 108  
      [emphasis added]. 
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power to determine what kind of conduct is ―anti-social‖.  Having 
identified such, it has the duty not to wink at such conduct, but to enact 
and enforce laws prohibiting such conduct, and to mete out punishment 
to transgressors.   
   
What should especially be borne in mind is that the type of conduct under 
consideration here is conduct which, depending on the interpretation of 
the Constitution, is countenanced by the text of the Constitution on 
religious grounds. 
 
On the other hand, we have sodomy which was also found by the 
legislature, as representatives of society, to be ―anti-social‖ conduct.  In 
view of its being ―anti-social‖, the legislature did what was expected of it.  
It exercised its power and discharged its duty to enact legislation 
prohibiting sodomy.   Like the possession and consumption of cannabis, 
sodomy is conduct which may escape criminal sanctions on constitutional 
grounds, since no one may be discriminated against on the basis of his or 
her sexual orientation.   
 
Both types of conduct are detrimental to health.  The only difference 
between the two is that the detrimental effect on health of the 
consumption of cannabis has been acknowledged by the legislature, and 
as a result, law has been enacted by the legislature to combat its 
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consumption.1103  On the other hand, it is probably the immorality aspect 
of sodomy that led to its criminalisation by the legislature,1104 as opposed 
to its dangerous effect on health. However, the detrimental effect the 
practice of sodomy has on health is known in the medical fraternity.  
However, such effect has not as yet been brought to the attention of 
courts, although it is generally accepted that it is against nature. 1105  
 
Both types of conduct, though they may be constitutionally excusable, 
they are both subject to limitation in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution.  The one type of conduct is allowed to pass the limitation 
scrutiny, and the other is not allowed.  The prohibition of both types of 
conduct serves a legitimate governmental purpose. 
 
In the sodomy challenge, the Court finds in favour of homosexual men, 
that they are a minority, and as such, it is impossible for them to exercise 
political power which will result in them having a piece of legislation 
decriminalising sodomy.1106  Interestingly, the Court acknowledges the 
same fact with regard to Rastafarians, that they are a small and 
marginalised group and, obviously like homosexuals, are unable to wield 
political authority over the majority to have legislation in their 
                                                 
1103  Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. 
1104  Section 20aA of the Sexual Offences Act of 1957. 
1105  Lawrence et al v Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003) at 568. 
1106  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  
       1999 (1) SA (6) (CC) at par. 25. 
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support.1107 Notwithstanding these striking analogies, though, the Court 
had little or no regard for its own precedent.  It is for this reason that 
Meyerson1108 feels that when comparing the pragmatic approach of the 
Constitutional Court in different cases, ―it is difficult to avoid the 
impression that the Bill of Rights is being applied selectively‖.1109 
 
7.6.1  The position in Canadian law 
 
The Canadian law does deal with sodomy, but from a different angle.  The 
challenge to laws pertaining to sodomy was not based on the right to 
privacy.  Therefore, the case dealing with sodomy, Egan v Canada,1110 is 
of little assistance for purposes of this Chapter, save to say that the 
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada of a right relating to 
homosexuality leaves much to be desired.   
 
Appellants were homosexuals who had lived together since 1948 in a 
relationship marked by commitment and interdependence similar to the 
commitment and interdependence one would expect to find in a 
heterosexual marriage. When one partner reached the age of 65, he 
began to receive old age security income from the state in terms of the 
                                                 
1107  Prince v President of the Cape Law Society and Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) at par. 112. 
1108  Meyerson D  ―Does the Constitutional Court of South Africa take rights seriously?  The case of  
       S v Jordan‖ 2004  Acta Juridica  154. 
1109  Ibid. 
1110  Egan v Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
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Old Age Security Act.1111  Upon reaching the age of 60, the other partner 
also applied for a spousal maintenance in terms of 19(1) of the Act.1112 
His application was rejected on the basis that the relationship between 
the two did not fall within the definition of ―spouse‖ in section 2 of the 
Act.  Section 2, as it was, defined ―spouse‖ as ―a person of the opposite 
sex who is living with that person, having lived with that person for at 
least one year, if the two persons have publicly represented themselves 
as husband and wife‖.1113 
 
The crucial part of this matter is the action that was brought by the 
couple to the Federal Court seeking a declaration that the definition 
contravened section 15(1)1114 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1115 
in that it discriminated on the grounds of sexual orientation.1116 
                                                 
1111  Old Age Security Act of 1985. 
1112  Section 19(1) of the Old Age Security Act, as it then was, prior to the challenge, provided: 
       ―Subject to this Act and the regulations, for each month in any fiscal year, a spouse‘s  
       allowance may be paid to the spouse of a pensioner if the spouse 
(a)  is not separated from the pensioner; 
(b)  has attained sixty years of age but has not attained sixty-five years of age; and 
(c) has resided in Canada after attaining eighteen years of age and prior to the day on 
which the spouse‘s application is approved for an aggregate period of at least ten years 
and, where that aggregate period is less than twenty years, was resident in Canada on 
the day preceding the day on which the spouse‘s application is approved. 
1113  emphasis added. 
1114  Section 15(1) and (2) of the Canadian Charter of Freedoms and Rights provides: 
      ―(1)  Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal  
             protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without  
             discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex age or mental  
             or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prelude any law, program or activity that has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are 
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From the provisions of section 15(1) and (2) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, as reproduced in the footnote, it is evident that the 
section relied on by the couple enumerates the grounds on which 
discrimination is prohibited.  It is evident that ―sexual orientation‖ is not 
listed as one of those grounds. 
 
It is submitted that it amounts to misleading the court to argue before it 
for relief that is not constitutionally based.  It is submitted further that it 
is ultra vires for a court, in its eager and zealous endeavour to grant relief 
to a litigant, to read into the text of a Constitution a right, or a basis of a 
right, which was not included by the drafters.  The litigants in this matter 
could base their argument on any ground but sexual orientation. 
 
The Supreme Court, in its endeavour to afford the litigants relief based on 
―sexual orientation‖ as a ground of discrimination, stretched the 
provisions of the impugned Act too far when it held that ―the distinction 
in the Act is based on a personal characteristic, namely sexual 
orientation.  Sexual orientation is analogous to the grounds of 
discrimination enumerated in s. 15(1) ‖.1117 
                                                                                                                                                 
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability‖.  
1115  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982. 
1116  Egan v Canada  [1995] 2 S. C. R. 513 at 514. 
1117  Egan v Canada [1995] 2 S. C. R. 513 at 520 [emphasis added]. 
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If, by ―analogous‖, the Court had in mind that sexual orientation is 
analogous to ―sex‖ as a ground enumerated by section 15(1), this too 
would be an error on the part of the Court.  It has been shown in this 
Chapter that there is a distinction between ―gender‖ and ―sex‖, as 
grounds on which discrimination is prohibited, enumerated under section 
9(3) of the South African Constitution.   
 
A court may read a word or words in into the text of an Act, to cure a 
defect which renders the Act unconstitutional.  It is submitted that a court 
may not do so in the text of a Constitution, as this would amount to 
rewriting the Constitution, a duty that falls outside its jurisdiction. 
 
Interestingly, it is the Constitution of a province, Quebec, that specifically 
lists ―sexual orientation‖ as a ground on which discrimination is 
prohibited.  The Constitution of the Republic of Canada is falling short in 
this regard.  Section 10 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms1118 provides: 
 
     Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his human rights and  
       freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or preference based on race, colour, sex, pregnancy,  
       sexual orientation, civil status, age except as provided by law, religion, political convictions,  
       language, ethnic or national origin, social condition, a handicap or the use of any means to  
                                                 
1118  Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, which came into effect in 1976 
http://www.cdpdj.qc.ca/en/commun/docs/charter.pdf  (accessed: 2011/08/11). 
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       palliate a handicap.1119 
 
Section 10(1) concludes by providing:   
 
      No one may harass a person on the basis of any ground mentioned in section 10. 
 
The inclusion of ―sexual orientation‖ in the provincial Constitution of 
Quebec makes it clear that ―sexual orientation‖ could not be read into the 
text of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that the Court 
misguided itself in doing so. 
 
Accordingly, the Old Age Security Act was constitutional, since it could 
not be challenged on the basis of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, since the Charter is silent on sexual orientation. 
 
As in South Africa, closely related to homosexual sodomy, is prostitution, 
in view of the claim that these should enjoy the privacy that the 
Constitution guarantees.  In Canada, prostitution is not illegal.  However, 
the Criminal Code of Canada has contained provisions which have the 
effect of directly or indirectly criminalising prostitution.1120  The 
                                                 
1119  emphasis added. 
1120  Section 193 of the Criminal Code of Canada provides: 
(1) ―Everyone who keeps a common bawdy-house is guilty of an indictable offence and is   
 liable to imprisonment for two years. 
(2)  Everyone who 
(a) is an inmate of a common bawdy-house,  
(b) is found, without lawful excuse, in a common bawdy-house, or 
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provisions concerned make it a crime to keep a brothel, referred to in the 
statute as a bawdy-house.  They also make it a crime to be inside a 
brother without lawful excuse.  Further, it is a crime, in terms of the 
statutory provisions, to hinder the free flow of traffic, or even of 
pedestrians on a public place.  Contravention of these provisions lead to 
summary conviction and imprisonment. 
 
It was, consequently, contended that these sections run counter to the 
provisions of section 71121 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms which entrenches the right to liberty and security of the 
person.  It had been submitted on behalf of women in the prostitution 
industry that the statutory provision being challenged also had the effect 
of infringing on the right to freedom of association, and that this right 
                                                                                                                                                 
(c) as owner, landlord, lessor, tenant, occupier, agent or otherwise having charge or 
control of any place, knowingly permits the place or any part thereof to be let or used 
for the purpose of a common bawdy-house, 
is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
       Section 195 provides: 
           ―(1)  Every person who in a public place or in any place open to public view 
(a) stops or attempts to stop any motor vehicle, 
(b) impedes the free flow of pedestrian or vehicular traffic or ingress to or egress from 
premises adjacent to that place, or 
(c) stops or attempts to stop any person or in any manner communicates or attempts 
to communicate with any person for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or of 
obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute is guilty of an offence punishable on 
summary conviction. 
(2 )  In this section, ―public place‖ includes any place to which the public have access as of  
       right or by invitation, express or implied, and any motor vehicle located in a public  
       place or in any place open to public view‖. 
1121  Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides: 
      ―Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be  
       deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice‖. 
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shields adult intimate relationships from government control.  Decisions 
about whom or how to court, love, cohabit, marry, experience sexuality, 
are matters to be regulated by individual private conscience. 
 
The objective of sections 193 and 195 of the Criminal Code of Canada 
was to curb the nuisance caused by the soliciting done by prostitutes on 
the streets and public places in general.  The legislature felt that the 
soliciting caused unnecessary hindrance to the free flow of pedestrian 
movement and vehicular traffic. 
 
However, in its legislative attempt to accomplish this objective, the 
legislature went too far.  It intruded into private premises and, from the 
reading of the two sections, it becomes abundantly that the legislature 
sought to make prostitution itself punishable.   
 
It is submitted that such a legislative measure is constitutionally ultra 
vires.  Among other things, it strikes at a very basic constitutional right — 
freedom of association, and freedom of expression.1122  No citizen may 
be policed as to whom he or she associates with, and as to the content of 
his or her expressions.  Further, the sections of the Criminal Code can be 
described  as unenforceable, since it is not easy for law enforcement 
officers to know the content of a conversation taking place between two 
                                                 
1122  Section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
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individuals, whether the individuals are in a public or private place.  Any 
attempt to intercept a conversation would fly in the face of constitutional 
guarantees. 
 
As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court of Canada had earlier committed 
itself to treating the privacy of people in its jurisdiction with the respect 
that it deserves.  In Hunter v Southam,1123 this Court had recognised the 
significance of the right to privacy, as a ―right to be let alone by other 
people‖.1124  It must be mentioned that this was the holding of the Court 
notwithstanding the fact the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
like the United States Bill of Rights, contains no right to privacy in its text.  
The right to privacy is something that Canadian Courts and the United 
States Courts read into the Constitution. 
 
In this particular case of statutory provisions which hit at prostitution, the 
Supreme Court of Canada avoided the issue of privacy.  It chose instead 
to deal with the impugned legislative provision on other aspects of the 
Charter.   The Court held, for instance, that section 193 of the Criminal 
Code, prohibiting the keeping of a brothel, was not unconstitutional.  Nor 
was the prohibition of the presence of anyone who was in a brothel, or 
was found therein without lawful cause, unconstitutional.   
 
                                                 
1123  Hunter v Southam  [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
1124  Hunter v Southam   [1984] 2 S. C. R. 145 , at 161 –162. 
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It was held further by the Court that section 195(1)(c), which made it a 
crime to stop a motor vehicle, or to attempt to do so, or to impede the 
free flow of  traffic and of pedestrians, for the purpose of obtaining 
sexual services, was not unconstitutional.  This had the effect that women 
who approached men on pavements to solicit for commercial sex were 
doing so in contravention of the law, and risking being arrested. 
 
In effect, the statutory law in Canada left the position unclear as to 
whether the act of selling sex itself was illegal, as the legislature 
regulated activities which are only peripheral to the act of prostitution. 
 
7.6.2   In international law 
 
The Constitution of South Africa enjoins courts to consider public 
international law.  They have the discretion to consider foreign law.  
Although they are not obliged by the Constitution to follow international 
law, they are nevertheless obliged to have regard thereto.1125  
International law may assist a court in its reasoning where a similar issue 
has been dealt with by a court of international status, and such reasoning 
may serve as a persuasive guideline. 
 
                                                 
1125  Section 39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution. 
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It is also enlightening to examine how a court of international status 
views its own judicial precedent.  Consequently, it is of interest to see 
whether a court of international status is consistent in its interpretation 
of international instruments. 
 
The right to privacy with regard to sexuality was dealt with by the 
European Court of Human Rights in X v Federal Republic of Germany.1126  
The Court recognised that sexual life forms an important part of a 
person‘s private life.1127  This, logically, conveys the understanding that 
whatever one does in the area of sexuality in one‘s privacy falls outside 
the area of operation of the state.   
 
However, whether the Court would be consistent in its interpretation 
would be tested in a later case involving male homosexuality, Dudgeon v 
United Kingdom,1128 wherein reliance was placed on the right to 
privacy1129 entrenched in the European Convention on Human Rights.1130  
Article 8 of the Convention provides: 
 
      (1)  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his  
            correspondence.   
                                                 
1126  X v Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook XIX (1976) 277; See van Dijk P and van Hoof G J H  
       Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 2nd ed (1990) at 373. 
1127  X v Federal Republic of Germany, Yearbook XIX (1976) 277  at 277. 
1128  Dudgeon v United Kingdom 7525/76 [1981] ECHR 5. 
1129  Sieghart P The International Law of Human Rights  (1983) 313. 
1130  European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1953 (hereinafter  
       referred to as ―the Convention‖. 
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     (2)  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except  
           such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the  
           interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for  
           the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the  
           protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
The applicant in the European Court of Human Rights was a 35-year-old 
homosexual, who had been consciously homosexual from the age of 14, 
and was aggrieved by the Northern Ireland laws1131 which effectively 
criminalised certain homosexual acts between consenting male adults.  In 
terms of these laws, consent was no defence, and age was not a factor 
taken into account by the relevant sections.  For some time, he and 
others had been conducting a campaign aimed at bringing the law in 
Northern Ireland into line with the law in England and Wales and, if 
possible, achieving a minimum age of consent lower than 21 years.1132 He 
contended before the European Court of Human Rights that the existence 
of these law constituted an unjustified interference with his right to have 
his privacy respected, in breach of article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
The government of Northern Ireland defended its law by arguing that the 
law relating to homosexual acts is not inconsistent with article 8, as it 
serves a legitimate purpose, and in fact was necessary, to protect morals 
                                                 
1131  Section 61 and 62 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 (the two sections have  
       since been repealed). 
1132  Dudgeon v United Kingdom 7525/76 [1981] ECHR 5at par. 32. 
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and the rights of others.  It was for this reason that the drafters of the 
Convention had added sub-article (2) which provided that there would be 
no interference with one‘s privacy by the state authorities, unless this was 
necessary, in terms of the law, to protect health and morals, and the 
rights of others. 
 
Thus, the reading of article 8 makes it clear that the right to have one‘s 
privacy respected is subject to some considerations, and therefore the 
right is not absolute.  It is submitted that no court may change this.  If 
the text of a constitution, or of an instrument, qualifies a right, the 
qualification of a right by the drafters places it outside the jurisdiction of 
a court to interpret the provision as if it is absolute. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that there could be 
no denial that some degree of regulation of male homosexual conduct 
was necessary by means of criminal law, in a democratic society.  It is of 
significance that the Court acknowledged the necessity of some 
regulation even in cases of consensual acts committed in private, in order 
―to provide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and corruption of 
others, particularly those who are particularly vulnerable because they are 
young, weak in body, inexperienced, or in a state of special physical, 
official or economic independence‖.1133 
                                                 
1133 Dudgeon v United Kingdom 7525/76 [1981] ECHR 5 at par. 49.   
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Notwithstanding this candid acknowledgement, however, the Court 
decided that it was not concerned with making value judgment as to the 
morality of homosexual relations between adult males. 
 
It is submitted further, that a court, in interpreting rights, ought not to 
take judicial notice of how morals have evolved or degenerated in society 
over a period of time.  Perhaps the Court may be at liberty to do this 
whether there is no law enacted by the legislature, or where there is no 
specific guidance given in a constitution, or international instrument.  On 
the contrary, however, this is precisely what the European Court of 
Human Rights did.  The Court took judicial notice of the trend in society.  
It reasoned that as compared with the era when sections 61 and 62 of the 
Offences Against the Person Act1134 were enacted, there was now a better 
understanding and, consequently, an increased tolerance of homosexual 
behaviour, to the extent that in the great majority of member states of 
the Council of Europe, it was no longer considered to be necessary or 
appropriate to treat homosexual practices as conduct to which criminal 
law should be applied.1135   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
      See also  Burgess-Jackson K  ―Our millian Constitution:  The Supreme Court‘s repudiation of  
      immorality as a ground of criminal punishment‖  2004 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics &  
     Public Policy  Vol 18 407 (27 May 2004). 
1134  Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 (Ireland). 
1135  Dudgeon v United Kingdom 7525/76  [1981] ECHR 5 at par. 60. 
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In adopting this approach, the European Court of Human Rights reasoned 
in a manner similar to that of the United States Supreme Court in 
Lawrence  v Texas,1136 and in doing so both Courts have been 
inconsistent. 
 
It is submitted that a softened attitude of society towards a particular 
conduct which was made a criminal offence by the legislature, who are 
representatives of society, is no authority for any court of law to base its 
decision on the softened, or changed, attitude of society.  If the law still 
remains in the statute books, the duty of a court is to be guided by, and 
to apply, the law, despite the changed frame of mind of society towards 
conduct which is a crime.  The situation can be illustrated by a changed, 
or softened, attitude of society towards honesty.  As levels of integrity of 
society drop lower and lower over the years, and honesty is no longer 
viewed as a virtue, the question arises as to whether courts should now 
take that softened attitude of society into account, when dealing with 
cases of theft and fraud.  If the approach of the European Court of Human 
Rights is a principle to be guided by, courts would be expected to also 
adopt a softened attitude towards persons of accused of theft or fraud, 
and acquit them.  If they convict them, they would be expected to reflect 
the change in the attitude of society towards honesty, by passing lenient 
sentences.   
                                                 
1136  Lawrence et al v Texas  539 U. S. 558  (2003). 
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It is submitted that since the legislature represents society, it is the 
legislature that should formally and legally reflect the changed, or 
softened, attitude of society, by making necessary amendments to the 
law, or by repealing it.  Until such time, courts are bound by what is in 
the statute book. 
 
In the case at hand, the provision was not in the statute books, but in an 
international instrument.  The European Court of Human Rights was 
bound, it is submitted, by what appeared in the Convention, until such 
time that the member states deemed it necessary to amend the provision, 
or repeal it.   
 
For the European Court of Human Rights to adjudicate a matter in a way 
that is contrary to the provisions of the Convention, is tantamount to 
saying that it is not bound by the Convention.  This is similar to a 
constitutional court or supreme court of a country saying that it is not 
bound by the text of the constitution of its own country. 
 
On the other hand, the minority judgment is, by comparison, attune to 
the text of the Convention.  The minority judges approached their 
interpretation of article 8 of the Convention from the perspective of the 
majority.  It is the view of the minority that a democratic society is 
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governed by the rule of the majority.1137  The minority judgment finds it 
rather odd and perplexing to underestimate the necessity of keeping a 
statutory law which is in force for the protection of morals held in high 
esteem by the majority of people.   
 
There is also the question of morality.  It is generally known that 
homosexuality, though it may be countenanced by a constitution of a 
country, is the type of conduct which has to do with morality.  Courts are 
not the community, but they judge members of the community.  The 
question arises, therefore, whether courts are custodians of morality.  
The majority decision of the European Court of Human Rights had 
answered this question in the negative.  It held that ―the Court is not 
concerned with making any value judgment as to the morality of 
homosexual relations between adult males‖.1138 
 
It is submitted that if morality is not contained in the statute books, 
indeed, the Court may not take it upon itself to be the custodian of 
morality.  However, if morality is weaved in in a statutory provision, or in 
the text of a constitution, or in the text of a covenant, the Court is bound 
to be the custodian of morality, even if such morality applies in the 
private sphere of one‘s home. 
 
                                                 
1137  Dudgeon v United Kingdom  7525/76  [1981]  ECHR 5 at par. 3 of the minority judgment. 
1138  Dudgeon v United Kingdom 7525/76 [1981] ECHR 5 at par. 54. 
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In this regard, the text of article 8 of the Convention does contain a 
morality principle by providing that there will be no interference by the 
state in one‘s privacy unless it is necessary, in accordance with the law, 
―for the protection of health or morals‖.1139  The ―health‖ aspect of 
sodomy has already been dealt with earlier in this Chapter.1140  
Interestingly, of all international instruments, the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is the only instrument 
which covers morality and health. 
 
The inconsistency of the majority decision is pointed out by the minority 
highlighting the anomaly of decriminalising male homosexual conduct on 
the ground that it is protected by privacy, while there are other offences 
which may be committed in private, and pose no danger to the public, 
and yet remain punishable in terms of criminal law.  Such offences 
include euthanasia, the killing of another at his own request, suicide 
pacts, duelling, abortion, and incest between brother and sister.1141  
These are acts which could be done in private and without offence to 
others, and need not involve the corruption and exploitation of others.  
Yet, no one has ventured to suggest that they should be left outside the 
criminal law as matters of private morality. 
 
                                                 
1139  Sub-article (2) of article 8 of the Covenant. 
1140  Under the subheading ―Without harming one another‖, pages 359-364. 
1141 Dudgeon v United Kingdom 7525/76  [1981]  ECHR  5 at par. 9. 
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As for morality, it is an issue authorities cannot turn a blind eye to.  If 
they did, they would be deliberately choosing to close their eyes to 
reality.  The reality is that there are laws which are in place, whether by 
common law, or statute, because there was, and there continues to be, a 
need to regulate morality.  Cruelty to animals is illegal because of a moral 
condemnation of enjoyment derived from the infliction of pain on 
creatures which feelings.  Laws restricting gambling are mentioned by the 
minority judges as laws aimed at preventing the effect an addiction to 
gambling may have on the character of the gambler as a member of 
society.1142   
 
It becomes convincingly clear, therefore, that most laws were enacted, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, with the maintenance of good 
moral principles in mind. 
 
Before the European Court on Human Rights could decide on the case 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom,1143 it had to be guided by the 
recommendations of the Wolfenden Committee1144 on the matter of the 
privacy of male homosexual acts. 
 
In its report, the Wolfenden Committee stated: 
                                                 
1142  Dudgeon v United Kingdom 7525/76  [1981]  ECHR 5 at par. 10. 
1143  Dudgeon v United Kingdom  7525/76 [1981] ECHR 5. 
1144  The Wolfenden Committee was established in 1957.  It was set up for the  
       purpose of exploring legality and constitutionality of homosexuality and prostitution. 
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      There remains one additional counter-argument which we believe to be decisive, namely, the  
        importance which society and the law ought to give to individual freedom of choice in action  
        in matters of private morality.  Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society acting  
        through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, there must  
        remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the  
        law‘s business.  To say this is not to condone or encourage private immorality.1145  
 
It is clear that the proper interpretation of article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is one that 
takes into account the wording of the Convention.  The Convention 
expressly contains a proviso which, though privacy should not be 
interfered with by public authorities, allows it to be interfered with for the 
sake of health and morality.  It is submitted that the opinion of the 
dissenting judges in the case of Dudgeon v United Kingdom 1146 is in 
harmony with the wording of the Convention, and therefore correct. 
 
7.7  In search and seizure 
 
When it comes to the right of a citizen‘s privacy with regard to search and 
seizure, the Constitution of South Africa is direct to the point.1147  It 
                                                 
1145  Committee On Homosexual Offences And Prostitution, The Wolfenden Report  
       (Authorized Am. Ed., Stein & Day 1963) (1957) par. 61.  
       See also Backer L C ―Exposing the perversions of toleration:  The decriminalization of private  
      sexual conduct, the model penal code, and the oxymoron of liberal toleration‖ 1993 Florida  
       Law Review  755. 
1146  Dudgeon v United Kingdom  7525/76  [1981]  ECHR  5. 
1147  Section 14 of the Constitution provides: 
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renders unconstitutional actions or attempts to conduct a search of a 
person‘s body, or home.  Property is also beyond searching.  The concept 
―property‖ may be broad in its application, as it may refer to one‘s 
movable possessions, and one‘s immovable possessions.  However, 
―possessions‖ are also mentioned separately, and they may not be 
confiscated, or seized.  Finally, communications are sacrosanct.  They 
may not be intercepted.   
 
It is necessary to point out at this stage, that the wording of section 14 
indicates that the belongings that are protected by the right to privacy 
are not exhaustive.  This becomes clear from the use of the word 
―includes‖.  It is submitted that other interests may legitimately be the 
interests protected by section 14.  Privilege, for instance, or the so-called 
attorney-and-client privilege, or legal professional privilege, may rightly 
be brought under the wing of the broad right to privacy.1148   
 
Prior to the advent of the constitutional right to privacy, one‘s home was 
one‘s castle in name only.  The Criminal Procedure Act1149 gave wide 
powers to police to enter property, sometimes without a warrant and 
                                                                                                                                                 
       Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have— 
(a)  their person or home searched; 
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possession seized; or 
(d) the privacy of of their communications infringed. 
1148  More attention will be given to privilege towards the end of this Chapter. 
1149  The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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conduct a search, if it appeared, in the opinion of a police officer, that an 
item the possession whereof was illegal was inside a home, or 
premises.1150   
 
A police was authorised to enter, and search premises, without a warrant, 
and seize articles if he or she was of the view that if applied for, a warrant 
would be issued, but the delay in bringing such an application would 
defeat the purpose of the search.1151 
 
The reality is that these criminal procedural provisions have survived the 
advent of the Constitution, and have passed constitutional muster. 
 
It has been suggested1152 that for search and seizures to be 
constitutional, there must be an authorising law which properly defines 
the scope of the power to search seize.  Secondly, there must be prior 
authorisation by an independent authority.  Thirdly, the independent 
authority must be persuaded by evidence on oath that there are 
reasonable grounds for conducting the search. 
 
                                                 
1150  Sections 19 to 36 contain provisions regarding search and seizure.  Section 22 specifically  
       authorises searches without a warrant under certain circumstances. 
1151  Section 22. 
1152  Currie I and de Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook  (2005) 5th ed at 325. 
       See also Mcquoid D ―Invasion of privacy:  common law v constitutional delict — does it make  
       a difference?  2000  Acta Juridica  250. 
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These guidelines do have value, and have been used in practice.1153  
However, the Constitution itself, in entrenching one‘s right to privacy by 
prohibiting searches and seizures, does not provide that national 
legislation should be enacted to regulate this matter, or to render what 
would otherwise be an unconstitutional search and seizure, 
constitutional.  In entrenching other rights, such as the right to 
equality,1154 the right to just administrative action,1155 and the right to 
access to information,1156 the Constitution expressly provides that 
national legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights. 
 
In the matter of police traps, courts were loath to convict on the basis of 
evidence obtained by police traps.  In cases, where they convicted, their 
disinclination to convict would manifest itself in the resulting lighter 
sentences.1157  
 
It was for this reason that section 252A was inserted to the Criminal 
Procedure Act.  By enacting this provision, the legislature sought to 
authorise and to render lawful the use of traps and undercover operations 
in certain circumstances, and to regulate their use.  It also sought to 
                                                 
1153  For example, in Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and  
       Others  2009 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
1154  Section 9(3) of the Constitution. 
1155  Section 33(3) of the Constitution. 
1156  Section 32(2) of the Constitution.  
1157  Du Toit E et al   Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act  2010 at 24-130. 
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avoid the conviction of people who are victims of unfair and improper 
trappings.1158 
 
With regard to the first requirement for search and seizure mentioned by 
Currie and de Waal,1159 empowering statutes must clearly identify the 
purpose of the search and seizure, and provide clear guidelines within 
which the responsible agents must perform their duties.  The correctness 
of this view was demonstrated in Mistry v Medical Association,1160 where 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa found the provisions of section 
28(1) of the Medicines and Related Matters Substances Control Act1161 to 
be overbroad, and giving inspectors carte blanche powers to enter any 
place, including private homes. 
 
With regard to the third requirement of prior authorisation before a 
search and a seizure is carried out, the Cape Division of the High Court 
had occasion to deal with it in the case of Park-Ross v Director, Office for 
Serious Economic Crimes,1162 where the offices of a company were 
entered and searched, and documents were confiscated in terms of the 
Investigation of Serious  Economic Offences Act.1163  The Court threw 
light on the actual subject of the right to privacy, by holding that the 
                                                 
1158  Du Toit E et al  Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act  2010 at 24-131. 
1159  Currie I and de Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 5th ed at 325. 
1160  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others  1998 (4) SA 1127. 
1161  Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965. 
1162  Park-Ross v Director, Office for Serious Economic Offences  1995 (2) BCLR 198 (C). 
1163  Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act 117 of 1991. 
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interest protected by the search and seizure legislation, is privacy rather 
than property.  In view of this holding, it was found by the Court that the 
relevant provision of the Act was not a justifiable limitation of the right to 
privacy, in terms of the limitation clause.1164 
 
Parallels were drawn by the Court between South Africa and Canada by 
referring to Hunter v Southam Inc,1165 where the following guidelines 
crystallised, namely, that the authorising entity should be an independent 
judicial officer, evidence placed before the judicial officer must be to the 
satisfaction of the judicial officer that there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that an offence is about to be committed, the evidence before 
court must be to the satisfaction of the judicial officer that something 
that will constitute concrete evidence will be recovered.1166 
 
In South Africa, this does not mean that searches without a warrant will 
always be unlawful.  Section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act specifically 
makes a search without a warrant lawful in certain circumstances.  The 
position is the same in the United States of America, although courts 
prefer the obtaining of a warrant, if at all possible. Obviously, this is 
required in order to limit the possibility of frivolous searches, which may 
                                                 
1164  The interim Constitution was used at that time, and therefore the limitation clause was  
       section 33. 
1165  Hunter v Southam Inc  (1985) 11 DLR (4th) 641 (SCC). 
1166  Park-Ross v Directror, Office for Serious Economic Offences  1995 (2) BCLR 198 (C) at 217I-J  
       to 218A-B. 
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be motivated by malice, or other improper considerations.  The Supreme 
Court of the United States held in MacDonald v United States,1167 that: 
 
      Power is a heady thing, and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be  
        trusted.  And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police  
        before they violate the privacy of the home.  We cannot be true to that constitutional  
        requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who  
        seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made  
        that course imperative.1168 
 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa was presented with its first 
opportunity to interpret the right to privacy in Bernstein v Bester.1169  The 
matter was not dealing with search and seizure in its ordinary sense, but 
the litigant‘s interpretation of the statutory provision involved was that it 
dealt with search and seizure.  The right of the directors of a company 
were in issue, in that the statutory provision1170 that was the subject 
matter enjoined the directors, during examination, to disclose 
information which, in their view, was protected by the constitutional right 
to privacy.  The extracting of such private information constituted, in the 
belief of the directors, a search and seizure.  As such, so they contended, 
it violated the right to privacy.1171 
                                                 
1167  MacDonald v United States  335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
1168  at 335 par. 456. 
1169  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
1170  Sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
1171  The interim Constitution was used at that time, and the relevant section in the interim  
       Constitution was section 13.  The right to privacy in the final Constitution has since become  
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In a previous decision,1172 the Constitutional Court had held that the 
provisions of the Companies Act were unconstitutional only to the extent 
that the Act permitted compelled self-incriminating answers given at an 
examination authorised by sections 417 and 418, to be used against an 
examinee in subsequent criminal proceedings against him or her.  The 
applicant‘s attack in Bernstein v Bester  was broader, and was aimed at 
striking down the examination provision in its entirety on the grounds 
that it infringed an examinee‘s right to privacy, and freedom from seizure 
of private possessions. 
 
The principle that was laid in Bernstein v Bester is a useful yardstick in 
determining whether the Court would be consistent in its future 
interpretation of the right to privacy where it involved search and seizure.  
The Court approached the matter from the angle that no right is to be 
considered absolute.  The truism that no right is absolute implies, 
according to the Court, that from the outset of interpretation, each right 
is always already limited by every other right accruing to another 
citizen.1173 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
       section 14. 
1172  Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others  (1996) (1) SA  
       984 (CC). 
1173  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at par. 67. 
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According to the Court, however, there is an exception, and this 
exception, it is submitted, is crucial for purposes of this discussion.  It is 
that ―it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his or her family 
life, sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from 
erosion by conflicting rights of the community‖.1174 
 
The point of the Court is clear:  No one may claim absolute privacy, 
because other citizens also have a claim to that right to a large or little 
extent.  Nevertheless, as far as privacy in the inner sanctum of a person, 
such as family life, sexual preference, and home environment,‖ is 
concerned, these areas are beyond the reach of other citizens.  The 
inviolability of this principle would in time be put to the test. 
 
With regard to the absoluteness or otherwise of the right to privacy in the 
South African Constitution, one would  do well to consider the wording 
thereof, and compare it with the wording of this right in article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
Article 8(2) of the Convention makes it clear that the right is not absolute, 
but is subject to law, interests of national security, public safety, the 
economic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, 
the protection of health or morals, and the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
                                                 
1174  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at par. 67. 
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By contrast, section 141175 the South African Constitution attaches no 
factors to which the right is subjected, save for section 36 which would 
have to be taken into account in each case, as a limitation clause.  The 
wording simply guarantees that no one may have his person, home, 
property searched, and no one may have his or her possessions seized, 
and no one may have the privacy of their communications infringed. 
 
The Court laid a further guide to be used in future litigations surrounding 
the right to privacy, especially with regard to search and seizure.  It drew 
from the United States jurisprudence, where the concept of ―search‖ is 
understood to refer to an invasion by the government, as opposed to 
invasion by a private citizen.1176  In the United States jurisprudence, a 
two-part test is used to determine whether there has been a violation of 
privacy.  There must be a subjective expectation of privacy by the 
individual who complains of a violation.  Secondly, society must 
recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable.  Finally, the United 
States Court, in determining whether the individual has lost his or her 
legitimate expectation of privacy, will consider such factors as whether 
the item was exposed to the public, abandoned, or obtained by 
consent.1177 
                                                 
1175  It was section 13 at the time of this constitutional challenge, in the interim Constitution. 
1176  Katz v US  389 US 347 (1967) 361, Abel v US  217 (1960) 241. 
1177  Katz v US 389 US 347 (1967) 361 at 361. 
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Later, the South African Constitutional Court had to deal with a real 
search-and-seizure case.  The matter before the Court was not dealing 
with privacy in one‘s private home, nor was it political, but it dealt with 
privacy in one‘s business or profession offices, in the case of Mistry v 
Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others.1178  The central 
issue was whether the powers of entry, examination and seizure given to 
inspectors by the Medicine and Related Substances Control Act1179 violate 
the right to privacy in terms of the Constitution.1180  The Act authorises 
inspectors to enter medical practitioners‘ rooms, and in fact, any 
premise, vehicle, or vessel, where inspectors reasonably believe that there 
are substances regulated by the Act.   
 
The Court had laid a precedent principle in Bernstein v Bester 1181 that, 
whereas privacy in the inner sanctum of a person, in family life, and home 
environment, should be accorded the highest respect, one‘s entitlement 
to privacy shrinks gradually as one moves gradually into the outer 
sphere, such as in business activities, or in one‘s profession.1182 
 
                                                 
1178  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others  1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC). 
1179  Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965. 
1180  The interim Constitution was used at the time the mater came before Court. 
1181  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
1182  Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at par. 67. 
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It was appropriate for the Court in Mistry to be guided by the principle it 
had laid down in Bernstein v Bester.  In line with the principle, the Court 
held that in the case of any regulated enterprise, such as was the case in 
the medical doctor‘s profession in Mistry, the proprietor‘s expectation of 
privacy with respect to the premises, equipment, materials and records, 
must be attenuated by the obligation to comply with reasonable 
regulations, and to put up with occasional inspections which may lawfully 
take place.1183   
 
The principle laid in Bernstein v Bester  1184  was augmented by holding 
that people who have dealings with communities in carrying out their 
professional or business obligations, and are licensed to function in a 
competitive atmosphere, acknowledge as a condition of their licence that 
they will adhere to the same reasonable controls as are applicable to their 
competitors.1185 
 
However, if a statutory provision, while serving a noble purpose, goes 
beyond what is necessary in achieving that purpose, such a statutory 
provision may be at the risk of being struck down by courts.  A closer 
consideration of the Medical and Related Substances Control Act reveals 
                                                 
1183  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others  1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at  
       par. 27. 
1184  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
1185  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at  
       par. 27. 
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that it is such a statute.  Section 28(1) of the Act does not restrict itself to 
regulating medical doctors‘ practices by way of inspections, but the 
section empowers  inspectors to enter any ―place, vehicle, vessel or 
aircraft‖.  It was the Court‘s view that the word ―place‖ was meant to have 
a wider meaning than ―premises‖, otherwise there would have been no 
need to add the word.1186   
 
In view of this, it was the Court‘s interpretation that the scope of the 
section is so broad that it authorises inspectors to enter private homes 
which, in Bernstein v Bester,1187 were held to be part of the inner sanctum 
of a person.  A comparison in this regard is appropriate.  In Canadian 
statutory law, Canadians had the Canadian Food and Drugs Act,1188 which 
authorised a peace officer, at any time, without a warrant, to enter and 
search any place other than a dwelling house.1189  Thus, the Canadian Act 
showed some respect for a private home by stipulating that only a 
structure that is not a dwelling house could be entered without a warrant.  
In the case of a dwelling house, however, the relevant section required 
that entry be sought and authorised by a judge.  Once a warrant was 
issued by a judge, a peace officer could enter and search any dwelling 
                                                 
1186  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others  1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at  
       par. 28. 
1187  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
1188  Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, F-27. 
1189  Section 42(1) of the Act [emphasis added]. 
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house in which he or she believed on reasonable grounds that there was 
a statutorily controlled, or regulated, drug. 
 
Appropriately, then, the wide scope of section 28(1) of the Medical and 
Related Substances Control Act, and having regard to the relevant 
comparable Canadian statute, led the Court to believe and to hold that 
the section gave inspectors carte blanche powers.  With such powers they 
could enter any place, including private dwellings, where they suspected 
medicines to be, and inspect documents which may be of the most 
intimate kind.  Accordingly, the Court held that section 28(1) was 
disproportionate to its public purpose, and was overbroad in its reach.  
As such, the section failed to pass the proportionality test that was laid 
down in S v Makwanyane.1190 
 
In S v Makwanyane, the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that 
proportionality calls for the balancing of different interests.  It held that 
in the balancing process, the relevant considerations will include the 
nature of the right that is being restricted and its importance to society.  
Regard should also be had to the purpose for which the right is restricted 
and the importance of that purpose to society.  Further, a court entrusted 
with the interpretation of a right should look at the extent of the 
limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to be 
                                                 
1190  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at par, 104. 
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necessary, it should consider whether the desired ends could reasonably 
be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question. 
 
For purposes of the permeating theme of this thesis, namely, the 
desirability of consistency in constitutional interpretation, it is necessary 
at this stage to make special reference to the words of the Court when it 
emphasised the need to accord private dwellings more privacy than 
business or profession structures.  The Court emphasised that in entering 
any dwelling and conducting a search and seizure, inspectors were 
running the risk of inspecting ―documents which may be of the most 
intimate nature‖.1191 
 
In view of the seriousness in which the Court viewed the inspection of 
―documents which may be of the most intimate nature‖, the Court was 
prepared to go beyond the text of the Constitution, and made what it 
called ―assumptions‖1192 in favour of the applicant.  In so doing, the 
Court, was reading into the text of the Constitution what was not 
provided for by the drafters.  Perhaps the Court was endeavouring to 
adopt the generous approach to interpretation.  The first assumption that 
the Court was prepared to make was that a right to informational privacy 
                                                 
1191  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others  1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at  
       par. 30. 
1192  Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others  1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) at  
       par. 48. 
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is covered by the protection of privacy guaranteed by section 13.1193  The 
second was that the respondent was at all material times fulfilling state 
functions and, as such, obliged to respect the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, including the right to privacy. 
 
The relevance of these two assumptions, and of the Court‘s emphasis 
that there was a possibility that the applicant‘s documents were of an 
intimate nature, will be clear in the light of the discussion that follows 
immediately after this paragraph. 
It would appear that when a court deals with a matter which borders on 
politics, or is outright political, its line of reasoning changes from what it 
would be had the matter been an ordinary one.  It will be recalled that 
Chapter 2 of this thesis touched on the possibility, and indeed, on the 
admission by some judges, that complete neutrality, or objectivity, in 
controversial, or political, matters, is a challenge to maintain.1194 
 
In 2008, in Thint v National Director of Public Prosecutions,1195 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa had an opportunity to adjudicate 
upon a political, high profile case, which challenged the constitutionality 
of section 29 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act.1196  The subject 
                                                 
1193  of the then interim Constitution.  The section in the final Constitution is now section 14. 
1194  See Chapter 2, under the subheading ―Neutrality in interpretation‖, pages 82-86. 
1195  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
1196  National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. 
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matter of the case was the lawfulness or otherwise of a number of search 
and seizure warrants issued by a judge in chambers, purportedly in terms 
of section 29 of the Act.  The matter concerned the validity of the terms 
of the warrants and the lawfulness of the manner in which they were 
executed.  Among other places, the search and seizure warrants were 
executed at two private places of residence of one of the applicants.  
Some of the warrants were executed at the offices of the applicants. 
 
The High Court, which was the Court of first instance in hearing the 
application for the warrants to be declared invalid, had ruled in favour of 
the applicants.  It found that the warrants were invalid in that they were 
vague and overbroad in that they did not describe the suspected offences 
with sufficient particularity, and so they did not convey intelligibly to the 
suspect the ambit of the search they authorised.  It was found to be 
essential by the Court a quo that the warrants should have specified the 
suspected offences exactly, as well as when and by whom they were 
allegedly committed.  Further, the search and seizure warrants should 
have been issued with due regard being had to the attorney-client 
privilege which could be compromised during the course of the search of 
the attorney‘s offices.1197 
 
                                                 
1197  Zuma and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2006 (1) SACR 468  
       (D) at 494;  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  
       2009 (1)  SA  (CC)  at 94D-E. 
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Commendably, it was out of regard for the doctrine of stare decisis that 
the Court a quo found that the search and seizure warrants were invalid, 
as they did not comply with principles laid down in the body of case 
law1198 guiding the South African Courts. 
 
It has become settled law in South Africa, which should not be disturbed, 
that warrants should meet certain requisites.  It is interesting to note that 
these requisites became part of our law even before the advent of the 
Constitution.1199  It is submitted that if these requisites could not be 
compromised in an era when no rights were protected by the 
Constitution, they now weigh even more heavily under the authority of 
the Constitution. 
 
The principle of legality is another authority in deciding the validity of 
search and seizure warrants.  This principle was relied upon by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Powell v Van der Merwe,1200 and indeed by 
the Court a quo.  The principle of legality does not specifically deal with 
search and seizures, but it broadly deals with the requirements which our 
                                                 
1198  Ex parte Hull  1891 4 SAR 134; Hertzfelder v Attorney-General 1907 TS 403; Ho Si v Vernon  
      1909 TS 1074; Pullen NO and Others v Waja  1929 TPD 838; Minister of Justice and Others v  
       Desai NO  1948 (3) SA 395 (A); Divisional Commissioner of SA Police, Witwatersrand Area and  
       Others v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd and Another  1966 (2) SA 503 (A). 
1199  Ex parte Hull  1891 4 SAR 134; Hertzfelder v Attorney-General  1907 TS 403; Ho Si v Vernon   
       1909 TS 1074; Pullen NO and Others v Waja  1929 TPD 838; Minister of Justice and Others v  
       Desai NO  1948 (3) SA 395 (A); Divisional Commissioner of SA Police, Witwatersrand Area and  
       Others v SA Associated Newspapers Ltd and Another  1966 (2) SA 503 (A). 
1200  Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others  2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA). 
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law must comply with in order for it to be fair.  For example, it is a 
requirement of the principle of legality that the definition of common law 
and statutory crimes should be precise and settled.1201  The statement of 
prohibited conduct should be in clear and unambiguous language.  
Vaguely conceived proscriptions and imprecisely described elements of 
conduct are objectionable, since they insufficiently guide an ordinary 
citizen.1202 
 
The spirit of the principle of legality has been absorbed into the text of 
the Constitution of South Africa.  This can be seen from section 35(3)(a) 
of the Constitution, which makes it a requirement for a fair trial that an 
accused person be informed of the charge with sufficient detail so as to 
be able to answer it.  
 
Applying this principle to search and seizures, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Powell  correctly held that the principle of legality required the 
state to confine itself in the exercise of powers permitted by statute.1203 
 
As already pointed out, South Africa has a long history of requiring that 
search and seizures adhere to certain rules.  It is not clear why the 
Constitutional Court, in handling the Thint v National Director of Public 
                                                 
1201  Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law   (2008) 3ed at 100. 
1202  Ibid. 
1203  Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others  2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) at par. 22. 
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Prosecutions 1204 case elected to act with disregard of settled law.  As far 
back as the nineteenth century, in Ex Parte Hull,1205 a search warrant was 
set aside for vagueness and overbreadth.  The Court, per Kotze CJ, held 
that the warrant was too general and too vague.  It was the Court‘s firm 
view that if warrants were allowed to be issued under a loose and 
arbitrary exercise of a general power, no one would be safe: 
 
       The secrets of private friendship, relationship, trade and politics, communicated under the  
         seal of privacy and confidence would become  public, and the greatest trouble,  
         unpleasantness and injury caused to private persons, . . . The secrecy and sanctity of private  
         dwellings might be violated, . . . if the private citizen did not feel safe against what may be  
         nothing more than the curious eye of the police agent, sheltering itself behind the authority  
         of a search warrant.1206 
 
It is submitted that the Constitutional Court of South Africa is bound by 
precedent established over the years as long as the decisions arrived at 
over the years are in harmony with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.  It is 
only in those instances where the decisions of earlier courts, when 
weighed against the spirit of the Bill of Rights are found to be out of 
harmony, that the Constitutional Court may deviate, and establish its own 
precedent.  It is necessary to add, however, as a matter of fairness, that 
the Constitutional Court, as the highest court in constitutional matters, 
has the power to overrule its own prior decisions where they become 
                                                 
1204  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       (1) (CC). 
1205  Ex parte Hull  1891 4 SAR 134. 
1206  Ex parte Hull  1891 4 SAR 134 at 141. 
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manifestly incorrect.  However, in doing so, the doctrine of stare decisis 
would necessitate that such intention be stated clearly and reasons given. 
 
With the line of precedent faithfully continuing in those early years, the 
Supreme Court of South Africa, in Hertzfelder v Attorney-General,1207  
was consistent in holding to a principle it had laid down in Hull.  In 
Hertzfelder, the applicant was charged with fraud, and police seized his 
documents and effects which were not the property in respect of which 
the offence was alleged to have been committed.  Police had relied on 
section 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provided that if there 
was any property in regard to which there was a reasonable ground for 
believing, upon sworn information, laid before a magistrate, that the 
property might afford evidence as to the commission of a crime, a 
warrant could be obtained to search the premises containing the 
property.  The property could be seized and taken before a magistrate to 
be dealt with in accordance with the law.   
 
The warrant of search and seizure which the police were relying on was 
on a printed form dealing with stolen property, and authorising the 
proper officer to search premises and seize property.  But all the words 
relating to stolen property had been struck out.  Thus, the warrant did 
not specify the crime alleged to have been committed, and was, in the 
                                                 
1207  Hertzfelder v Attorney-General  1907 TS 403. 
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opinion of the Court, ―irregular in form‖ and ―in fact quite 
unintelligible‖.1208  This judgment echoed the principle that search and 
seizure warrants should not be vague and overbroad, as was correctly 
required by the Court a quo in Zuma and Another v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions.1209   
 
The unbroken chain of consistency established by South African courts  
continued in Ho Si v Vernon,1210 where, again, it became necessary to 
reiterate the need for warrants not to be vague and overbroad.   The 
warrant in question was described by the Court as ―a very remarkable 
document‖,1211 a form of search warrant which was intended to be used 
for searching premises in which stolen goods were suspected to be 
concealed.  Three-fourths of the warrant had been left blank.  The 
document did not show upon whose information it was issued, and none 
of the blank spaces were filled in.  The reference to goods had been 
deleted, and across the face of the document, the following words were 
written: 
 
     Asiatics illegally in this colony or wanted on warrant, or not in possession of registration  
       certificates, in houses or rooms to be pointed out.1212   
                                                 
1208  Hertzfelder v Attorney-General  1907 TS  403 at 405. 
1209  Zuma and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2006 (1) SACR 468  
       (D) at 486H-I. 
1210  Ho Si v Vernon  1909 TS 1074. 
1211  Ho Si v Vernon  1909 TS 1074 at 1078. 
1212  Ibid. 
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Below these words, the document continued thus: 
 
      These are therefore in the name of our Lord the King to authorise and require you, with  
        necessary and proper assistants, to enter in the daytime or nighttime into the said dwelling- 
        house of the said Asiatics at Johannesburg, and there diligently search for the said Asiatics;  
        and if the same, or any part thereof, shall be found upon such search, that you bring the  
        bodies of the said Asiatics before me to be disposed of and dealt withal according to law.1213 
 
Assessing the validity of the document which purported to be a search 
warrant, the Court described the terms of the document as being 
grammatically unintelligible.  The Court held that ―to say that such a 
document had any validity in law, or conferred authority upon its holder 
to enter private houses forcibly and as of right, would be to state an 
alarming proposition, and one subversive of the most elementary rights 
of freedom‖.1214 
 
It is necessary at this stage to briefly pause, and highlight the 
requirements established by the South African courts: warrants must 
state what precisely is to be seized, and must state the offence which the 
search is intended to prove.  Stated differently, the warrant must not be 
vague or overbroad, a fact correctly stated by the Court a quo in Zuma 
and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions,1215 based on consistency 
                                                 
1213  Ho Si v Vernon  1909 TS 1074 at 1078. 
1214 Ho Si v Vernon  1909 TS 1074 at 1078 [emphasis added]. 
1215 Zuma and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2006 (1) SACR 468  
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required by judicial precedence, confirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.1216  
 
In confirming the judgment of the Court a quo, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal continued the line of precedent established for warrants, by 
requiring that warrants should violate the right to privacy to as little 
extent as possible.  The Supreme Court of Appeal drew attention to 
Pullen v Waja,1217 wherein a warrant authorised the seizure of ―certain 
books and documents and other papers of A. E. Waja and or M. A. Waja & 
Co.‖1218  Again, the Court in Pullen reiterated the established pattern by 
holding that these words were quite general and did not identify the 
things to be seized.  The words were so vague, held the Court, ―that it is 
impossible to say what they include‖.1219  It was argued on behalf of the 
State that Waja must have understood what books were wanted and the 
nature of the offence in connection with which their seizure was 
authorised.  However, even this submission was not weighty enough to 
persuade the Court from the established pattern.  Rejecting the 
submission, the Court held that ―even if he had an inkling on these 
points, this cannot cure the defect in the warrant itself‖.1220 
                                                                                                                                                 
      (D). 
1216 National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Zuma and Another  2007 SA 137 (SCA)  
      at par. 70. 
1217  Pullen NO  and Others v Waja  1929 TPD 838. 
1218  Ibid at 851 [emphasis added]. 
1219  Ibid. 
1220  Ibid. 
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True, the Court in Pullen relaxed the requirement that a warrant should 
state the offence in connection with which a search is sought.  Having 
made this compromise, the Court nevertheless was of the view that the 
conclusion it had arrived at made no inroad on the doctrine that a 
warrant must not be in general terms. 
 
The Court acknowledged that as we have a specific statutory provision on 
the subject, it is obvious that the English decisions do not govern in 
South Africa, but they are useful because they emphasise certain general 
principles, namely, that courts ought to examine the validity of warrants 
with a jealous regard for the liberty of the subject, and his rights to his 
property, and refuse to recognise as valid a warrant the terms of which 
are too general.1221 
 
Further precedent was established in our case law.  Twenty years after the 
Court decided Pullen v Waja,1222 the Supreme Court of Appeal,1223 then 
the Appellate Division, overruled the decision of a provincial division 
which authorised seizure of documents for purposes of being used in 
evidence.  A lesson to be learned from the Court‘s judgment is the value 
it attached to the common law right to privacy even when the litigant 
                                                 
1221   Pullen NO and Others v Waja  1929 TPD 838 at 846 – 847. 
1222  Pullen NO and Others v Waja  1929 TPD 838. 
1223  Minister of Justice and Others v Desai NO  1948 (3) SA 395 (A). 
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claiming the right was a juristic person.  The litigant claiming the right to 
privacy by challenging the validity of a warrant of search and seizure was 
what was referred to in the warrant as ―non-European Trade Unions‖ and 
the ―Council for non-European Trade Unions‖1224.  The fact that the 
litigant was a juristic person did not compromise the requirement that 
warrants must not be vague and overbroad.  The Court declared the 
warrant bad on its face1225 because it gave the officer executing it a wider 
field of choice as to the documents to be seized than the statute 
authorised.1226 
 
Eighteen years later, when a newspaper sought to expose prison 
conditions under apartheid, part of a warrant authorised seizure of ―all 
other documents including statements of whatsoever nature concerning 
reports in connection with the conditions in gaol and experience of 
prisoners in gaols throughout the Republic of South Africa‖.1227  The 
Appellate Division ruled this portion of the warrant to be too general.  It 
was the Court‘s view that it was couched in such wide terms as to justify 
the inference that the justice of the peace who had issued it had not 
properly applied his mind to it.  In holding thus, the Court referred to the 
                                                 
1224  Minister of Justice and Others v Desai NO 1948 (3) SA 395 (A) at 397. 
1225  Minister of Justice and Others v Desai NO 1948 (3) SA 395 at (A) 397. 
1226  Minister of Justice and Others v Desai NO 1948 (3) SA 395 at 397; Section 49(1)(b) of Act 31  
       of 1917. 
1227  Divisional Commisssioner of S.A. Police, Witwatersrand Area and Others v S.A. Associated  
       Newspapers Ltd and another  1966 (2) SA 503 (A) at 509. 
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long chain of precedent that the South African judicial system had 
established over decades. 
 
The final word in the long chain of precedent was heard in Cine Films v 
Commissioner of Police,1228 where the warrant was supposedly intended 
to bring about the seizure of films.  The warrant, however, went beyond 
that, and authorised the seizure also of all stock books, stock sheets, 
invoices, invoice books, consignment notes, all correspondence, and all 
documents.1229  Even the suggestion to bring the understanding of the 
word ―document‖ in line with what was intended to be seized was rejected 
by the Appellate Division.  The warrant had been drawn too widely.  The 
documents to be seized had to be identified. 
 
The purpose of this review of the South African case law surrounding the 
question of search and seizure warrants is to show the desirability of 
consistency in constitutional interpretation, and indeed in the 
interpretation of our law as a whole.  The purpose is further to show that 
such an established pattern of how our courts understand the importance 
of the right to privacy should not suddenly be broken simply because the 
case before court is a political one. 
 
                                                 
1228  Cine Films (Pty) Ltd and Others v Commissioner of Police and Others  1972 (2) SA 254 (A). 
1229  Cine Films (Pty) Ltd and Others v Commissioner of Police and Others  1972 (2) SA 254 (A) at  
       503, 504. 
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In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeal, this long chain of judicial 
precedent establishes the following:  
 that because of the inherent risk of misuse in the issuing of search 
and seizure warrants, courts examine their validity with a jealous 
regard for the liberty of the subject and his or her rights to privacy, 
and property;  
 that this applies to both the authority under which a warrant is 
issued, and the ambit of its terms;  
 that the terms of a search must be construed with reasonable 
strictness; 
  that a warrant must convey intelligibly to both searcher and the 
searched the ambit of the search it authorises; 
  that if a warrant is too general, or its terms go beyond those the 
authorising statute permits, the Courts will refuse to recognise it as 
valid, and it will be set aside;  
 that it is no cure for an overbroad warrant to say that the subject of 
the search knew, or ought to have known  what was being looked 
for.1230 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal added that it set out these authorities 
because they appeared to have been overlooked when the warrant was 
granted, since the judge in the Court a quo had not referred to any of 
                                                 
1230  Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others  2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) at par. 59. 
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them, or to the principles they establish.1231  The warrants, in the Court‘s 
view, were riddled with imprecision and vagueness, and they had to be 
set aside on this ground alone.  Those carrying out the searches were 
given untrammelled power to carry out what amounted to a general 
ransacking of the subject‘s premises.  The Supreme Court of Appeal 
emphasised1232 that this has not been the law in this country since at 
least 1891, and it is not the law under our Constitution, which preserved 
and enhanced what was best in our legal traditions.  The warrants were 
set aside as unlawful.   
 
Against this background, attention is now focused on the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in Thint v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions.1233  Two of the applicants complain that the search and 
seizure warrants were too vague and overbroad, and their execution 
amounted to a gross violation of their right to privacy, protected by 
section 14 of the Constitution.  Indeed, the High Court as the Court of 
first instance, finds them to be so, relying in so doing on the 
requirements set out by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Powell NO and 
Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others.1234  The Supreme Court of 
Appeal confirms the finding of the High Court, relying in so doing on the 
                                                 
1231  Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others  2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) at par. 60. 
1232  Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others  2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) at pat. 62. 
1233  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1)  
       SA 1 CC). 
1234  Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others  2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA). 
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long chain of precedents in the history of the South African judicial 
system.   
 
An examination of the search and seizure warrants supports the finding 
of the High Court that they were vague and overbroad.  The warrant 
covers six pages, and contains phrases such as ―in general, any . . .‖,  
―any other correspondence‖, and ―documentation relating to any 
allegation‖.   
 
The Constitutional Court itself leaves no doubt in any one‘s mind that it is 
aware of the legal principles that have crystallised over the decades in the 
South African jurisprudence regarding search and seizure warrants.  This 
awareness on the part of the Constitutional Court can be gleaned from its 
own judgment that a proper balance should be struck between the need 
to combat serious crimes and the obligation to respect privacy and 
dignity in the context of a search and seizure operation.1235  The Court 
reasons, correctly so, that investigators should always have a clear idea of 
what items might have a bearing on their investigation.  For this reason, 
they should, at the very least, always limit their search to avoid 
examining items that are irrelevant to the investigation.  They are never 
entitled simply to search through everything present in the hope that 
                                                 
1235  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC) at par. 144. 
440 
 
something relevant might be found.1236  Searching through everything 
would amount to having what the Supreme Court of Appeal referred to as  
―untrammelled power‖ to carry out a ―general ransacking‖ of premises.1237 
 
This knowledge, however, did not dissuade the Constitutional Court from 
making a finding that is consistent with its knowledge.   
 
It is necessary to combat crime, such as was suspected in Thint v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions,1238 but the principle of legality cannot be 
sacrificed in the state‘s endeavour to combat crime.1239  One of the 
aspects of the principle of legality is that a narrow interpretation should 
always be preferred over a broad one.  A narrow interpretation will always 
operate in favour of an individual, as opposed to the state.1240  
Accordingly, it is submitted that a proper interpretation of section 29 of 
the National Prosecuting Authority Act, authorising search and seizures, 
would not allow warrants to be overbroad. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1236  Ibid. 
1237  Powell NO and Others v Van der Merwe NO and Others  2005 (5) SA 62 (SCA) at par. 62. 
1238  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2009 (1) SA 1  
       (CC). 
1239  Basdeo V  ―A constitutional perspective of police powers of search and seizure:  The legal  
       dilemma of warrantless searches and seizures‖  2009  403 SACJ  417. 
1240  Shaik-Peremanov N ―Basel II — The right to privacy:  A South African perspective‖ 2009 SA  
       Mercantile Law Journal  550. 
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7.8  In the United States law 
 
In the United States jurisprudence, the right to privacy with regard to 
search and seizure is protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  The Fourth Amendment provides: 
 
      The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against  
        unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but  
        upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place  
        to be searched, and persons or things to be seized. 
 
Thus, the prohibition of searches and seizures authorised by warrants 
that are vague and overbroad is based on the Constitution in the United 
States.1241  In addition, the United States Supreme Court1242 has 
developed a legal test aimed at determining whether one‘s claim to 
privacy may be upheld.  The test is twofold.  The first leg of the test is 
whether the person had a subjective expectation of privacy.  Once the 
first leg of the test has been determined, the second leg is considered, 
namely, whether objectively, the person had expectation of privacy.1243  
For example, the Supreme Court has recognised that in the context of the 
government workplace, employees may have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy against certain intrusions.1244  However, public employees‘ 
                                                 
1241  Hogg P W  Constitutional Law of Canada  Vol 2 (2007) at 48-3. 
1242  Katz v United States  389 U.S. 347 1967. 
1243  United States v Sarkisian  197 F.3d 966, 986 (9th Cir. 1999). 
1244  Minnesota v Olson  495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
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expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets may be 
reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by 
legitimate regulation.1245  
 
Further, it appears that the right to privacy in the United States applies 
only vertically, and not horizontally.  This means that the respect to be 
shown for the right to privacy is expected from the state towards its 
citizens, and not so much from private citizens towards other citizens.  
This  becomes clear from the understanding of the concept ―search and 
seizure‖.  In the United States, ―search and seizure‖ is understood to 
mean a government or state invasion of a person‘s privacy.1246 
 
As regards warrants for search and seizure, the law in the United States is 
that they must have particularity.  This concept is the South African 
equivalent of ―not vague‖.  In the context of the United States 
jurisprudence, particularity means that ―the warrant must make clear to 
the executing officer exactly what it is that he or she is authorised to 
search for and seize‖.1247 
 
Further, like in South Africa, it is a requirement in the United States as 
regards warrants for search and seizure that they must not be overbroad.  
                                                 
1245  Minnesota v Olson  495 U. S. 91 (1990) at 95, 96. 
1246  Devenish G E A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights  (1999) at 144. 
1247  In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas  1987, 926 F.2d 847, 856 – 857.   
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In the context of the United States jurisprudence, this means that ―there 
must be probable cause to seize the particular things named in the 
warrant‖.1248 
 
In a United States court case of United States v SDI Future Health  Inc,1249 
resembling the South African case of  Thint v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions,1250 after a nearly two-year investigation spearheaded by the 
Internal Revenue Service with the participation of some state agencies, 
investigators concluded that SDI Health Inc, a California corporation, had 
engaged in wide ranging Medicare fraud. In addition, they believed that 
SDI Health Inc had committed extensive tax fraud.  On the basis of 
information obtained during investigation, investigators applied for a 
warrant to search SDI Health Inc premises.  The warrant relied on an 
affidavit.   
 
In terms of an annexure to the warrant, the premises to be searched were 
SDI‘s corporate headquarters, principal business offices, and computers.  
In terms of an additional annexure, twenty-four categories of items had 
to be seized.  The annexure also gave specific instructions about the 
retrieving and handling of electronic data and other technical equipment. 
 
                                                 
1248  In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas 1987, 926 F.2d  847 at 857. 
1249  United States v SDI Future Health Inc et al 491 F.Supp 2d 975 (2007). 
1250  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
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A magistrate concluded that a probable cause existed for the search, and 
granted the warrant, on condition, however, that both the affidavit and 
the warrant be amended to guarantee protection, or privilege, for 
patients‘ medical information. 
 
The legality of the warrant was impugned on the ground of vagueness 
and overbreadth.  On this basis, it was submitted that the evidence thus 
obtained be ruled inadmissible.  The Court of first instance1251 granted 
the motion, not only in part, as was requested, but in full.  On appeal by 
the State, the United States Court of Appeals concluded that five of the 
twenty-four categories of materials listed in the search warrant were 
unconstitutionally overbroad, and that no exception rescued them from 
being rejected.1252 
 
There is a striking similarity between the United States case and the South 
African case.  In both cases the warrants were extensive.  The South 
African counterpart was six pages long.  The United States counterpart 
took the court two hours to review.1253  About both warrants it was 
complained that they were vague and overbroad.   
 
                                                 
1251  United States v SDI Future Health Inc et al  491 F.Supp 2d 975 (2007). 
1252  United States v SDI Future Health Inc, 568 F.3d 684 (2009) at 14. 
1253  United States v SDI Future Health Inc, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit 1 (2009) at  
        2. 
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Admittedly, South African courts are not enjoined to follow foreign law, 
but are constitutionally advised to at least consider it.1254  Foreign law 
may, and in fact does, provide insight into how to adjudicate upon certain 
matters where there are striking resemblances between South Africa and 
the particular foreign jurisdiction in respect of our case facts, law, and 
perhaps the constitutional text.  As a matter of fact, the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa has often relied on the jurisprudence of the United 
States of America, Canada, India and Germany for insight into the 
interpretation of some rights in the Bill of Rights.1255  By comparison, 
however, the Court has made reference to only six African countries, 
namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia.1256 
 
7.9  In Canadian law 
 
In Canadian law, the right to privacy in respect of searches and seizures, 
is constitutionally protected by section 8 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.1257  Section 8 of the Charter provides: 
 
      Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure. 
 
                                                 
1254  In terms of Section 39(1)(c)  of the Constitution.   
1255  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA  391 (CC); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian  
       Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others  1999 (1) SA 6 (CC);  S v Jordan and  
       Others  2002 (6) SA 642 (CC). 
1256  Church J Schulze C Strydom H et al Human Rights from a Comparative and International Law 
       Perspective (2007) at 80. 
1257  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982. 
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Like in the United States law, the right to privacy in Canada is understood 
to apply vertically.  It is the protection of citizens against searches and 
seizures by the state.1258      
 
In Canada, the regulation of searches and seizures has been primarily the 
responsibility of the legislature, and its regulations have been enforced 
by the Supreme Court of Canada.1259  The relevant piece of legislation 
which dealt specifically with searches and seizures was the Combines 
Investigation Act.1260  In terms of the Act, the requirement for searches 
and seizures was reasonableness.  The Act stipulated conditions which, if 
met, would enable a court of law to declare a search reasonable:  A 
search warrant had to be obtained prior to the search.  The warrant had 
to be issued by a person who was capable of acting judicially, that is, who 
must not be involved in the investigation.   The warrant had to be issued 
only after it had been established upon oath that reasonable and 
probable grounds existed to believe that an offence had been committed, 
and that evidence was to be found in the place to be searched.1261 
 
The Combines Investigation Act has since been repealed and replaced by 
the Competition Act.1262  It is remarkable that the Competition Act of 
                                                 
1258  Hogg P W Constitutional Law of Canada  Vol 2 (2007) at 48-4. 
1259  Hunter v Southam  [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
1260  Combines Investigation Act of 1969, as amended. 
1261  Hogg PW Constitutional Law of Canada  Vol 2 (2007) at 48-23. 
1262  Competition Act of 1985. 
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Canada echoes the legal position in South Africa, the consistency of 
which has already been shown in this Chapter,1263 and in the United 
States, namely, that a warrant must not be vague and overbroad.  Section 
15(2) of the Competition  Act succinctly provides that: 
 
      A warrant issued under this section shall identify the matter in respect of which it is issued,  
     the premises to be searched and the record or other thing, or the class of records or other  
      things, to be searched.1264 
 
In South Africa, authors1265 have expressed themselves in an almost self-
contradictory manner regarding the issue of whether corporate entities 
have a claim to the right to privacy.  Neethling,1266 for example, writes 
that contrary to a natural person, a juristic person does not have a body, 
and that any other view would be unrealistic.  He then expresses the view 
that since a juristic person does not have a body, it does not have 
feelings which can be infringed.  For this reason, he draws the conclusion 
that a juristic person has no claim to the right to dignity and feelings.  It 
is submitted that this view is correct. 
 
The same author, however, then considers the right to privacy and 
identity.  The author reasons that since privacy and identity may be 
                                                 
1263  Pages 410-438. 
1264  Emphasis added. 
1265  Neethling J et al Law of Delict  (2006) 5th ed 299 – 301; Neethling J et al  Law of Personality   
       (2005) 2nd ed 71. 
1266  Neethling J et al  Law of Personality   (2005) 2nd ed  at 71. 
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analysed in the same way as with the right of a juristic person to a good 
name, fama, the same conclusion may be drawn as in the case of the 
right to a good name, namely, that there may be an infringement of 
personality without injured feelings.  The author comes to the final 
conclusion that, from a dogmatic point of view, a juristic person should 
be able to claim satisfaction for invasion of privacy even though it cannot 
suffer hurt to its feelings.1267 
 
It is a non-understandable contradiction  that a juristic person cannot 
claim the right to dignity and feelings, but can claim the right to privacy 
and identity. 
 
As far as South African courts are concerned, the Court in Financial Mail v 
Sage Holdings 1268 was prepared to accept Neethling‘s view that a juristic 
person does have a claim to the right to privacy notwithstanding the fact 
that it cannot have injured feelings.   
 
On the other hand, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has held that 
the privacy of a corporate entity is attenuated when compared to that of 
an individual.1269  In this respect only, the Court is to be commended for 
holding to consistency in the South African judicial precedent.  This has 
                                                 
1267  at 71. 
1268  Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451. 
1269  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC) at par. 77. 
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been the view since the early decision in Bernstein v Bester,1270 followed 
by Investigating Directorate v Hyundai Motor Distributors.1271   
 
It is submitted that this view is correct, since it accords with the text of 
the Constitution.  Section 8(2) of the Constitution provides that: 
 
     A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that,  
       it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty  
       imposed by the right. 
 
The condition created by the words ―if‖, ―to the extent that‖, ―taking into 
account the nature‖ makes it clear that a juristic person may be entitled 
to a right, or may be bound to respect and grant, a right, depending on 
the nature of the right.  Accordingly, the interpretation of the 
Constitutional Court in respect of the right a juristic person may have to 
privacy, that it is not as uncompromising as that of a natural person, is 
correct. 
 
However, the Court‘s interpretation of the right to privacy left something 
to be desired.  The premises of applicants which were the subject of the 
warrants of search and seizure were not only the premises of a juristic 
person, namely, the Thint Company.  The warrants also authorised 
                                                 
1270  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at par. 67. 
1271  Investigating Directorate:  Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor      
       Distributors and Others  2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at par. 18. 
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searches in the private dwellings of one of the applicants, a natural 
person.  These premises were listed clearly in paragraph 15 of the Court‘s 
judgment.  These were private dwellings at the applicant‘s flat in 
Killarney, Johannesburg, and at the applicant‘s residence at the Nkandla 
Traditional village, KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
The Court expressed itself clearly on the right to privacy of the juristic 
person in these words: 
 
     It must be borne in mind, however, that in Thint‘s case we are concerned with the search of  
       the offices of a company.  As a corporate entity, Thint does not bear human dignity and thus  
       its rights of privacy are much attenuated compared with those of human beings.1272 
 
However, the Court said nothing on the search conducted at the 
dwellings premises, which were of a private nature.  Whether this silence 
was by sheer oversight is not known, but the search of the offices was 
thoroughly analysed by the Court.     
 
The fact that the Court addressed itself to the right to privacy of a juristic 
person, to the neglect of the right in respect of the natural person, is not 
consistent with its precedent.  The Court had established in no uncertain 
                                                 
1272  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC) at par. 76. 
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terms the right of a natural person to privacy in Bernstein v Bester ,1273 
where the Court had held that: 
 
     A very high level of protection is given to the individual‘s intimate personal sphere of life and  
       the maintenance of its basic preconditions and there is a final untouchable sphere of human  
       freedom that is beyond interference from any public authority.  So much so that, in regard to  
       this most intimate core of privacy, no justifiable limitation thereof can take place.1274 
 
Despite the high respect the Court had shown for the privacy of an 
individual in his or her personal sphere in Bernstein v Bester,1275 it elected 
to be silent thereon in Thint v National Director of Public Prosecutions.1276 
 
7.10  Privacy arising from privilege 
 
It was a bone of contention in Thint  that the search and the subsequent 
seizure of personal belongings belonging to the applicants violated the 
attorney-client privilege, or legal profession privilege.  In order to assess 
the consistency of interpretation in this regard, it is essential first to set 
out  what the law provides in the statutes, in case law, and at common 
law. 
 
                                                 
1273  Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
1274  at par. 15 [emphasis added]. 
1275  Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NO  1996 (2) SA 751 (CC). 
1276  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others   2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
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Communication between a legal practitioner and his or her client enjoy 
protection, to enable unfettered communication without fear on the part 
of the client that what he or she told the legal practitioner in confidence 
would be divulged.  Privilege may be waived only by the client.1277 
 
In South Africa, legal professional privilege, or attorney-client privilege, is 
so important that its importance has been acknowledged  by the 
legislature.  Section 201 of the Criminal Procedure Act1278 protects legal 
professional privilege in criminal cases as follows: 
 
     ―No legal practitioner qualified to practice in any court, whether within the Republic or  
       elsewhere, shall be competent, without the consent of the person concerned, to give evidence  
       at criminal proceedings against any person by whom he is professionally employed or  
       consulted as to any fact, matter or thing with regard to which such practitioner would not on  
       the thirtieth day of May, 1961, by reason of such employment or consultation, have been  
       competent to give evidence without such consent:  Provided that such legal practitioner shall  
       be competent and compellable to give evidence as to any fact, matter or thing which relates  
       to or is connected with the commission of any offence with which the person by whom such  
       legal practitioner is professionally employed or consulted, is charged, if such fact, matter or  
       thing came to the knowledge of such legal practitioner before he was professionally  
       employed or consulted with reference to the defence of the person concerned‖.1279 
 
The essence of the statutory provision is that a legal practitioner is bound 
to keep confidential what was communicated to him or her by the client, 
                                                 
1277  Schwikkard P J et al  Principles of Evidence   (2009) 3rd ed at 149. 
1278  Act 51 of 1977. 
1279  Section 201 of the Act. 
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if it was communicated to the legal practitioner while the relationship 
between the legal practitioner and the client was that of a client 
consulting with the legal practitioner.  There are only two exceptions to 
the rule:  only if the client has given consent to the communication being 
disclosed, and if the legal practitioner came to have the information 
before he or she was consulted by the client. 
 
When writing about this kind of privilege, authors1280 have a common 
denominator, that legal professional privilege requires the following:  that 
the legal practitioner must have been acting in a professional capacity; 
the communication must have been made in confidence; it must have 
been for the purpose of obtaining legal advice; and it is the client who 
must claim the privilege.1281 
 
The requirement that the legal practitioner must have been acting in his 
or her professional capacity has been strengthened by courts, both in 
England1282 and in South Africa,1283 by holding that it is not necessary 
that the legal practitioner be a private practitioner; consultations of a 
salaried practitioner employed by a private company or by the State are 
also privileged.  The rationale for this view, according to the South 
                                                 
1280  Schwikkard P J et al  Principles of Evidence  (2009) 3rd ed; Cross R  Cross on Evidence   
      (1979) 5th ed;  Hoffman L H and Zeffert D The South African Law of Evidence  (1988) 4th ed. 
1281  Schwikkard P J Principles of Evidence 3rd ed (2009) at 147 -149. 
1282  Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (No 2)   
       [1972] 2 QB All ER 353. 
1283  Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa  2001 2 SA 1145 (C).   
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African Court in Mohamed v President of the Republic of South Africa,1284 
is that if the legal professional privilege applied only in the case of 
lawyers in private practice, that would force government departments, 
statutory bodies, and private companies with in-house legal advisers to 
reorganise — at great cost to themselves — their modus operandi, so 
that all legal advice required is received from independent legal advisers, 
rather than from their salaried legal staff.   
 
There is one recognised reason which would preclude a client from 
claiming privilege, namely, if the client consulted with a legal practitioner 
for the purpose of discussing a possible settlement.1285  The rationale 
behind this exclusion is that the communication between the client and 
the legal practitioner is intended, in any event, to be communicated to a 
third party, that is, the opponent of the client in litigation.  
 
Another area of law where privilege features, is in civil procedure.  Civil 
procedure  requires discovery of documents which either party relies on 
for its case.  This step should take place after close of pleadings, before 
the matter is argued in court.  Rule 35 of the High Court Rules was 
designed for this very purpose.  Discovery is such a crucial stage of 
proceedings that if a party, having been duly served with notice to 
discover, fails to do so within the time allowed, the party requiring 
                                                 
1284  Ibid. 
1285  Dugdale A M Professional Negligence  2nd ed (1989) at 490. 
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discovery may apply to court for an order to comply.  Failure to comply 
may result in the court dismissing the claim, or striking out the defence, 
at the instance of the party requiring discovery.1286 
 
Having set out the seriousness with which discovery is viewed in civil 
procedure, it is now appropriate to show the parallel importance of 
privilege.  While Rule 35 makes provision for compelling discovery, it 
exempts certain documents from discovery. Subrule (2) relaxes the rigid 
requirement of discovery by allowing documents which are deemed to be 
privileged to be excluded from discovery.  Documents of this nature are 
those which contain ―communications between attorney and client and 
between attorney and advocate‖.1287 
 
Commenting on the weight to be attached to privileged documents which 
exist between a client and a legal adviser, Erasmus et al1288 remark that 
documents  which fall into this category must be omitted from schedules 
by the party making discovery.  The subrule gives effect to the general 
principle that a litigant is not obliged, either before or during a trial, to 
disclose any document which was brought into existence for the purpose 
of litigation.  The subrule also underscores the fact that communication 
made in confidence to counsel, attorneys, and even to their clerks, that 
                                                 
1286  Rule 35(7) of the High Court Uniform Rules. 
1287  Erasmus H J et al  Superior Court  Practice  (2005) at 247. 
1288  Ibid.  
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is, professional assistants acting under the control and direction of the 
principal, is privileged.  The learned authors add that such 
communication is privileged even if it is made through an interpreter.  
Finally, they make a point, not made by other authors, that such 
communication is ―privileged permanently‖.1289  
 
Discovery may be resisted even where a litigant is conducting his or her 
own case.1290 
 
Having outlined the position in law as regards privilege, it is now 
convenient to assess the consistency in the South African jurisprudence.  
The South African judicial precedent in respect of privilege was 
established at a time when there was still no special court entrusted with 
the adjudication of constitutional questions only.  The fact of the matter 
is that there was no Constitution that was elevated to the status of being 
the supreme law of the land, against which the validity of all laws would 
be tested.  The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa 
was the highest and final judicial authority in settling any questions of 
law.  Thus, the body of precedents established by that authority should 
be respected. 
 
                                                 
1289  Erasmus H J et al  Superior Court Practice  (2005) at 255 [emphasis added]. 
1290  Hoffmann L H and Zeffertt D The South African Law of Evidence (1988) 4th ed at 267. 
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The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 is now the 
supreme law of the land, and the validity of every law, and of every 
conduct of the executive, is measured against it. Interpretation of laws 
must also be consistent with the Bill of Rights contained in the 
Constitution. 
 
The question arises, then, as to what the position should be with regard 
to judicial precedent established by higher courts, and especially by the 
Appellate Division, or the now Supreme Court of Appeal, now that there is 
the Constitutional Court. 
 
The answer lies in the text of the Constitution itself.  Section 39(2) of the 
Constitution answers: 
 
      When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law,  
        every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of  
        Rights. 
 
This means that the test is whether the existing body of precedent is in 
harmony with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.  The Constitutional Court is 
the highest court in constitutional matters.  As such, it has the 
jurisdiction to overturn precedent established by other higher courts 
where their decisions are inconsistent with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.  
Conversely, this also means that the Constitutional Court would have no 
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basis for disturbing what has become settled law, if that law is consistent 
with the Bill of Rights.  If any court were to do so, it would be showing 
disregard for the internationally recognised doctrine of stare decisis.   
 
It is convenient, first, to look at the way the right to privacy was drafted.   
Section 14 of the Constitution does not mention privilege.  However, the 
wording of the section indicates that the four listed aspects of privacy are 
merely the four among other aspects.  The section says that the right 
―includes‖1291 the four listed aspects.  The section does not limit the right 
to privacy to the few specified areas.  It is submitted that privilege, for 
example, is an aspect of privacy.  However, under privilege alone, there 
are several other aspects falling under privilege.  For example, 
communication between the following persons is privileged:  between 
husband and wife; doctor and patient; and between a legal practitioner 
and a client.1292 
 
In view of the wording of the section, it is abundantly clear that in 
interpreting the section, a court may not adopt a narrow approach.  A 
generous approach is called for.  Thus, if a litigant claimed the right to 
privacy under one of its aspects, namely, privilege, and more specifically 
attorney-client privilege, a court would have to accept the claim as being 
covered by the Bill of Rights.   
                                                 
1291  Emphasis added. 
1292  Erasmus H J et al Superior Court Practice  (2005) at 247. 
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The correctness of this view is backed up by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in its interpretation of the right to privacy.  In Lavelle v 
Canada,1293 the Court held: 
 
      Solicitor-client privilege is a rule of evidence, an important civil and legal right and a  
        principle of fundamental justice in Canadian law.  While the public has an interest in effective  
        criminal investigation, it has no less an interest in maintaining the integrity of the solicitor- 
        client relationship.  Confidential communications to a lawyer represent an important exercise  
        of the right to privacy, and they are central to the administration of justice in an adversarial  
        system.  Unjustified, or even accidental infringements of the privilege erode the public‘s  
         confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.  This is why all efforts must be  
         made to protect such confidences.1294 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada did not hesitate to interpret the right 
to privacy as encapsulating the legal professional privilege.  By 
comparison, the Constitutional Court of South Africa eschewed the 
question whether the right to privacy covers privilege, and explained its 
avoidance by stating that the applicants did not assert that the 
Constitution itself protects legal professional privilege, and therefore 
there was no need for the Court to explore that question.1295 
 
                                                 
1293  Lavellee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada  
       (Attorney General); R v Fink 2002 3 S.C.R. 209. 
1294  Ibid at par. 49. 
1295  Lavellee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada  
       (Attorney General); R v Fink  2002 3 S. C. R. 209 at par. 82. 
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A long chain of judicial precedent in South Africa dealing with privacy has 
already been outlined in this Chapter.  However, for purposes of privilege, 
it is necessary to look at the groundwork that was laid by the South 
African courts even before the coming into effect of the final 
Constitution.  While the interim Constitution was still the provisional 
Constitution, the Cape Provincial Division of the High Court in Park-Ross 
v Director:  Office for Serious Economic Offences,1296 dealt with search 
and seizure, which was said to be out of harmony with the right to 
privacy, as it was then entrenched in section 13 of the interim 
Constitution.    
 
The constitutionality of section 6 of the Investigation of Serious Economic 
Offences Act1297 was impugned.  The section provided for search and 
seizure, and was worded as follows: 
 
      (1)  The Director or any person authorised thereto by him in writing may for the purposes of  
      an inquiry at any reasonable time and without prior notice or with such notice as he may deem  
      appropriate, enter any premises on or in which anything connected with that inquiry  is or  
      suspected to be. 
 
 
The Court acknowledged that, like any other right, the right protecting 
citizens against search and seizure was subject to limitations.   However,  
                                                 
1296  Park-Ross and Another v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences  1995 (2) SA 148 (C). 
1297  Act 117 of 1991. 
461 
 
a law limiting the right would have to meet certain requirements, namely, 
(a) that the law must pursue an objective which is sufficiently important 
to justify limiting the right; (b) the law must rationally be connected to 
the objective; (c) it must impair the right no more than is necessary to 
accomplish the objective; and (d) it must not have a disproportionately 
severe effect on the persons to whom it applies.1298  It was the Court‘s 
view that section 6 of the Act, while meeting the requirements (a) and (b), 
did not meet the requirements (c) and (d). 
 
However, a strong precedent in respect of legal professional privilege was 
set by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bogoshi v Van Vuuren NO and 
Others ,1299 where similarities can be found in almost all material respects 
between the Thint v National Director of Public Prosecutions 1300  case of 
the Constitutional Court and the Bogoshi v Van Vuuren 1301  case of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal: in both cases attorneys and their offices were 
involved; in both cases the offices of the attorneys were searched and 
documents seized; in both cases privilege was claimed; in both cases a 
request was made that the documents be kept at the Registrar‘s office 
until the lawfulness of the search and seizure was determined. 
 
                                                 
1298  Park-Ross and Another v Director:  Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) SA 148 (C)    
       at 152. 
1299  Bogoshi v Van Vuuren NO and Others  1996 (1) SA 785 (SCA). 
1300  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
1301  Bogoshi v Van Vuuren NO and Others  1996 (1) SA 785 (SCA). 
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Crucial principles were laid down in Bogoshi as to how attorney-client 
privilege should be viewed in cases of search and seizure. It is submitted 
that these principles are not in conflict with the spirit of the Bill of Rights.  
As such, they are constitutionally valid, and should serve as precedent to 
any court that is seized with the adjudication of the question of legal 
professional privilege, as it relates to searches of attorneys‘ offices. 
 
The principles, or guidelines, which crystallised in Bogoshi  were that: (a)  
only confidential communications, and material integral thereto, between 
attorney and client, made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, are 
privileged1302; (b)  in the multitude of documents contained in an 
attorney‘s office, there would be documents and information which, in 
the ordinary course of events, may not be privileged1303;  (c)  privilege 
does not arise automatically, it must be claimed.1304  This may be done 
not only by the client, but by the attorney as well.  As a matter of fact, an 
attorney is under a duty to claim privilege.  The Court found it necessary 
to qualify this third principle by stating that in claiming privilege on 
behalf of client, an attorney must be acting, not for his own interests, but 
on behalf of the client, otherwise the attorney‘s claim to privilege may be 
regarded as not genuine.1305  In such a case, a court would be entitled to 
                                                 
1302   Bogoshi v Van Vuuren NO and Others  1996 (1) SA 785 (SCA) at 792J to 793A. 
1303   Ibid at 793A-B. 
1304   Ibid at 793H-I. 
1305   Ibid at 793J; see In re Impounded Case (Law Firm)  879 F 2d 1211 (3rd Cir 1989) where an  
        attorney ostensibly claimed privilege on behalf of his client, whereas his intention was to  
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disregard the claim to privilege, and admit the document in question as 
evidence, or permit its seizure, as the case may be; (d)  privileged 
documents may not be seized under a search warrant1306; and (e) it is the 
task of courts to vigilantly safeguard legal professional privilege, and 
therefore, the right of governmental authorities to enter upon an 
attorney‘s office and to seize a client‘s documents must be critically 
examined.1307 
 
Attention is now given to applying the first principle laid down by the 
Court, that only confidential communications, and material integral 
thereto, between attorney and client, for the purpose of obtaining legal 
advice, are privileged.  Applying this principle to the case of Thint v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions,1308 it is reasonable to conclude 
that the applicant had no expectation that his legal profession offices 
were to be searched.  In a situation where a search is sudden, it is only 
natural that an attorney will not be able to say with certainty which 
document, lying where precisely in his or her office, contains confidential 
communication.  Therefore, a court judgment which is in the spirit of the 
Bill of Rights will take this human inability into account, and will not be 
                                                                                                                                                 
        frustrate investigation against him. 
1306   This principle was repeated with approval by the Constitutional Court in Thint (Pty) Ltd and  
        Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others   2009 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
1307  Bogoshi v Van Vuuren NO and Others  1996 (1) SA 785 (SCA) at 795D. 
1308  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
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rigid in its demand that documents or information claimed to be 
privileged be specified with unmistaken accuracy.   
 
Indeed, it is submitted that it would be safer for any court to err on the 
side of caution, by assuming that most of what is to be found in an 
attorney‘s office is privileged.  The Constitutional Court made this 
important observation,1309 but was not  guided by it.  An attorney‘s 
profession is that of consulting and providing legal advice to clients.  Our 
law, in all its manifestations in criminal proceedings, is careful to make 
presumptions that are favourable to the accused, than to the State.1310  
This is because the onus of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the 
shoulders of the State.  An example of this presumption is the 
admissibility of confessions in criminal proceedings.1311  The admissibility 
of confessions as evidence of the guilt of the accused is not presumed in 
                                                 
1309  In Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2009 (1)  
       SA 1 (CC), at paragraph 12, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that: ―there is always the  
       risk that privileged documents may be discovered during a search, wherever the search takes  
       place, and any judge who issues a search warrant will appreciate this‖.  At paragraph 96 the  
       same acknowledgment was made:  ―It is undeniable that, where a search of an attorney‘s  
       offices is undertaken in circumstances where his or her client is under investigation, such  
       searches may raise a danger that items protected by legal professional privilege will be  
       discovered.  Of course, searching the home or office of a person under investigation will also  
       bear the risk of the discovery of privileged items, as it will be likely that any letters or  
       documents prepared for legal advice to that person will also have been sent to the person  
       under investigation.  But when attorneys‘ offices are searched, there is the additional risk that  
       the privileged documents of other clients of an attorney may be found.  I agree therefore that  
       there is a greater risk of the invasion of legal professional privilege when the search of  
       attorneys; offices is undertaken‖. 
1310  See, for example, S v Bhulwana  1996 (1) SA 388.  
1311  Cross R  Cross on Evidence  (1979) 5th ed at 541; Hoffmann L H and Zeffertt D  The South  
       African Law of Evidence (1988) 4th ed 207 – 235;  Schwikkard P J Principles of Evidence (2009)  
       3rd ed  335 – 358. 
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favour of the State.  The presumption is in favour of the accused; it is that 
the confession is inadmissible.  For the confession to be admissible, it 
must meet certain requirements,1312 which are proved by means of a trial 
within a trial.1313 
 
The above view finds support in Canadian law.  In Canada, the State has 
been regarded as a ―singular antagonist‖1314 against an individual; the 
State is in a position of power when compared to the accused person.  
For this reason, the failure on the part of a court to balance up the 
unequal positions by demanding less of the State, while demanding too 
much of the accused, who is in a weaker position, would be a failure of 
justice. 
 
This view was reinforced in connection with criminal proceedings by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Lavallee v Canada,1315 where the Court 
emphasised that in the context of a criminal investigation, legal 
professional privilege acquires an additional dimension.  The individual 
privilege holder is facing the state as a ―singular antagonist‖, and for this 
reason he or she requires an arsenal of constitutionally guaranteed 
                                                 
1312  Section 217(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51  of 1977; Schwikkard P J et al Principles of  
       Evidence  (2009) 3rd ed at 337-338; Cross R Cross on Evidence  (1979) 5th ed at 534-536.      
       For a confession to be admissible as evidence against the accused, it must have been made  
       voluntarily by the accused, in his or her sober senses, and without undue influence. 
1313  Schwikkard P J Principles of Evidence  (2009) 3rd ed at 347. 
1314  Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General)  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 994. 
1315  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada  
        (Attorney General) R v Fink  2002 3 S.C.R 209 at par. 23. 
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rights.  The Supreme Court of Canada added that it is when a person is 
the target of a criminal investigation that the need for the full protection 
of the privilege is activated.  It is therefore incumbent on courts to ensure 
that the privilege delivers on the promise of confidentiality that it 
holds.1316 
 
The second guideline that was laid down by the Court in Bogoshi was 
that, in the multitude of documents found in an attorney‘s office, there 
would be documents and information which, in the course of events, may 
not be privileged.1317  The use of the word ―may‖ opens the way for the 
guideline to be applicable both in favour of the State or the attorney.  
This means that, because some documents in the office of an attorney 
may not be privileged, by the same token, some documents may be 
privileged.  The latter understanding is in consonant with the principle of 
legality, which requires that if a law is open to more than one 
interpretation, the interpretation favourable to the accused must be 
preferred over the one prejudicial to the accused.1318 
 
                                                 
1316  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada  
       (Attorney General); R v Fink  2002 3 S. C. R. 209  at par. 23. 
1317  Bogoshi v Van Vuuren NO and Others  1996 (1) SA 785 (SCA) at 793A. 
1318  Burchell J  Principles of Criminal Law  (2005) 3rd ed at 101; S v Maweke and Others  1971 (2)  
       SA 327 (A) at 329; Nkopane and Others v Independent Electoral Commission  (2007) 28 ILJ  
       670 (LC) at 671; Terblanche S ―Aspects of minimum sentence legislation: judicial comment  
       and the court‘s jurisdiction‖ 2001  SACJ  7; Van der Walt A J ―Transformative  
       constitutionalism and the development of South African Property of Law (part 2)‖ 2006   
       TSAR  9. 
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The Constitution itself favours such an understanding.  Section 39(2) of 
the Constitution enjoins courts which perform the task of interpreting 
legislation, developing common law, or customary law, to promote the 
spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.  The Bill of Rights, while 
placing some limitation to rights under section 36, was designed, 
particularly in criminal proceedings, to protect accused persons from 
being victimised by the State.  An example of this fact is section 35 of the 
Constitution, which protects the rights of arrested, detained, and trial-
undergoing accused persons. 
  
Further, section 39(3) provides that the Bill of Rights does not deny the 
existence of any other rights, or freedoms, that are recognised, or 
conferred by common law, customary law, or legislation, to the extent 
that those rights are consistent with the Bill.  This section means that 
there may be other rights which are not specifically mentioned in the text 
of the Constitution which may be a creature of common law, customary 
law, or legislation.  Such rights, though not mentioned by the text of the 
Constitution, are still protected by the Constitution.  It is submitted that 
among such rights is privilege, which arises from common law, in 
particular the legal professional privilege.  Privilege is not specifically 
mentioned in the text of the Constitution, but it falls under the right to 
privacy, which was drafted in an open-ended style so as to include other 
rights, which section 39(3)  says are also protected. 
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Applying this guideline and the interpretation attached to the case of  
Thint v National Director of Public Prosecutions,1319 it is submitted that 
the Court was supposed to lean towards the assumption that there were 
documents or information in the applicant‘s office which could be 
privileged.  Indeed, the applicant requested that documents seized be 
taken for safekeeping to the Registrar‘ offices, until the lawfulness or 
constitutionality of their seizure was determined.  The fact that the 
applicant could not, at the stage of the seizure, state with certainty that 
the documents seized were privileged or not, should have, in the 
assessment of a reasonable court, been understandable.  In view of this 
uncertainty as to which documents were privileged, and which were not, 
the applicant only claimed a blanket privilege.  It is submitted that the 
approach which the Court should have adopted is:  in any legal 
practitioner‘s office, privileged documents are bound to be found.  It is, 
therefore, only prudent to err on the safe side, by assuming that there 
are, rather than the opposite assumption.  An opposite assumption flies 
in the face of the principle of legality and the spirit of the Bill of Rights. 
 
The third principle, or guideline, laid down in Bogoshi v Van Vuuren 1320  
was that privilege does not arise automatically, but must be claimed.  
                                                 
1319  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
1320  Bogoshi v Van Vuuren NO and Others  1996 (1) SA 785 (SCA). 
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Academic writers1321 and courts1322 have repeatedly stated that privilege 
is the right of the client, and therefore it can only be waived by the client.  
However, privilege can also be claimed by a legal practitioner on behalf of 
his or her client.  The only reason why in Bogoshi  the claim to privilege 
was not sustained is that it was not raised bona fide.  
 
Applying further the principles established in Bogoshi  to the case of 
Thint v National Director of Public Prosecutions,1323 it is best to outline 
first the background to the argument that was finally endorsed by  the 
Constitutional Court, that the applicants did not raise privilege. 
 
The search warrants were executed both at the offices of the juristic 
person, Thint (Pty) Ltd, and at the offices of an attorney.  Investigators 
seized various items from Thint‘s offices, including documents and 
computers.  An employee of the Company was present during the search.  
The employee stated in unambiguous terms in her affidavit that she was 
aware that certain correspondence between the Company, Thint, and its 
lawyers, was confidential and privileged.  She stated that she had been 
informed by her superior which documents were in this class.  She 
                                                 
1321  Dugdale A M et al Professional Negligence  (1989) 2nd ed 490; Schwikkard P J Principles of  
       Evidence  (2009) 3rd ed 149; Cross R Cross on Evidence  (1979) 5th ed 286; Hoffmann L H and  
        Zeffertt D  The South African Law of Evidence  (1988) 4th ed 254. 
1322   Waterhouse v Shields  1924 CPD 155; Watts v Goodman  1929 WLD 199; Bogoshi v Van  
        Vuuren NO and Another  1996 (1) SA 785 (SCA) 793D. 
1323   Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
        1 (CC). 
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claimed privileged in respect of certain documents in a filing room, while 
calling in the assistance of the Company‘s attorneys.1324   
 
As regards the search in the offices of the attorney, the issue was 
whether the applicant had claimed privilege at the time that the search 
was conducted.  It was argued that the applicant did not claim privilege at 
the time of the search and seizure, and that if he did, he did so later, and 
the claim was a mere suggestion that there might be privileged 
documents in the items that were seized by the State.   
 
If the import of section 39(2) of the Constitution was clear, there should 
have been no doubt as to what the correct view should have been.  The 
section favours a court ruling that inclines itself towards the promotion of 
the spirit, purport, and objects of the Bill of Rights.  A ruling that inclines 
itself away from the overall spirit of the Bill of Rights is, accordingly, 
discouraged by the section.   
 
In the light of the above submission, therefore, the Court was supposed 
to be prepared to develop the common law principle of privilege which 
requires that privilege be raised at the time of the search.  The Court was 
supposed to develop the principle to cover the situation where privilege is 
claimed later, rather than at the time of the search.  Such a development 
                                                 
1324  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC) at par. 20. 
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of the common law principle would be in terms of section 39(2) of the 
Constitution.   Indeed, section 173 of the Constitution puts the 
responsibility squarely on the Constitutional Court1325 ―to develop the 
common law, taking into account the interests of justice‖. 
 
It is interesting to note that the Constitutional Court acknowledged the 
fact, either without being aware of it, or without intending to rely on its 
own acknowledgement, that it is immaterial when privilege is claimed.  
What is material is that it should be raised.  The Court acknowledged the 
import of section 29(11) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act1326 : 
 
      Section 29(11) in no way undermines the ordinary common-law accorded to privileged  
        documents.  Should investigators seize documents that are privileged, but no claim of  
        privilege is made at the time of the search so that section 29(11) does not come into  
        operation, the ordinary rules governing privileged documents will continue to apply.  The  
        state therefore will not be able to use the privileged documents in any criminal proceedings,  
       and any derivative evidence obtained as a result may also be excluded (depending on the  
        application of section 35(5) of the Constitution by the trial court).  There may also be the risk  
        that the unlawful seizure of privileged documents in egregious circumstances could result in  
                                                 
1325   and the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the High Courts. 
1326   Act 32 of 1998.  Section 29(11) of the Act provides: 
        If during the execution of a warrant or the conducting of a search in terms of this section, a  
        person claims that any item found on or in the premises concerned contains privileged  
        information and for that reason refuses the inspection or removal of such item, the person  
        executing the warrant  or conducting the search shall, if he or she is of the opinion that the  
        item contains information which is relevant to the inquiry and that such information is        
        necessary for the inquiry, request the registrar of the High Court which has jurisdiction or his  
        or her delegate, to seize and remove that item for sake custody until a court of law has made 
        a ruling on the question whether the information concerned is privileged or not. 
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        the trial court ruling that the trial itself is unfair.1327 
 
In casu, the attorney did not raise the question of privilege immediately, 
but later after the searchers had left his office. 
 
The second stronger precedent in South Africa, on the question of the 
extent of protection to be afforded attorney-client communications, was 
established in S v Sefatsa,1328 where, during cross examination of a state 
witness, defence counsel brought to the attention of the trial judge that  
the defence was in possession of a statement made by the state witness 
which was prima facie a privileged statement.  The statement had been 
made by the state witness to an attorney for the purpose of obtaining 
legal advice.  Defence counsel argued that he was nevertheless entitled to 
cross-examine the state witness on the contents of the statement.  If 
allowed by the trial judge to cross-examine the state witness, the cross-
examination would show the innocence of the accused represented by 
counsel.  It was counsel‘s argument that the trial judge had the power to 
order that the state witness be cross-examined on his privileged 
statement.  Defence counsel relied on R v Barton,1329 where Caulfield J 
held that if there are documents in the possession of counsel which, on 
                                                 
1327 Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA 1  
       (CC) at 56G-I [emphasis added]. 
1328  S v Sefatsa and Others  1988 (1) SA 868. 
1329  R v Barton  [1972]  2 QB All ER 1192. 
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production, help to further the defence of an accused person, no privilege 
attaches.1330 
 
The trial judge in S v Sefatsa leaned towards the view that he had no 
power to override privilege.  After conviction and sentence, the trial 
judge, having heard an application for leave to appeal, granted the 
application for leave to appeal on the basis, among others, that he could 
have erred in law by disallowing cross-examination of the state witness 
on grounds of the inviolability of privilege. 
 
When the matter came before the Appellate Division, as it then was, the 
Court, per Botha JA, held that any claim to a relaxation of privilege must 
be approached with the greatest circumspection.1331  Accordingly, the 
Appeal  Court found that the trial judge did not err in law in disallowing 
the cross-examination of the state witness on a privileged statement. 
 
Thus, the view taken in Thint v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions1332 regarding the legal professional privilege does not take 
into account the precedent established in the South African 
jurisprudence.  The acknowledgement1333 that precedent was set in 
                                                 
1330  R v Barton  [1972]  2 QB All ER 1192 at 1192D. 
1331  S v Sefatsa and Others  1988 (1) SA 868 at 886G. 
1332  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
1333  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
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Bogoshi v Van Vuuren NO and Others1334 that privileged documents may 
not be seized under search warrant should have prevented the seizure of 
privileged documents in Thint v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions.1335 
 
It is not a prerequisite of common law, nor of any statute, that a person 
claiming privilege be precise as to what document or information is 
privileged, at least at the time of the unexpected search.  It is common 
knowledge that when a search is sudden and unexpected, confusion and 
anxiety may set in, and at that moment of confusion and anxiety a 
precise recollection of what is privileged and what is not, is not always 
humanly possible.  It is these considerations that a court should always 
be prepared to grant in criminal proceedings in favour of the accused. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada has been exemplary in this regard.  It was 
precisely for this reason, the failure of taking into account possible 
confusion and anxiety on the part of an attorney, that a statutory 
provision was declared constitutionally invalid by the Supreme Court of 
Canada.  In Lavallee v Canada,1336 section 488.1 of the Criminal Code of 
                                                                                                                                                 
       1 (CC) at par. 84. 
1334  Bogoshi v Van Vuuren NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 785 (SCA). 
1335  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
1336  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Otternheimer & Baker v Canada  
       (Attorney General); R v Fink  2003 3 S. C. R. 209. 
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Canada1337 was impugned for violating attorney-client privilege.  The 
challenge was based on section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,1338 which guarantees protection against search and seizure.  
As in the  South African case of Thint v National Director,1339 the applicant 
was an attorney whose offices had been searched on the authority of a 
warrant.   
 
The impugned section 488.1(2) provided that seized items may be sealed 
and kept safe only if a ―lawyer . . .  claims that a named client of his has a 
solicitor-client privilege‖1340 in respect of the documents.  In terms of the 
impugned section 488.1(8), if the attorney is present at the time and 
place of the search, the officers conducting the search had to give the 
attorney a reasonable opportunity to claim privilege.  If no claim was 
made, the searching officers could seize the documents and freely 
examine their contents, which had the effect of the privilege being lost.  
Most importantly, however, the statutory provision was struck down 
because of allowing privilege to be lost if the attorney, though present, 
failed to claim privilege for whatever reason, such as sickness, or out of 
sheer nervousness arising out of having his or her office searched.1341  
                                                 
1337  Criminal Code of Canada R.S.C. 1985. 
1338  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982. 
1339  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
1340  Emphasis added. 
1341  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada  
       (Attorney General); R v Fink  2002 3 S. C. R. 209 at par. 27. 
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Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada was exemplary in taking human 
nature and weaknesses into account, and in not allowing these to 
compromise the protection afforded by attorney-client privilege. 
 
The applicants in the South African case of Thint v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions 1342 had relied on the Canadian case of Lavallee v 
Canada 1343 in claiming privilege, but the Constitutional Court dismissed 
their reliance by pointing out that the attorney in Lavellee had claimed 
privilege, whereas in Thint he had not, that is, in the Court‘s view.  It is 
submitted that the judicial practice of comparing foreign law, and the 
doctrine of judicial precedent in the court‘s own jurisdiction, does not 
require blindly that there be exactly identical parallels between the case 
before the court and the case relied upon as precedent, or the case relied 
upon in another jurisdiction.  It is sufficient that there be some major 
similarities, and the underlying principles be the same.  For a court to 
reject being bound, or at least being persuaded, by the judgment of 
another court simply because the cases do not correspond in every minor 
detail, betrays a disregard for wisdom and insight already displayed in its 
own jurisdiction, or in comparable foreign case law. 
 
                                                 
1342  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others  2009 (1) SA  
       1 (CC). 
1343  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada  
       (Attorney General); R v Fink  2003 3 S. C. R. 209. 
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Canada has a long history of treating legal professional privilege with 
respect.  Indeed, the case of Lavellee was the culmination of a trend 
which had its start from the 1970s.  Before the 1970s, the searching of 
law offices, according to the Court in Lavellee, was seldom heard of in 
criminal investigations.  But since the 1970s the Court1344 observed that 
there had been an increasing trend in Canada towards more aggressive 
investigatory methods which included the issuing of warrants to search 
law offices for evidence of crime. 
 
Canadian courts1345 expressed concern about the dangers of searching 
law offices in view of the attorney-client privilege, and urged Parliament 
to create protective measures.  Thus, section 488.1 of the Criminal Code 
of Canada was designed to allay the concerns of the Court with regard to 
attorney-client privilege.  Unfortunately, however, section 488.1 fell short 
                                                 
1344  at par. 10. 
1345  In R v Colvin, ex parte Merrick  (1970) 1 C.C.C. (2d) 8 (Ont. H.C., the Court held: 
       ―The question of solicitor-privilege is, in this connection, a troublesome one.  On the one  
         hand, no authority should be given carte blanche to search through the files in a solicitor‘s  
         office in hopes of discovering material prepared for the purpose of advising the client in the  
         normal and legitimate course of professional practice.  The privilege, however, is exclusively  
         that of the client and does not extend to correspondence, memoranda or documents  
         prepared for the purpose of assisting a client to commit a crime nor to material  in no way  
         related to the giving of proper advice but stored with the solicitor purely for the purpose of  
         avoiding seizure in the hands of the client‖ at 13.  
          See also Re Borden & Elliott and The Queen  (1975) 30 C.C.C. (2d) 337 (Ont. C.A.).   
          In Descôteaux v Mierzwinski   [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860, the Court expressed the view that: 
          ―If the privilege could not be invoked to prevent the seizure and examination of documents  
           under a search warrant, the Crown would be free in any case to seize and examine the files  
           and brief of defence counsel in a criminal prosecution.  It would be small comfort indeed to  
           the accused and to his counsel to discover that his only protection in such a case was to  
           prevent the introduction into evidence of the documents that had been seized and  
           examined.  Such a result, in my view, would be absurd‖. 
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of being the desired legislative protection, but instead the section itself 
unconstitutionally jeopardised attorney-client privilege.1346 
 
At the time of the search in the attorney‘s offices in Thint v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions, the attorney raised the concern that some 
documents seized might be privileged.  In view of this concern, the 
attorney requested the seizing officers to place the seized items with the 
Registrar of the High Court for safe custody until the question of which 
items were privileged was settled by a court of law.  The seizing officers 
denied the attorney this indulgence, retorting that ―the law did not make 
provision for the documents to be lodged with registrar for that 
purpose‖.1347  It turned out that the statutory law which the seizing 
officers were a creature of, in fact authorised the proposal made by the 
attorney — lodging the seized documents with the registrar of the High 
Court until the question of privilege is determined by a court of law.1348 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the law was in favour of the applicant‘s side 
of the issue in this regard, the Court did not attach much weight to this 
aspect in its order. 
 
                                                 
1346  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada  
       (Attorney General); R v Fink  2003 3 S. C. R. 209 at par. 11. 
1347  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2009 (1) SA 1  
       (CC) at par. 27. 
1348  Section 29(11) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998. 
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7.11  The absolute or relative nature of privilege 
7.11.1  In South African law 
 
The final issue worth exploring is the extent to which legal professional 
privilege should be protected by courts — whether it is absolute or not.  
It is convenient to consider first the view adopted by the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa in deciding the political case of Thint v National 
Director of Prosecutions.1349  The Court took the view that legal 
professional privilege is not absolute.1350 
 
In establishing the extent of protection to be afforded privileged material, 
it is enlightening to peer into Canadian, Australian, and English law.   
It is convenient to consider, first, what the Supreme Court of Canada has 
held.  
 
7.11.2   In Canadian law 
 
 In Lavelle v Canada,1351 the facts were similar to the facts in Thint v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions.  The Supreme Court of Canada 
acknowledged that despite its importance, legal professional privilege is 
not absolute.  However, the Court added that legal professional privilege 
                                                 
1349  Thint (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions  2009 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
1350  Ibid at par. 84. 
1351  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v Canada  
       (Attorney General); R v Fink 2002 3 S.C.R. 209. 
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―must be as close to absolute as possible to ensure public confidence and 
retain relevance.  As such it will only yield in certain clearly defined 
circumstances‖.1352   
 
Thus, the clear view held by the Canadian Supreme Court is that, while 
legal professional privilege cannot be said to be absolute, it should 
nevertheless be treated as close to absolute as possible.   
 
7.11.3   In Australian law 
 
In Australia, as was the position in Thint, the High Court of Australia had 
to deal with the seizure of attorney-client privileged documents.1353  The 
seizure was authorised by legislation.1354  The wording of section 10 of 
the Australian Crimes Act did not exempt a lawyer‘s office from being 
                                                 
1352  Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v Canada (Attorney General); White, Otteheimer & Baker v Canada  
       (Attorney General); R v Fink  2002 3 S. C. R. 209  at par. 36. 
1353  In Baker v Campbell  [1983] HCA 39; (1983) 153 CLR 52. 
1354  Section 10 of the Australian Crimes Act of 1914 provided: 
       If a Justice of the Peace is satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable ground  
       for suspecting that there is in any house, vessel, or place— 
(a)   anything with respect to which any offence against any law of the Commonwealth or of           
  a territory has been, or is suspected on reasonable grounds to have been, committed; 
(b) anything as to which there are reasonable grounds for believing that it will afford         
  evidence as to the commission of any such offence; or 
(c) anything as to which there is reasonable ground for believing that it is intended to be      
used for the purpose of committing any such offence,he may grant a search warrant 
authorising any constable therein, with such assistance as he thinks necessary, to enter at 
any time any house, vessel, or place named or described in the warrant, if necessary by force, 
and to seize any such thing which he may find in the house, vessel or place‖. 
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searched and from having documents found therein seized, 
notwithstanding the fact that privilege was raised.   
 
It was contended on behalf of the law firm that was involved that if 
section 10 was allowed to operate to include law firms, it would operate 
to extinguish a privilege which had existed for many centuries and which 
was recognised to be in the public interest.1355  For this reason, it was 
argued that Parliament could not have intended such a result, otherwise 
such an intention would have been expressed in unambiguous terms. 
 
The majority judgment held that section 10 of the Crimes Act did not 
entitle the seizing of privilege-protected documents under a search 
warrant, as that would extinguish a right which was essential for 
communication between lawyers and their clients. 
 
7.11.4   In English law 
 
Finally, the position in England is being considered.  In England, legal 
professional privilege enjoys such protection that it is absolute.  In R v 
Derby Magistrate‘s Court,1356 the Court referred to an earlier decision  
in R v Ataou,1357 in which a principle was stated that a judge is required 
to approach an application for production of documents protected by 
                                                 
1355  Commissioner of Inland Revenue v West-Walker  (1954) NZLR 191 at 211. 
1356  R  v Derby Magistrates‘ Court, ex parte B and another appeal [1995] 4 QB All ER 526. 
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legal documents in two stages.  First, the judge must ask whether the 
client continues to have any recognisable interest in asserting the 
privilege and, secondly, whether, if so, his or her interest outweighs the 
public interest.  In considering this principle, the Court in R v Derby 
Magistrates‘ Court  declared that principle as being in conflict with the 
long established rule that a document protected by privilege continues to 
be protected so long as the privilege is not waived by the client.  The 
Court interpreted this rule to mean that ―once privileged, always 
privileged‖.1358  Further, the principle that was established in R v 
Ataou1359 was found fault with by the Court in R v Derby Magistrates‘ 
Court as it went against the view that the privilege is the same whether 
documents are sought for civil or criminal proceedings, and whether by 
the prosecution or defence, and that the refusal of the client to waive his 
or her privilege, for whatever reason, or even for no reason, cannot be 
questioned or investigated by a court.1360 
 
Unlike the way in which the Constitutional Court of South Africa has 
treated legal professional privilege, the holding of privilege as being 
sacrosanct in England has been consistent.  This becomes evident in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1357  R v Ataou  [1988] 2 QB  All ER 321. 
1358  R v Derby Magistrate‘s Court, ex parte B and another appeal [1995] 4 All ER 526 HL  
       at 537F-G. 
1359  R v Ataou  [1988] 2 All ER 321. 
1360  R v Derby Magistrate‘s Court, ex parte B and another appeal  [1995] 4 All ER 526 HL at 537G. 
483 
 
consideration of an earlier case, Southwark v Quick,1361 where Cockburn 
CJ compared the benefits and the damage that would result if the 
protection given to attorney-client communications could be removed.  
The Chief Justice found that ―though it might occasionally happen that 
the removal of the privilege would assist in the elucidation of matters in 
dispute, I do not think that this occasional benefit justifies us in incurring 
the attendant risk‖.1362 
 
Even Parliament of England had, in the opinion of the Court in R v Derby v 
Magistrates‘ Court, left legal professional privilege untouched, while it 
had made inroads in other areas.1363  
 
With regard to the balancing up of public interests with the interests of 
the client, the Court further demonstrated the absolute nature of 
privilege by holding that the drawback to allowing the balancing of 
interests is that once any exception to the absoluteness of privilege is 
allowed, the client‘s confidence is necessarily lost.  The lawyer, instead of 
being able to tell his or her client that anything which the client might say 
would never in any circumstances be revealed without his or her consent, 
the lawyer would have to qualify his or her assurance.1364 
 
                                                 
1361  Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co v Quick  (1878) 3 QB 315. 
1362  Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co v Quick  (1878) 3 QB 315 at 317 – 318. 
1363  R v Derby Magistrate‘s Court, ex parte B and another appeal  [1995] 4 All ER 526 at par.541E. 
1364  R v Derby Magistrate‘s Court, ex parte B and another appeal  [1995] 4 All ER 526 at 541G. 
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Finally driving home the absolute nature of legal professional privilege, 
the Court of England held in R v Derby Magistrate‘s Court: 
 
      It is not for the sake of the appellant alone that the privilege must be upheld. It is in the  
        wider interests of all those hereafter who might otherwise be deterred from telling the whole  
        truth to their solicitors.  For this reason I am of the opinion that no exception should be  
        allowed to the absolute nature of legal professional privilege, once established.  It follows  
        that R v Barton [1972] 2 All ER 1192, [1973] 1 WLR 115 and R v Ataou  [1988] 2 All ER 321,  
        [1988] QB 798 were wrongly decided, and ought to be overruled.1365 
 
Pazes1366 favours a broader balancing of interests where a court has to 
decide whether public interests should yield to legal professional 
privilege.  In favouring broader balancing of interests, he is, however, not 
unmindful of Botha JA‘s caveat1367 that any claim to a relaxation of the 
principles underlying the privilege must be approached with the greatest 
circumspection.1368  Paizes draws a comparison between Canadian and 
South African courts, and finds that Canadian courts will stretch privilege 
as long as some evidentiary connection remains apparent, while South 
African courts do not seem, in his view, to apply privilege outside legal 
proceedings. In thus drawing the comparison, he is of the view that the 
South African approach is to be preferred in that it ―restricts the privilege 
to its intended historical proportions and allows the courts the freedom 
                                                 
1365  R v Derby Magistrate‘s Court, ex parte B and another appeal  [1995] 4 All ER 526 at 542D. 
1366  Paizes A  ―Towards a broader balancing of interests:  Exploring the theoretical foundations of  
       the legal professional privilege‖  1989 109 SALJ  142-143. 
1367  In S v Sefatsa and Others  1988 (1) SA 868. 
1368  S v Sefatsa and Others (1988) 1 SA 868 at 886G. 
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and flexibility to give effect to the spirit of the privilege rather than its 
form‖.1369 
 
It is submitted that while Paizes‘ view may be correct, it is rendered 
incorrect by the fact that the Constitutional Court of South Africa allows 
itself to depart from legally sound precedent when the matter before it is 
political in nature.  For this reason, it is submitted that the position in 
Canada, Australia, and especially the position in England, is to be 
preferred since, due to the absolute protection given to legal professional 
privilege, any change of opinion by a court when the matter before it is 
political in nature becomes impossible. 
 
The discussion in this Chapter demonstrates that the doctrine of stare 
decisis has not been a constant feature in the adjudication of 
constitutional rights in the South African jurisprudence.  In making this 
point, one does not lose sight of the fact that courts are not bound by 
foreign law, but may consider it and be persuaded thereby.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1369  Paizes A ―Towards a broader balancing of interests: Exploring the theoretical foundations of  
       the legal professional privilege‖ 1989 SALJ at 143. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
How consistency should affect the right to one‘s culture 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
The Constitutional Assembly saw fit to include, in the Bill of Rights, the 
right to practise one‘s culture.  With this right, the Constitutional 
Assembly entwined the right to practise one‘s religion and to speak one‘s 
language of choice.1370 
 
A comparison of the Constitutions of the jurisdictions which the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa usually relies upon for insight, 
reveals that these jurisdictions do not have the right to practice one‘s 
culture in their Bill of Rights.  These are the Constitutions of the United 
States and its Amendments, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.1371 
 
One may be inclined to think that the silence of these Constitutions on 
the right to practice one‘s culture is due to the population of these 
countries being largely of the Western civilisation.  That is indeed so.  
However, this justification falls away when one realises that even the 
                                                 
1370  Section 31 of the Constitution. 
1371  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982. 
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Constitutions of South Africa‘s neighbouring states, Lesotho and 
Botswana, whose population is not of Western civilisation, do not contain 
the right to culture.  They do, however, contain the right to practise one‘s 
religion,1372 a right closely associated with the right to practise one‘s 
culture in the Constitution of South Africa. 
 
It becomes clear, therefore, that something is amiss with the inclusion of 
the right to culture in the Constitution of South Africa.  This naturally 
leads to the conclusion that if courts have been inconsistent in their 
interpretation of the right to practise one‘s culture, their problematic 
interpretations are merely the corollary of mixing two conflicting 
civilisations in the text of the Constitution.   
 
8.2  The nature of customary law 
 
The Constitution provides no definition of any concept contained in its 
text, save for the definition of the organ of state provided in section of 
239.  Thus, customary law and culture are not defined by the 
Constitution.  Customary law is, however, generally understood to be oral 
traditions, because the outstanding characteristic of customary law is that 
                                                 
1372  Section 13(1) of the Constitution of Lesotho, and section 11(1) of the Constitution of  
        Botswana. 
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in its original form, it is unwritten, but understood and believed by the 
society of people practicing it.1373 
 
Since customary law is a system of a deeply entrenched way of life, and is 
unwritten, it cannot be amended, or repealed, as is the case with 
statutory law.  Neither can it be developed by courts, as is the case with 
common law.  Customary law evolves on its own from generation to 
generation.  If courts attempt to develop it, the imposed development 
becomes an exercise in futility, since traditional communities simply 
continue to live their life in the traditional way.1374  Thus, court 
judgments aimed at altering the position in a customary way of life 
become abstract, as they fail to alter the thinking in the minds of the 
staunch traditional communities.  Interestingly, Pienaar1375 reasons 
similarly.  He writes that women who were interviewed and were married 
under civil law testified that even though they were married under civil 
law, and even though they had formal equal status since 1993, customary 
law continued to rule their lives.  Pienaar concludes from this that law in 
                                                 
1373  Bennett T W  Customary Law in South Africa  (2004) at 84. 
1374  Lehnert W holds the same view in his article:  ―The role of the courts in the conflict between  
       African customary law and human rights‖ 2005 SAJHR  at 251.  He writes that:  ―One has  
       to bear in mind that the courts do not create customary law in the same way as they do  
       common law.  Instead, customary law consists of unwritten rules created by a community  
       which regards them as binding.  The changing views of the community consequently  
       influence the content of the living customary law so that rules can adapt in response to  
       changing social and economic circumstances.  Thus, customary law is in a constant process  
       of development‖. 
1375  Pienaar J M ―African customary wives in South Africa:  Is there spousal equality after the  
       commencement of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act?‖ 2003 Stell LR  256. 
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itself is unable to transform power relations on a private level.  Law has a 
very limited effect on the prevailing mindsets of people.  In his view, this 
shows that formal, legalistic equality can only be effective if it is backed 
up by social and economic developments.1376 
 
8.3  The conflict between the Bill of Rights and customary law 
 
In view of the nature of customary law set out above, the development of 
customary law by courts adulterates customary law.  The regulation of 
customary law by legislation imposes Western civilisation to highly 
esteemed customs and traditions.  The application of the Bill of Rights by 
courts on customary law amounts to imposing a foreign way of life on a 
society of people who are content with their customs and traditions. 
 
Traditional communities who find delight in, and are proud of, their way 
of life, do not view certain seeming restrictions as slavery.  They find 
delight in conscientiously observing the tenets of their culture.  To be 
sure, some urbanised individuals whose lives are now torn between the 
rural customary life and the urban civilised way of life may find some 
aspects of their culture burdensome, or bordering on slavery, because of 
the influence of urban life.  Such individuals are an exception.  They are 
                                                 
1376  Pienaar J M ―African customary wives in South Africa:  Is there spousal equality after the  
       commencement of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act?‖ 2003 Stell LR at 270. 
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the few individuals who will approach courts whenever they find some 
aspects of their culture to be undesirable, and obsolete. 
 
The conflict between the Bill of Rights and customary law is confirmed by 
Bennett.1377  He  takes the view that once the application of customary 
law is regarded as a constitutional right, and not a precarious freedom, it 
is thrown into competition with the other fundamental rights in Chapter 2 
of the Constitution.1378  According to Bennett, the result will be a series 
of conflicts, especially between the right to equal treatment and the many 
rules of customary law which subordinate the interests of women and 
children to senior males.1379 
 
Lehnert1380 also sees the simultaneous recognition of African customary 
law and human rights in the Constitution of South Africa as resulting in a 
complex conflict between two different value systems.  Proponents of 
customary law, according to Lehnert, describe the Constitution, and 
particularly the Bill of Rights, as a largely Western document which is 
foreign to Africans, and threatening the continued existence of customary 
law. 
                                                 
1377  Bennett T W  Human Rights and African Customary Law Under the South African Constitution   
       (1995) at 28. 
1378  At the time of his writing, Bennett was referring to Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution,  
       since the final Constitution was not yet finalised.  Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution has  
       since become Chapter 2 of the final Constitution.  Chapter 2 contains the Bill of Rights. 
1379  at 28. 
1380  Lehnert W ―The role of the courts in the conflict between African customary law and human  
        rights‖ 2005 SAJHR 241. 
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This raises the question whether the Bill of Rights was meant to apply 
horizontally, that is, between citizens, or vertically, that is, between the 
state and its citizens.1381  It is submitted that the application of the Bill of 
Rights was meant to be enforced by courts vertically, that is, between the 
state and its citizens.  If the Bill of Rights was meant to be enforced 
horizontally, it is submitted that its enforcement was meant  
to be more vigorous between the state and its citizens, and less vigorous 
between citizens.  The correctness of this view is confirmed by the 
wording of section 7(2) of the Constitution.  The section provides that the 
state must respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.  Thus, great store is set on the state.  Further clarity is provided 
by section 8(1), which provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law, 
and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and all organs of 
state.  It must be noted that, again, the private citizen is left out.  The 
view that if the Bill of Rights is enforceable between private citizens, it is 
enforceable less vigorously, is supported by the wording of section 8(2) 
which provides that: 
 
      A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural person or a juristic person if, and to the  
                                                 
1381  Currie I and de Waal J the Bill of Rights Handbook  (2005) 5th ed at 43 write that, traditionally,   
       the Bill of Rights confines itself to regulating the ‗vertical‘ relationship between the individual  
       and the state, since this is not a relationship of equality.  However, the Bill of Rights  
       recognises that private abuse of human rights may be as pernicious as violations perpetrated  
       by the state.  See also Devenish G E A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights  (1999)  
       at 24. 
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       extent  that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right  and the nature of any  
       duty imposed by the right.1382   
 
The wording of the section makes it abundantly clear that when the Bill of 
Rights becomes enforceable between natural persons, that is, private 
citizens, its enforcement is qualified; it becomes dependent on whether it 
is applicable or not, and on the extent of its applicability.  Its 
enforcement will also have to take into account the nature of the right, 
and the nature of the duty imposed by the right. 
 
That this view is correct is confirmed by Bennett,1383 who holds that 
―human rights were originally devised to protect the citizen from arbitrary 
and oppressive treatment by the state; they were not conceived to be a 
ground of action by citizens inter se.‖1384  Accordingly, Bennett holds that 
whether constitutional rights override customary law or, conversely, 
whether customary law may limit constitutional rights, depends on a 
positive answer being given to an antecedent question whether the 
Constitution regulates private relationships.1385 
 
                                                 
1382  Emphasis added. 
1383  Bennett T W Human Rights and African Customary Law Under the South African Constitution  
       (1995) at 29. 
1384  Bennett T W Human Rights and African Customary Law Under the South African Constitution  
       (1995)   at 29. 
1385  Bennett T W Human Rights and African Customary Law Under the South African Constitution  
       (1995)  at 29. 
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The United States Supreme Court has leaned towards the approach of 
confining the Bill of Rights of the United States to the relationship they 
were intended to protect, that is, the relationship between the state and 
citizens.  In the nineteenth century Civil Rights Cases,1386 the Supreme 
Court had to adjudicate upon the validity of an enactment which sought 
to compel innkeepers, owners of public transport, and placement of 
amusement, not to discriminate against members of the public.  The 
Court struck down the enactment because it held the view that the 
invasion of the rights of a private citizen by another private citizen is not 
a matter covered by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Bill 
of Rights.1387   
 
Also, relatively recently, in DeShaney v Winnebago,1388 the Supreme Court 
of Canada reiterated its nineteenth century position that the objective of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Bill of Rights was to 
protect citizens against the abuse by the state, and not to ensure that 
private citizens are protected against one another. 
 
Indeed, the South African Constitutional Court itself has, in its early years 
of existence, inclined itself towards the view that Chapter 21389 of the 
                                                 
1386  Civil Rights Cases 109 US 3 (1883). 
1387  Civil Rights Cases 109 US 3 (1883) at 11.  See also Bennett T W Human Rights and African  
       Customary Law (1995) at 31, footnote 19. 
1388  DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services 489 US 189 (1989). 
1389  Chapter 2 was Chapter 3 in the interim Constitution.  
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Constitution, containing the Bill of Rights, was intended to apply 
vertically.  In Du Plessis v De Klerk,1390 the Constitutional Court held that 
constitutional rights under Chapter 2 may be invoked against an organ of 
government, but not by one private litigant against another.1391  This 
holding, it is submitted, was correct, especially in view of the right to 
equality between husband and wife, as will be analysed briefly below. 
 
Against this background, attention is now given to section 9 of the South 
African Constitution.  The section provides that: 
 
      Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
 
This provision was relied upon in Mthembu v Letsela 1392 in challenging 
the customary law principle of primogeniture.  The principle of 
primogeniture favours a senior male descendant in the matter of 
inheriting after the death of the family head.  Female descendants may 
not inherit.  What further disqualified the applicant in casu, was that not 
only was she female, but she was an illegitimate female.  In terms of 
customary law, an illegitimate child does not belong to the family of his 
or her father, but to the mother‘s family.   
 
                                                 
1390  Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another  1996 (3) SA 850 (CC).  
1391  Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) at 879A.  See also  
       Kerr A  J ―The Bill of Rights in the new Constitution and customary law‖ 1997 SALJ  346.  
1392  Mthembu v Letsela and Another  1997 (2) SA 936 (T). 
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The constitutional challenge of the principle was brought before the 
Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court, as it then was.  It was 
argued that the principle of primogeniture violates the right to equality, 
as protected by the Bill of Rights.  The Court found,1393 as already pointed  
out, that the applicant was an illegitimate female, while customary law 
attaches great value to the institution of marriage, and the birth of 
children within the marriage arrangement.  Further, the Court found that 
in challenging the principle, the applicant had lost sight of one beneficial 
aspect of the principle of primogeniture, namely, that while the principle 
favoured male descendants in the matter of inheriting, the seeming 
favour came with responsibility.  The male descendant had the 
concomitant responsibility of providing for the family of the deceased 
from the inheritance.  The Court held that, viewed in this light, the 
principle of primogeniture did not constitute an unfair discrimination 
against female descendants, and did not violate the right to equality.  The 
result of the seeming discrimination was that the overlooked females 
were lovingly provided for by the male descendant.1394 
 
On appeal, the reasoning of the court a quo was sustained.1395  In fact, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal showed profound respect for the customary 
way of life by holding that to strike down the principle of primogeniture 
                                                 
1393  Mthembu v Letsela and Another  1997 (2) SA 936 (T) at 945. 
1394  Mthembu v Letsela and Another  1997 (2) SA 936 (T) at at 945H-946C. 
1395  Mthembu v Letsela and Another  2000 (3) SA 867 SCA 876. 
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would be to summarily dismiss an African institution without examining 
its essential purpose and content.1396 
 
It is submitted that the reasoning of the High Court and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal was correct.  However, some twelve years later, in 
Gumede v President,1397 the Constitutional Court was approached to 
decide on the constitutionality of statutory provisions governing 
matrimonial property regime of customary marriages in KwaZulu-
Natal.1398  Section 20 of the KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 
provided that the family head was the owner of and had control over all 
family property in the family home. 
 
In granting relief to the applicant, the Constitutional Court declared 
unconstitutional and invalid the impugned section 20, on the basis that it 
made the family head the owner, and granted him control, of all family 
property in the property home, The Court also declared unconstitutional 
and invalid section 22, on the basis that it placed family members under 
the headship of the family head, and required family members to be 
obedient to him.  By thus holding, the Constitutional Court abolished the 
deep-rooted aspect of customary law, namely, the headship of a man 
                                                 
1396  Mthembu v Letsela and Another  2000 (3) SA 885 (SCA) at 885A. 
1397  Gumede v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2009 (3) SA 152 (CC). 
1398  Section 20 of the KwaZulu Act on Code of Zulu Law 16 of 1985, and sections 20 and 22 of  
       the Natal Code of Zulu Law Proc R151 of 1987. 
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over his family.  Indeed, in a related case, Bhe,1399 while dealing with the 
principle of primogeniture as the subject matter of the case, the 
Constitutional Court pronounced itself on the case of Mthembu v 
Letsela,1400 that served before the Supreme Court of Appeal some twelve 
years back.  The Constitutional Court, per Langa DCJ, as he then was, 
held: 
 
     I have held that section 23 is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.  As a result, reg  
       2 (e) falls away.  I have also found that the customary-law rule of primogeniture, in its  
       application to intestate succession, is not consistent with the equality protection under the  
       Constitution.  It follows therefore that any finding in Mthembu which is at odds with this  
       judgment cannot stand‖.1401 
 
The abolishing of headship in the customary law family arrangement was 
not in harmony with the reality in the practice of customary law.  
Headship is the cornerstone of the family institution.  This is the position, 
not only in customary law, but in all civilisations.  A family is a unit, and 
like any other unit, someone must be responsible for taking the lead, 
providing guidance, and making decisions after necessary of 
consultation, in order for the family unit to function in a smooth and 
organised manner.  Wives are inclined to need and appreciate having a 
                                                 
1399  Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others  2005 (1) SA 580 (CC). 
1400  Mthembu v Letsela and Another  2000 (3) SA 885 (SCA). 
1401  Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others  2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 624 [emphasis  
       added]. 
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family head.  It is only when headship is abused and is arbitrary that 
wives chafe under the authority of their husbands.1402   
 
The provision of section 9 of the Constitution cannot be used to abolish 
headship in the family arrangement.  The section provides expressly that 
everyone is equal before the law.  The equality envisaged by the text of 
the Constitution is equality of private citizens in the eyes of the law.  The 
Constitution does not say that husband and wife are equal in the eyes of 
each other, but in the eyes of the law.  It is submitted that the 
Constitution does not attempt to interfere in, and regulate, private 
relationships.1403  This view is consistent with the interpretation of the 
Constitutional Court in Du Plessis v De Klerk,1404 that the Bill of Rights 
may be invoked against an organ of state, and not by a private litigant 
against another.   
 
                                                 
1402  Bojosi K N ―Botswana abolishes marital power:  A commentary on some interesting aspects of  
       the Abolition of Marital Power Act‖ 2006 SALJ  13.  In this article, the writer discusses  
       section 8 of the Botswana Abolition of Marital Power Act, which bestows on a spouse the right  
       to perform any juristic act without the consent of the other.  The writer‘s view is that section  
       8 only applies in those instances where a marriage is showing signs of strain, because where  
       there is peace and tranquility in a marriage, it is unlikely that a party would perform juristic  
       acts without obtaining the consent of the other.  This view is correct. 
1403  In her article, ―Botswana abolishes marital power: A commentary on some interesting aspects  
       of the Abolition of Marital Power Act‖ 2006 SALJ  13, Bojosi K N points out that the  
       abolition of marital power and its consequences is perceived by many as an unwarranted  
       intrusion into matters which are essentially private in nature, and are therefore best left to  
       self-regulation by the parties to a marriage. 
1404  Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another  1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). 
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Cronjé and Heaton1405 share the above view, that headship is not 
something that can be abolished by a court by its interpretation of the 
right to equality.  They state that in terms of our common law, the 
husband is the head of the family.  They refer to the attempt that was 
made by the legislature in 1984 when the rule that the husband is the 
head of the family was expressly incorporated into section 13 of the 
Matrimonial Property Act.1406  In 1993, the legislature attempted to 
remove the husband‘s headship from our law by deleting the reference to 
it from section 13 of the Matrimonial Property Act.  The two authors then 
point out that since the true source of the rule is the common law, and 
not section 13 of the Matrimonial Property Act, the deletion did not 
achieve what the legislature intended.  The two authors conclude that as 
a result of this, the husband‘s headship still forms part of our law.1407  
Van Heerden et al1408 share the same view.  In addition, Hahlo1409 writes 
that the powers of the husband as head of the family cannot be excluded 
by contract.  He adds that an agreement that he is not to be the head of 
the family, or that the wife is to be the head, would be ineffective as 
being against public policy.1410 
 
                                                 
1405  Cronje DSP and Heaton J South African Family Law  (2004) 2nd ed 67-68. 
1406  Act 88 of 1984. 
1407  Cronje DSP and Heaton J South African Family Law  (2004) 2nd ed at 67, 68. 
1408  Van Heerden B et al Boberg‘s Law of Persons and the Family (1999)  2nd ed at 172. 
1409  Hahlo H R The South African Law of Husband and Wife  (1985) 5th ed. 
1410  Ibid at 13. 
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There are aspects of customary law, and indeed of common law as 
well,1411 which indicate the inherent nature of the husband‘s headship in 
the marriage institution.  One such aspect is the traditional assumption of 
the husband‘s surname by women upon marriage.  This is the norm 
rather than an exception.  Were a husband to assume the wife‘s surname 
upon marriage, that would be viewed as an exception, indeed as against 
public policy.1412  This aspect of marriage alone underscores the position 
of a husband as head of the family.   
 
It is true that statutory law does not make it peremptory that a wife 
should assume the husband‘s surname when they get married.  The 
Births and Deaths Registration Act1413  leaves the matter to her personal 
decision.  But the Act suggests it as a matter of course that she will 
assume her husband‘s surname.  What is noteworthy is that the Act does 
not suggest the reverse, thus entrenching the headship of the husband.  
 
It is for this reason that, when in Namibia a husband approached the 
Supreme Court in order to be allowed to assume the surname of his wife, 
he was viewed as acting in a manner contrary to tradition.  In Müller v 
                                                 
1411  In Roman-Dutch common law, the husband was the head of the family.  See Hahlo H R The  
       South African Law of Husband and Wife 5th ed (1985) 13. 
1412  McConnachie C ―‘With such changes as may be required by the context‘:  The legal  
       consequences of marriage through the lens of section 13 of the Civil Union Act‖ 2010 SALJ  
       424, 426; Müller v President of the Republic of Namibia and Another 2000 (6) BCLR 655  
       (Nms). 
1413  Section 26(1) of Act 51 of 1992. 
501 
 
President of the Republic of Namibia,1414 a husband of German nationality 
challenged the Aliens Act1415 on the basis that it discriminated against 
men, and was violating the right to equality.  The Act, originating from 
South Africa, allowed a married woman to assume her husband‘s name, 
and to assume, after the dissolution of the marriage, any surname she 
may have previously had.  The Act did not allow this for the husband.  
The applicant, in casu, averred that in his country of birth, Germany, 
husbands may adopt the their wives‘ surname, if they so wish.1416 
 
In settling the challenge to the Act, the Supreme Court of Namibia held 
that the challenge must be seen against the background that the Aliens 
Act gave effect to a tradition of long standing, namely, that the wife 
normally assumes the surname of the husband.  Further, evidence 
remained uncontested that not one husband was known in Namibia who 
assumed, or wanted to assume, the surname of his wife.  More important, 
however, was the Court‘s holding that the seeming discriminating effect 
of the Act served a legitimate governmental purpose, that of establishing 
certainty as to the surname by which married couples are called.1417 
 
                                                 
1414  Müller v President of the Republic of Namibia and Another 2000 (6) BCLR 655 (Nms). 
1415  Act 1 of 1937. 
1416  Bonthuys E ―‘Deny thy father and refuse thy name‘:  Namibian equality jurisprudence and  
        married women‘s surnames‖ 2000 SALJ 464. 
1417  Müller v President of the Republic of Namibia and Another  2000 (6) BCLR 655 (Nms) at  
       668D-G. 
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Establishing the headship of a husband in a family is sections 9(2) and 
10(1)(a) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act.  Section 9(2) stipulates 
that the birth of a child born in wedlock is to be registered under the 
father‘s surname.  The only exception is where, in terms of section 
10(1)(a), the child is illegitimate, in which case the child‘s birth is to be 
registered under the mother‘s surname.   
 
The second aspect of marriage which points to the inherent nature of the 
husband‘s headship, particularly in the African customary way of life, is 
the payment of lobola.  It invariably is paid by the man, for the 
woman.1418 
 
Lobola has been defined as a transfer of property, preferably livestock, by 
a husband to his wife‘s family as part of the process of constituting a 
marriage.1419  Goldin and Gelfand,1420 however, mention a situation where 
marriage may take place without lobola being paid.  It is where a man 
takes as a wife the widow or widows of a deceased relative.  
 
The futility of court judgments imposed as law to communities living in 
terms of customary law is further illustrated in the situation of polygamy.  
There are more than one wife to one husband.  For the arrangement to 
                                                 
1418  Bennett T W Customary Law in South Africa (2004) at 220. 
1419  Ibid. 
1420  Goldin B and Gelfand M African Law and Custom in Rhodesia  (1975) at 130; See also     
       Khumalo J A M The Civil Practice of All Courts for Blacks in Southern Africa  (1969) 3rd ed 20. 
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work, there must be a head, exercising headship.  If a court judgment 
were to declare that all the wives are equal to the husband, and the 
headship, and the marital power of the husband are taken away, 
complying with such a judgment would be impractical. 
 
 It would appear, though, that the Constitutional Assembly and the 
Constitution drafters were uncertain as to the position to take regarding 
customary law.  This becomes manifest in the text of the Constitution 
which is inconsistent in the development and regulation of customary 
law.  For example, section 30 guarantees citizens the right to practise the 
cultural life of their choice, but this right is governed by the Bill of Rights.  
Section 31 further guarantees the right to live one‘s life according to 
one‘s culture, but with the proviso that the Bill of Rights is recognised as 
the regulating force.  Once customary law is made subject to the Bill of 
Rights, the freedom to practise one‘s culture is restricted, and is 
westernised. 
 
A comparison of sections 8(3) and 39(2) with section 173 creates 
uncertainty.  Section 8(3) excludes customary law as a law that may be 
developed by courts, but includes common law.  Section 39(2) includes 
both customary law and common law as laws that may be developed by 
courts.  Section 173 excludes customary law, but includes common law 
instead.  Based on this uncertainty caused by the Constitutional Assembly 
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and the drafters, there is an academic view that ―the drafters of the 
Constitution did not intend to give customary law special protection‖.1421  
An opposite view1422 is that customary law, or at least much of it, is 
exempt from the application of the Bill of Rights.  According to this view, 
neither the central legislature nor the provincial legislatures, nor the 
courts, should attempt to alter any one small area of customary law of 
succession or of marriage.1423 
 
This Chapter has endeavoured to show the desirability of consistency in 
the adjudication of constitutional rights which, initially, leaned towards 
vertical application, but in later years towards an enforced horizontal 
application.  However, a contributing factor in the lack of consistency has 
been the inclusion of customary law in some constitutional provisions 
and its exclusion in others as a law which may be developed by higher 
courts. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1421  Lehnert W ―The role of the courts in the conflict between African customary law and human  
        rights‖ 2005 241 SAJHR 245. 
1422  Kerr A J ―The Bill of Rights in the new Constitution and customary law‖ 1997 SALJ  354. 
1423  Kerr A J ―The Bill of Rights in the new Constitution and customary law‖ 1997 SALJ  at 354. 
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CHAPTER  9 
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
 
The foregoing has established the need for courts to always have, at least 
at the back of the mind, the guiding principle of judicial precedent in 
construing provisions of the Constitution.  A careful examination of all 
sources of law available for examination in the international sphere of 
legal practice points to the direction to be followed in constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
Undoubtedly, setting an example in the matter of consistency in 
constitutional interpretation takes a balanced combination of insight in 
the application of domestic and international laws, practicality of the 
judgment, and being conscious of possible future developments. 
 
Some judgments1424 which involved constitutional interpretation were 
prepared and delivered in a climate different from the obviously 
unforeseen climate prevailing in the country today.  The question arises 
whether the interpretation arrived at in those judgments has passed the 
test of time with regard to their practicality.  With the Bench of the 
                                                 
1424  Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); Case v Minister of Safety  
       and Security and Others 1996 (3) (CC) 617; Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another  
       1999 (3) SA 850 (CC). 
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Constitutional Court being constituted differently by a new generation of 
judges, one wonders whether the interpretation and views held by the 
previous generation will remain sacrosanct. 
 
The interpretation of the right to life has been just a small-scale 
demonstration of the need for consistency in the interpretation of other 
constitutional rights, and other constitutional provisions which are not in 
the Bill of Rights.   It is perhaps the right to life, however, that is the 
loudest among the rights which cry out for the observing of the principle 
of stare decisis, since the enjoyment of other rights is entirely dependent 
on life. 
 
It is also this right that should not be subject to the limitation clause.  
The constitutional guideline that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be 
limited only in terms of a law of general application cannot justifiably be 
applied in limiting the right to life.  This is because in the process of 
limiting the right to life, other rights are automatically brought to a 
sudden end.   It is perhaps in this area also that we may, in the future, 
see the overruling of some of the judgments of the Constitutional Court 
that were profoundly respected previously, being overruled by the same 
Court. 
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In the light of the presented arguments, based on what research has 
yielded, it is recommended that courts which have the jurisdiction of 
interpreting the Constitution, do so with due regard for their own 
precedent, and the precedent set by the Court that serves as the final 
arbiter in constitutional interpretation. It is recommended further, that in 
setting judicial precedent, courts should have the future in mind, by 
handing down judgments that are not only practical for the present 
generation in the currently prevailing climate, but will continue to be so 
for posterity.  
 
It has been shown in Chapter 2,1425 through the admission of some 
judges, that it is not easy to pretend in their judgments that they are 
apathetic to controversial issues in their country, and that they may be 
tempted to allow personal views or beliefs to influence their judgments.  
For example, in S v Zuma and Others,1426 Kentridge AJ admitted that it is 
not ―easy to avoid the influence of one‘s personal intellectual and moral 
preconceptions‖.   In S v Makwanyane,1427 Kriegler J admitted that in 
constitutional matters, ―extra-legal considerations may loom large‖.  In 
President of the RSA v SA Rugby Union,1428  the Constitutional Court, all 
the judges endorsing the judgment, admitted that ―absolute neutrality on 
the part of a judicial officer can hardly if ever be achieved‖.    This is 
                                                 
1425  Pages 82-86. 
1426  S v Zuma and Others  1995 (2) SA (CC) at par. 17.   
1427  S v Makwanyane and Another  1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 476B. 
1428  President of the RSA v SA Rugby Union  1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) at par. 42. 
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made difficult by the fact that they are part of the community in which 
they live.  
 
It is nevertheless recommended that in adjudicating on controversial 
matters, judges should resolve to be guided by the law.  In being guided 
by the law, they should strive to resist the temptation to allow extra-legal 
considerations to interfere with interpretation.  Keeping these points in 
mind will contribute largely toward consistency in constitutional 
interpretation. 
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